Memorandum submitted by the Department
for International Development
1. INTRODUCTION
1. This Memorandum aims to address the questions
raised by the Committee in announcing this Inquiry on 21 July.
It focuses on the role of DFID and of the wider donor community,
since the end of major hostilities in April 2003. The final section
provides a brief overview of current progress on reconstruction.
2. DFID PROGRAMME IN IRAQ, APRIL 2003 TO OCTOBER
2004
2. DFID's current strategy for Iraq is set out
in the Interim Country Assistance Plan, which was published in
February 2004. Its development goal is an inclusive, Iraqi-led
reconstruction process which brings sustained benefits to all
citizens, particularly the poor and vulnerable. Its three primary
objectives are:
· To promote
rapid, sustainable and equitable economic growth
· To encourage
effective and accountable governance
· To promote
social and political cohesion and stability.
3. The principal elements of DFID's programme
in Iraq, as it has evolved since April 2003, have been as follows:
a. The initial priorities were to ensure an effective
response to humanitarian needs arising from the 2003 conflict,
and then to begin supporting the process of reconstruction.
b. From the end of the 2003 conflict until the
handover to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) on 28 June 2004,
DFID contributed advisers to the Office for Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and then to its successor, the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
c. Beginning in the summer of 2003, DFID developed
a programme to support the regeneration of the southern four Governorates,
amongst the poorest parts of Iraq, and to restore their links
with the centre.
d. DFID has also developed a "National Programme"
primarily to provide advice to the new IIG on core central government
functions, and also to promote Iraqi civil society and political
participation.
e. Multilaterally, DFID has worked to strengthen
international support for Iraq's reconstruction, and has contributed
£70 million to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility
for Iraq (IRFFI) to enable the World Bank and United Nations to
assist in a wide range of sectors.
4. These elements are described in more detail
in the following sections. A summary list of the projects funded
is at annex 1.
a. 2003 humanitarian assistance through the
UN, ICRC and NGOs
5. The primary objectives of DFID's humanitarian
assistance in 2003 were to ensure that the international community
was sufficiently prepared to avert any major humanitarian crisis
arising from the 2003 conflict, and to assist in the restoration
of essential services after the conflict. DFID contributed £85m
towards the humanitarian and reconstruction operations of UN Agencies
in response to appeals launched in March and June 2003. DFID committed
£32 million to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
(IRRC) movement in 2003, £18 million of which has been disbursed,
primarily to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Some of this has subsequently been carried forward into 2004 due
to IRRC's inability to operate within the deteriorating security
situation. This assistance has provided emergency rehabilitation
and repair work at vital health, water and sanitation facilities
serving millions of people throughout the country. We are considering
with the ICRC and the IFRCS to what extent further support may
be needed. £7.2 million was also provided to NGOs for their
post conflict humanitarian work in Iraq, in sectors including:
health, nutrition, water and sanitation, food, agriculture, security,
mines action, media, humanitarian coordination and information,
displaced people, power, fuel, education, and human rights.
6. The UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs were able to
set up effective humanitarian operations quickly after the end
of the major conflict in 2003, using their previous experience
of working in Iraq and established local networks with capacity
to deliver assistance on the ground. The deteriorating security
situation since mid-2003, particularly following the UN and ICRC
bombings, has resulted in a significant reduction in the numbers
of their international (non-Iraqi) staff able to work in Iraq.
This has caused some slowing down of the implementation of assistance
programmes. However, many organisations' Iraqi staff have continued
to operate discreetly, and effectively, and assistance has been
channelled though emerging Iraqi NGOs and private sector companies.
International NGOs have also retained a stronger presence in Kurdish-controlled
areas where they have been able to operate more easily and have
a good track record.
b. Support for the Coalition Provisional Authority
7. From mid-2003 until 28 June 2004, DFID contributed
to the provision of qualified personnel to the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) to support its work towards the effective reconstruction
of Iraq. About £28 million was spent on this programme, and
related security costs.
8. In the CPA headquarters in Baghdad, DFID provided
24 personnel. The posts included the CPA Director of Operations,
and advisers to the Ministries of Finance, Municipalities and
Public Works, Trade, Industry and Minerals, and Planning and Development
Cooperation. DFID advisers to the CPA also worked on food security,
gender and migration issues.
9. In southern Iraq, DFID provided over 40 technical
experts to the regional office of the CPA in Basra between
October 2003 and June 2004. Key subject areas included infrastructure
services (power, fuel and water), health, education, social
policy and welfare, agriculture and transport. Advisers worked
closely with senior provincial officials from the four southern
governorates over this period. This work enabled DFID to develop
sound local working relations early on in the reconstruction process
and to deepen its understanding of the problems facing some of
the poorest areas of Iraq.
c. DFID programme in Southern Iraq
10. In addition to the deployment of DFID staff
and consultants to the CPA in southern Iraq, DFID's main priority
in the south prior to the handover of power to the IIG was the
restoration of essential infrastructure. This work included an
Emergency Infrastructure Programme focusing on the reinstatement
of infrastructure for power, fuel, and water supplies, as well
as sewerage systems; and other projects focused on the refurbishment
of public sector buildings. The majority of this work has now
been completed. It cost US$100 million, of which US$ 66 million
was met from the Development Fund for Iraq and US$34 million by
DFID. The programme was managed in close collaboration with the
Iraqis and UK forces. It helped to stabilise infrastructure in
the south and make some improvements before the arrival of larger
investments from the US Supplemental and, in the longer term,
Iraqi's own budget and the private sector.
11. The longer-term challenges to reducing the
high levels of poverty in the south are to promote economic recovery
and to build political and other links between the south and the
centre. A priority will be to strengthen Iraqi capacity to ensure
that the flows of financial resources coming into the region over
the next two years are used well and are targeted at sustainable
and inclusive economic growth. DFID has agreed a new capacity
building programme for the four governorates in southern Iraq,
worth £20.5m over two years. The programme will help the
southern governorates to plan and manage reconstruction funding.
The implementation of this programme in the Governorates of Al
Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan is currently being hindered by the
poor security situation. The programme is continuing in these
areas through management from Basra and day visits to the other
three governorates. DFID is also financing (over a six month period
from July 2004) a £16.5m programme to assist employment generation
and to provide a facility to deal with potential critical failures
in essential services.
12. Other DFID support in the south includes
the development an effective media through a £6.7m project
being undertaken by the BBC World Service Trust; and a one-year
project to support de-mining. Some of DFID's national programme
work will also benefit the south, including the funds for political
participation and civil society capacity building.
d. The "National Programme"
13. DFID is working at the national level in
Iraq to support the development of public policies and reforms
which benefit the poor and strengthen public administration, based
on the three Country Assistance Plan objectives:
(i) Promote rapid, sustainable and equitable economic
growth
14. DFID has a £3 million programme to assist
the IIG in the design and implementation of essential economic
reform programmes, which will also help Iraq in its negotiations
for a debt-reduction package. DFID has also provided over £3
million towards an IMF technical assistance package for Iraq.
This support has provided training for Iraqi officials in a wide
range of public financial management areas. These programmes have
helped to facilitate agreement to an IMF Emergency Post Conflict
programme, which is an important precursor to debt reduction negotiations
in the Paris Club. DFID has also provided around £8.5 million
towards an International Finance Corporation (IFC) finance facility
for small and medium enterprises in Iraq. This facility aims to
strengthen the capacity of Iraqi financial institutions and provide
much needed finance to the Iraqi private sector.
(ii) Encourage effective and accountable governance
15. DFID's £3 million Emergency Public Administration
Programme is providing technical support to the Iraqi Prime Minister's
Office, other government institutions and three ministries which
are key for reconstruction: Finance, Municipalities and Public
Works, and Planning and Development Cooperation. The project aims
to build the foundations for a modern professional and accountable
civil service. DFID is also exploring how we can help strengthen
the capacity of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In
the justice sector, a £2 million project is providing training
to the judiciary, prosecution and bar association; and a £1
million project with the Institute of War and Peace Reporting
is providing training for journalists to help develop independent
and effective news media.
(iii) Promote social and political cohesion and
stability
16. DFID has established a Political Participation
Fund (PPF) which aims to increase opportunities for participation
by Iraqi citizens in the political process; and a Civil Society
Support Fund (CSSF) which focuses on strengthening the capacity
of Iraqi civil society organisations. Each fund, worth £5million
includes elements to promote gender equity.
e. Multilateral Assistance: IRFFI
17. The International Reconstruction Fund Facility
for Iraq (IRFFI), was set up in December 2003 by the United Nations
and World Bank. It provides bilateral donors with a means of channelling
their contributions towards Iraq's reconstruction priorities in
a coordinated manner, and reduces the transaction costs to the
Iraqi Government of dealing with many different donors with their
own individual priorities and procedures.
18. In March 2004, DFID made a £70 million
contribution to IRFFI: £30 million to the trust fund managed
by the United Nations, and £40 million to the World Bank's.
For the UN, we stipulated that our contribution should go towards
DFID priority sectors, including primary and secondary education,
health, water and sanitation, electricity supply, refugees and
governance. In September 2004, in response to an urgent request,
we allocated US$10 million of our £30 million contribution
specifically to meet security costs for the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq. Our contribution to the World Bank's fund
is not earmarked to specific sectors or projects. A decision on
any further contributions will be based on an assessment of progress
made, requirements for 2005 and resources available in DFID's
Iraq programme.
19. Overall, donors have committed just over
US$1 billion to IRFFI: US$400 million to the World Bank's trust
fund and US$600 million to the UN's. The biggest contributors
are Japan (US$490 million), European Commission (US$192 million),
UK (US$120 million) and Canada (US$75 million). A full list of
donors and their contributions is attached at annex 2.
20. The UN has approved projects worth a total
of US$377 million, covering all regions of Iraq in sectors including
health, education, water and sanitation, and infrastructure. Implementation
has begun on several of them. The UN's pipeline of projects under
preparation will absorb all the finance currently available. In
addition to IRFFI-funded projects, the UN is continuing to implement
projects for which finance was provided during 2003 under the
emergency appeals for Iraq. Over US$100 million was disbursed
in the first half of 2004, including emergency support for people
affected by the fighting in cities such as Fallujah and Najaf.
21. Two World Bank projects are currently underway:
over 600 Iraqi officials have received training; and approximately
40,000 textbooks have been delivered. Projects are under preparation
in education, urban infrastructure, water and sanitation, health
and private sector development.
22. The lack of an international presence in
Iraq of either the UN (until very recently) or the World Bank
has inevitably slowed project identification, approval and implementation,
and has inhibited the development of normal contacts with the
Iraqi government. The UN and World Bank have made considerable
efforts to overcome these difficulties through remote-working
links with their Iraqi national staff, focusing on work that can
be implemented by Iraqis and the private sector, using teleconferencing,
and hosting coordination and planning meetings in Amman. Pending
the return of international staff, DFID has contracted liaison
officers to represent the UN and the World Bank in Baghdad.
23. DFID plays an active role in the IRFFI Donor
Committee which provides strategic supervision of the funds. Its
next meeting is in Tokyo on 13-14 October where discussion will
focus on the progress of project implementation, and coordination
with Iraqi Ministries. The meeting will also provide an opportunity
for outreach to other potential donors to Iraq, and for the presentation
of Iraq's development priorities through its new National Development
Strategy.
3. OTHER DONORS
24. At the Madrid Donors Conference for Iraq
in October 2003, more than US$32 billion was pledged in grants
and concessional loans, as well as trade credits and assistance
in kind. The largest pledges were from the USA (US$18.4 billion
in grants), Japan (US$1.5 billion in grants and $3.5 billion in
loans), the World Bank (US$3 to 5 billion), IMF (US$2.5 billion)
and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia ($500 million each). A full list of
pledges is attached at annex 3.
25. The principal US instrument for assistance
to Iraq is its US$18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund (IRRF), which was approved as an Emergency Supplemental Appropriation
in November 2003. This funding is being managed mainly through
the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) in the US Embassy in
Baghdad. The main sectors for expenditure are security and law
enforcement, justice, electricity, oil production, and water and
sanitation. A recent reprioritisation exercise is expected to
shift some expenditure away from some longer term electricity
and water projects towards more immediate needs of security, oil
production and employment generation.
26. Japanese grant assistance is split
between multilateral contributions of US$500 million (US$490 million
to IRFFI and US$10 million to the International Finance Corporation
small business facility) and bilateral funding. US$517 million
of the latter has so far been programmed for the power sector,
hospital rehabilitation, water treatment plant, and vehicles for
the police, fire service and sanitation services. Japan is also
channelling US$35 million through NGOs. Work is beginning on programming
the US$3.5 billion which will be available in concessional loans
from next year.
27. The European Commission, Canada
and a number of smaller donors are channelling most or all of
their funding through IRFFI.
4. COORDINATION ISSUES
a. Whitehall Coordination
28. Progress in Iraq requires parallel progress
on security, the political process and reconstruction of the economy
and state institutions. DFID works closely with other Government
departments to ensure coherent UK policy and approach. The Secretary
of State for International Development attends regular Ministerial
Iraq co-ordination meetings. DFID officials participate in weekly
Whitehall meetings on strategy, security and day-to-day practical
issues, and daily contacts take place with other government
departments at working level. An example is the regular coordination
which takes place between DFID, FCO and HM Treasury economics
specialists on economic reform and debt reduction issues. In Iraq
the DFID offices are an integral part of the Embassy in Baghdad
and the British Embassy Office Basra. DFID staff in Iraq work
closely with their FCO, MOD and military counterparts.
29. The MOD's Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) has
also played an important role in reconstruction in southern Iraq.
MND(SE)'s ability to operate quickly and effectively on the ground
has contributed to stabilising security in the region.
b. Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP)
29. The FCO, MOD and DFID have pooled human and
financial resources, to develop and implement a Conflict Prevention
strategy in Iraq. The Iraq GCPP programme, with a budget of £19m
in 2004/05, is managed by FCO and focuses on three key objectives:
· Building
the capacity of the Iraqi government and civil society to carry
out conflict prevention and resolution initiatives;
· Preventing
further polarisation and reducing underlying tensions between
different elements of Iraqi society;
· Building
the capacity of the security sector, with special emphasis on
the police and prisons.
30. Security sector reform has been the emphasis
of much of GCPP's work, focusing on police and prison service
training, mentoring and monitoring. Other activities include technical
support to the Human Rights and Foreign Affairs Ministries, interfaith
activities, media, civic education, and training on a variety
of conflict resolution priorities. A devolved fund has also been
provided to the British Embassy in Baghdad to undertake small-scale,
quick impact conflict resolution projects. A summary of GCPP activity
in Iraq is at annex 4.
c. Coordination with the Iraqi Government
31. The nature of DFID's work, much of which
is aimed at strengthening Iraqi capacity to manage the reconstruction
effort, means that good and close working relations with the Iraqi
Government are essential. The present Secretary of State
for International Development has visited Iraq three times for
consultations with Iraqi ministers and senior officials, as well
as, before 28 June 2004, with senior CPA officials.
32. DFID has built its working relations with
Iraqi ministers and officials since the handover of power in June
2004, through DFID's offices in Baghdad and Basra and through
regular visits by UK-based staff.
d. Donor Coordination
33. DFID plays an active role in promoting donor
coordination on the ground in Baghdad and in the south. Priorities
are to ensure strong Iraqi leadership of the reconstruction effort,
and to encourage donors to work together coherently with the Iraqi
authorities. DFID is providing advisory support to the Iraqi Ministry
of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) to develop the
capacity to take a strategic approach towards donor support to
Iraq.
34. Two coordination mechanisms have been set
up to maintain a strategic overview of international support:
· The
Iraqi Strategic Review Board (ISRB) provides overall policy
guidance for donor assistance and has final approval authority
for reconstruction activities. Its membership comprises representatives
of the Ministry of Finance, MoPDC, and the Central Bank of Iraq.
Donor representatives also attend as observers.
· The
Council for International Coordination (CIC),
chaired by the Minister for Planning and Development Cooperation,
comprises 23 countries which are supporting the reconstruction
effort and are represented in Baghdad. It is the main official
forum in Iraq for dialogue amongst donors and between donors and
the Iraqi authorities. However, its effectiveness is currently
constrained by the absence of development professionals in many
foreign missions in Baghdad.
35. In addition to Iraqi coordination mechanisms,
and the IRFFI Donor Committee, a "Core Group" of donors
pledging $150m or more at Madrid holds monthly telephone conferences
with the MoPDC to discuss reconstruction issues. DFID also maintains
bilateral contacts with a range of other donors.
5. SECURITY ISSUES
a. Effects of insecurity
36. The security situation in Iraq has been difficult
since the end of major hostilities in April 2003. Managing reconstruction
programmes is a continuing challenge. The inability of international
donors and construction companies to move around and operate freely
in the country is a particular constraint. Costs are inevitably
likely to be higher than in normal situations, and the risks of
delay greater. In some cases, infrastructure rehabilitation has
been set back by sabotage or theft. These problems have affected
all international donors in Iraq. As noted above, the UN has only
a small international staff presence in Iraq, and the World Bank
currently has none. Many bilateral donors are also absent or have
minimal representation.
b. DFID/HMG response and staff protection
37. Staff security is the top priority for DFID
and it takes very seriously its duty of care to its employees
working in Iraq. Every effort is taken to ensure their health
and safety, and to provide a secure environment in which to work.
DFID works very closely with FCO to ensure all HMG staff are provided
the same level of protection. Resources are shared to avoid duplication
of effort and reduce costs. The extensive measures that are taken
include the provision of pre-posting hostile environment training
and briefing, body armour, armoured transport, communications
equipment and armed protection. Staff are informed of security
procedures upon arrival in Iraq and subsequently of any changes.
Security procedures are under constant review.
38. DFID and FCO work together to provide armed
protection to HMG staff working in Iraq. This is essential if
DFID employees are to carry out their work with ministries and
on projects. A private security firm, Control Risks Group (CRG)
which also provides intelligence and security advice, provides
this service. A defensive 'armed response' is the very last resort.
39. All DFID employees visiting or working in
Iraq are volunteers and are free to leave at any time. Counselling
is available for DFID employees and their families at any time.
We encourage our contractors to follow the same security procedures
as our own staff and offer help in meeting their duty of care
responsibilities, such as providing armoured transport, armed
protection and access to telephone counselling. The extent of
assistance needed by contractors depends on the capacity of the
organisation, so for solo consultants we provide essentially the
same level of support as we do for our own staff. DFID has offered
NGOs which we are supporting additional finance for increased
security provisions if needed.
c. "Humanitarian Space" issues in
Iraq
40. DFID shares the concern expressed by many
NGOs over the increasing incidence of humanitarian agencies being
targeted by violence in Iraq. Attacks on humanitarian staff have
risen to levels that even agencies used to managing serious risks
find difficult. For humanitarian staff, security normally derives
from the acceptance by all parts of the local community that they
are acting impartially and independently of governments
and combatant forces. In Iraq, humanitarian agencies, including
UN agencies and the ICRC, have struggled to gain that acceptance
in the face of forces determined to create instability and disrupt
reconstruction.
41. DFID generally discourages military involvement
in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance other than under
exceptional circumstances, and any association between military
forces and humanitarian organisations needs to be handled sensitively
in order to avoid a blurring of identities, which may render humanitarian
workers more vulnerable to attack. In Iraq, the UK military has
been provided with resources to undertake quick impact projects
(QIPs) to address real and immediate needs and contribute to providing
a stable environment in which political, social and economic development
can take root. QIPs have played an important role in the military's
presence in southern Iraq: in order to maintain "humanitarian
space" it is important that the military remains in uniform
when implementing them.
42. DFID contributed to the consultation process
prior to the publication of "Guidance for the use of Military
and Civil Defence Assets in Complex Emergencies" (also known
as "The Oslo Guidelines for Complex Emergencies"). DFID
is also involved in a wide range of military training, academic
courses and exercises in addition to consultation on military
doctrine for crisis response operations. We use these opportunities
to highlight appropriate roles for the military in emergencies.
6. PROGRESS IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 2003
43. The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) assumed
authority of the country ahead of schedule on 28 June 2004. Of
the 31 ministers, 6 are women and 5 are Kurds. The Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL), signed by the Iraqi Governing Council
on 8 March, provides a temporary legal framework for the governance
of Iraq until the agreement of a new constitution in 2005. The
TAL confirms the equality of all Iraqis and safeguards fundamental
human rights. It sets out the processes for elections by January
2005, the adoption of a new constitution, and further elections
under that constitution. A 100-member Interim National Council
was selected in August; its role is to hold the IIG to account
until elections take place. The IIG remains committed to the agreed
timetable for elections to be held in January 2005.
44. Since May 2003, the foundations of a market
economy have been laid. The new Iraqi Dinar has been introduced
and its value against other currencies has remained stable. The
Central Bank of Iraq is independent of Government and has kept
inflation under control - only 5.6% in the first 6 months of 2004.
The tax system has been simplified: income tax at 15 per cent,
and a 5% reconstruction levy on most imports. Iraq's economy is
expected to grow by over 50% in 2004, mainly due to higher oil
production and prices, and may rise by a further 17% in 2005.
An IMF programme has been agreed and work is underway towards
a debt reduction deal.
45. Unemployment is still high but steps are
being taken to create new jobs. The Iraqi National Employment
Programme and US reconstruction programmes have created almost
500,000 jobs. In southern Iraq, DFID has set up a project which
will generate up to 1.75 million days of employment, and has contributed
£1million towards a US$30 million job creation programme
managed by UNDP.
46. Oil production has been below target, but
still remains at more than 2 million barrels per day (bpd). Production
is on track for reaching 3 million bpd by early 2005, security
permitting.
47. Water and sanitation have been improved through
extensive programmes to rehabilitate a system suffering from years
of under-investment and neglect. Estimates suggest that immediately
after the conflict, 60 per cent of urban and 30 per cent of rural
populations had access to safe water. Considerable work has taken
place across Iraq to improve the quantity, quality and reliability
of water supplies, which are now better than before the conflict.
In the south, the former CPA estimated that coverage increased
by 10-15 per cent from May 2003 to July 2004. There are still
shortages however, particularly in the south, and the UN continues
to operate water tankers and provide drinking water to vulnerable
groups and inhabitants of rural areas.
48. Prior to the conflict none of the sewage
treatment plants in Iraq were operational and raw sewage was being
discharged into the rivers and waterways. Since then investment
has brought existing pumping stations back into service and repairs
have been made to broken equipment. A major wastewater treatment
plant in Baghdad began operating on May 19, 2004: the first major
plant in the country to operate in over 12 years. Major investment
is planned to extend and improve water and sanitation for the
large parts of the population still lacking these basic services.
49. The health service suffered badly from neglect
and mismanagement under Saddam Hussein. Since the conflict, the
Iraqi Ministry of Health (MoH) has been reformed and, with international
assistance, is increasingly able to deliver essential health care.
MoH has identified priority areas such as primary health care,
disease surveillance, pharmaceutical policy and professional training.
Iraq's 240 hospitals and 1,200 primary health centres are functioning.
Routine vaccination for children and mothers restarted in mid-2003:
so far 30 million doses have been delivered. National polio and
measles vaccination programmes were completed in September 2004.
However, much work remains to be done on maintaining reliable
drugs supplies, coordinating funding, and implementing the MoH's
plans. Security problems continue to restrict access to health
facilities for both the general population and health workers.
50. The education system is functioning. Iraq
has 6 million pupils and 300,000 teachers in over 20,000 schools.
In Higher Education institutions there are 350,000 students and
50,000 employees. USAID, UN agencies and NGOs are undertaking
programmes in teacher training and school refurbishment. 70 million
new textbooks have already been distributed. The World Bank plans
to spend $100 million for emergency education projects: a $40
million textbooks project is underway, and a $60 million school
rehabilitation project is expected to begin soon. The UN is also
undertaking school rehabilitation programmes.
51. Long-term rehabilitation of the energy sector
continues, although security problems have slowed progress. Power
generation is now averaging 4,750 MW, compared with the pre-conflict
level of 4,400 MW. Most of Iraq is receiving between 9 and 15
hours of electricity daily, which should improve as demand reduces
in the cooler months. The Interim Iraqi Government has set a target
of 6,000 MW by the end of 2004. A newly completed rehabilitation
of the power grid is ensuring more equitable distribution across
Iraq.
52. The creation of a free and independent media
is an essential part of Iraq's transition to an open and democratic
society. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, new newspapers
have flourished. DFID is spending about £7 million to support
media development, primarily through the BBC World Service Trust
and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting.
53. After the 2003 conflict an independent High
Judicial Council was established, judges and prosecutors were
vetted, and criminal defendants were guaranteed certain rights.
The Iraqi Special Tribunal, which will try members of the former
regime suspected of crimes against humanity, has been established.
The Human Rights Ministry now has 130 staff, and two lawyers have
been appointed as onsite monitors at the Abu Ghraib prison. DFID
is providing £2 million support to the sector, focusing on
training for the judiciary, prosecution service and the bar.
54. Key bridges have been reconstructed, new
rail tracks have been laid, and ports are being rehabilitated
and opened to commercial traffic. Baghdad International Airport
(BIAP) is now processing an average of 45 non-military arrivals
and departures a day. Iraqi Airways has recommenced commercial
flights after being grounded for 14 years. Telecommunications
have improved significantly with a 49 per cent increase in telephone
subscribers since the conflict. Internet access has become more
widespread, the number of subscribers increasing from around 11,000
pre-conflict, to almost 80,000 in August this year.
55. According to the United Nations High Commission
for Refugees (UNHCR) there were about 400,000 Iraqi refugees around
the world in early 2002. UNHCR is providing assistance for voluntary
returns, and so far 14,000 have returned to Iraq under this programme.
Many more Iraqis have returned to their country without assistance.
The number of spontaneous returns is not yet clear; estimates
range from 15,000 to 50,000. We are pressing the UNHCR for a more
accurate figure.
OCTOBER 2004
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