Memorandum submitted by Professor Richard
Black[33]
Director, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation
and Poverty and Co-Director, Sussex Centre for Migration Research
MAKING MIGRATION MORE "DEVELOPMENT-FRIENDLY":
TEMPORARY MOBILITY SCHEMES
BACKGROUND
The principle of expanding temporary worker
schemes is problematic for many on both the left and right of
the political spectrum. For those who oppose immigration, temporary
worker schemes represent a way in which permanent immigration
is opened up "through the back door", since those who
arrive temporarily often find ways to stay longer. In contrast,
for those who support more open immigration, and believe that
immigrants have much to contribute to the UK economy, temporary
worker schemes may appear too restrictivesince they may
rely on coercion to ensure return and therefore be completely
temporary. At the same time, by effectively shifting some of the
costs of social reproductionsuch as education, training,
and social careon to countries of origin, they could be
seen as exploitative of these countries welfare systems, and/or
unfair competition to domestic UK labour.
However, the point remains that there is both
demand for workers in the UKin both skilled and unskilled
occupationsand considerable demand for employment in developing
countriesagain amongst both the skilled and unskilled.
Innovative ways urgently need to be found to bring together these
two demands, but importantly for this to be done on a basis of
more equality in terms of the interests and objectives of the
UK and sending countries.
This note responds to a request from International
Development Committee members during oral evidence on 6 January
2004, to expand on how existing UK schemes for legal immigration
could be "made more coherent and particularly more consistent
with our development objectives." Since making this comment,
I have been made aware of an unpublished paper by Catherine Barber
of Oxfam, which has been supplied to the Committee.[34]
This note responds in part to the proposals outlined in this thoughtful
and original paper, but adopts a broader and less proscriptive
approach to options that might be considered. The thoughts set
out are preliminary and designed to provoke discussion and debate.
EXISTING TEMPORARY
WORKER SCHEMES
Since coming to office, the Labour government
has expanded some existing channels for temporary mobility to
the UK, as well as opening up new channels (Table 1). Temporary
worker schemes have been preferred over general relaxation of
immigration rules as they allow specific labour market demands
in the UK to be met in the short-term, without making a longer-term
commitments, and in a way that in principle reassures the UK electorate
that the government retains control over immigration. Both UK
employers, and those able to obtain temporary work permits, can
be seen to gain from such schemes.
These schemes include areas of both skilled
and unskilled work, and have been introduced primarily in response
to demand for workers in the UK. For example, critical shortages
have been faced in recent years not only in sectors such as health
(doctors, nurses) and education (teachers) but also for farm workers,
and in the hotel, catering and fish farming sectors, to name just
a few. Labour shortages have also been highlighted in the food
processing and canning industries.[35]
However, for this reason, the rules introduced reflect UK labour
market and political concerns, and have not, on the whole, been
designed around sectors where other countries have workers who
wish to migrate. In this sense, they have they not been designed
to fit with the development priorities of sending countries, even
though this could have been a consideration in their design. In
addition, significant barriers exist that prevent many poor people
accessing these schemes, notably in the form of fees charged either
for visas or by unscrupulous agents who control access to the
recruitment process.
Table 1
EXISTING TEMPORARY WORKER SCHEMES IN THE
UK, 2004
|
Scheme | Total number admitted (2002-03)
| Development of scheme | Main areas of origin in developing world
|
|
General work permit scheme | 137,488[36]
| Numbers have doubled since 1997 | India (10,000), South Africa (9,000), Philippines (7,000), Afghanistan (5,000)
|
Working holidaymakers | 40,000[37]
| Extension to whole Commonwealth and removal of employment restrictions
| No information available, but thought to be predominantly "old" commonwealth
|
Seasonal agricultural workers scheme (SAWS)
| 22,800 | Existing scheme doubled in size since 2000
| Ex-USSR (especially Ukraine), Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania Romania, Slovakia
|
Sectors Based Scheme (SBS) | 13,000[38]
| New programme launched in 2003 | Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic
|
Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) |
4,384[39]
| New programme launched in 2002 | No information available, but thought to be dominated by northern countries
|
Domestic workers | 14,000[40]
| On-going scheme | Worldwide?
|
Au pairs[41]
| 60,000[42]
| Expansion of existing scheme to non-EU countries
| Most from EU, but scheme now available also in other designated countries, including Bosnia, Croatia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey
|
|
TEMPORARY WORKER
SCHEMES AND
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
There are four main ways in which the UK's temporary worker
schemes might impact on development, and specifically the UK's
commitment to pro-poor development.
First, it is clear that migration represents a potential
livelihood strategy for people in poor countries. In this context,
the creation of additional places on temporary worker schemes
may provide opportunities for a direct positive impact on development
and/or poverty reduction as workers earn more money, although
this will depend on how schemes are organised, and who has access
to them. If only the relatively wealthy have access, the schemes
may contribute to increasing inequality. Meanwhile, potential
development benefits will also depend on the extent to which migrants
are encouraged to use their earnings in a way that contributes
to development in their home country.
Second, international migration also often carries risks
and vulnerabilities for migrants. The conditions under which people
move may be harsh, working conditions for migrant workers are
often poor or indeed exploitative, and migrant workers often enter
into debt in order to migrate in the first place, leaving them
unable or unwilling to demand basic employment rights, and highly
vulnerable in the event of unemployment or sickness. These risks
are generally more pronounced in the context of irregular flows.
In this context, the expansion of legal temporary worker schemes
could contribute to reducing the risks and vulnerabilities faced
by migrant workers.
Third, migration has an impact not only on the UK labour
market, but also on the labour market of the home country. This
may be positive, by relieving unemployment, or promoting positive
social or technological change, but it may also displace labour
shortages from the UK to the sending country. For example, in
key public services of relevance to poor people, notably the health
and education sectors, as well as more widely in skilled occupations
where the training of replacement workers may be costly or time
consuming, filling labour shortages in the UK almost certainly
will create labour shortages in the sending country.
In addition, almost by definition, temporary worker schemes
recruit workers to the UK labour market only at a productive stage
of their working lives, often leaving the costs of childcare,
education, health, and care of the elderly to their country of
origin. Yet, since these workers pay tax and National Insurance
in the UK, rather than their country of origin, the cost of social
care is not necessarily covered, leaving these sectors in countries
of origin relatively impoverished.
CATHERINE BARBER'S
PROPOSALS TO
MAKE TEMPORARY
WORKER SCHEMES
MORE "DEVELOPMENT-FRIENDLY"
Catherine Barber's paper focuses primarily on the first two
sets of concerns listed above, namely the generation of income
by migrants, and the risks and vulnerabilities they face. Barber
outlines how additional schemes for unskilled workers similar
to the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) could be designed
to maximise the development potential of earnings by participating
workers (as well as the political acceptability of such schemes
to different stakeholders), whilst minimising the risks involved
for potential migrants. Specifically, she proposes:
A small number of new targeted bilateral recruitment
programmes administered by the International Organisation for
Migration (IOM), designed to eliminate exploitation in the recruitment
process, and provide a fair and transparent basis for recruitment.
It is suggested these might be concluded in particular with Central
and Eastern European countries that are not accession states to
the EU.
A mandatory savings scheme for workers coming
to the UK on such schemes, in which 20% of earnings over £107
per week, plus all National Insurance contributions (NIC), should
be placed in an account in the migrant's home country, to be made
available to the migrant only on their return to the home country.
Return assistance targeted at providing information
on investment opportunities, access to credit, and advice on management
and technical issues.
A model for new, organised, bilateral recruitment is a Spanish-Ecuadorian
scheme cited by Barber,[43]
which is seen as having cut out unscrupulous middlemen who put
migrants at risk, and building an efficient and transparent mechanism
for recruiting workers. In turn, voluntary assisted return programmes
are already operated in the UK by IOM[44],
though currently targeted at asylum-seekers and failed asylum-seekers,
and not providing the specific forms of assistance envisaged by
Barber. Meanwhile, mandatory savings schemes are also already
in operationfor example by companies recruiting foreign
workers in countries such as Taiwan[45].
Indeed, the principle of a mandatory savings scheme already exists
in the UK for some migrant workers from the Baltic states who
work on short (three months) contracts in the hotel industry.
However, in this case, the workers receive board and lodging whilst
in the UK on a contract negotiated with a company that provides
a group of workers, and all of the rest of their salary is paid
in local currency into the home bank account. This practice is
of concern to UK trades unions, as it is seen as breaching basic
human rights, whilst also representing a loophole to circumvent
minimum wage legislation.[46]
In addition, Barber considers, but rejects the notion that
temporary mobility schemes should involve an element of training
in the UK. In principle, such a combination of work and training
is already available in the UK through relaxation of rules on
part-time employment for those entering the UK on study visas,
and the expectation of language learning for schemes such as those
for temporary agricultural workers and au pairs. However, Barber
argues that to extend such training more generally to temporary
workers would be too expensive for UK employers or the UK government
to pay for it, particularly given the fact that such workers are
often already over-qualified for the jobs they are doing,
and would certainly be more expensive than funding training in
countries of origin.
WAYS FORWARD
Some concerns might be raised in relation to specific elements
of the package of measures proposed by Barber. For example, justification
for the compulsory element of any mandatory savings scheme would
need to be demonstrated in relation to the benefits to the wider
sending country society or economy, which would need to outweigh
the infringement of individual liberty. Many human rights groups
and trades unions might question whether such a justification
could ever be made. Indeed, there was international outcry at
a 1983 decree by President Marcos in the Philippines that required
Filipino workers to remit 50-70% of their earnings, and for all
remittances to be sent through formal banking channels,[47]
and this was subsequently repealed through successful Filipino
migrant protests and NGO advocacy campaigns.[48]
Meanwhile, the history of organised recruitment of labour is not
always one of transparency or fairness even where public bodies
or governments manage the process,[49]
with criticisms of their large bureaucratic burden, incentives
to corruption and lack of cost-effectiveness.[50]
Return schemes, including those that involve the provision of
technical assistance, have also often received less than glowing
evaluations.
Whilst not ruling out consideration of the above approaches,
I would suggest a more basic application of principles in the
development of new (or modification of existing) temporary mobility
schemes, that might enhance their development-friendliness:
1. Wider consultation with stakeholders
A wider degree of consultation on any proposed changes to
temporary mobility arrangements would be likely to enhance the
potential for these to have outcomes of benefit to developing
countries, and to the achievement of the UK government's development
targets. For example, it appears that the sector-based scheme
developed for the food processing industry, although it met a
labour market need in the UK, has not been particularly successful
in attracting large numbers of applicants. Consultation with overseas
stakeholders could help both to refine areas in which sector based
schemes are developed, and to publicise them once they are in
place.
Key stakeholders who should be consulted might include:
Stakeholders involved in preparation of PRSPs
or Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) in sending countries,
as part of a process of ensuring consistency between migration
and anti-poverty agendas;
Labour attachés or labour ministries of
key sending country governments;[51]
Major UK development agencies working in migrants'
countries of origin;
Significant community organisations that represent
the interests of overseas migrant workers.
Each of these stakeholders may have a perspective on the
areas or sectors in which schemes would be valuable, the terms
and conditions that might be applied, and the way that schemes
might operate.
2. Exploration of incentives for temporary workers
to invest in development or poverty reduction
Without accepting the principle of mandatory savings schemes,
a variety of incentives might be envisaged that would encourage
migrant workers to invest in businesses (or indeed in education
or health) during their stay and/or after their return. These
measures could be specifically linked to managed temporary mobility
schemes, providing an incentive also to migrants to wait for spaces
on these schemes (rather than travelling illegally), and comply
with the rules.[52] Such
incentives might include:
Access to dedicated training or advice for returnees
under the scheme (as proposed by Barber);
Preferential interest rates on savings lodged
in approved home country accounts, but which could only be realised
if return took place within the rules of the scheme;
Matched investment from the UK government in approved
business initiatives, health insurance or charitable contributions
(including schools) made by temporary migrants, again paid after
a return in compliance with the rule of the scheme.
Incentives could also be targeted depending on the type of
migration involved; for example, where schemes involve less-skilled
migration, a legitimate objective might be to extend reach and
access to banking services, whereas with more highly-skilled migrants,
there may be more emphasis placed on encouraging productive investment
in pro-poor development in their home country, without infringing
basic liberties in relation to savings or investment decisions.
A focus on supporting pro-poor investment by skilled migrants
would help to address the objection to matched funding of migrant
remittances on the grounds that international migrants are not
usually poor, or the poorest, themselves.
At the same time, to the extent that basic services for migrants
(health, education) continue to be provided in the country of
origin if migration is truly temporary, further consideration
could be given to the legitimacy of some form of "tax"
on migrant earnings. Here, migrants are likely to be most concerned
that they have some way to hold governments accountable for the
way such tax income is spent, as well as seeking to avoid paying
tax twice, in both sending and receiving country, without having
access to double the level of services.
3. Development of codes of conduct for recruitment agencies
A possible half-way house between the promotion of new temporary
mobility schemes organised in a "top-down" manner by
IOM or a similar organisation, and the current laissez-faire
attitude to recruitment of workers, measures could be introduced
for more strict regulation of private recruitment agencies involved
in temporary mobility schemes. Indeed, there is already some renewed
appetite for this amongst some politicians and the trades unions
following the terrible events in Morecambe Bay in early February
2004.
The standard for such codes of conduct should be high, and
include transparent fee structures, involvement of migrant workers"
associations in recruitment, and rigorous enforcement of minimum
wage and other health and safety conditions in the workplace.
Such codes could moreover act as a model for the dissemination
of good practice not only for recruitment of labour to the UK,
but for labour mobility more generally, by giving regulated recruitment
agencies preferential access to good quality legal immigration
routes to the UK. Such agencies could also be integrated into
consultation on new schemes as envisaged in (1) above.
In practice, such a code already exists for recruitment of
medical and nursing personnel by UK health authorities, the "Code
of Practice on International Recruitment", established in
October 2001, and currently under revision. Like earlier guidance
on international recruitment issued in 1999, the principle applied
is that recruitment should only be undertaken "where it will
have no adverse effect upon the recruit's home healthcare system".[53]
This aspiration is supported by a list of prescribed countries,
from which the DoH is committed not to recruit doctors or nurses
without prior approval from the home country government, although
the code currently only applies to recruitment by English health
authorities, and does not cover the private sector. The latter
is a major gap, since it appears to be widespread practice for
private sector companies to recruit nurses into the UK, only for
them to be subsequently integrated into the health service. Meanwhile,
specific bi-lateral agreements have been concluded with some countries
which take into account the need to protect those countries' health
and education systems from labour shortages resulting from UK
recruitment.[54]
4. Inclusion of a training element in temporary worker
schemes
Although Barber explicitly rejects the idea of including
a training element in temporary worker schemes on grounds of cost,
it is worth noting that the value of such training would depend
on the sector in which temporary worker schemes were being developed.
Whilst for many low skilled occupations, Barber is probably right
that the costs of training in the UK would far outweigh equivalent
training that could be provided in the migrant's country of origin,
this should not rule out the possibility of training in basic
issues such as the rights and entitlements that foreign workers
have whilst in the UK. There are also some areas in which the
UK might be seen as having a comparative advantage in training
provision that could benefit migrants on their return. This would
most obviously be the case in specialised medical or nursing fields,
but might also apply to training in areas such as health and safety,
management, or corporate governance, where UK standards might
be higher than many developing countriesas well as the
English language training mentioned above.
CONCLUSION
The suggestions outlined above are advanced not as a coherent
proposal to make temporary worker schemes in the UK more "development
friendly", but more as a starting point for debate on this
important subject. After a long period in which temporary mobility
was rejected across the political spectrum, temporary mobility
schemes are now firmly on the political agenda, both in terms
of new UK schemes, and at an international level in terms of discussion
around GATS Mode IV. It is unlikely that any one set of rules
or guidelines could provide a "development-friendly"
solution to the wide diversity of movements from different countries
and involving different sectors, whilst the labour market needs
of receiving countries might be expected to remain a primary concern
in the introduction and revision of schemes. Nonetheless, the
engagement of development actors in this process could yield important
results.
February 2004
33
This note is submitted in a personal capacity, and does not represent
the views of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation
and Poverty. I acknowledge the valuable comments of Ben Rogaly
and Clare Waddington on an earlier draft, but responsibility for
the views expressed remains my own. The Migration DRC is considering
the organisation of a workshop on this theme later in 2004. Back
34
Barber, C, 2003, "Making Migration `Development Friendly'".
Unpublished MA dissertation. Placed in Library. Back
35
The existence of labour shortages in food processing in the UK
does however beg the question of whether this industry might be
better located in the South, where food crops are grown but often
exported to the EU unprocessed because of tariff barriers on processed
food. Back
36
Figure relates to financial year 2002-03. Quoted in Home Office
evidence to this Inquiry. Back
37
House of Commons answer to question 70795, 23 Jul 2002. Back
38
A quota of 10,000 each has been set for the hospitality and food
processing industries. See Clark, J. and Salt, J. 2003, Work permits
and foreign labour in the UK: a statistical review, www.statistics.gov.uk.
This figure is for total applications to mid-March 2004, quoted
in Home Office evidence to this inquiry. Back
39
Figure for 2003, quoted in Home Office evidence to this inquiry. Back
40
Estimate for 2002 from NGO "KALAYAAN" reported at http://www.irr.org.uk/2003/august/ak000004.html Back
41
Au pairs are not strictly classified as workers, since their
main intention is to "allow young people to improve their
linguistic skills and experience life in another country in exchange
for day-to-day family duties". However, as Newcombe (2004)
points out, the reality is that many au pairs can be considered
migrant domestic workers. See Newcombe, E., 2004, Temporary
migration to the UK as an au pair: cultural exchange or reproductive
labour?, Sussex Migration Working Paper no 21, University
of Sussex. Back
42
Newcombe, E, 2004, op cit. This figure is an estimate for 2002
of all au pairs coming to the UK; in 2002, around 12,000 entered
with visas from outside the EU-those inside the EU do not need
a visa. Back
43
See also IOM News December 2002, at www.iom.int/documents/publication/en/in%5Fdec%5F2002.pdf Back
44
The "Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme"
(VARRP) was launched in 1999. In addition, there are specific
schemes in operation notably for return to Afghanistan, and until
recently, to Somalia. Back
45
Barber, C, op cit. Back
46
Don Flynn, JCWI, pers comm. Back
47
Executive Order 857 required migrants to remit 50-70% of foreign
earnings, and Executive Order 935 required that remittances be
sent bank to bank. See Arcinas, F R, 1991. Asian migration to
the Gulf region: the Philippine case. In: Gunatilleke, G (ed),
Migration to the Arab World: experience of returning migrants,
United Nations University Press, Tokyo. Back
48
Tan, E, and Canlas, D, 1989. Migrants sending remittance and
labour supply behaviour: the Philippines case. In: Amjad, R, (ed),
To the Gulf and Back: studies on the economic impact of Asian
labour migration, Asian Regional Programme on International
Labour Migration, ILO, New Delhi. Back
49
See for example Castles, S and Kosack, G, 1985, Immigrant
Workers & Class Structure in Western Europe, Oxford University
Press11 Abe. Back
50
Abella, M, 1997, Sending workers abroad, ILO, Geneva. Back
51
Consultation could give priority to those countries that have
established a functioning Department concerned with the welfare
of overseas workers, as an incentive to developing country governments
to consider measures designed to protect their overseas workers. Back
52
The IOM memo to the committee also notes that "More legal
entry routes . . . should have at least two postive effects: one,
such policies, if well targeted and well understood could reduce
the incidence of illegal entries and residence, and two, bilateral
labour agreements can act as an incentive for labour-sending countries
to assume more responsibility to counter irregular migration"
(Ev 217) Back
53
See Guidance in International Nursing Recruitment, http://www.doh.gov.uk/pub/docs/doh/intnurse.pdf Back
54
See for example proposed bilateral agreement with South
Africa at http://new.hst.org.za/news/index.php/20030606/. There
are also country-to-country agreements that permit the recruitment
of nurses in India and the Philippines. Back
|