Before Cancún: TRIPS and
public health
10. On 30 August 2003, WTO members finally reached
agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
and Public Health, an issue which had assumed huge symbolic importance
since the Doha Ministerial of November 2001.[10]
We were pleased to hear the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry's
unequivocal reassurance that this agreement had not been in any
way contingent on progress made in Cancún.[11]
The agreement confirmed that countries could—without breaching
their obligations under the WTO's TRIPS Agreement—export
generic versions of drugs to countries with serious public health
problems which lack the manufacturing capacity to produce their
own supplies. We welcome this long overdue agreement on TRIPS
and public health which removes one of the obstacles which poor
people face in gaining access to affordable essential medicines,
and acknowledge the contribution made by the UK Government to
securing agreement.
11. Some NGOs have questioned whether the 30 August
deal really represented a breakthrough. Oxfam, Médecins
Sans Frontières and other NGOs described it as "a
'gift' bound in red tape", which in practice would be unnecessarily
restrictive as regards both disease coverage and country eligibility.[12]
Time will tell, and it would be naive to assume that an agreement
on paper will automatically improve on-the-ground delivery of
cheaper medicines for developing countries' public health needs,
but the agreement reached does at last fulfil the pledges made
at Doha. Governments and pharmaceutical companies must seek to
ensure that the agreement delivers what it promises, and is not
hampered by excessive restrictions.[13]
In this regard, we support Oxfam's call for UK legislation
to be amended to allow compulsory licensing for export.[14]
This should apply to all drugs for life-threatening diseases,
for export to least-developed countries. The UK should also support
similar changes to European pharmaceutical legislation. There
is, however, more to healthcare than the supply of cheap drugs.
Cheaper medicines cannot be delivered effectively by the sorts
of crumbling health services which exist in most developing countries.
We were pleased, therefore, to hear Hilary Benn emphasise the
importance of "treatment" and health-service delivery.[15]
The implications for developing
countries
12. In its immediate aftermath, two contrasting views
of the collapse of Cancún and its implications were put
forward. One view—held by some NGOs and some developing
countries—was that the collapse might prove to be beneficial
for developing countries. By this account, no deal was better
than a bad deal, what was on offer at Cancún was on balance
a bad deal for developing countries, and the collapse might eventually
lead to a good deal being reached. A contrasting view—espoused
most forcefully by the European Commission and the WTO's Director
General—was that the collapse was very bad news, and that
developing countries would be the main losers. The UK Government
too asserted that Cancún represented a "missed opportunity
that will naturally hit developing countries hardest."[16]
We see the collapse of Cancún as a major setback—not
least for multilateralism—and are dismayed to hear that
some organisations were celebrating the outcome, but any assessment
of the failure by the WTO's members to reach agreement must take
account of what sort of agreement, if any, might have been achieved.
13. According to Patricia Hewitt, on the Sunday evening
at Cancún the trade minister of one of the leading G20+
countries[17] said to
her that if there had been about six hours of serious discussions
on agriculture, agreement could have been reached on a framework
of negotiations to move things forward.[18]
Patricia Hewitt's view is that there was a deal to be done, and
it would have been a good deal for developing countries.[19]
ActionAid, CAFOD and Christian Aid took a different view; no deal
was better than a bad deal, and the Derbez text, the closest that
Cancún came to setting out a deal on paper, was without
doubt a bad deal for developing countries.[20]
Important progress had been made at Cancún, and more
may have been possible. But it is not possible to say with any
certainty whether a good deal was in the offing, particularly
because the unexpected closure of the Ministerial meant that some
countries and country-groups had probably not played all of their
cards (see paragraphs 19-20).
14. There is little point in speculating on what
might have been. A successful outcome may have been possible.
It may have been possible to reach agreement on agriculture. We
shall never know with any certainty. But what we can say is, that
the consequences of Cancún for developing countries will
depend upon what happens next.[21]
If there is a shift to prioritise bilateral trade negotiations
(see paragraph 54), and if the promise of a "Development
Round" evaporates, then the collapse of Cancún will
have been a disaster. What happens next depends upon how well
the lessons of Cancún are learned; this in turn depends
upon how well the reasons for the collapse of Cancún are
understood. It is to this task that we now turn.
3 Preparations for the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference, Draft Cancún Ministerial Text, Second Revision,
JOB(03)/150/Rev.2, 13 September 2003. Available at: www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/docs/draft_cancun_minist_text_rev2.pdf Back
4
Ibid. Back
5
"DTI leak blames Lamy for Cancún failure", the
Guardian, 22 October 2003, p.21. Available at www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,3604,1068109,00.html;
"EU may be more flexible on global trade talks agenda",
the Financial Times, 20 November 2003, p.13. Available at www.wto.ru/en/press.asp?msg_id=7121 Back
6
See glossary for membership of G90. Back
7
WTO, Summary of 14 September 2003, Day 5 "Conference ends
without consensus". Available at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm;
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD),
Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference,
Issue 6, "Cancún Collapse: Where there's no will there's
no way", 15 September 2003. Available at www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/ben030915.htm Back
8
WTO, Ministerial Statement adopted on 14 September 2003,
WT/MIN(03)/20. Available at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_20_e.doc Back
9
Ibid. Back
10
IDC, Trade and development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún,
HC400-I, paragraphs 104-107 (see footnote 1 for full reference). Back
11
Q 18 [Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry]
NB: Unless stated otherwise, all Qs refer to oral evidence given
to the International Development Committee. Back
12
Ev 71, paragraph 28 [Oxfam memorandum]; Ev 73 [Appendix to Oxfam
memorandum] Back
13
Q 32 [Claire Melamed, Christian Aid]; Q 34 [Claire Melamed, Christian
Aid; Matthew Lockwood, ActionAid] Back
14
Ev 71, paragraph 29 [Oxfam memorandum] Back
15
Q 18 [Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development] Back
16
Ev 26, [DFID and DTI memorandum] Back
17
The Consumers' Association attribute this view to Brazil (Ev 58,
paragraph 2.4); others have attributed it to South Africa. See
glossary for membership of G20+. Back
18
Q 4 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
19
Q 4 [Patricia Hewitt]; Q 1 of oral evidence taken by the Trade
and Industry Committee, Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i
[Patricia Hewitt]. Back
20
Q 24 [Claire Melamed, Christian Aid; Duncan Green, CAFOD; Matthew
Lockwood, ActionAid; John Hilary, formerly ActionAid] Back
21
Q 24 [Claire Melamed, Christian Aid] Back
