Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Oxfam

INTRODUCTION

  1.  Oxfam welcomes the opportunity to feed into the Committee's inquiry post Cancún. The launch of the Doha development agenda was based on the promise that this round would finally deliver the reforms needed to provide developing countries with trade opportunities "commensurate with their development needs", something they were promised almost half a century ago in the GATT agreement of 1947. Developing countries came in good faith to the Cancún ministerial conference, expecting a fair deal. However, the conference ended in failure because developed countries were unable to match with deeds the commitments made in Doha.

  2.  A number of critical factors contributed to this unfortunate outcome: The European Union and the United States failed to build domestic constituencies in support of deep agricultural reform, the cornerstone of this round. Moreover, the international environment, marked by economic recession and weaker international cooperation, was more favourable to protectionism and unilateralism than a renewed commitment towards reform and multilateral trade rules. To make things worse, the agenda was completely overloaded due to missed negotiation deadlines on all key areas and the push by the European Union, Canada and Japan for the launch of negotiations on the very controversial Singapore issues.

  3.  In a way, everybody hoped for a miracle in Cancún, as if a four-day conference could compensate for two years of frustrating deadlock. The fact that it did not is no excuse for a complete freeze of the negotiations, which would be disastrous for everybody. This is a luxury that neither developed nor developing countries can afford. The development challenges are too pressing and the need for multilateral economic cooperation too great.

  4.  For these reasons, Oxfam joins many developed and developing countries in urging every WTO member to go back to the negotiating table to restart talks on a more constructive basis and with renewed energy.

RESPONDING TO PRESSING DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

  5.  The world trade system has so far failed to deliver on such a promise. In fact, the benefits of international trade remain unequally distributed:

    —  With 14% of the world's population, high-income countries account for 75% of world exports.

    —  Low-income countries with 40% of the world's population account for 3% of world trade.

    —  The UK accounts for a larger share of world exports than South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa combined.

    —  Unfortunately, this poor economic result is, at least in some part, due to continuing imbalances in global trade rules which urgently need to be addressed. For instance:

    —  Developing countries exporting to rich ones face trade barriers four times higher than those faced by industrialised countries—and goods produced by the poorest people face the highest import barriers of all.

    —  Northern governments are allowed to spend billions on agricultural subsidies, mainly for their richest farmers and agribusiness. Amounting to six times their spending on aid, many of these subsidies generate large surpluses that are dumped on world markets at prices bearing no relation to production costs.

  6.  Unless these imbalances are corrected, there is little hope that Millennium Development Goals will ever be achieved.

DEFENDING MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC CO -OPERATION

  7.  Almost ten years after the creation of the WTO the belief that multilateral trade rules are the best option is under fierce attack. The WTO is accused of being slow, cumbersome and inflexible. Big powers, confronted with greater preparedness and resolve of poorer nations, are threatening to short-circuit the WTO system and pursue their objectives through bilateral or regional deals.

  8.  While the WTO has certainly failed to live up to expectations, this fever for bilateralism and regionalism makes little economic and political sense:

    —  Bilateral and regional trade agreements can create severe distortions in trade flows, with greater costs than benefits for parties involved and the world economy as a whole. This is why the Most Favoured Nation was established as one of the cornerstone principles of the WTO and why there are disciplines on the establishment of free trade agreements and customs unions in Article XXVI of the GATT.

    —  The plethora of existing bilateral and regional agreements has had very mixed economic results. For instance, the 2003 World Trade Report shows that many Regional Trade Agreements have not led to trade creation, for instance because they failed to liberalise the sectors where the greatest protectionism was present (p59, WTO, 2003).

    —  Bilateral and regional trade agreements contribute to greater legal complexity and uncertainty, not only for customs authorities but also for economic actors faced with a web of contradictory rules and lack of clarity about their hierarchy and applicability.

    —  Bilateral or regional agreements involving developed and developing countries reinforce the natural imbalance existing between rich and poor nations, leading to very inequitable results with adverse consequences on the ability of developing countries to move up the development ladder.

    —  Bilateral and regional agreements do not have a dispute settlement mechanism equivalent to that of the WTO and therefore do not guarantee that rules will be enforced.

    —  Bilateral and regional agreements are unlikely to provide developed countries with access to the larger markets of developing countries. The Financial Times described the US strategy as "Trawling for Tiddlers", since the largest developing economies are showing no eagerness to negotiate with the United States outside the WTO.

    —  Agriculture, the thorniest issue under negotiation, cannot be resolved through regional or bilateral agreements since the European Union and the United States will never accept negotiating subsidy reductions outside of WTO. Similarly, agricultural markets of the South will never be liberalised without a deal on a substantial reduction in subsidies.

  9.  Furthermore, putting multilateral economic cooperation aside is inconsistent with the growing recognition that greater cooperation, albeit difficult, is needed to respond to the world's current challenges in terms of security, stability, development and environmental protection. Major powers cannot have it both ways, rejecting multilateral cooperation today and demanding international solidarity tomorrow, without completely losing their credibility and creating even more distrust in the international community.

A WAY FORWARD

  10.  The collapse of the Cancún Summit has undermined and possibly imperilled the multilateral trading system. There is an obligation on everyone to get the negotiations for a genuine Development Round back on track. The alternative is to abandon hope that nations can create together global trade rules to help remedy the growing inequality and dangerous instability of our divided planet. Confidence-building measures by major players are urgently needed to re-build trust and commitment to the round's success.

  11.  The Cancún declaration provides some useful clues on how to restart discussions in Geneva. It proposes to build on the "valuable work" done during the conference with two key principles:

    —  maintain points of convergence: "In those areas where we have reached a high level of convergence on texts, we undertake to maintain this convergence while working for an acceptable overall outcome."

    —  reconvene soon: "convene a meeting of the General Council at Senior Officials level no later than 15 December 2003 to take the action necessary at that stage to enable us to move towards a successful and timely conclusion of the negotiations".

  12.  One of the positive developments that also needs to be built upon is the improved coordination and coherence among developing countries, through the group of the G-20+, and the consolidated ACP/LDC/Africa Union. Rather than a threat, this new political landscape should be seen as an opportunity to move forward in a more focused and effective manner, overcoming some of the difficulties linked with negotiations among 146 members.

  13.  In the light of the above, Oxfam makes the following recommendations on four areas of negotiations which are crucial if the WTO is to overcome the current deadlock, and restart negotiations. Once negotiations are back on track, other important issues such as TRIPs, implementation or special and differential treatment will also have to be taken up by the membership.

  14.  The spirit of these recommendations is to provide suggestions on minimum steps to restart the negotiation process.

AGRICULTURE

  15.  Agriculture is the single most important issue on the agenda of the WTO and will define its capacity to deliver on a pro-development reform agenda. More than three-quarters of the world's poor—some 900 million people—live in rural areas, most of them working as small-scale farmers.

  16.  It is therefore quite clear that without constructive steps forward on agriculture negotiations cannot really restart.

  17.  The various proposals made by key developed and developing country in the run up to, and at, Cancún should provide useful inputs for restarting negotiations on modalities which should be completed without further delay. According to feedback from several developed and developing country members, discussions at Cancún seemed to be moving in the right direction. These advances must be capitalised upon. The EU and the US need to make meaningful concessions on subsidies, if they want additional market access in major developing country markets. Contrary to what happened at Cancún, more attention needs to be given by the Quad and the G20+ to the demands of the poorest members for effective special and differential treatment.

  18.  We suggest the General Council set, as soon as possible, a new date for the completion of modalities and for the chairman of negotiations to start consultations based on the various framework proposals presented by WTO members.

COTTON

  19.  Cotton became a litmus test at the Cancún conference because it provides a stark illustration of the flaws of current WTO rules on agriculture. Despite disciplines agreed during the Uruguay Round, cotton subsidies are threatening the survival of tens of millions of producers in developing countries. West African countries came to negotiate in good faith and presented constructive proposals in Cancún, gathering solid political support from the vast majority of both developed and developing countries.

  20.  The failure to reach a result at Cancún is a serious set back. West African countries have showed some flexibility at Cancún in terms of the end date of trade-distorting cotton subsidies. But their producers cannot wait until the end of the round for action, especially if it is delayed beyond 2005 and implemented over the course of five to ten years. By then, one of the very few competitive sectors in these desperately poor countries would be dead, which is why cotton was put on a separate track in the first place.

  21.  The text presented on 13 September, which was rejected by the vast majority of WTO members, should be discarded as a basis for discussion. To move towards a solution as soon as possible, the negotiation group on cotton issues, created at Cancún, needs to be reconvened as soon as possible to look at alternative options.

  22.  Of course, the phase out of all trade-distorting cotton subsidies would require important efforts on the part of the United States, the main subsidizer of cotton, and also the European Union. Potential difficulties for cotton producers in wealthy countries, especially small producers, must be taken in account. But these concerns should not be used as an excuse for inaction. While clearly insufficient, the proposed reform of the EU cotton sector is a useful first step. The US should also rise to the challenge and come up with constructive proposals regarding its own cotton subsidies. Any meaningful initiative would be helpful to resolve the current deadlock.

SINGAPORE ISSUES

  23.  Singapore issues played a significant role in the failure of the Cancún ministerial.

  24.  In pre-Cancún ministerial declarations, 90 developing countries had clearly indicated that they were not ready to launch the negotiations at this time. They were backed by the majority of NGOs and trade unions, several international business groups, and the World Bank as well as parliaments of several EU member states.

  25.  Clearly misreading the political climate, proponents such as the European Union, Canada and Japan continued to hope that opponents would accept their approach, while the vast majority of members clearly indicated their unwillingness to launch negotiations at this time. The insistence on launching negotiations in such a context contributed to a polarised political climate.

  26.  Irrespective of their individual merits, it is clear that, for the time being, Singapore issues cannot be negotiated at the WTO. It is time for demandeurs to accept this political reality if they want negotiations to restart on a more constructive basis. The European Union should take a positive step forward by clearly indicating their readiness to drop Singapore issues from the negotiation agenda so the atmosphere can be cleared and membership can focus on the core agenda of the WTO. Such a step would demonstrate concretely that the message sent by developing countries has been heard and that the European Union is ready to make concessions to salvage the multilateralism and the WTO at this decisive moment.

TRIPS

  27.  Included as an appendix is the joint NGO statement issued on 30 August in response to the WTO decision on patents and medicines which was aimed at allowing countries without adequate drug production capacity (including all developing countries) equal rights to affordable generic medicines as rich ones.

  28.  NGOs are critical of the WTO decision that we believe is unnecessarily restrictive due to pressures from rich countries. We had supported a simpler, fairer and broader solution which had been backed by developing countries, the WHO and intellectual property experts, but which was rejected by the US and EU.

  29.  Nevertheless, given that the decision has been taken, Oxfam now believes that it should be tested and hopefully made to work. To that end, countries with drug production capacity, including the UK, should amend their national legislation to allow compulsory licensing for export. The lessons from implementing the WTO decision should be used to simplify and improve the final amendment at the WTO discussions on which will begin in December.

  30.  In addition, Oxfam and other NGOs also strongly urge WTO members to fully implement the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. This requires:

    —  Countries to begin using all the TRIPS public health safeguards to provide affordable medicines to the poor, (including complusory licensing, Article 30 exceptions, the 30 August, 2003 decision, and the extended deadlines for LDCs granted by the Doha Declaration).

    —  An end to rich country and corporate pressure on developing countries to implement TRIPS plus obligations in regional or bilateral trade agreements.

    —  Technical assistance bodies including the WTO secretariat, WIPO, government to ensure that the Doha Declaration is fully integrated into their technical assistance programmes.

    —  Companies to agree to a systematic and global system of tiered pricing, and to endorse the use of the TRIPS public health safeguards by developing countries.

  31.  However, while the recent WTO decision on TRIPs and health was supposed to remove restrictions on the export of affordable generic medicines—it does nothing to address the 20-year patent period imposed by TRIPS which restricts the production of affordable medicines. Increasingly, in the future the supply of generic versions of newly patented medicines will rely on countries issuing compulsory licenses. Unless this can and is done in a routine and flexible way, or unless patent periods are shortened in developing countries, it will become increasingly hard for generic companies to achieve the necessary markets and economies of scale to produce affordable, quality generic medicines. And if this happens it will mean new improved medicines will remain priced out of reach for many of the world's poor.

  32.  For this reason the international community must continue to monitor the health impacts of the Agreement, and consider further future reforms to the TRIPS Agreement in order to give developing countries greater freedom to decide the appropriate length and scope of patent protection for medicines based on public health needs. More broadly, evidence from authorative sources such as the recent Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) and the Royal Society indicates the need for a substantive review of the entire TRIPS Agreement in the light of its detrimental impact on global intellectual property rules on innovation, access to knowledge-based goods and development.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

  33.  Given the failure of the Cancún ministerial, the issue of institutional reform has been raised by several members, including the European Union.

  34.  There is little doubt that procedural issues contributed to the Cancún failure, including the drafting of text under the responsibility of chairmen, the role of facilitators, decisions regarding the sequencing and prioritisation of issues on the conference agenda, and the lack of clear procedures and responsibilities for extending the conference.

  35.  For instance the revised declaration, which arrived late in the process on the afternoon of the penultimate day (13th), failed to reflect reactions and counterproposals of developing countries. The enormous gap between the proposed text and the positions of the vast majority of the membership led a number of countries to question the value of their participation at the conference.

  36.  Previous attempts at institutional reform, initiated by the breakdown at Seattle, have failed. While business as usual is not an option, Big-Bang proposals and sweeping reforms are unlikely to be accepted by all parties, at least in the near future.

  37.  However some concrete, common-sense, reforms could be adopted before the end of the year, which could significantly improve the atmosphere and help restart negotiations in a more transparent and efficient manner. These include:

    —  a decision by the General Council on which text should be the basis of further discussions;

    —  clearer terms of reference for chairs/friends of the chair;

    —  clearer procedures for preparing new drafts, which should reflect different views or present options on controversial issues;

    —  a more realistic timetable for the completion of the talks.

CONCLUSION

  38.  The way forward is simpler than it seems. WTO members need to stay true to the spirit of the Doha ministerial declaration, where ministers recognized that the world trading system was deeply imbalanced and needed to respond better to the needs and aspirations of developing countries, which constitute the vast majority of its membership. This decision was made not out of naïve generosity, but based on the growing realisation that sustainable development for all would guarantee greater prosperity and stability, and is in every country's interest. It is now time for WTO members, with the support of civil society, to transform this vision into concrete actions.

RESPONSE TO UK GOVERNMENT'S REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE, PARAGRAPH 108

  39.  We agree with, and welcome, the Government's commitment to reach agreement on a new framework for special and differential treatment for poor countries, but firmly believe that an important aspect of that framework should be longer transition periods for poor countries for relevant WTO agreements. TRIPs is a prime example, and indeed WTO members recently accepted the need for longer transition periods for poor countries by extending the compliance period for medicine patenting for LDCs until 2016. This was a welcome step in the right direction, but the extension is a fixed and short period, and based on political calculations rather than health or development criteria. The need for longer compliance periods for poor countries is also supported by the findings from the independent Commission on Intellectual Property (the CIPR) established by the UK Government. It said "We are not persuaded by the arguments that developing countries at very different stages of development should be required to adopt a specific date (January 2000 for developing countries and January 2006 for least developed countries) when they should implement TRIPS regardless of their progress in developing a viable technological base. On the contrary we believe there are strong arguments for greater flexibility in setting an optimum time to strengthen IP protection, taking into account the nation's level of economic, social and technological development". (Also see further quotes below.) It makes logical sense for compliance periods for both least developed and developed countries to be extended on bloc based on their achievement of development milestones".

  40.  Moreover, in a DTI response to a parliamentary question on this topic from Tony Worthington MP, the UK Government accepted the case in principle for longer transition periods. It said it "the UK Government supports the development of objective criteria to form the basis upon which extensions on TRIPS transition periods should be agreed. The Government therefore supports the introduction into TRIPS of a mechanism for extending transition periods for individual developing countries". We believe that the Government should also support mechanisms for extending transition periods for developing and least developed countries en bloc.

  41.  Finally, we do not understand why the Government thinks that "longer transition periods could mean that many countries would be unable to take advantage of new trading opportunities, leaving them excluded and marginalised in the world trading system". Developing countries are not likely to push for longer compliance periods in agreements which bring them clear and immediate benefits. Moreover, unlike in plurilateral agreements they would still be signatories to the agreement and thereby party to ongoing negotiations.

  42.   Quotes from CIPR about the impact of global IP rules on developing countries: "Because developing countries are large net importers of technology from the developed world, the globalisation of IP protection will result in very substantial net transfers from developing to developed countries."

  43.  "There is much less evidence from developing countries indicating that IPR systems are a key stimulus for innovation. Indeed, for most developing countries with weak technological capacity, the evidence on trade, foreign investment and growth suggests IP protection will have little impact. Nor is it likely that the benefits of IP protection will outweigh the costs in the foreseeable future. For most developing countries."

  44.  "The evidence suggests that the IP system hardly plays any role in stimulating research on diseases particularly prevalent in developing countries, except for those diseases where there is also a substantial market in the developed world. Nor it is likely that the globalisation of IP protection will lead to greater investment by the private sector for the development of treatments for diseases that primarily affect developing countries. The evidence also suggests that patent protection has an effect on the prices charged for medicines. In the absence of patents more people would be able to afford the treatments they need."

October 2003


 
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