1 INTRODUCTION
1. In November 2001, at Doha, the members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) signed up to what became known
as the "Development Round". This round is scheduled
for completion by 1 January 2005. From 10-14 September 2003, the
WTO held its 5th Ministerial meeting in Cancún,
Mexico. The Ministerial was intended to be a stock-taking exercise,
providing political impetus and a framework for further progress
with the round.
2. Prior to the Cancún Ministerial, we published
our report on "Trade and development at the WTO: Issues for
Cancún".[1]
In that report we outlined what we saw as the necessary components
of a genuine development round. These components were, and remain:
- Development-friendly agreements
on a range of specific issues (agriculture, non-agricultural market
access, Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and
public health, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services);
- Effective participation by developing countries;
and,
- Development-friendly rules.
3. In each of these areas, we made recommendations
aimed at maximising the chances of achieving a successful outcome.
The EU gave notice at Doha that it wanted the round to consider
the Singapore Issues of Investment, Competition, Trade Facilitation
and Transparency in Government Procurement (see figure 1). It
was agreed at Doha that a decision would be made later, at the
Cancún Ministerial, about whether to include negotiations
on the Singapore Issues during the Doha development round. The
sharpest comments of our earlier report were reserved for these
issues. We stated: "The chances of a genuine development
round being delivered, and of Cancún being a success, are
not improved by overloading an already-crowded agenda. A genuine
development round needs to focus on issues which are—and
are felt by the majority of developing countries to be—development
priorities."[2]
4. The Cancún Ministerial closed in confusion,
with precious little agreement reached. By extracting and applying
the lessons of Cancún, we hope that we can contribute to
putting negotiations back on track towards the development-friendly
outcome which the WTO's members promised at Doha. In chapter two
we summarise what happened at Cancún and assess the implications
for developing countries. In chapter three we extract the lessons
from the collapse of Cancún. Applying these lessons, in
chapter four we outline what needs to be done to revive a genuine
development round. Our recommendations are directed primarily
at the UK Government and the European Union (EU) and Commission.
This focus does not mean that others have no role to play; indeed
Cancún illustrated that a collective effort is needed by
all the WTO's members. Rather, it reflects our position as a UK
Parliamentary committee.
1 International Development Committee (IDC), Seventh
Report of Session 2002-03, Trade and Development at the WTO: Issues
for Cancún, HC400-I. See www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmintdev/400/400.pdf Back
2
Ibid. paragraph 100. Back
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