The European Commission and the
EU's Member States: Mandate, communication, accountability and
transparency
42. Having extracted the lessons of Cancún
as regards process, geo-politics and substance, we turn now to
examine the role of the European institutions and Member States,
and issues around the governance, role and scope of the WTO. The
European Commission negotiates on behalf of the European Union
and its Member States at the WTO. It is, as Patricia Hewitt put
it, very important "to get the balance right between the
Commission, who are doing the negotiation on our behalf, and the
Member States and the Ministers who of course are responsible
for the negotiating mandate."[96]
She had few complaints about how such relationships worked at
Cancún, at least in public.[97]
Others have been more vocal in their criticisms, suggesting that
weak lines of accountability and poor information flows between
the Commission and EU Member Stateson agriculture[98]
as well as on the Singapore Issuesmay have had a detrimental
effect on the strategy and tactics employed by the European Commission.[99]
43. Questions have been raised about the timing of
Pascal Lamy's concession on the Singapore Issues. In our view,
this offer came too late (see paragraphs 31-32). But it is difficult
to know whether this was a failing on the Commission's part or
simply the result of the Commission following the mandate given
by Member States. The evidence suggests the latter.[100]
The minutes of the 21 July meeting of the European Council (External
Relations) record that the "Council confirmed the objective
of negotiating new WTO rules and disciplines in all four areas,
and rejected suggestions that any one of the four Singapore issues
might be removed from the scope of the single undertaking."[101]
We asked the Government: what position the UK took at this meeting;
which countries suggested unbundling; and, which countries rejected
such a suggestion? In response, we were told that:
"The Commission reported to the Council
that unbundling had been proposed by some WTO members. At that
stage they considered that the acceptance of unbundling would
mean dropping some issues on the agenda. Accordingly, they recommended
that the EU should resist this approach. No Member State objected,
and the Presidency summed up accordingly."[102]
44. In July, the then-Secretary of State for International
Development, Baroness Amos stated that the UK did not regard the
Singapore Issues as a development priority.[103]
We welcomed this statement, and urged the Government to persuade
its EU partners and the European Commission to stop promoting
the Singapore Issues[104]
(emphasis added). In its response to our pre-Cancún report,
whilst making clear its position on the Singapore Issues (see
paragraph 35 of this report), the Government did not respond to
this specific recommendation.[105]
Rectifying this omission, the Government stated on 27 September
that: "we were and continue to be in dialogue with Member
States and the Commission regarding our view that any WTO agreement
on the Singapore Issues must be development friendly."[106]
45. We appreciate that the UK Government had a difficult
job to do in seeking to persuade its European partners and the
European Commission that the Singapore Issues were not a priority.
Rebutting a suggestion made by CAFOD,[107]
the Government states that its line on investment was "in
no way driven by tactical considerations relating to CAP reform."[108]
Nevertheless, seeking to de-prioritise the Singapore Issues whilst
maintaining the momentum of CAP reform, must have involved some
delicate balancing. Whilst we would not wish to jeopardise progress
towards much-needed CAP reform, in our view the Government
should have done more to persuade the EU and the Commission to
unbundle the Singapore Issues, and to drop Investment and Competition
rather than simply make them less of a priority.[109]
The Government should not have left itself open to the charge
that it failed to express its views about the Singapore Issues
with sufficient force.
46. Such charges would be easier to refute if there
were more transparency as regards the formulation and pursuit
of European trade policy and objectives, and the respective roles
of the Member States, the Council, the Commission and the European
Parliament. The Article 133 Committee, with its membership of
high-level Member State officials, plays an important role in
communication between Member States and the European Commission.
But its workings are little known. For instance, it remains unclear
whether the Commission sought advice from the Article 133 Committee
prior to making its Sunday morning offer to withdraw Investment,
Competition and, by some accounts, Transparency in Government
Procurement,[110] or
whether the Commission simply "reported" after the event,
as the Government suggests.[111]
A lack of transparency does not make for accountable or, ultimately,
effective institutions.[112]
Although we welcome the EU's commitment to greater use of Sustainability
Impact Assessments as a contribution to enhancing transparency
and improving discussion of the impacts of trade policy,[113]
the UK Government should do more. They should clarify the legal
status of the Article 133 Committee and explain its role in determining
the aims of European trade policy and pursuing those aims in multilateral
fora. The UK Government should also consider following Denmark's
example by publishing the agendas of Article 133 Committee meetings
when it next holds the presidency of the European Union in 2005.
We share the Government's view that the policies pursued by its
developing country partners should be determined through democratic
and inclusive processes; the EU should make this case through
example.
Governance, role and scope: The
WTO and a development round
47. If the WTO's members are to deliver a development
round, they must learn several lessons from Cancún. When
Ministerials are overloaded with issues to be considered and decisions
to be taken, they are likely to fail. More progress needs to be
made prior to Ministerials, especially in Geneva, and deadlines
must be taken seriously. In addition Ministerials themselves need
to be better organised. Cancún was an improvement on Doha
or Seattle; there was more transparency, better communication,
and more inclusive decision-making processes.[114]
But nevertheless, several organisational questions were posed
by the collapse of the Ministerial: what is the most effective
use of time at Ministerials; how should discussions on a range
of issues be organised; what is the status of papers produced
by facilitators and chairmen; how should decisions about the sequencing
of negotiations be taken; and how should decisions about extending
Ministerial meetings be taken? (see paragraphs 17-23).
48. In the immediate aftermath of Cancún,
as at Seattle, Pascal Lamy complained about the WTO's "medieval"
decision-making structures, pointing particularly to the difficulties
of reaching consensus among 146 members, and to the fact that
the Director General of the WTO has little power to push negotiations
forward.[115] Along
with Pascal Lamy,[116]
many developing countries[117]
and many NGOs,[118]
we are also concerned about the governance of the WTO, and specifically
about the way in which Ministerials are run. As the World Development
Movement put it, "for an organisation that creates so many
rules, it is surprising that the WTO does not have any rules to
guide its own negotiations and decision-making."[119]
The motivation for introducing new rules must be broader
than one of efficiency; it must also be to ensure that multilateral
negotiations are democratic, accountable and transparent. We were
pleased therefore to hear Patricia Hewitt state that: "the
fundamental principle of one member one vote must not be tampered
with".[120]
It seems likely that greater use might be made of mini-Ministerials,
to try to reduce the pressure on Ministerials themselves.[121]
This, and other organisational improvements are suggested in a
reflection paper produced by DG Trade of the European Commission
for the consideration of the Article 133 Committee. We would be
interested to hear the Government's response to the proposals
mooted in this paper. Specifically, we invite the Government's
comments: first, on what might be done to improve the effectiveness
of Ministerials; and, second, on the likely impact of a greater
use of Ministerials on levels of democracy, accountability, transparency
and the participation of developing countries at the WTO.
49. Cancún's collapse has also led to questions
about the nature of a "Development Round", the role
and scope of the WTO, and its relationship with other international
organisations.[122]
In our pre-Cancún report, we suggested that there was some
tension between the notion of a "Development Round"
and the hard-bargaining concessions-trading which is the stuff
of WTO negotiations.[123]
At Cancún, there were certainly differing expectations.[124]
Believing the rhetoric of a "Development Round",[125]
many developing countries thought that they would receive the
benefits of a new round without having to make concessions themselves.
Others, including the European Union, took the view that successful
trade negotiations require all countries to make concessions.
With hindsight, it seems to us that the notion of a development
round was always likely to result in differing expectations. The
"Development Round" may have been sold to developing
countries at Doha, but the use of such language merely postponed
the issue of determining just what it might amount to, andunless
its meaning is specifiedallows countries to claim too easily
that they have kept their Doha promises.
50. For some commentators the solution is for the
WTO to pull back from the notion of a development round, and to
return to its traditional emphasis on mercantilism and concessions-trading.[126]
We have some sympathy with such suggestions, but the reality
is that the very poorest countries have little in the way of concessions
which they can exchange. They cannot, therefore, be part of a
concessions-trading round. For some commentators such as Martin
Wolf of the Financial Times, one solution is to have a round which
does not include countries which are unwilling or unable to be
part of a mercantilist round.[127]
But in our view, rather than excuse the developed world from
delivering on its promise of a "Development Round" which
involves developing countries, the appropriate response is to
work harder to deliver a round that really does serve the developmental
interests of the WTO's diverse membership. If trade and trade
liberalisation is a positive-sum game, then it ought to be possible
to ensure that all countries gain; for a development round, the
gains for developing countries should be substantial.
51. The European Commission's DG for Trade has, since
Cancún, asked some fundamental questions about the scope
of the WTO's agenda, and about the ways in which trade agreements
are organised.[128]
One of their suggestions is that the WTO should have a core of
agreements to which all members are signed up, and additional
opt-in plurilateral agreements which would be binding only on
those members who subscribe to them.[129]
This would in effect be a variable geometry WTO, with the principle
of the single-undertaking abandoned. Such an approach may seem
to offer the flexibility which the WTO needs, particularly if
it were limited to allowing non-reciprocal commitments on market
access.[130] But if
it left developing countries with the choice of participating
in negotiations for rules that they don't want, or facing pressure
to sign up to rules which they had no part in negotiating, this
would not be development-friendly.[131]
The European Commission clearly considers plurilateralism, as
regards trade negotiations in general, and investment rules specifically,
as a way out of the current impasse.[132]
Action Aid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam and the World Development
Movement suggest that there would be very strong opposition to
a plurilateral investment agreement[133];
plurilateral agreements on other issues might meet a similar response.
We would like to hear the Government's views about the implications
for developing countries of a shift to plurilateral trade negotiations
and agreements: might such a shift presage the emergence of a
more flexible and development-friendly WTO; and, how could the
interests of developing countries, and the priority afforded to
poverty reduction, be protected?
52. A common maxim for those contemplating institutional
reform is, "if it isn't broken, don't fix it." The failure
of two out of the last three WTO Ministerials suggests that some
repairs are needed.[134]
However, with the 2015 deadline for meeting the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) fast-approaching, now is not the time
for fundamental reforms which act as a distraction, and which
postpone any progress on making trade work for poverty reduction.[135]
The question is whether there are some limited and useful
reforms which can be undertaken immediately to restart negotiations
in a more transparent and efficient manner without stalling the
process completely, whilst discussions about more fundamental
reform go on in parallel.[136]
We invite the Government to comment on what immediate reforms
it would like to see and what it is doing to secure such reforms,
and also to tell us what input it is making into debates, including
the work of the Sutherland Commission, about longer-term reforms.[137]
22 Q 9 [Hilary Benn] Back
23
This is the thrust of Pascal Lamy's analysis of Cancún
given to the European Parliament on 24 September 2003. See www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/debatsL5?FILE=20030924EN&LANGUE=EN&LEVEL=TOC2&CHAP=6
He omits in that speech to extend his analysis to the EU. We have
filled in the gap. Back
24
Q 3 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and Industry Committee,
Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i [Patricia Hewitt]. Back
25
Ibid. Back
26
Ibid; and evidence to International Development Committee
Q 4 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
27
Q 9 [Hilary Benn]; Q 3 and Q 6 of oral evidence taken by the Trade
and Industry Committee, Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i
[Patricia Hewitt]. Back
28
Q 15 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
29
Ev 41 [CAFOD memorandum] Back
30
IDC, Trade and development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún,
HC400-I, paragraph 36 (see footnote 1 for full reference). Back
31
Ev 68, paragraph 2 [Oxfam memorandum] Back
32
EC Directorate General for Trade, The Doha Development Agenda
after Cancún, 25 September 2003, p.6. Available at
www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/docs/COMMISSION-Cancun-and-Beyond-Sept-03.pdf Back
33
Q 4 and Q 15 [Patricia Hewitt]; Q 6 of oral evidence taken by
the Trade and Industry Committee, Session 2002-03, 15 October
2003, HC1178i [Patricia Hewitt]. Back
34
Q 4 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
35
Q 3 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and Industry Committee,
Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i [Patricia Hewitt]; see
also Q 4 of evidence to IDC Back
36
"Breakdown means no end in sight to Doha round", the
Guardian, 16 September 2003, p.15-available at www.guardian.co.uk/wto/article/0,2763,1043079,00.html;
"No hope of trade deal warns Lamy", the Independent,
16 September 2003, p.17-see news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/story.jsp?story=443826 Back
37
Ev 60, paragraph 3.3 [Consumers' Association memorandum] Back
38
Q 13 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
39
Ev 42 [CAFOD memorandum]; Ev 53, paragraph 2.2 [Christian Aid
memorandum] Back
40
Q 12 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
41
Ibid; Q 11 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and Industry
Committee, Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i [Patricia
Hewitt] Back
42
Ev 59, paragraph 2.6 [Consumers' Association memorandum] Back
43
Ev 26 [DFID and DTI memorandum] Back
44
Ev 61 [Consumers' Association memorandum] Back
45
Ev 39 [CAFOD memorandum] Back
46
Ibid. Back
47
Q 40 [Pascal Lamy, European Commission]; Pascal Lamy, European
Parliament debate on the outcomes of Cancún (see footnote
23). Back
48
Q 4 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and Industry Committee,
Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i [Patricia Hewitt]. Back
49
Q 9 [Hilary Benn]; Ev 25 [DFID and DTI memorandum] Back
50
Oxfam, The EU after Cancún: A way forward, October
2003, pp.3-4. Available at: www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/eu_cancun.htm Back
51
Q 41 [Pascal Lamy] Back
52
Q 3 [Hilary Benn] Back
53
Q 6 [Hilary Benn]; Q 15 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and
Industry Committee, Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i
[Patricia Hewitt]. Back
54
Ev 57, paragraph 2.4 [Consumers' Association memorandum] Back
55
Q 11 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
56
Ev 55, paragraph 1 [Consumers' Association memorandum] Back
57
Q 40 [Pascal Lamy] Back
58
European Commission, Reviving the DDA negotiations-the EU perspective,
Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the European
Parliament, and to the Economic and Social Committee, 26 November
2003, p.7 and p.17. Available at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114259.pdf Back
59
Ev 39 [CAFOD memorandum] Back
60
Franz Fischler "Ten ingredients to make Cancún [a]
success", Press Conference, Brussels, 4 September 2003. Available
at: europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/03/384|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display= Back
61
Q 24 [Matthew Lockwood, ActionAid] Back
62
Q 10 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
63
ICTSD, Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference,
Issue 2, "Cotton, the 'TRIPS and Health' of Cancún?"
11 September 2003. Available at www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/ben030911.pdf;
Q 24 [Duncan Green, CAFOD] Back
64
Q 11 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
65
G20 Ministerial Communiqué of 9 September 2003.
Available at: www.mre.gov.br/portugues/imprensa/nota_detalhe.asp?ID_RELEASE=1838 Back
66
Pascal Lamy, European Parliament debate on the outcomes of Cancún,
p.85-see footnote 23; Q 41 [Pascal Lamy] Back
67
Q 41 [Pascal Lamy] Back
68
Q 1 [Patricia Hewitt]; Q 6 of oral evidence taken by the Trade
and Industry Committee, Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i
[Patricia Hewitt]. Back
69
Q 45 [Pascal Lamy] Back
70
Ev 27 A3 [DFID and DTI supplementary memorandum]; Pascal Lamy,
European Parliament debate on the outcomes of Cancún, 3-215
(see footnote 23). Back
71
Q 9 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and Industry Committee,
Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i [Patricia Hewitt]. The
Government, responding to a written question from the Committee,
has noted that: "Lamy has told the European Parliament that
an earlier move would have been premature in the light of lack
of movement from other countries on other issues in Cancún.
It is not possible to be certain, with hindsight, whether or not
this judgment was correct." Ev 27 A3 [DFID and DTI supplementary
memorandum] Back
72
Ev 58, paragraph 2.5 [Consumers' Association memorandum]; Ev 30,
paragraph 2.4 [Action Aid memorandum] Back
73
Ev 41 [CAFOD memorandum] Back
74
Q 16 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and Industry Committee,
Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i [Mike O'Brien]. Back
75
"DTI leak blames Lamy for Cancún failure", the
Guardian, 22 October 2003, p.21 (see footnote 5). Back
76
Q 25 [Claire Melamed, Christian Aid] Back
77
Ev 52-53, paragraph 1 [Christian Aid memorandum] Back
78
Ev 33, paragraph 4.12 [ActionAid memorandum] Back
79
Q 517 of oral evidence taken by the IDC, Session 2002-3, HC 400-II
[Baroness Amos, then Secretary of State for International Development] Back
80
IDC, Trade and development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún,
HC400-I, paragraph 96 (see footnote 1). The Least Developed Countries
made clear in the Dhaka Declaration of 2nd June their opposition
to launching negotiations (see www.sdnbd.org/sdi/issues/economy/ldc_dhaka/documents/ldc_final_decleration.pdf).
The African Union expressed its reservations in the Grand Baie
Declaration of 20 June (see www.cancun2003.org/en/web/111.html).
Bangladesh, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe insisted on the need
for "explicit consensus" in a paper published by the
WTO General Council on 8 July WTO (see www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/docs/WTGCW501.doc). Back
81
IDC, Trade and development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún,
HC400-I, paragraph 96 (see footnote 1); Q 517 of oral evidence
taken by the IDC, Session 2002-3, HC 400-II [Baroness Amos] Back
82
Government response to the Committee's Seventh Report:
Trade and Development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún, (received
on 7 September, published on 18 September) HC1093 [incorporating
HC1092], p.9. Back
83
Action Aid, Chips off the bloc: Disunity within the EU on the
Singapore Issues, August 2003. Available at www.actionaid.org/resources/pdfs/chips.pdf Back
84
Ev 47 [CAFOD memorandum] Back
85
ICTSD, Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference,
Issue 4, "New ministerial statement to be issued today",
13 September 2003. Available at http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/ben030913.htm Back
86
EU-US Joint Text: Agriculture, 13 August 2003. Available at www.tradeobservatory.org/library/uploadedfiles/EC_-_US_Joint_Text.pdf Back
87
WTO, Preparations for the fifth session of the Ministerial Conference,
Draft Cancún Ministerial Text Revision [JOB(03)/150/Rev.1],
24 August 2003. Available at www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/docs/Job.03.150.Rev.1.pdf Back
88
Our views on agriculture are set out in paragraphs 68-75 of this
report. Our views on the EU's CAP reform are spelt out in recommendations
6-8 of our pre-Cancún report (see footnote 1). Back
89
Ev 57, paragraph 2.2 [Consumers' Association memorandum] Back
90
ICTSD, Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference,
Issue 1, "Cancún Ministerial, setting the stage",
10 September 2003. Available at www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/ben030910.htm Back
91
Under the current WTO Agreement on Agriculture production-boosting
domestic support is classified as Amber Box, production-limiting
domestic support is classified as Blue Box, and domestic support
which is at most minimally trade-distorting is classified as Green
Box support. See glossary for further explanation. Back
92
Memoranda submitted by Action Aid [Ev 29] and CAFOD [Ev 38] include
much useful detail on agriculture. Back
93
Ev 41 [CAFOD memorandum]; Ev 59, paragraph 3.1 [Consumers' Association
memorandum] Back
94
Ev 59, paragraph 3.1 [Consumers' Association memorandum] Back
95
IDC, Trade and development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún,
HC400-I, paragraph 69 (see footnote 1). Back
96
Q 1 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
97
"DTI leak blames Lamy for Cancún failure", the
Guardian, 22 October 2003, p.21 (see footnote 5). Back
98
Ev 42 [CAFOD memorandum]; "EU reneges on pledge to third
world", the Guardian, 11 September 2003, p.16 - see www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1039652,00.html;
and, "Mexican standoff: the west is rumbled", the Guardian,
15 September 2003, p.27, see - www.guardian.co.uk/wto/article/0,2763,1042074,00.html Back
99
Ev 54, paragraph 4.5 [Christian Aid memorandum]; Ev 42 [CAFOD
memorandum]; Ev 35, paragraph 7.11 [Action Aid memorandum]; "DTI
leak blames Lamy for Cancún failure", the Guardian,
22 October 2003, p.21 ( see footnote 5). Back
100
Q 9 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and Industry Committee,
Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i [Patricia Hewitt] Back
101
EU General Affairs and External Relations Council, Minutes of
21 July meeting, p.20 [11439/1/03 REV 1 (Presse 209)]. Available
at http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/gena/76752.pdf Back
102
Ev 27, paragraph A4 [DFID and DTI supplementary memorandum] Back
103
Q 517 [Baroness Amos, then Secretary of State for International
Development] Oral evidence taken by the IDC, Session 2002-3, HC
400-II Back
104
IDC, Trade and development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún,
HC400-I, paragraph 98 (see footnote 1). Back
105
Ev 38 [CAFOD memorandum, Annex A] Back
106
Ev 25 [Hilary Benn letter to Tony Baldry, Chairman of the IDC] Back
107
Ev 39 [CAFOD memorandum] Back
108
Ev 27, paragraph A5 [DFID and DTI supplementary memorandum] Back
109
IDC, Trade and development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún,
HC400-I, recommendations 20-25 (see footnote 1). Back
110
Ev 54, paragraph 4.4 [Christian Aid memorandum]; ICTSD, Bridges
Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Issue
5, "At the eleventh hour, divergence all over again",
14 September 2003. Available at www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/ben030914.htm Back
111
Ev 27, paragraph A6 [DFID and DTI supplementary memorandum] Back
112
WWF-UK, A league of gentlemen; who really runs EU trade decision-making?
November 2003. Available at www.panda.org/downloads/europe/aleagueofgentlemenfinal.pdf Back
113
Q 40 [Pascal Lamy] Back
114
Q 14 [Patricia Hewitt] Back
115
Q 42 [Pascal Lamy] Back
116
EC Directorate General for Trade, The Doha Development Agenda
after Cancún (see footnote 32); EC Directorate-General
for Trade, Reflection paper on WTO organisational improvements,
29 October 2003. Back
117
WTO, Preparatory process in Geneva and negotiating procedure at
the Ministerial conferences, Communication from Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe,
(WT/GC/W/471). Available at www.wto.org Back
118
The Cancún democracy challenge. Available at www.wdm.org.uk/news/WTOdemands280703.htm Back
119
Ev 84, paragraph 4 [World Development Movement memorandum] Back
120
Q 27 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and Industry Committee,
Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i [Patricia Hewitt] Back
121
EC Directorate-General for Trade, Reflection paper on WTO organisational
improvements, 29 October 2003, p.6 (see footnote 116). Back
122
Ev 84 [WWF-UK memorandum] especially paragraph 3.6 (Ev 86) Back
123
IDC, Trade and development at the WTO: Issues for Cancún,
HC400-I, paragraph 16 (see footnote 1). Back
124
Q 16 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and Industry Committee,
Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i [Patricia Hewitt] Back
125
Ev 41 [CAFOD memorandum]; Q 24 [Duncan Green, CAFOD] Back
126
Evenett, S.J. The failure of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancún:
What implications for future research on the world trading system?
CESifo Forum 3, Autumn 2003-see www.cesifo.de/link/forum3-03-focus2.pdf;
Ev 63, paragraph 5.4 [Consumers' Association memorandum] Back
127
"The abominable no-men menacing world trade", the Financial
Times, 24 September 2003, p.21. Available at www.wto.ru/en/opinion.asp?msg_id=6397 Back
128
EC Directorate General for Trade, The Doha Development Agenda
after Cancún, 25 September 2003 (see footnote 32). Back
129
Plurilateral agreements would be entered into by many or some
of the WTO's members, but not all of them. Back
130
Oxfam, The EU after Cancún: A way forward, October
2003, p.2 (see footnote 50). Back
131
Ev 37, paragraph 8.12 [ActionAid memorandum] Back
132
EC Directorate General for Trade, Singapore Issues-Options
post-Cancún, 30 October 2003. Available at www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/docs/EC-Sing-Issues-Post-Cancun.pdf Back
133
ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam and World Development Movement,
Four arguments against a plurilateral investment agreement in
the WTO, November 2003. Available at www.cafod.org.uk/policy/pia200311.shtml Back
134
Pascal Lamy, The EU, Cancún and the future of the Doha
Development Agenda, speech delivered to the Journal for Common
Market Studies, London 28 October 2003. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla195_en.htm Back
135
Q 14 [Patricia Hewitt]; Q 27 of oral evidence taken by the Trade
and Industry Committee, Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i
[Patricia Hewitt] Back
136
Q 24 of oral evidence taken by the Trade and Industry Committee,
Session 2002-03, 15 October 2003, HC1178i [Mike O'Brien]; Q 42
[Pascal Lamy]; Ev 72, paragraph 37 [Oxfam memorandum] Back
137
Trade Observatory, After Cancún, WTO panel seeks an
end to gridlock, 29 September 2003. Available at www.tradeobservatory.org/News/index.cfm?ID=4839 Back