Memorandum submitted by Save the Children
UK
1.
Summary of Main Observations and Recommendations
This memorandum presents observations and recommendations
pertaining to humanitarian and development assistance in Iraq,
and the future role of DFID in meeting critical humanitarian and
development needs. The main points are summarized here across
five key areas:
I. The Role of DFID in Humanitarian and Development
Assistance in Iraq
- To better meet its target objectives, DFID should
revise assumptions underlying its Interim Country Assistance Plan
(CAP) for Iraq on a regular basis, identify how best to 'sequence'
its programmes, and identify commonly-used indicators (e.g. UN
Common Country Assessment indicators) to monitor progress;
- DFID should incorporate and prioritise child-focused
initiatives in its programme activities, especially in the Health
and Education sectors;
II. The Role of DFID's Partners
- In light of the current minimal operating presence
of the United Nations in Iraq, DFID should assess the cost effectiveness
of funding certain sectoral interventions through the UN;
- DFID should ensure that implementing partners
guarantee a majority role for Iraqi stakeholders in managing and
implementing DFID-funded projects;
III. Coordination of Service Provision and
Policy
- To what extent has DFID established close working
relationships and liaison arrangements with other UK Government
entities (including FCO, UK-MoD etc.)?
- DFID should work with members of the Donor Core
Group to ensure that there is a single, well-resourced assistance
and reconstruction coordination centre within the interim administration;
IV. The Security Environment and Humanitarian
Space
- DFID is uniquely well placed to play a pivitol
role in ensuring that the delivery of humanitarian assistance
according to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality
and independence is not compromised by inappropriate engagement
of military forces in 'humanitarian'-like activities. To date,
DFID has not been proactive in executing this role;
- As part of its enhanced working relationship
with the UK MoD (on Iraq) DFID should adopt a proactive stance
in ensuring that UK military missions/activities protect and expand
the operational space necessary for humanitarian assistance in
Iraq;
- DFID should launch an initiative to engage humanitarian
and military actors for the purposes of updating guidelines on
humanitarian-military relations to better reflect the current
operating environment and threats faced by humanitarian workers;
V. The Transition From Humanitarian Relief
to Reconstruction and Development
- To better monitor progress towards achieving
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for Iraq, DFID should
use the UN Common Country Assessment indicators to (i) establish
a development "Baseline"; and (ii) to track changes
in conditions associated with the MDGs.
I Save the Children UK's Work in Iraq
2. Save the Children UK's mission is to fight
for children's rights and to deliver immediate and lasting improvement
to children's lives worldwide. SC UK's work for children is guided
by the following strategic goals: basic services enjoyed by all
children; children safeguarded in emergencies; children protected
and respected as citizens; and child-focused economic policies.
3. Except for a short period bracketing the conflict
in March/April 2003, SC UK has sustained an operational presence
in Iraq since 1991. Following initial deployment to the region
to provide emergency relief to displaced persons following the
failed Kurdish uprising, SC UK established a relief programme
inside Iraq for returning refugees in August 1991. This programme
focused on repair of shelters and food distribution.
4. SC UK decided to work exclusively in Iraqi
Kurdistan after the Government of Iraq made clear its intention
to restrict access and activities of humanitarian non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in the South/Central regions. From 1992 to
1997 SC UK's programme activities focused on rehabilitation of
villages, roads and schools, and assistance to agriculture.
5. Towards the end of 1999 SC UK revised its
programme in Iraq to focus on long-term development, including
social development, community mobilization and capacity building
for local authorities. SC UK moved away from direct program implementation
to working through local communities and local institutions in
the areas of social services, alternatives to institutionalization
and juvenile justice.
6. SC UK currently has 20 (predominantly Iraqi)
staff working in the country, with offices in Erbil and Baghdad.
SC UK activities include emergency education, institutional capacity
building for local NGOs, and enhancing child protection at the
community level. In addition to its programme activities, SC UK
has engaged in policy-directed research on aspects of the humanitarian
situation in Iraq since 1998, including research on food security
and livelihoods in Northern Iraq.[6]
7. Based on Save the Children UK's operational
experience and institutional research, this memorandum serves
to provide constructive input and recommendations to the International
Development Committee on the issue of "Development Assistance
in Iraq", across five key subject areas: (i) the role
of DFID in humanitarian and development assistance in Iraq; (ii)
the role of DFID's partners; (iii) coordination of service provision
and policy; (iv) the security environment and humanitarian space;
and (v) the transition from humanitarian relief to reconstruction
and development.
II Context: Framing Assessment of Development
Assistance in Iraq
8. There are several important operational and
policy-related factors that define the context for development
assistance in Iraq. These factors provide a 'lens' through which
to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian and
development assistance in the country. These bounding parameters
include: the security situation in Iraq; legal principles underlying
international intervention; agreed donor principles for humanitarian
assistance; and operating policies, guidelines that relate to
humanitarian assistance.
The Security Situation in Iraq
9. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq
constitutes the dominant constraint on humanitarian and development
assistance in the country. The security situation is characterized
by: (I) armed engagements between Iraqi security forces and Multinational
Force (MNF) troops on the one hand, and insurgent groups on the
other; (II) attacks by individuals and groups against persons
believed or perceived to be supporting the political transition
process; (III) deliberate targeting of humanitarian- and development
workers; (IV) the raised general level of lawlessness; and (V)
increased level of 'retribution'-type attacks between various
elements of the population.
10. Any assessment of humanitarian and development
assistance in Iraq must therefore take into account the level
of operational presence and activity that is feasible in such
a volatile security environment.
Applicable Legal Principles and Regimes
11. The legal framework and context within which
humanitarian and development assistance activities have been undertaken
in Iraq has changed in response to the factual situation 'on the
ground': From the onset of hostilities in March 2003 to 28 June
2004, the provisions of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (especially
the Geneva Conventions of 1949) as they relate to conduct of hostilities,
protection of civilians, and situations of occupation were clearly
applicable, and were recognized as being so by the UN Security
Council. This was the case notwithstanding the debates that were
ongoing on the legal basis for the conflict itself.
12. With the assumption of power by the Iraqi
Interim Government on 28 June 2004 the legal regime became less
clear-cut. Although international humanitarian law is still held
to be applicable in Iraq, the extent to which the law of belligerent
occupation remains applicable will depend on the factual situation
on the ground (including the extent to which foreign forces exert
control over specific areas).[7]
Donor- and Humanitarian Agency Principles and
Policies
13. The Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship
agreed by major donors in Stockholm in June 2003 also frame the
assessment of humanitarian and development assistance in Iraq.
Participants in that international meeting endorsed a common definition
of humanitarian action, and agreed principles relating to, among
other issues: allocating humanitarian funding in proportion to
needs; participation of beneficiaries; promoting accountability,
efficiency and effectiveness; and support for implementation of
guidelines on humanitarian-military relations.[8]
14. Other relevant framing principles and guidelines
include the guidelines for humanitarian-military relations in
delivery of humanitarian assistance. Of particular relevance in
this regard are the policy papers and guidelines produced by the
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Steering
Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC).[9]
III The Role of DFID
in Humanitarian and Development Assistance in Iraq
15. DFID published its Interim Country Assistance
Plan (CAP) for Iraq in February 2004. The CAP identifies the following
development goal for Iraq: "an inclusive, Iraqi-led reconstruction
process that brings sustained benefits to all citizens, particularly
the poor and vulnerable." [10]
16. The interim CAP sets out the following strategic
objectives to fulfill the primary development goal: (i) to promote
rapid, sustainable and equitable economic growth; (ii) to encourage
effective and accountable governance; (iii) to promote social
and political cohesion and stability. The CAP provides a frank
and objective assessment of the challenges and opportunities that
DFID has encountered in implementing its programme in Iraq. DFID
has compiled a matrix of objectives, activities and indicators
to assess progress in implementing its programme out to March
2006. The first annual assessment of progress is due to be completed
in March 2005.
17. Between 1991 and October 2002 the UK Government
provided approximately £100 million for humanitarian assistance,
predominantly for Northern Iraq, focusing primarily on making
the UN Oil-for-Food Programme more effective and strengthening
local capacity to provide support for vulnerable persons.[11]
Save the Children UK believes that this capacity building support,
provided through international NGOs, significantly enhanced the
ability of local institutions in the three Northern Governorates
to respond to the needs to the population and to enhance fulfillment
of human rights. This capacity building activity has provided
the Kurdish Region with a distinct advantage over the South/Centre
of Iraq in addressing current and future challenges.
18. From the onset of the conflict in March 2003
to the end of May 2003, DFID provided £115 million through
the United Nations, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs to meet humanitarian
needs in Iraq. As of 30 July 2004 DFID had committed £331
million to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq,
allocated as follows: UN pre-conflict preparedness - £13
million; UN consolidated appeal 2003 - £71.8 million; International
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) - £70 million;
Red Cross - £32 million; NGOs - £7.4 million; DFID secondments
and security - £28.1 million; and 'Other Reconstruction Work'
- £109 million.
19. An approximate sectoral breakdown
of the 'destination' of DFID funds disbursed under the UN Appeal-,
NGO- and 'Other Reconstruction Work' categories is provided in
Figure 1.[12]
The eleven groupings in Figure 1 combine the seven clusters identified
in the UN-World Bank Joint Needs Assessment of October 2003 and
four other sectors where DFID has committed funds.[13]
20. A new Ministry of Civil Society Development
has recently been established in Iraq. The exact role and functions
of this entity are not yet clear. However, the Ministry appears
to be in the early stages of formation, with limited 'personnel'/administrative
capacity.
21. Observations and
Recommendations:
- In light of the dynamic security
situation, DFID should revise assumptions underlying the CAP on
a more regular basis (every 3 months), and revise programme activities
accordingly.
- DFID should consider identifying more frequent
intervals (than annual reviews) for monitoring progress in implementing
its programmes in Iraq, and should identify indicators for this
purpose that can also be used to measure progress towards meeting
the needs identified in the joint UN/World Bank Needs Assessment.
For example, indicators used for the UN's Common Country Assessment
Process may provide a basis for measuring progress.
- Given that an estimated 50 % of Iraq's population
is under 15 years of age, DFID should incorporate and prioritise
child-focused initiatives in its programme activities, particularly
in the Health and Education sectors.
- Under its strategic objective of "promoting
social and political cohesion and stability", DFID should
consider its role in supporting aspects of the constitutional
drafting process in Iraq as they relate to the incorporation of
children's rights into the draft Constitution (to be drafted by
the National Assembly following elections).
- Of the funds DFID has provided to UN 2003 Appeal,
NGOs and 'Other Reconstruction Work' categories, only 0.92 % has
been targeted to the "Human Rights, Gender and Environment"
cluster. Although funds may have been provided to these sectors
through multilateral partners (e.g. International Reconstruction
Fund Facility for Iraq), DFID may wish to consider programme interventions
that will support additional activities in these sectors, particularly
in promotion of human rights and advancement of women's and children's
issues.
- DFID has recognized the needs for the development
of a vibrant civil society and an independent media. DFID should
take steps to ensure that civil society organizations are supported
by the Iraqi Interim Government, but that they are not constrained
in any way in their legitimate activities by the interim administration.
The role of DFID in this regard may be to advise and support the
Iraqi Interim Government in establishing registration processes,
resource centres, networking initiatives and technical assistance
(especially IT-related) to provide an environment conducive to
the emergence of civil society organizations.
- DFID should seek to clarify the role and objectives
of the new Ministry of Civil Society Development, and should take
steps to ensure that civil society can develop independently
of state institutions - the essence of "civil"
society. In this regard, DFID should consider provision of additional
support to international civil society organizations (CSOs)
to enter into capacity-building partnerships with emerging Iraqi
CSOs.
- DFID has acknowledged the need to better 'sequence'
programme implementation. DFID should assign priorities to key
sectors such as support to government institutions, rule of law
and civil society development initiatives that will have a knock-on
effect on other sectors, and that can deliver results within the
constraints of the existing security environment.
IV The Role of DFID's Partners
22. The total amount of £331 million committed
to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq by 30 July
2004 was allocated to DFID's partners as follows: United Nations
(preparedness and UN Appeal 2003) - 25.6 %; International Reconstruction
Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) - 21.1 %; Red Cross Movement -
9.7 %; NGOs - 2.2 %. Funding was provided to a variety of entities
under DFID's 'Other Reconstruction Work' category (33 %), and
DFID secondments and security accounted for 8.5 % of the total
amount committed. (See Figure 2)
23. DFID has stated that it will need to implement
some programmes bilaterally in the short term (in light of the
operational constraints on UN/International Financial Institutions'
activities).
24. Observations and Recommendations:
- In light of the current minimal
operational presence of the United Nations in Iraq, and purely
as an interim measure, DFID should consider assessing the cost
effectiveness of funding certain activities through the United
Nations, especially in areas where the organization has limited
access to implement the programmes. In some circumstances the
funding may be more effectively delivered directly to the implementing
partners in Iraq (local, national institutions and NGOs).
- DFID's funding of 'Other Reconstruction Work'
accounts for almost 33 % of all DFID funds committed to date.
DFID should ensure that implementing partners in this category
identify qualitative or/and quantitative indicators that will
enable DFID (and UK Government) to assess the effectiveness of
these contributions.
- In pursuit of its goal of an "inclusive,
Iraqi-led reconstruction process" in Iraq, DFID should
ensure that implementing partners (if not entities within the
Iraqi Interim Government) guarantee a majority role for Iraqi
stakeholders in managing and implementing DFID-funded projects.
V Coordination of Service Provision
and Policy
25. The United Nations Assistance Mission for
Iraq (UNAMI) supports the coordination of humanitarian activities
in Iraq through the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Displacement
and Migration in Baghdad.[14]
In its Interim CAP of February 2004, DFID identified that the
(then-) Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) had established an aid coordination process, working
primarily through the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation.
It is unclear whether these two coordination mechanisms are working
in parallel, or whether they have been merged into a single coordinating
entity.
26. Observations and Recommendations:
- In its Interim CAP, DFID asserted
that "we must be joined up with other UK government departments".
To what extent has DFID established close working relationships
and liaison arrangements with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Ministry
of Defence (MoD) vis-à-vis fulfilling DFID's development
goal in Iraq?
- DFID should play a lead role in moving from a
'high-level' liaison relationship among members of the Donor Core
Group (apparent situation as of September 2004) to a more technical
approach to coordinating programme activities and reducing overlap/redundancy
within the Group.
- DFID should work with members of the Donor Core
Group to ensure that there is a single, well-resourced assistance
coordination mechanism within the Iraqi Interim Government.
VI The Security Environment
and Humanitarian Space
27. Save the Children UK has undertaken significant
policy-directed research on the subject of humanitarian-military
relations in recent years.[15]
This work has provided practical recommendations to cross-agency
efforts to develop guidelines for humanitarian-military relations
in complex emergencies.
28. Save the Children UK maintains that the increased
involvement of military forces in relief operations (as part of
militaries' Peace Support Operations), the increased justification
of military interventions on purported "humanitarian"
grounds, and the multi-dimensional nature of recent peacekeeping
and peace-enforcement missions have conspired to blur the conceptual,
policy-related and operational boundaries between humanitarian
and military activities.
29. Save the Children UK further maintains that
this erosion of the conceptual and operational space necessary
for effective delivery of humane, impartial, and independent assistance
has contributed to the deterioration in humanitarian security,
a term used to encapsulate the various aspects of physical and
psychological safety of both assistance providers and recipients
associated with, and necessary for, humanitarian operations. In
Afghanistan and Iraq, aid workers have been targeted in part because
of their perceived association with foreign forces and because
they present a 'soft' target for would-be attackers.
30. A defining feature of the interface between
humanitarian and military actors is the differing perspectives
each party holds on what exactly constitutes "humanitarian"
assistance. While there is general agreement on the substance
of what constitutes humanitarian assistance (what is delivered),
the processes and motivations driving the delivery of assistance
differ. Humanitarians provide assistance based on principles of
humanity, impartiality and independence and based solely on need.
Military forces (with the exception of some UN-mandated peacekeeping
forces) act in pursuit of political- and military objectives and
frequently undertake relief operations to win the 'hearts and
minds' of local populations.
31. SC UK has identified three important shortcomings
of existing guidelines for humanitarian-military interactions:
(a) the guidelines are based on the faulty premise that the fundamental
principles of humanity, independence and impartiality will be
acknowledged and respected by all military actors; (b) the guidelines
are not sufficiently explicit concerning situations where civil-military
teams engage in a complex or ambiguous range of missions; and
(c) the guidelines do not sufficiently address scenarios where
the needs are less humanitarian than in full crises, yet a situation
is bad enough to warrant a military intervention.
32. Existing guidelines
do provide for direct military implementation of relief operations,
but only in limited, "exceptional circumstances". In
such instances, the use of military or civil-defence resources
should satisfy the following criteria: the military resources
represent means of last resort; a significant level of need is
identified by civilian agencies; interventions remain under civilian
control and are time bound.
33. In the case of Iraq, the use of private security
contractors has further compromised the distinction between military
and civilian personnel. In many cases, these security contractors
wear civilian clothes, fall outside the military chain of command,
travel in unmarked vehicles similar to those previously or currently
used by humanitarian workers from international organizations,
and provide security for persons working on projects that may
be similar to those undertaken by humanitarian agencies.
34. Observations and Recommendations:
- As the UK Government department
responsible for reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development,
and for leading the reconstruction effort in Iraq, DFID is uniquely
well placed to play a pivitol role in ensuring that the delivery
of humanitarian assistance according to the principles of humanity,
impartiality, neutrality and independence is not compromised by
inappropriate engagement of military forces in 'humanitarian'-like
activities. To date, DFID has not been proactive in executing
this role.
- As part of its enhanced working relationship
with the UK MoD (on Iraq) DFID should adopt a proactive stance
in ensuring that UK military operations protect and expand the
operational space necessary for humanitarian assistance in Iraq.
- DFID should facilitate a dialogue between non-governmental
humanitarian agencies (NGHAs) and the Multinational Force in Iraq
on practical approaches to ensure the protection of humanitarian
space in Iraq. The output from such an initiative could be a set
of agreed "Working Principles" for undertaking assistance
and reconstruction activities in Iraq.
- The "Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian
Donorship" agreed at the June 2003 International Meeting
on Good Humanitarian Donorship (Stockholm) highlighted that "humanitarian
action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity,
impartiality, neutrality and independence." DFID should
play a lead role within the Donor Core Group, and among other
key donors, to ensure that the principles agreed in Stockholm
are operationalized in Iraq.
- DFID should launch an initiative to engage humanitarian
and military actors for the purposes of updating guidelines on
humanitarian-military relations to better reflect the current
operating environment and threats faced by assistance providers.
- In situations where UK military forces engage
in relief operations in 'exceptional circumstances' as provided
for under the SCHR Guidelines for humanitarian-military interactions,
DFID should ensure that such activities are undertaken according
to the criteria outlined in those Guidelines (see para. 31 above).
VII The Transition
From Humanitarian Relief to Reconstruction and Development
35. In contrast to situations of rapid-onset
humanitarian crisis, the situation in Iraq is characterized by
structural factors that affect humanitarian conditions. These
factors include the dilapidated state of essential infrastructure
(especially Water and Sanitation); the dependency of the population
on the public (ration) distribution system since the mid-1980s
(and especially since 1990); the legacy of a state-controlled
economy which was overly dependent on the oil sector; and the
prevailing insecurity which limits the ability to meet humanitarian
needs.
36. Iraq represents a case of development regression,
whereby the 'de-development' of the society has advanced to such
a point that it is impacting humanitarian conditions.
37. Observations and Recommendations:
- To better monitor progress towards
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for Iraq, DFID
should use the UN Common Country Assessment Indicator Framework
to (i) establish a development "Baseline"; and (ii)
to track changes conditions associated with the MDGs.
- DFID and other key donors should identify and
implement targeted initiatives in the four key sectors of Health;
Food & Nutrition; Water & Sanitation and Education, to
move from direct provision of palliative assistance towards longer-term
development activities. Such interventions could include, for
example, efforts to improve food security by reducing dependency
on the public ration system; direct support to revitalize/expand
the network of Community Child Care Units etc. Strategies for
humanitarian-development transitions should be considered by DFID
when it focuses on better 'sequencing' of its activities (see
para. 20).
VIII Conclusion
38. Save the Children UK maintains that notwithstanding
the operational challenges in Iraq, DFID can play a critical role
in supporting Iraqi leadership of development and humanitarian
assistance in the country. This enhanced role will require a more
proactive approach on the part of DFID in several areas, including
(i) working with Iraqi authorities to coordinating programme interventions
among key international donors; (ii) ensuring that the objective
of an Iraqi-led reconstruction process becomes a reality; and
(iii) working with other donors, UN, military forces and NGOs
to take practical steps to preserve the operational- and conceptual
space for humanitarian action.
October 2004
6 For example: Alastair Kirk and Gary Sawdon, Understanding
Kurdish Livelihoods in Northern Iraq: Final Report (London:
Save the Children (UK), January 2002); Save the Children (UK),
Winning the Peace in Iraq: Defining a Role for the United Nations
(London: Save the Children (UK), May 2003). Back
7 The preamble
to UN Security Council resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004 states:
"Noting the commitment of all forces promoting the maintenance
of security and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with international
law, including obligations under international humanitarian law
…" Back
8 Government
of Sweden, International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship:
Meeting Conclusions (Stockholm: June 2003). Back
9 UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Guidelines
on The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United
Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (New
York: UN-OCHA, March 2003); Steering Committee for Humanitarian
Response (SCHR), SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military
Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance (2002,
revised 2004); Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Civil-Military
Relations in Complex Emergencies. An IASC Reference Paper
(Geneva: IASC, 28 June 2004). Back
10 UK Department
for International Development (DFID), Iraq: Interim Country
Assistance Plan (London: DFID, February 2004). This development
goal has been identified in the context of the broader UK Government
goal to: "support and encourage a stable, united and law
abiding state that provides effective and representative government,
sustainable economic growth and rising living standards for all
Iraqi citizens." Back
11 UK Department
for International Development (DFID), UK Humanitarian Assistance
to Iraq (London: DFID, 14 October 2002) Available at http://www.reliefweb.int
(accessed 26 September 2004). Back
12 It is important
to note that this is an APPROXIMATE sectoral breakdown.
Data were compiled by Save the Children UK based on DFID 'Iraq
Update' documents. Blocks of funding provided to some recipient
organizations covered more than one sector, and in such cases
only the primary sectoral allocation of funds was considered.
Back
13 United Nations,
United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment (New
York: United Nations, October 2003). The seven clusters are: (A)
Education, Health and Employment Creation; (B) Infrastructure;
(C) Agriculture, Water Resources and Food Security; (D) Finance
and Private Sector Development; (E) Mine Action; (F) Government
Institutions, Rule of Law, Civil Society, Media; and (G) Human
Rights, Gender and Environment. Back
14 See: United
Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant
to Paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546 (2004), UN Document ref.
S/2004/710 (New York: United Nations, 3 September 2004) : paragraph
47. Back
15 See: Gerard
P. Mc Hugh and Lola Gostelow, Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan
(London: Save the Children (UK), September 2004); Jane Barry with
Anna Jefferys, A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military
in Humanitarian Response, Network Paper # 37 of the Humanitarian
Practice Network (London: Overseas Development Institute, January
2002). Back
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