Memorandum submitted by Christian
Aid
Executive Summary
· Security
remains the primary concern of Christian Aid's partners, who are
effectively obliged to conceal their identity as humanitarian
organizations in order to continue working.
· Many
Iraqis now regard the multinational force as a force of occupation,
and there is considerable public support in many parts of the
country for insurgency against the interim administration and
its security forces, as well as the multinational force.
· The
presentation by Coalition nations of the US-led military mission
to Iraq as a partly "humanitarian" intervention has
led to a failure to establish neutral humanitarian space in which
NGOs, Red Cross and UN agencies can safely access those in need.
There is an urgent need for a new policy with clear separation
of military and humanitarian actors.
· Inter-ethnic
and inter-confessional tensions have greatly increased in Iraq
over the last year and the potential for future violence over
such issues as the control of land and resources, the central
or devolved nature of the state, secular versus religious law,
regional autonomy or secession, is now considerable.
· There
is an urgent need to select, recruit, protect and train Iraqi
police and security forces, in such a way that they will have
the confidence of the communities they will serve.
· As
displaced Iraqis seek to return to their original homes, there
is a need for increased support for the newly established Iraqi
Property Claims Commission and for the establishment of a compensation
fund for those who find themselves displaced in turn, without
a housing solution. Unless the problem of disputed property and
secondary displacement is addressed, it is likely to become a
direct cause of further conflict.
· Concerns
remain about the transparency of accounting for Iraqi oil revenues,
both during the CPA period and under the present Iraqi interim
administration.
· Local
accountability has not been a familiar concept in Iraqi society
to date. There is a need to support central and local government
structures in the fields of strategic planning, communication,
co-ordination, transparency and local accountability
Introduction
Christian Aid believes that the deterioration
of working conditions for both international and local humanitarian
organisations, as well as ICRC, UN and bilateral government agencies
such as DFID, represents the greatest impediment to establishing
the basis for Iraq's long-term development. Addressing the sources
of insecurity in ways that facilitate the long-term objectives
of Iraqis themselves to reconstruct their state and society should
be a priority for all those committed to providing humanitarian
assistance to Iraq.
This submission is based both on Christian
Aid's own observations and responses to questions asked of six
Iraqi partner organisations during the course of August and September
2004. These NGOs' views represent a snapshot of the conditions
in which they have been working since the transfer of authority
to the Iraqi interim government on 28th June 2004.
However, we are concerned about the difficulties we and our partners
are experiencing in gaining accurate information about conditions
for development across the whole of Iraq. There are large swathes
of the country about which little is currently known, above all
to Iraqis themselves.
Since security remains the primary concern of the organisations
Christian Aid supports, we have relayed their responses anonymously.
We regret that partners have to disguise the fact that they are
humanitarian and development NGOs by such measures as removing
external signs from their premises and travelling in unmarked
cars and taxis. In rural communities, far from insurgents and
armed forces, their security is assured by the communities they
serve. But in urban areas they are forced to be discreet about
their sources of funding and their activities.
Before the war Christian Aid's programme autonomous
Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Since 1992, Christian Aid has
supported local NGOs in a range of rehabilitation and development
activities, and continues to do so. A substantial water, sanitation
and community development programme has been co-funded by DFID.
Since May 2003, Christian Aid has extended its operations to provide
humanitarian support in the central and southern parts of the
country, including emergency relief, landmine clearance, water
and sanitation supply, seed banks and nurseries, education, medical
and community needs assessment. As well as keeping in close touch
with our Iraqi partners, Christian Aid staff visited Iraq in June
2003, providing technical assistance to partners and spending
time principally in Baghdad, Kerbala, Basra, Kirkuk and the formerly
autonomous Kurdish governorates.
Since the August 2003 bombing of the
UN in Baghdad, the security situation has deteriorated to the
point where Christian Aid staff are no longer free to travel to
Iraq. We are therefore unable to make first hand assessments,
meet local organisations or the beneficiaries of their programmes
on the ground, or monitor projects in the field. Alternative methods
of liasing with Iraqi partners and local organisations have been
pursued, mainly by meeting in Amman: two such meetings have been
held so far (the most recent in April 2004) and the next is planned
for October 2004. Amman has proved an effective location for partner
capacity building workshops and liaison between CA, other NGOs
and UN organisations. Christian Aid is nevertheless concerned
that the continuing inability of staff to travel to Iraq itself
will, over time, damage our ability to extend our assistance beyond
the partnerships we have already established.
Of the many aspects required for the
successful delivery of development assistance in Iraq, the most
urgent is restoration of a secure environment. The military strategy
adopted by the Coalition nations over the last 18 months has been
to present the multinational force as a partly humanitarian intervention.
As a result, the understanding which might have developed among
the Iraqi population for neutral humanitarian work has never been
established. A clear separation between humanitarian and security
work is now urgently required.
We also believe that actions can be
taken now to restore the trust of Iraqis and pre-empt further
outbreaks of violence. This submission focuses on what we perceive
to be the most urgent courses of action that the British Government
should take.
Key recommendations
· That
the British government use its influence and example to ensure
that the security mission of the multinational forces in Iraq
prioritise the needs of ordinary Iraqis, safeguard their lives
and livelihoods, and move as swiftly as possible towards handing
over control of their own security arrangements to Iraqis themselves
as a prerequisite for development (paras 1.1 to 1.7). A
new policy of a clear separation between military and humanitarian
actors is now required. This will begin to establish neutral humanitarian
space within which the UN agencies, ICRC, international and national
NGOs can begin to play a full role in meeting the needs of ordinary
Iraqis and reconstruction.
· That
the British government, through DFID, take note of rising insecurity
fuelled by interethnic tensions in the
northern provinces of Iraq and resource and accelerate the work
of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) in reviewing and
adjudicating property claims in the city of Kirkuk and surrounding
areas, where property disputes are leading to inter-communal violence.
The British government should also promote and financially contribute
to a Compensation Fund to provide relocation resources to those
whose claim to the land and properties they currently occupy is
disallowed by the IPCC, or who remain homeless or internally displaced
(paras 2.1-2.3)
· That
the British government fulfil its moral obligation to provide
full and transparent accounts for the funds accruing to and disbursed
from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) over which it shared
joint responsibility with US authorities as a member of the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) until 28th June 2004. The
British government should also assist the official auditors (KPMG)
and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) in
their continuing work, and use its influence and expertise to
ensure the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) and its successors set
up systems to monitor the extraction and export of Iraqi oil,
safeguarding the expenditure of oil revenues for the benefit of
Iraqis in the most transparent fashion possible (paras 3.1
- 3.3)
· That
in addition to strengthening central government institutions the
British government reinforce and resource the capacity of local
authorities to coordinate and promote programmes for the long-term
development of Iraq. Local elections are likely to be delayed
by the requirements of preparing national elections by early 2005.
In the interim, the British government should focus its assistance
on ensuring that both Iraqi local authorities and ministries of
the IIG involve local communities in identifying, designing and
implementing development projects and in holding their local authorities
to account for local expenditure and the granting of contracts
for both reconstruction and development (paras 4.1-4.5)
1. Security for Development
1.1 Of immediate concern
to Christian Aid are the humanitarian consequences of continued
military action in Iraq for a population that remains, despite
Iraq's potential wealth, dependent on external assistance and
on a crumbling infrastructure neglected over many years. Iraqi
people certainly require more security than most currently enjoy.
We are especially concerned at the rise in terrorist and insurgency-related
civilian deaths, as well as the use of military force to combat
insurgencies, where this force results in civilian deaths. The
Iraqi Ministry of Health has recorded 3,186 civilian deaths through
terrorist and security force attacks in the period 5th
April to 12th September 2004, a figure that has increased
by at least 100 in subsequent weeks. The death of civilians is
not only unacceptable, but undermines efforts to create a climate
conducive to the sustained and long-term development of Iraq.
1.2 Christian Aid's Iraqi partners share the concerns expressed
in a recent survey by the Washington-based Center for Strategic
and International Studies, which show that many in Iraq now believe
the multinational force to be a force of occupation, regardless
of its intent or future actions.[1]
In this respect, we support calls for a more appropriate use of
military force, which recognises that civilian deaths directly
undermine the core objective of the mission: to return Iraq to
democratic Iraqi control.
1.3 To this end, we welcome recent moves to accelerate the recruitment,
training and retention of an Iraqi police force to provide local
security, but stress that new recruits and applicants need increased
protection from the multinational forces in Iraq. To gain popular
respect, this force needs to be legitimate in the eyes of the
local community and sensitive to local objections to the re-instatement
of former Ba'athist officers and officials. Our partners have
expressed dismay at the training of security forces overseas,
at what is considered to be disproportionate cost and in ways
(and places, such as Jordan and Egypt) reminiscent of practices
of the old regime. Expenses paid overseas are deemed to encourage
further corruption within the security forces and discourage the
kind of patriotism needed for the new circumstances of Iraq.
1.4 Iraqi civil society organisations also emphasise the need
to 'de-militarise' security operations as soon as possible, so
that the Iraqi National Guard are trained as border guards only,
and that the multinational forces support, rather than lead, the
swift return to an Iraqi led civilian security operation. The
need to replace the external military mission with a locally rooted
civilian police force as soon as possible arises from the increasing
concern of Christian Aid partners with new and increasing sources
of criminality. Among the most worrying are the growth in kidnappings
for profit, not just of foreigners, but of Iraqi citizens, and
the targeted assassinations of local officials, politicians and
contractors deemed to be 'working for the Americans.' The daily
lives of Iraqis with whom our partners work are more often affected
by this kind of ambient criminality than they are by insurgencies,
unless they live in or near combat zones. To tackle the diverse
sources of crime, local police forces need to receive human rights
training and be supported by a functioning justice system. In
the absence of due process and local accountability, some police
have 'reverted to their previous practice of torturing prisoners
and death threats to gain information/confessions from them',
according to more than one of our partners.
1.5 In addition to the continuing death toll, Christian Aid remains
extremely concerned at the damage inflicted to the neutrality
of the humanitarian community, both local and international, by
the presentation of the US-led military mission to Iraq as 'humanitarian'.
This association has, in our view, endangered the personal security
of the staff of those international humanitarian agencies to have
remained in Iraq after the UN relocated its HQ to Jordan last
autumn, and has led in recent weeks to their forced withdrawal.
As well as the dangers faced by foreign nationals, we are concerned
for the Iraqis who continue to engage in reconstruction and long-term
development of their country. Many of them are threatened by association
with the activities of multinational force military personnel.
1.6 There is still a tendency, particularly in the US, to assume
that the multinational forces and Baghdad government continue
to face an organised and united insurgency, focused around Sunni
Arab Ba'athist loyalists with some assistance from Al-Qaida linked
foreign terrorists. The reality is much more messy and dangerous,
in that the US-UK Coalition over the past year has managed to
alienate large sections of the population, including Shi'ia Arabs
in the south and centre, who had welcomed the overthrow of the
Ba'athist regime and might have been expected to support a US-led
reconstruction operation in Iraq. Only among the Kurds of the
north is the public approval level of the multinational forces
still reasonably high, and this approval is likely to disappear
rapidly if Kurdish aspirations for autonomy or independence are
blocked.
2. Property
disputes, displaced people and security
2.1 We believe that the unresolved
and long-standing issues of land and property rights require urgent
attention if further inter-communal strife and violence are to
be avoided. This eventuality, we believe, could be prevented if
the British Government were to lend its full support to the work
of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission. It should help set up
and contribute to a Compensation Fund to relocate families already
displaced, to assist those who are willing to move but lack the
means, and to compensate those who will need an incentive to move
if the adjudication process goes against them.
2.2 There has been a reluctance among multinational force nations,
as well as many Iraqis, to accept that most of the violence involves
Iraqis killing Iraqis. Iraqi security forces are now taking most
of the heat and incurring most of the casualties produced by the
insurgency. This violence and its legacy of bitterness have contributed
to existing tensions and mistrust between different ethnicities
and religious confessions, which have increased enormously over
the past year. We have already seen violence between Kurds, Arabs
and Turkmen over contested property in the upper centre area of
Iraq. The potential for future violence between Shi'ia and Sunni
Arabs, between Kurds and Arabs, or between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen,
over such issues as the control of territory and resources, secular
versus religious law, the unitary or devolved nature of the Iraqi
state, Kurdish autonomy or secession, is now very great.
2.3 Given Christian Aid's strong links with organisations in the
northern region of Iraq, we would like to draw the Committee's
attention to rising instability within communities which, with
the exception of the northern city of Tal Afar, are often perceived
to be outside the core regions of recent instability, such as
the Sunni Triangle. One of our partners in Kirkuk commented on
the rise in atrocities over the past six months 'perpetrated in
order to escalate tensions between national groups'. These include
at least 13 assassinations of local officials and politicians,
attacks on main roads outside the city and bomb attacks on individual
quarters within Kirkuk. Our partner reports that in the lead-up
to the national elections, the two main Kurdish parties, the PUK
and KDP, have proposed returning all internally displaced Kurds
to Kirkuk and 'putting a timetable [on] sending back all the people
who came to Kirkuk from the centre of Iraq to their own cities
without giving compensation to them'.[2]
There are also plans to reorganise the administrative map of Kirkuk
to include towns excluded from the province in 1968, in order
to secure a Kurdish majority on electoral rolls prior to the national
elections.
3. Accounting for Iraq's oil revenues
3.1 Following Christian Aid's
reports of October 2003 and June 2004 (Iraq: the Missing Billions
and Fuelling Suspicion: the Coalition and Iraq's oil billions'[3]),
we continue to be extremely concerned by the absence of full and
transparent accounts for Iraqi oil revenues and disbursements
from the Development Fund for Iraq during the period these were
entrusted to the management of the CPA. The CPA ceased its mission
on 28 June 2004 with no accounts at all for its activities over
the previous year. Only on 14 July 2004, the independent auditors,
KPMG, presented the first audits for the period 22 May 2003 to
31 December 2003 to the IAMB, who expressed their concerns over
a number of issues: the absence of oil metering during this period;
the use of unrecorded barter transactions for certain oil sales
in exchange for electricity; the use of non-competitive bidding
procedures for a number of contracts funded from the DFI; and
the absence of a draft report commissioned by the CPA reviewing
controls over the State Oil Marketing Organisation (SOMO).[4]
3.2 In a press release on 8th
September 2004, the IAMB voiced its concern that it has still
'not received reports of audits undertaken by various US agencies
on sole-sourced contracts, despite repeated requests' and noted
that the designated auditors, KPMG, will be delivering their next
report in early October 2004, covering the period 20 January to
28 June 2004.[5]
3.3 Christian Aid would like to bring the Committee's attention
to this report, and to reiterate our belief that the British government
has a moral obligation to account for Iraqi funds accrued and
disbursed in the period that HMG formed part of the CPA. We believe
that this moral obligation extends to ensuring that the IIG and
successor governments establish systems to monitor the extraction
and export of Iraqi oil, above all through installing metering
equipment in accordance with standard oil industry practice. The
British government should also assist the IIG and its successors
in setting up competitive bidding procedures for the future award
of contracts, so that the IIG and its successors can clearly demonstrate
that publicly owned funds are being spent in the most efficient
and transparent way possible for the benefit of Iraqis, rather
than to increase the profits of third party contractors.
4. Local accountability and coordination of development
assistance
4.1 Christian Aid is concerned that
at provincial and local government level, there is insufficient
evidence of a coordinated strategy for the long-term development
of Iraq, either on the part of international humanitarian agencies,
or the IIG itself. Only one of the organisations we support is
aware of DFID's activities in their locality in Iraq, and the
majority of partners who have heard of DFID do not associate DFID
with the British government or distinguish it from other international
or bilateral donor agencies. With the withdrawal of UN agencies
and foreign employees of international NGOs, local Iraqi NGOs
are concerned about the commitment of external agencies both to
remaining in Iraq and to the coordination of externally funded
humanitarian and development activities beyond Baghdad. Within
Iraqi domestic structures, there is a dearth of information on
how central and local authorities interact for the purposes of
coordinating and devolving funds for development, and few opportunities
for civil society organisations to engage in shaping local development
plans.
4.2 We believe that strengthening local government capacity to
respond to local needs is central to maintaining the goodwill
and confidence of Iraqis committed to working for the long-term
reconstruction and development of their country. To this end,
the British government should devote resources to enhance the
capacity of local authorities to coordinate and promote programmes
for long-term development, to increase their consultation with
NGOs and communities most in need, and to prioritise employment
creation. Much current reconstruction work appears to take place
on an ad hoc basis and is focused on the physical reconstruction
of Iraq, without addressing the human aspect of development. For
our partners, human-based development means that Iraqi NGOs assist
community based organisations to draw up priorities for poverty
alleviation and sustainable local employment on the basis of local
experience and expertise. Without the technical and financial
assistance of local authorities to support this process or a clear
policy framework for the future of local development, this activity
risks being isolated and unsupported.
4.3 The proliferation of unregulated
Iraqi NGOs is a cause of concern for the credibility and legitimacy
of development activities. There are now around 3,000 officially
registered national NGOs in contrast to only 250 in May 2003.
In Kirkuk, where there were 7 local NGOs a year ago, there are
now 37. Not all of these are considered to be legitimate NGOs,
since many represent narrow family interests, are linked to political
parties, are contractors posing as NGOs, or are clearly not humanitarian
in mission. Local authorities currently lack the capacity to enforce
legislation introduced by the CPA to regulate NGOs, and we would
urge that the British government address this issue by advising
local governments on how to strengthen their regulatory capacity.
As NGOs are a new type of agency in the Iraqi context, it is critical
to the success of civil society organizations working to improve
the lives of ordinary Iraqis that their role be clearly distinguished
from commercial enterprises or politically motivated groups.
4.4 Lack of financial transparency for the purposes of development
also remains a key concern. Christian Aid's partners are aware
of the different ways in which funding arises (through oil revenue,
customs and income taxes as well via international donors), but
not of how it is allocated or spent. Accountability from central
ministry level to local government level exists in principle but
could be significantly improved. In some cases, when reconstruction
works have been abruptly halted for security reasons (usually
when international contractors have left), local authorities have
not been forthcoming about plans for completing the works or how
they intend to allocate residual funds.
4.5 Corruption has been endemic in Iraq for years, but optimism
for future change is tempered by fears of continuing nepotism
at ministerial level and the appointment of people according to
party or ethnic/religious loyalties, rather than on the basis
of qualifications or competence. In Baqubah and Kirkuk, partners
cite increased competition between central ministries to allocate
budgets and resources ahead of the general elections. We are concerned
that the allocation of aid and development assistance according
to political criteria, rather than on the basis of need, may increase
as the election period approaches. We would encourage the British
government to help the Iraqi authorities ensure that financial
accounting systems established for centrally managed funds also
apply at provincial and local levels, and that greater efforts
are made to devolve central state funding to provincial and local
authorities once these systems are in place.
October 2004
1 CSIS Progress or Peril?
Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction (September 2004, Washington
DC, pp.x-xi http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0409_progressperil.pdf) Back
2
For details on the background to these issues, see Human Rights
Watch Claims in Conflict - Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern
Iraq (HRW, Vol. 16, No. 4(E), August 2004. http://hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804)
Back
3
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/310iraqoil/index.htm
& http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/406iraqoilupdate/index.htm Back
4
See http://www.iamb.info/auditrep/pr071504.pdf
Statement by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board
on Iraq - Release of the KPMG Audit Reports on the development
Fund for Iraq 15 July 2004 Back
5
See http://www.iamb.info/pr/pr090804.htm
Statement by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board
on Iraq 8th September 2004 Back
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