House of COMMONS
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN BEFORE
QUADRIPARTITE COMMITTEE
Wednesday 25 February 2004
RT HON JACK STRAW MP, MR EDWARD OAKDEN CMG
and MR DAVID LANDSMAN
Evidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 72
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Oral Evidence
Taken before the Quadripartite Committee
on Wednesday 25 February 2004
Members present
Mr Roger Berry, in the Chair
Donald Anderson
Tony Baldry
Mr John Battle
Mr Crispin Blunt
Ann Clwyd
Mr Tony Colman
Mr Quentin Davies
Mr Nigel Evans
Mr Bruce George
Mr Fabian Hamilton
Mr Martin O'Neill
Rachel Squire
Sir John Stanley
Mr Peter Viggers
________________
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Rt Hon Jack Straw, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; Mr Edward Oakden CMG, Director, International Security, and Mr David Landsman, Head, Counter-Proliferation Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, examined.
Q1 Chairman: Foreign Secretary, welcome very warmly to the annual get together with the Quadripartite Committee. Perhaps first of all you would like to introduce the two colleagues by your side.
Mr Straw: Edward Oakden, who is Director, International Security, and David Landsman, who is Head of the Counter-Proliferation Department, and there are officials behind who are responsible day-by-day for the operation of our part of the arms control system.
Q2 Chairman: Can I start by thanking yourself and your colleagues for the replies to the questions. Inevitably we have to ask a significant number of questions each year when we scrutinise your Annual Report and we are very grateful for the replies we have received.
Mr Straw: May I thank you for that. I do a good deal of work on those and so do the two officials sitting side-by-side. The people behind and those back in the office have to do a phenomenal amount of work. Our duty is to do it but it is useful to note that it is appreciated and it has a value. I will pass it on to the officials concerned.
Q3 Chairman: Thank you very much. Foreign Secretary, in the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report last year they noted that "a small number of UK companies are still trying to breach export restrictions". Are you confident that those who try to breach export restrictions are actually prevented from doing so?
Mr Straw: I am confident that we are tightening up controls against them. By definition, you can never be completely confident about these things. There are people who make a great deal of money out of breaching arms control regimes not only in this country but elsewhere and/or who support a variety of failing states, states which do not observe international standards, and also in respect of terrorists and in respect of smaller arms criminal organisations as well. So in a sense it is a similar question to that of: is any government getting on top of crime? You think so but obviously you are never going to be sure of the denominator. We are certainly doing everything we can to tighten controls and, if I may, I would like to draw the Committee's attention to a written Ministerial Statement that I made this morning about countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is specific to WMD. I placed before the House a detailed statement about the steps that we are taking to deter, check and roll back WMD programmes in countries of concern. This builds on our experience, for example, in rolling back proliferation as we have been doing in respect ‑ and I have been very actively involved in this ‑ of Libya, Iran and the al-Qaeda network and much else besides. For example, in terms of the Proliferation Security Initiative we are seeking agreements in respect of the boarding of vessels. We have them in respect of the boarding of vessels where we think they are carrying drugs; we now need them where we think they are carrying prohibited weapons and we are seeking such agreements with 10 of the largest commercial flag states. We have got other proposals. There is the idea of a Security Council Resolution on counter‑proliferation. It is interesting that counter-proliferation itself has not been discussed in the Security Council since 1992. We are now seeking a consensus on a Security Council Resolution and drafting is at an early stage. It is extraordinary to me; we have now got a very clear and tough Resolution 3073 on terrorism but not on counter-proliferation. We are seeking ways in which we can further strengthen the safeguards division of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I have seen and admired their work day‑by‑day and at close quarters, not least through my active involvement on both the Libyan and the Iranian fronts, but they do need strengthening. Then something which is of a particular and personal concern to me is the strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Colleagues may be aware that there is a perfectly sound Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons per se but there is no enforcement mechanism of the kind which applies to either nuclear weaponry or to chemical weapons, and we have been seeking an international consensus so there is in future a very clear enforcement safeguards mechanism for biological weapons.
Q4 Chairman: Going back to the Intelligence and Security Committee comment about there being a number of companies trying to breach export restrictions, are you surprised that Customs and Excise has brought only one prosecution over the last couple of years?
Mr Straw: Customs and Excise do a very good job and it has always been a key focus of theirs. They have to operate on the basis of, first of all, the information that is available to them and, secondly, and crucially within the British system, in terms of what evidence could be adducible in court. That is aside from the issue which the Home Secretary is raising for consultation, which is whether intercept evidence could be adducible in court. At the moment under Section 17 of the Investigatory Powers Act it is not at all. There are also, as Dr Berry you will be aware, general rules on evidence which mean that intelligence (which is the basis for a lot of this counter‑proliferation enforcement activity) cannot be adduced in court either because it is not good evidence or because it would compromise the original source. In my judgment Customs do the best job they can but there is always room for improvement and we are in no sense complacent.
Q5 Chairman: Can I ask you a final question on the general issue of export controls. The new Export Control Act ‑‑‑
Mr Straw: --- which I have before me for greater accuracy!
Q6 Chairman: Excellent! Of course that seeks to extend controls not just to technology transfers in tangible form but transfers in intangible form ‑ computer files, et cetera, et cetera. Whose job is it going to be to check electronic communications leaving the country and how is it going to be possible to do this?
Mr Straw: I will be able to provide some more detail in closed session, if I may, about some of the methods that we use.
Q7 Chairman: We are always a bit reluctant to go into closed session unless we have to.
Mr Straw: You may be but I am a bit reluctant to give too much information, thank you very much. If you want these people caught then it is a good idea if I do not give it to you in open session. It is very straightforward. A good deal of work goes on in that respect to counter all sort of threats to our international security. I am grateful to you for drawing attention to both the Act and also the statutory instruments that go with this because they do, as you say, seek to regulate not only goods but also the transfer of intangibles, and controlling that information is very, very important if you are countering WMD proliferation but also other proliferation as well. It is absolutely critical.
Q8 Chairman: That might be an example that we will come back to in confidential session.
Mr Straw: I think you should. I am very happy to answer it but you will forgive me for not going down this route of explanation in public session.
Chairman: Thank you. Fabian?
Q9 Mr Hamilton: Foreign Secretary, I wonder if I could move on to end-use conditions especially in relation to Indonesia. I understand that until August 2002 the Indonesian Government was bound by an undertaking not to deploy British‑built military equipment to Aceh and to provide advance warning of any possible deployment. When you wrote to the Committee on 3 October 2002 - and I do not expect you to remember the details of the letter ‑ to inform us of the Indonesian Government's advance warning of its intent to deploy British‑built armoured personnel carriers to Aceh, why did you not also tell us that the Government had agreed to do without such advance warnings in the future?
Mr Straw: I cannot answer that question offhand ‑ I do not know if Mr Landsman or Mr Oakden can ‑ and I would need to have details. You kindly conceded that I would not have an immediate recall of the original letter which is, after all, getting on for 18 months ago, Mr Hamilton. Let me say colleagues here round the table may or may not agree with the decisions which I and ministers make, but I have always sought to be completely open with the Committee and if I am going to do something which is controversial, still more so. I will have to provide a further explanation. Had I been warned in advance I could have given an answer. I simply do not know is the answer.
Q10 Chairman: For clarification could I just say, Foreign Secretary, you wrote to this Committee on 3 October 2002 not mentioning this change and it was not until we had a parliamentary answer from Mr Mike O'Brien that we were advised this change took place in August 2002. With respect, whoever drafted the letter of 1 October 2002 was probably aware of what had happened in August 2002. Our concern is that we only found out about this change from a written parliamentary answer substantially after the Government had made this decision.
Mr Straw: I will look into it. I have no interest in being anything but completely straightforward and open with this Committee. Sometimes by definition it has to be in confidential session. If that question had been one of the many I received before then I would have been happy to provide an answer today.
Q11 Mr Hamilton: I am sorry you did not receive advance notice of it. Can I look at the general position though because if any country agrees to end-use conditions and makes assurances to us and then breaches them how do we actually police that?
Mr Straw: There is a general issue about policing end use which is difficult for all countries and the principal way you make judgments about end use is on the history of that country and the history of the arms supplier as well. You have to rely, as you do in many other areas, on judgments about past conduct being a good indication of judgments about future behaviour. In some cases where we have had undertakings and they have clearly been broken then that affects the decisions that we make. Colleagues will recall that two years ago it emerged that chassis which were British built, albeit 30 or 40 years ago, were being used by the Israeli Defence Force in the Occupied Territories. We had had some undertakings about them before, they were clearly not being followed, so we made a decision to discount any future undertakings, and so we do. We are seeking to strengthen as far as we can end use arrangements and Mr Landsman or Mr Oakden may like to add something to it.
Mr Oakden: It is an area that we have said we will look at doing more and at the last Committee hearing you mentioned the Blue Lantern exercise which the Americans have mounted. We have looked quite hard at what that procedure involves ‑‑‑
Q12 Chairman: Sorry to interrupt, I do not think we are talking about Blue Lantern. We are talking about when the Government has secured assurances from the government of a country to which arms are exported about the use to which those weapons would be put and whether or not advance warnings about the deployment of those weapons would be made, which used to be the case in Indonesia. That is the issue. I am interested to know why, for example, the Government no longer wants advance warning of deployment of these weapons when that was proclaimed as being a major undertaken given by the Indonesian Government until the policy changed in August 2002. Why did that policy change?
Mr Straw: As I say, I do not think, although I speak from recollection, that the background to Mr Hamilton's questioning is quite as dramatic as is being implied. If I had had notice I could have provided you with some detail about this but there we are, I will have to write to you.
Q13 Chairman: Foreign Secretary, I am trying to be helpful here, what is the current policy in relation to assurances provided by Indonesia?
Mr Straw: What is the current policy?
Mr Oakden: The Indonesian Government have given us repeated assurances that they will not use British‑built equipment in a way which would infringe human rights obligations or in an aggressive way. We have repeatedly sought confirmation, and I can give you specific instances over the last year, to confirm that those assurances remain in effect and, on that basis, and I think this is probably the answer to Mr Hamilton's question, we do not think that the question of notice of advance deployment arises, in the sense that the Indonesians have already given us assurances that they will not use this British‑built equipment in a way which would contravene the consolidated criteria.
Mr Straw: If they are not going to use it they are not going to use it so there would not be a question of them giving notification of using. It does not arise and I think that is the point we are making.
Q14 Chairman: With respect, it does arise. In Mike O'Brien's answer to a parliamentary question on 12 June last year he said: "Before August 2002 the Indonesian Government provided assurances that British‑supplied military equipment would not be used in Aceh or anywhere else in Indonesia against civilians to prevent the exercise of their rights of free expression" et cetera. "The Indonesian Government added that if against expectations they were to contemplate the use of such equipment in Aceh at a later stage, they would inform the British Government in advance." At the time therefore the British Government were celebrating the policy, which was that we had the assurance they would not use equipment in these circumstances, but in addition there was a double arm lock; if they were to think about it then they would inform the British Government in advance.
Mr Straw: What is your question now? What is your anxiety?
Q15 Chairman: Firstly, that to suggest that the second condition is irrelevant now is incorrect. It clearly was not irrelevant to the Government not too long ago and it is really a question about the status of the assurances you received from the Indonesian Government.
Mr Straw: I will do my best to go into this. I am surprised that you did not think it appropriate to give me forewarning of such a detailed question, if I may say so, given the fact that I am subject to all sorts of really detailed questions on all sorts of subjects in advance. If I had had the information ahead of me I could have answered the questions on it. The arms control system covers a huge range of countries and of subjects. We do our best to digest all the briefing that we can but on a detailed issue like this where we have not had notice of the large number of letters that go backwards and forwards between the Committee it is a bit more difficult to give the answers that you are seeking here. If I had had the information in advance I would have done so. I promise you I will follow it up as quickly as I can. If you want to see me again in session I am happy to oblige. Until I have been able to look at the matter in the way in which I look at literally hundreds of issues you raise with me on other matters, I am sorry that I cannot give you a more detailed reply.
Chairman: We had advised your office that we were going to raise questions about Indonesia.
Q16 Mr Hamilton: I am sure you will know the answer to this, Foreign Secretary. Have any British officials or ministers visited Aceh at all in recent years?
Mr Straw: Officials have. I visited Indonesia. I certainly did not go to Aceh. I went there the year before last. I am told that officials have been.
Q17 Mr Hamilton: Would it be possible to let us know details of those visits in writing?
Mr Straw: Yes, of course, but not off the top of my head.
Mr Landsman: The most recent was in February this year, very recently.
Q18 Ann Clwyd: Foreign Secretary, as you know Indonesia has always been a controversial issue, particularly the export of arms to Indonesia. According to the most recent US State Department report on human rights in Indonesia they say: "Soldiers and police murdered, tortured, raped, beat and arbitrarily detained both civilians and members of separatist movements. These abuses were most apparent in Aceh ... where members of an on‑going separatist movement killed at least 898 persons ... during the year. Human rights violations in Aceh were frequent and severe during the year." I think the broad question we are concerned about is what appears to be the rapidity with which the Government appears to view Indonesia as an eligible market for UK arms sales and I think that is a legitimate matter for debate. I think last time you came you said that you would look at the US system of end use monitoring. Mr Oakden did refer to it a moment ago. What conclusions have you reached about the possibility of formalising a British system of end use monitoring following your consideration of the US Department's Blue Lantern programme?
Mr Straw: Thank you for the question. It goes without saying that I share the concern about the reports of abuses of human rights in parts of Indonesia, and we apply the consolidated criteria with very great care, particularly with countries like Indonesia. We looked at this issue of end use monitoring to which Mr Oakden referred and which is called the Blue Lantern programme, as I understand it, and is run by the Office for Defense Trade Controls Compliance Department What they do is use indicators or warning flags to identify exports of potential concern. Under their system every US mission overseas is required to have a Blue Lantern point of contact. In some posts but not all it is the customs attaché or the defense attaché who carries out this programme. I wrote to members of this Committee and I hope you received the letter. I am advised that we already carry out the vast majority of the work of the Blue Lantern programme as part of our current programme and procedures. Although we have not badged it as a separate programme. Obviously the integrity of a system of export controls is very heavily dependent on being pretty certain about how they are going to be used in the end. If those procedures are defective then it renders the whole system defective. At the same time this is a problem as much faced by the US as by us. Since by definition you are selling to third countries, the degree of direct control you can have over those third countries or organisations within them is going to be more limited than if you are selling within your own country. What I said in my letter is that we are going to encourage relevant officials to make greater use of the facility that is already available to them to request end use monitoring on a case‑by‑case basis and to remind them of the indicators which would suggest such action. I will keep a close eye on this as well and I am sure it will be useful for the Committee to do so too. There is already quite a lot done on end use monitoring, including the particular case which I drew to the attention of the House of Commons two years ago, the case to which I have just referred, where it was our defence attaché in Tel Aviv who gained knowledge by really quite good detective work of the use of these armoured personnel carriers which were based on British chassis. That amounted to direct end-use monitoring and I then made it known to the Commons and to your Committee. There is already a lot but we are trying to upgrade it because you cannot just say, "This is Blue Lantern and we will put it into the UK". We have to build on the relevance of the way the Blue Lantern system operates for the UK.
Q19 Ann Clwyd: Could I quickly ask you would you then assert that we do have a regular system of end-use monitoring of arms that are exported from Britain?
Mr Straw: We have a system for it. The question is are we able to monitor the end use in every circumstance? The answer to that is no. Are we seeking to upgrade the monitoring we provide? The answer to that is yes.
Q20 Mr Hamilton: Can I briefly come back to Aceh for a second, Foreign Secretary, bearing in mind what you said earlier. I want to know how you react to the accusation that the Government is turning a blind eye to the breach of end-use assurances in Aceh?
Mr Straw: I would just say we are not turning a blind eye to anything. You will be aware that there is an application for judicial review in respect of arms licences to Indonesia so I am constrained in what I can say but we apply the consolidating criteria. We do not turn a blind eye to anything. Why should we?
Q21 Mr Viggers: Comprehensive monitoring is of course very difficult but there are occasional press stories indicating that there might be breaches. For instance on 24 June 2003 The Guardian quoted the senior military spokesman in Aceh who reportedly said that Scorpion armoured vehicles "will become a key part of our campaign to finish off the separatists. Maybe later the British Foreign Minister will have a fit." And The Times newspaper of 22 May 2003 quoted the Army's chief spokesman as saying about the British‑built Hawk jets: "we have already paid, so there is no problem. We use fighters to defend our sovereignty." My question to you, Foreign Secretary, is does the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have in place a system of following the press, vetting the press and informing the local post and encouraging the local post to enquire as to the accuracy of the story?
Mr Straw: Yes is the answer and on the decision to approve licences in 2002 for Scorpion armoured vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, all the licences concerned were scrutinised against the consolidated criteria. We would not have issued a licence which was inconsistent with the criteria. Let me say this: the security forces have a legitimate right to adequate protection whilst carrying out their duties, as long as they operate in accordance with international human rights standards and humanitarian law. That is also consistent with the common criteria. As far as the approval of in this case Hawk spares following the declaration of martial law in Aceh in May 2003, let me say this again: all the licences were scrutinised against the consolidated criteria and the Indonesian Government has consistently confirmed their assurances that British-built military equipment would not be used offensively or in violation of human rights. In addition, the Indonesian Government has confirmed that there are no plans to use Hawk offensively in Aceh or in contravention of the assurances.
Mr Landsman: Might I just add to the Foreign Secretary's answer. There is no evidence that Scorpion has been used in Aceh in recent times. From our researches we have no confirmed evidence that any British‑built military equipment has been used in any way contrary to the Indonesian assurances anywhere in the country in 2002 and 2003, and that all the high level contacts with senior Indonesian personalities have confirmed the assurances. They certainly have not said that the assurances that have been given do not apply.
Q22 Mr O'Neill: Can we move on to the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports. As I understand it, there are two mechanisms, the denial notifications, which are the means whereby you circulate refusals, and there are also the undercut notices, where another country may have refused to grant a licence but country B, as it were, decides that there are grounds to do so. I realise that these are not legally binding but it has been suggested that some potential customers play off one country against another. Could you perhaps give us an indication as to how effective these two mechanisms have been both as policy instruments and in practice?
Mr Straw: I came to this system pretty fresh when I became Foreign Secretary two and a half years ago and I think I had a healthy scepticism about whether or not this system, which is based on a political agreement (and it is not legally binding across the European Union but it is in many countries' domestic law) was going to be effective, but I have been pleasantly surprised by the extent of co‑operation between European countries. I know there are stories about country X or country Y trying to pull the wool or go behind the rules, but I have yet to see evidence of that. Sometimes different judgments are made on similar applications. We may have decided to agree a licence whilst other countries have said they are not going to and they have sent a denial notification. Sometimes the reverse is the case and we have denied a licence and other EU countries have and a third EU country decides to issue a licence. On the whole, however, I think it works pretty well, although, as you may know, there is a review now taking place because the consolidated criteria are five years old. Certainly let me say - and I am not presuming anything in terms of your own opinion - I am not in favour of turning this into part of the acquis of the EU, part of EU law, where that could all end up being subject to QMV and adjudicated before the European Court of Justice. I think it is better that this is seen to be an instrument of common defence and foreign policy. I want to ask my officials here if they want to add anything.
Mr Landsman: I cannot give you a precise figure but we reckon there are about 15 or so undercuts per year across the board, not very many, and that would suggest perhaps a pretty considerable convergence in the interpretation which each Member State will have to give to the Code of Conduct and applying the criteria there on a case‑by‑case basis for each application.
Q23 Mr O'Neill: I think it is significant that the words "imprecise" and, in your case Secretary of State, "surprise" were used. I kind of get the feeling that there has not been a great deal of rigour applied. You say there might be 15. Is there any particular country which is more likely to undercut other people's denial notifications?
Mr Straw: In terms of undercutting we consulted other Member States 20 times last year and we undercut them five times. There is detailed information held on this and if we have not already provided it to the Committee we can seek to do so. As Mr Landsman has said, it is relatively low numbers. I think we would have to provide information in a confidential session because the denial notices and undercut notifications are confidential. One Member State does make information available about its denial notices, which is the Netherlands, but all the rest of us do not, for our own reasons. In terms of total numbers it is roughly proportionate to the size of the different countries' defence industries. You will be aware of that distribution.
Q24 Mr O'Neill: I understand that next year when we have the Presidency, the Code of Conduct will be up for review. I presume that you are already giving thought to that review. Can you give us any indication as to what you would regard as the priorities into which you would wish to group the various issues that will come within the composite?
Mr Straw: Let me say we are in the market for proposals.
Q25 Chairman: Excellent! We are in the market for helping.
Mr Straw: Thank you very much. Very good. You always have been, by the way. Let me give you some examples, if I may, and I give four. One is in respect of licensed production overseas and we suggest the inclusion of text on licensed production to the effect that Member States should carefully consider what might happen to the finished products in licensed production agreements in which their exports or technology or components are the raw materials. We do this already but it is not fully spelt out within the terms of the common criteria. There are arms brokering licence denial notifications where a licence to broker strategically controlled goods is denied, and we want those to be subject to the same process as the export of export equipment currently is, so for example if someone is refused a licence to broker in the United Kingdom and then applies for a similar licence elsewhere, the other country would need to consult us before issuing it. That is very important. There are intangible technology transfers and the Export Control Act, to which you referred Chairman, is introducing controls on the export of military information and designs and we think it should also be reflected in the common criteria. Then there is the issue of transparency standards and, as you have kindly acknowledged in previous reports, our Annual Report on arms exports is by far and away the most comprehensive in the European Union. It is the most thorough and transparent system of arms control, I would suggest, in the world. We want to raise transparency standards by including in the Code a provision which obliges Member States to publish a publicly available report containing information about equipment exported and not just a breakdown of how many licences they issued for each destination because what is the case, coming back to the burden of your earlier question, is that whilst the criteria are common and I am satisfied about their application, it is also the case that for most of our EU partners they provide none of the information that we routinely provide to this Committee nor, I am certain, do my colleague foreign ministers, probably bar one or two, ever have to go through the processes which we have to go through in scrutinising the applications, not least because we know that if we do not do that (and it is our duty) there is interrogation before the Quad Committee to follow! This is all parliamentary accountability and it concentrates the mind and it is a good thing and one supports the other, so that our system is very transparent, and we want to see similar transparency elsewhere and then in a sense it would be easier to answer your first question.
Q26 Mr O'Neill: Can I ask one last question and that is within the review ‑ and I can understand the point you make about the criteria ‑ if you want to get the information, do you think there will be a need for some form of stiffening of the Code which is at the moment voluntary and which you have been at pains (and I have some sympathy with the view) to point out that we do not want to be cast in the role of "super" regulators in a European context or to be unduly litigious, but why should other people not go through the same pain and suffering that we are trying to inflict on you today?
Mr Straw: I am a well‑known masochist anyway ‑‑‑
Q27 Mr O'Neill: Spread it around a bit. That is where the sadism comes in!
Mr Straw: You and I are old friends, Mr O'Neill, and you know I enjoy it! Let me say it is not voluntary. It is the result of a Common Position within the European Union (and that is a capital C, capital P) made within the relevant pillar of the Treaties, and a Common Position is binding, so, for example, we in a separate area (but it is a good illustration) agreed last week to a continuation of sanctions on Zimbabwe initially through a Common Position, some parts of which are put into force by regulations under other pillars in the Treaty but in a Common Position it is binding. That is absolutely right. I think colleagues here would be in favour of that. What I am not in favour of, however, is moving away from this area of foreign and defence policy being settled other than by unanimity and nor am I in favour of making this justiciable because that would then be drawn down the road of detailed regulations of the kind with which you are as familiar on your parent select committee. It is one thing to run the Single Market that way because you need them but this one is a matter of national sovereignty where we act collectively.
Mr Landsman: May I make a point of clarification. The review of the Code of Conduct has actually already started. Member States have been asked to send in their thoughts already. We envisage these being discussed in the EU over the coming months. At the moment we anticipate a final revision decision coming in the autumn. If that timetable is kept to then it is likely this issue will be completed before the UK Presidency.
Q28 Mr Evans: Following the Tiananmen Square massacre and the brutality and the awful deaths of young people that happened there, in June 1989 the EU introduced an arms embargo on China. 15 years have passed since that time and I understand the German Chancellor himself recently said that he was keen on lifting the arms embargo. What is the policy of Her Majesty's Government on that?
Mr Straw: The policy of the British Government is to support a review of the embargo but we have not come to any final view on the merits of lifting it until we have had a full consideration of its effects up to now, and that has been the position that we took at the December Council of the European Union which was on 12 or 13 December which is where it arose. It was very clear in terms of the conclusions which were reached (which were reached unanimously) and I am happy, Mr Evans, to provide you with those. It may be helpful, however, if I provide some background with respect to the embargo. It is not a full scope embargo. It is quite wide in scope but it is not a full scope embargo. Our late and much lamented colleague Derek Fatchett set out in a parliamentary answer on 3 June 1998 the UK's interpretation of it. We do not issue licences for the export of any items which contravene the interpretation and under our interpretation it covers lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles, specially designed components of the above, and ammunition, military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapon platforms and any vehicles which might be used for internal repression. There are other exports of controlled goods which are outwith the embargo but within the criteria. Sometimes there is some confusion about this. That explains why notwithstanding the embargo there are still some arms exports from the UK and other European countries which are permitted, subject to the criteria. One of the two issues that is raised as part of the review - and again I emphasise we have not come to anything like a final decision on this and we are consulting widely about it - concerns the decision to impose this arms embargo, taken, as you say Mr Evans, in the light of Tiananmen Square. We have to ask has the human rights situation moved on in a sufficiently satisfactory way since then? The second issue is at the time when the decision to impose the embargo was taken there were no consolidated criteria relating to arms exports. These criteria are now in place and there is substantial experience of their use in all European Union countries. Then the question is: to what extent is the arms embargo overtaken by this? To what extent would goods which are prohibited under the embargo be prohibited in any case under the common criteria? Those are the issues which we are seeking to examine with great care.
Q29 Mr Evans: Is it more human rights you are interested in as far as the review is concerned rather than proliferation or stability?
Mr Straw: As far as proliferation is concerned, there are other international instruments in place which we are obliged by law to observe, for example in respect of nuclear proliferation under the NPT. As you will be aware, China in any event is a nuclear state under the NPT and I can ask Mr Oakden to give you more information about that. We are looking at it in terms of what has changed in respect of human rights and what has changed in respect of arms control but also there are wider strategic questions as well so we are looking at it in the round and that is the way all members of the EU are looking at it.
Q30 Mr Evans: There are a number of other countries, and Uzbekistan springs to mind immediately, on the human rights front where we do not have an arms embargo there and we do against China. What is the difference there?
Mr Straw: The difference there I suggest is an historical one. To come back to the point, Tiananmen Square was an event which was shocking to the whole of the world and it was felt there ought to be an international reaction. Although, as I said at the time, we had legislation to enable us to impose such controls, as did some of the other European states, there were no consolidated criteria. Now what we do in respect of Uzbekistan is quite an interesting point; we apply the consolidated criteria. That is what we do in respect of a wide variety of other countries, including Indonesia. So far as I am aware, although sometimes people say there ought to be a full scale arms embargo with respect to country X and country Y, generally speaking there is acceptance that these are pretty robust. So that is one of the issues. As I say, the other issue is a wider strategic issue.
Q31 Mr Evans: I am wondering whether there is a timescale on the review?
Mr Straw: Not a specific timescale on the review. There were some who were asking that it be completed by next month but I do not think there is any chance of that because there are some very detailed issues to weigh up. Whether it is completed before the summer is an open question. Do you want to come back on the wider WMD proliferation issues?
Mr Oakden: What we are trying to do is to universalise particularly the additional protocols - and this does not apply so much to China as to countries of proliferation concern - so that you give the IAEA greater ability to inspect actively the countries of concern.
Q32 Mr Evans: Foreign Secretary, can I just raise one issue which we have been written to as a Committee about from a company in the North West of England, not in my constituency I hasten to add ‑‑‑
Mr Straw: Not in mine either?
Q33 Mr Evans: Not in yours. It relates to whether all our EU partners are playing the game on this. It is a company that was going for a contract on some equipment to supply the Chinese armed forces and we refused them permission to do so. It was a cockpit and aircraft exterior lighting system. We said no and basically a French company came in and won the contract. It is worth £20 million so you are talking about a substantial sum of money here for an export order. The company then relates other instances where the Germans have been getting contracts when we have been denied them, and the Belgians also. I am just wondering what confidence do we have that whilst we tend to stick to the rules of what we sign up to how can we be sure that other countries are not interpreting the rules somewhat differently and getting away with stuff?
Mr Straw: I am aware of the complaint, I assume it is from the same company although I will go into it in detail in closed session if that is okay. Without mentioning it, which we can only do in closed session, I cannot be absolutely certain that we are talking about the same thing.
Q34 Chairman: It is the company you were advised of before the session. We are talking about the same company, I assure you.
Mr Straw: I have an explanation I have to give to you in confidence. Of course we are concerned about any such suggestions and I say to other colleagues around the table they are not just from companies in the North West but from around the UK. You asked me whether I can be certain that other countries are applying the criteria. I have confidence that they are. You can never be absolutely certain about this. You cannot even under our system be certain and you will recall a few years ago in my constituency we were the subject of a most outrageous deception and corruption by a British government official who was diverting ammunition contracts from a UK company in my constituency to others abroad and taking money for this. Foxley; you may remember the case. Even within the British system it is possible for there to be examples of corruption and that caused the loss of perhaps 300 or 400 jobs in my constituency. What happened there was preposterous and it led to his conviction, as you will recall. One cannot be absolutely certain about this but the more we work with our European Union colleagues the more I feel comfortable about it. To go back to a question I was asked by Mr O'Neill, the proposals which we are making for strengthening the common criteria should enable me to give you a better and more certain answer on these subjects in future.
Q35 Mr Evans: And rigorous policing of it because clearly that is going to protect our interests?
Mr Straw: It goes without saying that my first duty on this is to apply these criteria but, like every other member of the Commons, I also have a very keen interest in the health of British manufacturing and I am assiduous in following up any suggestions that British manufacturers, whether in this field or the non‑controlled goods field, are being worsted by other countries not playing by the rules.
Q36 Rachel Squire: Foreign Secretary, given the review of the EU arms embargo against China, will that review look at not only possibly weakening and removing it but also strengthening it and in respect not only of completed equipment but also components? That leads me on to my next question. You will be aware, I am sure, of the publicity that has been given today to the publication of this report by Oxfam on the Control of Arms Campaign in the UK about the sale of components to countries where there is currently an embargo on arms equipment, as there is with China. How do you justify the fact that the British Government exports substantial quantities of parts and components for combat aircraft and other military equipment to China, sometimes under open licence?
Mr Straw: On your first question, Ms Squire, the review looking into whether the arms embargo in respect of China should be lifted or modified to make it lighter, there has been no suggestion from any Member States of the European Union that it should be reviewed with the idea of strengthening it, so the result of the review will either be a status quo or it would be some lightening of it or its lifting altogether. That is the decision that was made. On your second point, it really comes back to what I said a few moments ago - and there may have been a misunderstanding about the nature of the embargo in respect of China - it is not and it never has been a complete ban on all controlled goods. The details are well‑known, they have been on the record since 1989 but, more particularly, there were spelt out to Parliament in June 1998 by our late colleague, Derek Fatchett and they cover the things as I have described. Any other exports are subject to the consolidated criteria and we apply those criteria in respect of any applications for exports to China in the same way as we apply them in respect of any other applications. So I refute entirely that suggestion ‑ and to be kind to Oxfam I think it is based on a misunderstanding about the nature of the embargo regime for that country.
Q37 Chairman: Can I pursue that briefly, if I may. The scope of the EU embargo, as you say, Foreign Secretary, was not defined. If I can give credit to the UK Government, the UK Government has defined precisely what it means by the embargo against China whereas I do not think any other EU country has been quite so specific, so congratulations on that one.
Mr Straw: Thank you very much, but that was our colleague who did that.
Chairman: However, the UK Government has decided, presumably for reasons of human rights considerations or regional stability or proliferation or whatever, that licences will not be granted for the export of military aircraft, that is on the list that you mentioned, but you do grant licences for significant components of military aircraft. Maybe I am as foolish as Oxfam, I do not know, but I cannot understand if the Government's policy is that they should not have military aircraft, for good reasons, but it is all right, however, if they get the components to make them.
Mr Straw: I suggest no one is foolish, Mr Berry - not you or Oxfam. Nor am I suggesting you are less than well informed, so let us be clear about that. You may have a different opinion from me but you are entitled to it; that is your job. I come back to the nature of the embargo and the nature of the criteria. The embargo is about, as I read it, complete equipment. There is a difference sometimes (and we can come on to this, I am sure, in other respects) between whether you provide the whole of an aircraft, for example, and there is a difference when it comes to measuring things up on the criteria, and whether you provide a fire control system for that aircraft by way of spare part. I happen to think that if they have got the aircraft already and they can buy the fire control systems from somewhere else, since a fire control system is not an aggressive piece of equipment itself then you have to do what the criteria requires you to do which may not be mechanical but to apply judgments on a case-by-case and common-sense basis. My judgment in cases of that kind is to say "Well, I judge this on whether a fire control system should be sold, albeit subject to controls and not on whether I am selling the whole aircraft", because what we are doing is agreeing to the sale of a fire control system or, for example, in respect of ejector seats to aircraft which already exist. I would need to have specific examples, and we may need to go into this in detail in the private session, about sales to China which are particularly worrying you; I do not have the details in front of me.
Q38 Chairman: It is the general principle, Foreign Secretary. The Government, quite reasonably, says that the purpose of the criteria is that they should be applied to weapons and weapon systems and to the components, and that the criteria apply equally to components and the weapons. In this case the Government has a policy - it is a government policy - that we will not grant licences for the export of military aircraft to China but we will happily grant licences for the export of all sorts of components, not just harmless fire equipment and stuff but important parts of machinery. It is partly this components issue that the Committee has raised, as you know, ever since we started meeting. I do not understand the logic of simply saying, "You should not have a licence to export the final weapon, but we are perfectly happy to grant licences to export components". What is the rationale for that?
Mr Straw: I am afraid we will have to agree to disagree about that. Mr Landsman is saying that the embargo is there to prevent China acquiring new systems or equipment. That is, I understand, the purpose of the embargo. Components for existing systems are different and they are covered by the consolidated criteria. As far as I am concerned, there is a very obvious distinction as there is a world of difference between them. There is an issue of the balance of proportionality. You could argue - and some people may do so - that in respect of a country where we are concerned about their strategic record, or others which could get embroiled in respect of this, that we should not even supply the most obvious, dual-use items like common screws and bolts because they are going to be used to put together the kit to put together the final equipment.
Q39 Chairman: Not screws and bolts, with respect.
Mr Straw: If you accept that then you do accept there is a distinction ---
Q40 Chairman: There is a logic problem here.
Mr Straw: --- and a logical difference between the final equipment and the components that go to make it up. There just is. Obviously, for some things the issues are very similar where you are dealing with equipment which is plainly aggressive or can upgrade the aircraft. Where you are dealing with an awful lot of components then you have to judge it, as the criteria say, on a case-by-case basis, and a lot of the issues where I am asked for my decision on components come into this area, for example, where although the equipment into which they are going to be installed, for sure, has a purpose as a weapon or part of a weapons system, the equipment itself - an ejector seat or fire control system - does not have that purpose at all. Now, there is the other issue you raise, which is about incorporation. I know Ms Squire was concerned about this last year but I am happy to go into further detail about that. There is just a reality that the international defence industry has become more and more internationalised; the production lines are international now and they are not just national or local. That is one of the reasons why there has been an increase in the total number of licences for components, because increasingly British companies are supplying components to other companies. I think there is now only one completely UK-made military aircraft, which is the Hawk; all the others are now made in different parts of Europe or between Europe and the United States. So we are in this production line situation. The judgment I then had to make when I came to consider what became called the Incorporation Policy is whether we were making a strategic decision, effectively, to cease to play our part in those production lines where otherwise the production was consistent with the consolidated criteria. This may be an uncomfortable position for some people but the country has made a strategic decision on an all-party basis that we have a defence industry, that it needs to be controlled properly - as it is - but within that it has to prosper. If that is the case, then colleagues have got to accept that as circumstances change, and the increasing globalisation of production is one of the major changes in circumstances, then the way in which we have to deal with licences also has to change, although the criteria have not changed, nor the rigour with which we put them into force.
Q41 Rachel Squire: I think the Foreign Secretary may have advanced the issue because I was going to ask about the Government allowing the temporary export to China of a variety of training and combat aircraft demonstration models and mock-ups, saying this was for exhibition purposes. Am I right to conclude that that does indeed suggest that we are ensuring British companies will be well-placed to sell to the Chinese, perhaps, when, rather than if, the current embargo is lifted or relaxed?
Mr Straw: I have a feeling, Ms Squire, that these particular approvals predated the decision of the European Council to review the embargo. So I do not think there is any direct cause and effect there, but I can check on that. What, however, is the case is that there is plainly a difference between a licence for use in the particular country and a licence for exhibition where it is not for use in a country, and again we look at it on the basis of the consolidated criteria. I remember reading a note about this and I have been trying to find it in my extensive brief.
Q42 Chairman: Perhaps you could drop us a line on that one.
Mr Straw: I may even turn it up, but I have definitely seen it on the page.
Q43 Mr George: Secretary of State, on 4 May ten new nations join the European Union. My questions, which are related, relate to how well these ten new countries are going to fit into European practices and the European Code of Conduct. The impression I have from what the Government have said is that they are reasonably happy with the ten countries' administrative procedures but I do not know if the Government - and we will find out in a moment - is satisfied with their implementation of the European Code of conduct or their ability or willingness to implement properly. The question then is, of these ten new countries, none of them appear to have a very strong tradition of export control. What have we been doing to ensure that these ten new members of the European Union do not become the weakest link in the export control system, in terms of both the standards and enforcement?
Mr Straw: Mr George, it is an issue which we, as a Government, and I as Foreign Secretary, take very seriously. What we have been doing specifically is we have organised two seminars for accession states about the code's criteria and how they should operate, because it is not just what is on the paper it is about what approach individual officials should take when they are looking at arms applications. One took place in Estonia and the other in Slovakia. The seminars focused upon how concretely you need to take licensing decisions. Although the accession countries have been applying the criteria for a number of years as part of their accession arrangements, we thought it important to provide them with strategic information. There was also a session in the seminars on transparency, focusing on the information provided by almost all Member States in their annual reports, albeit that some of their annual reports are limited. There is also the issue of ensuring that all the EU accession states become members of the non-conventional weapons group regimes, like the Australia Group, the MTCR, the NSG, the Wassenaar and the Zangger groups. I was checking through this in preparation for this Committee hearing. The EU WMD action plan provides for the setting up of a task force to assist accession states on export controls and discussion with the EU regulation. Ten cluster groups of three countries per group have been set up. The UK is in two such groups; the first with Ireland and Malta, the second with Greece and Cyprus. Within each group a visit will be made to each country to discuss customs issues, transhipment, identification of goods in the regulation and technical control issues. Customs & Excise are working closely with these countries. There is then the Australia Group, which is a group - as you know, Mr George - of like-minded countries which aim to limit and frustrate the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons through the implementation of export controls. Five of the EU accession states are expected to join the Australia Group this year - they are: Malta, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia - and we are supporting the applications. The other five are already members of the regime. In respect of the Missile Technology Control Regime, again, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia are applying to join the MTCR and the other accession states are already members. These are going to be considered at a meeting in May. Then again, for the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Malta, Estonia and Lithuania have applied to join the regime, the other accession states are already members. The other two groups are not directly relevant, the Wassenaar and the Zangger. Just to give you an indication that we are concerned about the point you raise, ticking the box that you agree the criteria is only the first stage; you have got to make sure you apply it. So we are very concerned it is applied, both in respect of conventional and non-conventional weapons. We have a good relationship with the accession states, for all sorts of reasons of which you are aware, and we intend to continue to stay alongside them on this. Their arms industries, as with their size, varies a great deal.
Q44 Mr George: You are getting close to a related point on the peer review process. Are you satisfied it is working? It seems a bit like the whipping system in the House of Commons, where these wonderful people are able to coax, cajole, persuade and arm-twist. We are amongst the best of the countries in relation to the implementation of arms-control regimes. Are you really satisfied that this peer review control, peer review system is really working? It will take more than a few seminars. Again, the impression I have is that the Americans are rather better at it than we are. At the end of the day, on 5 May will you be able to say "Well, look, I think now we have made very significant and successful steps to getting these guys into the regime that we regard very highly"?
Mr Straw: I am going to ask Mr Oakden to answer your specific point, but let me make this clear point, that I am satisfied that as from 1 May the regime which these countries will operate under, and its enforcement, will be better than it has been in previous years in these countries. The very fact that they are joining the European Union is a way of raising their standards of law enforcement generally. Whether it is at the level which we would regard as wholly satisfactory is another question, but it is moving in the right direction, and you only have to look at some of the other former Soviet Union nations which are not joining the EU, so we do not have the same control over them, to see what the problems are.
Mr Oakden: It is a serious issue and I think it is recognised across all the accession states as being a serious issue. Clearly, for the larger states with bigger bureaucracies, implementing these detailed obligations is maybe less of a challenge than for some of the smaller ones. However, as the Foreign Secretary has just gone through, for each of the supplier regimes, including Wassenaar, all of the EU Member States are into the control regimes and all the accession states either are already or will be members. That has entailed a substantial effort, not just bureaucratically but in terms of the commitment of their officials to sort of follow through what that actually means in practice. Clearly, it will be an on-going challenge but it is one that has quite a high priority.
Q45 Tony Baldry: Foreign Secretary, sometimes sitting here it seems a planet away from the impact of the irresponsible use of weapons on individuals elsewhere in the world. I was in Sierra Leone last week and amongst the things I was looking at were camps for amputees. The indictment for the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone makes chilling reading. We saw last weekend a massacre in Northern Uganda by the resistance army and the continuing abuses in the DRC. These are all innocent people out there who get killed, maimed and injured by the irresponsible use of weapons. Last October Oxfam and Amnesty International launched a campaign for an international arms trade treaty "to prevent arms being exported to destinations where they are likely to be used to commit grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law." One does not have to look far for instances of that and, of course, there is still a UN War Crimes Tribunal in Rwanda. I understand the Government's line on arms is that HMG "supports the goal of an international instrument on arms transfers, but argues that for it to be effective such a treaty would have to enjoy the support of all major arms exporting countries." So, on that, I would just like to ask two very simple questions: what do you consider to be the prospects of all major arms-exporting countries supporting an international arms trade treaty, and can you tell us which countries are reluctant to establish such a treaty? What are we doing to gain their support? Is this something we are passively sitting in Whitehall saying, "If the others do it we will do it"? Or is this something where you and colleagues are pro-actively suggesting to other major arms-exporting countries that we need to have a new international instrument to try and prevent future substantial violations of international human rights and humanitarian law?
Mr Straw: We are at an early stage but let me say I do welcome the proposals which have been made by Oxfam and others in respect of this, and their concern. The issue, however, and where you always have to make a judgment with these international draft instruments, is how effective they would be and whether it is going to be possible to gain support for them; in a sense, what diplomatic and other price would you have to pay? You asked me what countries have supported it up to now. I am aware of reports that Finland has offered support but it has offered support for the treaty's principles but not the text. The Netherlands have, I think, given support in rather similar terms, saying that (according to my information) they support agreements which strengthen the control on arms trade but they are not convinced an arms treaty is feasible yet. So we are having consultations on this. It goes without saying that if I felt an arms control treaty would deal with many of the problems which you have raised and we could get it through, I would be in favour of it. After all, we have signed up to all sorts of instruments in terms of arms control and there is no argument there, in principle, between us, it is just whether this is going to work. The examples that you use, I think, are quite interesting because you talk about Sierra Leone and Uganda, where there have been the most terrible massacres. Most of the loss of life and the damage in both of those conflicts has been caused through small arms. It happens, as you know, that we have a large defence industry and small arms plays a tiny part in that in the UK. We have made a lot of efforts better to control the trade in small arms. In respect of that, we are well ahead of the proposals for the arms trade treaty, but it has been very, very hard going. A lot of people make a lot of money out of small arms and they are also relatively easy to produce in unlicensed, uncontrolled premises. It is difficult. We have already got international treaties and instruments in respect of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and I have issued proposals this morning better to enforce those regimes. We have got the Missile Technology Control Regime, of which we are members. There is no issue at all about what we want to do, it is just whether this is the right way of doing it. I remain open on it.
Mr Oakden: Can I just add one point? We have talked about this somewhat in the European Union. There is, I think, a general agreement that the real countries that we need to be getting at are not the other countries of the European Union, they are not a problem, it is the countries which are the major exporters of small arms. Our experience hitherto, including on all the work we are doing on small arms, is that if western countries, EU countries, get out in front and say "We want to do this" that actually makes it harder, very often, to bring either some of the developing countries on board because they feel that they are being made to sign up to somebody else's agenda, or, indeed, some of the big exporters of small arms. So what we are trying to do is, at this stage, talk through - and ministers have been involved already - with the NGOs exactly how best to go about this. Clearly, we will do what we can, both nationally and within the European Union, to try to create a movement from this that goes wider than the western consensus. When we have discussed this within the European Union that seems to be where the centre of gravity is about where we should be going forward on this treaty.
Q46 Tony Baldry: I think we would all welcome the restrictions on small arms exports to Africa. Indeed, the Prime Minister on 9 December of last year said in the House of Commons: "In respect of small arms we already prevent their sale into Africa, which is the single most important thing that we can do." However, when I look through the annual report on strategic export controls I note that the number of African countries receiving UK open export licences for small arms has increased from 4 in 1999 to 11 in 2002. This includes machine guns to Senegal, components for mortars to Cameroon, Angola and the Ivory Coast and Namibia, and grenade launchers to Tunisia. I can see that grenade launchers go a bit beyond small arms, or AK47s, but there seems to be a kind of disparity between what the Government is saying about small arms and Africa and what is actually happening.
Mr Straw: I have not got the details directly in front of me of those applications. By definition, I am happy to go into detail there. I do not think there is a disparity, Mr Baldry. I am happy to provide you with more detail. We are very, very careful about our arms exports anywhere, particularly to Africa, for reasons which are well understood.
Mr Landsman: If I can just add to that. On some of those we can obviously provide some more details, but some of those will be for the use of humanitarian agencies in certain circumstances or for UN peace-keeping forces.
Q47 Tony Baldry: I cannot imagine humanitarian agencies using heavy machine guns in Senegal, but I will be very interested to hear the details of that.
Mr Straw: There was some concern, not in respect of Africa but another country, about armoured vehicles which looked as though they were military vehicles but, in fact, they were for a well-known broadcasting organisation. We were about to be pilloried for providing armoured vehicles to a country which had a record which some questioned. We cannot give full details of these exports because they are confidential, but the armoured vehicles were for a well-known broadcasting company. So sometimes there is an explanation which may even satisfy this Committee.
Q48 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, I want to turn to the very key recommendation which was made unanimously by this Committee last year in our report HC620. We said this: "We recommend that the Government should seek to extend extraterritorial control to all trafficking and brokering which if conducted in the UK would not be granted a licence." Sadly, this unanimous, all-party recommendation from these four Select Committees of the House has not been accepted by the Government. Indeed, in practical terms it has been rejected to the tune of 90 per cent plus, because as you are well aware the only weapons to which the extraterritoriality provisions as far as trafficking and brokering is concerned that are currently being applied are to missiles in excess of 300 kilometres range and limited amounts of items which have a torture connotation, such as handcuffs. Everything in between is excluded. This, as you will be aware, was the major issue of policy which was the subject of the Committee's debate in Westminster Hall on 6 November. I must put it to you that in the contributions that were made by all those who took part from all parties the argumentation put forward by the Members of the Committee and other Members of the House who took part for the policy position of the Quadripartite Committee, I believe, the argument was won absolutely conclusively in relation to the - I thought - wholly unpersuasive and thoroughly inadequate defence of the Government's line that Mr Nigel Griffiths put forward. I know it is incredibly difficult for you, as Secretary of State, in front of a Committee to indicate that the Quadripartite Committee may have got the policy right whereas the Government has got it wrong, but that is what I invite you to respond to the Committee by saying. If you do not think this is a serious issue I am going to come to some very serious questions to you, Foreign Secretary. I put it to you, this is a serious life and death issue, to which I am going to come in a moment. I put it to you that the Government's policy is jeopardising life.
Mr Straw: Of course it is a serious issue, but I was smiling at what I thought was a witticism of your own but, there we are, maybe I made a mistake there. Of course these are issues of life and death by definition, but it is perfectly possible for colleagues to disagree about how you deal with these issues in an honourable way without it being implied that because we have come to one view about this discrete issue of extra-territoriality therefore we are less assiduous in terms of trying to protect people's lives than those who have come to the opposite view. On balance these are always judgments but I have to say that I have always been sceptical about this issue of extra-territorial control and extra-territorial offences except in very specific circumstances. We are members of various international instruments which make genocide, torture and so on, crimes which are try-able internationally, slightly different from extra-territorial jurisdiction but they are try-able internationally. Also we have very strongly resisted efforts by the United States to impose an extra-territorial jurisdiction on otherwise perfectly lawful activities, for example of United Kingdom businessmen, both operating here and in third countries. There are businessmen in this country, and your Party complains about this as much as mine, who are absolutely sound, who are not involved in any improper conduct, and yet are subject to all kinds of restrictions because on the basis of our law, not that of the United States, they happen to make decisions to trade with other countries to which the United States takes exception and there are various extra-territorial offences as well. This also arises in taxation. This is a subject of some difficulty for us and other European countries and the US. The US does have a system of extra-territorial controls, however we have not been made aware of one single successful prosecution which has been made under US extra-territorial brokering controls, for example. I am open to further information on this. It is not an ideological position I am taking, I am simply taking a position on the balance of the arguments; if the arguments change I am happy to change. In contrast, I am told that for over 25 years Germany has operated a system of brokering controls applying to activities done on German territory similar to the United Kingdom controls with regular prosecutions resulting in custodial sentences. That is our approach so far. I am very happy to look again at the debate that took place in Westminster Hall and the report. This is not an idle view we have come to. I appreciate the position of the Committee. It is much in my interests to agree with the Committee wherever I can, and I do, because why should I not, you have great expertise and you look at these things. I do not open your reports with the view that I am going to disagree with what you say, I open the reports with the view that I should agree with them whenever I can take the recommendations on board. It has not been possible here so far, as I say, but we are always open to argument.
Q49 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, at no point have I suggested idleness or any lack of assiduousness on your part. I am sure this is an honest difference of view and I, and I am sure other Members of the Committee, wish to persuade you that the Government has got the policy wrong. This is not an issue about British businessmen conducting themselves legally. The Quadripartite's position is quite clear: the extension of extra-territoriality that we are seeking is in relation to trafficking and brokering which if conducted in the UK would not be granted a licence. I suggest you have to defend the position why should it be legitimate for a UK broker outside the territorial area of the UK to make a sale of a particular item to a particular country which if conducted inside the United Kingdom would require an export licence. It would seem to me, and to the rest of the Committee, that as far as people who are British citizens are concerned, and therefore liable to British law, the same boundaries of the business should apply whether they are operating inside the UK or not. Can I come to a specific weapon? Here we have an individual case where I must put it to you the Government has been put on to very, very clear notice of the risks that it is running. I put it to you also, Foreign Secretary, it is not an issue as to how many successful prosecutions there have been or not, the issue is whether the law in place is a law which will, as far as possible, do all that can be done in legal terms to protect the lives of British and, indeed, other people from the activities of British citizens. The case that I am referring to, which has been widely reported in the press, is the case of Mr Hemant Lakhani who, following clearly a very successful intelligence operation, as has been widely reported, and British Intelligence Services should be congratulated, was arrested in the United States - I stress Mr Hemant Lakhani is a British citizen - whilst he was allegedly trying to sell up to 50 Russian surface-to-air missiles. The question which I believe you and your colleagues in Government need to ask yourselves with the utmost seriousness is given the absolutely known risks from the proliferation of surface-to-air missiles today, and the media have been full of reports on British and other aircraft from such attacks, and we have already suffered the loss of several lives in Iraq from surface-to-air missiles, how can you defend the situation when you are clearly on notice of a British subject already having been subject to arrest on allegations of trying to procure Russian surface-to-air missiles of not including surface-to-air missiles in the extra-territoriality provisions that the Government has now passed into law?
Mr Straw: On the detailed point that you raise, Sir John, Mr Oakden can go into this in more detail in the closed session. I think you are asking about MANPADs and we already have tight controls on the export of these. It does not matter if they were a UK National or not, if they were engaged in the same activity in the UK they would prima facie be committing a criminal offence in the UK, so I am not entirely clear what point it is you are making. Of course we take these things seriously.
Q50 Sir John Stanley: Can I just put it very clearly. If this particular gentleman, as a British citizen, was engaged in the brokering of surface-to-air missiles outside the UK's territorial jurisdiction, that particular individual would not be the subject of the offences which you have laid down in the Secondary Legislation which the House has now passed. That is the legal position.
Mr Straw: Hang on. There are other provisions, for example the Terrorism Act, which do necessarily have extra-territorial effect. We can go into detail about the specific case in the closed session. Sir John, I am very happy to look again at this issue and your recommendation. The only question is, is it going to work? It is not an issue of principle here whatsoever, we are all in favour of the toughest enforcement in this area. There may be arguments about the judgments, and sometimes they can lead to sharp arguments, but there is no issue of principle. Let me say I have got forms as long as your arm for introducing all sorts of further criminal offences on to the criminal calendar, principally as Home Secretary but also as Foreign Secretary, so that does not worry me at all, it only worries me is it going to work. I will promise you I will look at it again.
Chairman: I am very conscious of the time. Can we have quick questions and quick answers, please?
Q51 Sir John Stanley: You suggested, as did Mr Griffiths in replying to the debate, that this issue, this huge lacuna of everything between handcuffs and missiles with ranges in excess of 300 kilometres, was in some way going to be covered by the terrorism legislation. Mr Griffiths said: "The trafficking in shorter range missiles by terrorists, or for the purposes of terrorism, is covered in many circumstances by the anti-terrorism legislation which has extra-territorial effect". That is one of these ministerial statements which probably we have all been guilty of from time to time which is factually correct but inadvertently is actually profoundly misleading in the impression it conveys.
Mr Straw: You may be guilty of that, Sir John, but ----
Q52 Sir John Stanley: I just want to finish my point. Why it is profoundly misleading is that this trade is not conducted by people who are clearly terrorists, absolutely not, it is conducted by middle men, people who are disguising very, very carefully their activities and doing their utmost to shield themselves from any association with terrorism. For that reason, and you as a lawyer will understand this, if you are going to make a prosecution you have got to do it on the basis of proving a connection with terrorism and I believe under those circumstances you will virtually never achieve it. If you are going to mount a prosecution on the fact of brokering, which is what the extra-territorial provision should extend to, you have got a much greater chance of succeeding with a prosecution and I ask you to consider that issue.
Mr Straw: I will look at it again.
Q53 Mr Blunt: Secretary of State, just to come back to the international arena. To quote from an American academic study, it says: "Having four regimes that appear to policymakers to be doing the same thing, regulating weapons-related technologies and items, has resulted in a lack of sustained high level political attention in almost all Member States, including the United States", I think with the honourable exception of this Committee. "In this context one can understand the complaints from firms and their clients about confusing and overlapping regulations and the consequent introduction of piecemeal solutions by individual legislators. In most countries that we have studied, the issues appear so esoteric to national policymakers that few high level political resources are invested to rationalise the national export control system as a whole". Do you agree with that?
Mr Straw: I think it is a fair criticism, Mr Blunt. It is complicated. These systems have grown up on a bespoke basis. Personally, as I have already made clear, one of my great concerns - this is a personal concern - is about the lack of enforcement mechanisms for biological and toxic weapons. I published a Command Paper about this two years ago and have been arguing for it internationally. However, those who are opposed to a more substantial enforcement regime argue that if you go down this route you have then got a problem of interference with the pharmaceutical industry, for example, which is at the heart of the argument over biological weapons control. Then the issue is it is better to ring-fence biological weapons in order that at least you can have a reasonable regime in respect of chemical weapons and nuclear weapons. That is why these things have grown up. I do not defend these arrangements. It would be good if they could be rationalised and it would also be good if senior people at all levels in other governments paid the same kind of attention that I believe we do in the UK Government.
Q54 Mr Blunt: Does it not mean, as Mr Oakden said, talking with NGOs about how we might approach this at this stage is really not good enough? If we are going to get a single international control regime, now is the time to strike because now is the time that the full attention of the United States is engaged following 9/11.
Mr Straw: The US are engaged in a number of initiatives, including the ones which I talked about yesterday, and that was part of the purpose of President Bush's speech that he made on 11 February as I recall. They have taken a lead over things like the global partnership to clean up WMD, particularly in Russia and former Soviet countries, and much else besides, but if you take the issue of biological weapons, the control and enforcement regime, one of the countries which take a different view from us is the United States. It is on the record. There was an international conference about this towards the end of 2001. We sought to achieve at least a consensus that could continue the process of discussion but although the United States' Government is very committed indeed to counter-proliferation and generally to arms control, there are some of these issues, and BW is a good example, where their view of what is required is different from ours. Their view, in a nutshell, is that it is so difficult fully to enforce a BW regime that it may not be appropriate to try and we have a different view. You have to deal with these things on a case-by-case basis, I think.
Q55 Mr Blunt: I am conscious that we are pressed for time. Does the need for the Proliferation Security Initiative demonstrate the limitations of current arrangements and does that initiative not really demonstrate that we are now in effect carrying out other countries' export controls on WMD and missiles by proxy?
Mr Straw: We need the Proliferation Security Initiative because although there are many countries which observe the high standards to which every other country in the world, bar a tiny handful, are committed, there are other countries which sign up to international instruments but do not enforce or, even if they wish to enforce, lack the capacity to do so. Of course it is right, and in a sense this is a good example of us using extra-territorial arrangements in a practical way, that we should seek to take action to enforce rules which the originating countries should have enforced themselves. The best example, and I hope this is of some reassurance to Sir John, is the proposal in respect of the transport of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials, on commercial vessels on the high seas where we want agreement with the flag countries to be able to interdict and not just for drug purposes.
Q56 Mr Battle: Foreign Secretary, could I focus on arms exports to developing countries and perhaps try to make a modest but constructive proposal because, as we all know, the Export Credit Guarantee Department offers subsidised insurance cover for arms sales to actually encourage arms companies and recipient countries to take up arms sales that might not be otherwise economically viable and which might have a massive negative impact on their economies. I think we should welcome the Government's introduction of what is called the productive expenditure criteria for arms sales to all the HIPC countries, the highly indebted poor countries. Would an extension of that productive expenditure criteria to all the international development association countries, all the poor countries listed under the UN, not dissuade them from taking up arms and taking on more unsustainable debt and also release money for the alleviation of poverty? I would just suggest that as a practical suggestion, it would get widespread common support. What arguments could there possibly be against that modest extension?
Mr Straw: I am very happy to look at it is the answer, Mr Battle. I do not think you were suggesting that countries in that category should not have any kind of defence arrangements at all, because plainly they need them, but it has got to be proportionate. We are applying this criterion of proportionality pretty rigorously, as we have done in the refusal to which your attention has been drawn, and we can no doubt discuss that in closed session if you wish. I will certainly follow it up.
Q57 Mr Colman: Foreign Secretary, some very brief questions around what I understand to be the Government's intention to give two short take-off and landing aircraft to Nepal. First of all, you said that you wished to keep us as a Committee informed, but in this case the decision to give these two aircraft emerged via the press in Nepal rather than through a statement to Parliament or even a letter to this Committee. Plainly by the look on your face you are concerned that this is so. The second point, while I still have your attention, is as we said last year in terms of the supply of helicopters, again this Committee did not oppose that, we were surprised that the money for these two aircraft should come from the global conflict prevention pool, and again we were surprised that these aircraft were supposedly there to prevent conflict. We were a bit surprised that this pool was used to fund it. First of all, could you perhaps assure us that this was a one-off and should such gifts occur in the future, and we support Nepal, you would inform us before the event rather than us hearing about it through the press? Secondly, would you again like to reconsider using the conflict prevention pool money?
Mr Straw: Mr Colman, we do not at the moment have a system of prior scrutiny. There is an argument in favour of that, but we have retrospective scrutiny, so it is appropriate that the committee is told once a licence has been issued, but not in advance. There is nothing particularly secret about this at all, but the reason I was looking puzzled was that I have written quite a number of letters about this and I thought perhaps one of them was to the committee but I have certainly written letters to colleagues who have followed this up on behalf of constituents. I think you said we need to support Nepal. We have had to take a strategic decision that the government of Nepal needs support, subject to some clear conditions, because of the very severe threat it faces from the Maoists. I do not say for a second that I regard the human rights record of the government of Nepal as satisfactory; in a number of respects it is not, but I also say that the human rights records of the Maoists is infinitely worse and the strategic consequences of us either supporting them or washing our hands of the issue would be very serious, so we have to make a difficult choice in an imperfect world and that is the choice that we have made. It is not an oxymoron for us to use the global Conflict Prevention Fund to support, for example, the operation of short take-off and landing aircraft because sometimes you have to prevent conflict and its scale by making use of military action; there is no other way. Again, it is an unpleasant world we live in but it is a world that we do live in. It may be helpful to provide the committee, Chairman, with information about these aircraft. They are twin-engined Islander aircraft with a normal carrying load of around seven persons, including the crew. They will be capable of conducting non-lethal activity such as search and rescue but are not combat aircraft and do not have a substantial military lift capability. The aircraft are used by some UK police forces for similar roles to that anticipated for these aircraft in Nepal, and we would arrange for an agreement between ourselves and the RNA that the aircraft would be strictly limited to a logistical, medical and humanitarian role, so I hope that is helpful. With respect to the two helicopters, they were gifted during 2002 for transportation and were not designed for offensive purposes. Their supply to the Royal Nepalese Army was on the condition that they were used solely for troop and equipment carrying, medical evacuation and humanitarian purposes. We stipulated that combat or attack roles were excluded to the lifetime of the aircraft, including the fitting of weapons, allowing soldiers to fire from doorways whilst airborne or the dropping or ordnance. It may, however, sadly be known that one of the two aircraft crashed on 3 April whilst on a re-supply task with one fatal casualty and a number of serious injuries, but that was not to do with the nature of the aircraft, I understand.
Q58 Chairman: Could not almost any arms sale be justified on the grounds that it is conflict prevention?
Mr Straw: No. You have got to make judgments here, Dr Berry. The Conflict Prevention Fund is not a pacifist programme. What we have done in Sierra Leone, which was raised earlier, has been very significant in preventing conflict not only in Sierra Leone but also elsewhere in West Africa. It does involve the use of arms.
Q59 Chairman: It was a good question though.
Mr Straw: But a better answer, if I may say so!
Q60 Mr Battle: If I could follow up the question of my colleague on the International Development Select Committee, Tony Baldry, this morning he and I met the Finnish minister who is responsible, interestingly, for trade and industry and development, in other words, development criteria are integrated into their trade and industry department, and in August 2002 our Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred to criterion 8 of the Consolidated Criteria, suggesting that we should take account of the fiscal implications of the export of arms, small arms in particular, and light weapons. In assessing export licence applications, especially for small arms and light weapons, against criterion 8 of the Consolidated Criteria, how are possible human security impacts factored into the assessment so that there is a real development assessment built into the process?
Mr Oakden: I am very sorry. I am not sure I understand the question.
Mr Straw: I half understand the point of the question, Mr Battle.
Q61 Mr Battle: Under the Consolidated Criteria, article 8 -----
Mr Straw: We know all about that.
Q62 Mr Battle: It is fiscal, so it just assesses the money. What about the impact on the people in poor countries? Why is that not factored in? Would that make it clearer?
Mr Straw: I think it is inherently in article 8, is it not?
Q63 Mr Battle: So they are factored in?
Mr Straw: Yes.
Mr Oakden: Human rights are in criterion 2.
Mr Straw: These are not mutually exclusive. I think we need to follow this up in some more detail, but criterion 2 is in respect of human rights and fundamental -----
Q64 Mr Battle: Criterion 8. You apply them all across the board?
Mr Straw: We apply them all together. Criterion 8 is an addition which has specific relevance in respect of developing countries, the HIPC and other countries on the OECD international aid list, but it does not mean that we ignore the other seven; far from it.
Q65 Ann Clwyd: Prior scrutiny: it has been around a long time and I have got a feeling that it has been kicked into the long grass, and I would have hoped that by now all government departments who are involved in this discussion might have come up with a proposal which would be mutually acceptable, maybe on a trial basis, but at least a proposal, because we have talked about this long enough and we should have come to a decision by now.
Mr Straw: I understand your concern here. It is a really difficult issue and the more one goes into it the more difficult it becomes. On many issues the reverse is the case. We have actively been looking within government at ways of enhancing retrospective scrutiny and my colleague Patricia Hewitt is due to write to me very shortly with proposals on this. I am sorry that the proposals are not before the committee and were not before the committee in advance of this hearing, but that is the current situation. A great deal of work has gone on inside government on this, let me say. Whether the result is regarded as satisfactory is another matter.
Q66 Ann Clwyd: The answer is no to that because this committee has discussed it long and hard. We have made proposals, counter proposals; we have had discussions with various secretaries of state, and I personally am fed up of talking about prior scrutiny and would like us to come to some arrangement which could be temporary, could be permanent, but at least a proposal that we can work from.
Mr Straw: For the time being the straightforward answer is that I do not hold out a prospect of that happening given the decisions which have been made across government. What we are aiming to do, however, is to enhance retrospective scrutiny; that is the official position. I also say, and I understand your concern here, that it does need to be borne in mind that this system that we have in the UK is a better, more effective, more thorough system than any in the world, and I include in that the United States. It really does do the job. Of course, it could be enhanced, and we are looking to that but, compared with most other country systems, it is certainly a Jaguar - the car, not the aircraft - and approaching a Rolls Royce.
Q67 Ann Clwyd: I think retrospective scrutiny, as you have illustrated this afternoon, is not satisfactory to this committee.
Mr Straw: You and I have discussed this and I have been reasonably open-minded about the issue of prior scrutiny, but you do then run into the undergrowth about constitutional arrangements, who is making the decisions, how that would operate and so on, whether it would lead to a blurring of lines. I just have to say to the committee that the fact that the criteria exist first of all, the fact that you exist, the fact that we now have legislation in place and that there is this annual outing for me before the committee and much else besides, really raises the standard of scrutiny, both by officials and by ministers, including myself. We all have to pay attention - quite right too, because that is what you are here for and what I am here for, but if this system did not exist I believe that there would inevitably be a lower standard applied to the decisions. As it is I think it is a pretty high standard.
Q68 Mr O'Neill: You will appreciate, Foreign Secretary, that it is rather frustrating for us because, as we get closer to the general election, we tend to find that the secretaries of state become more sympathetic to our position and then, as soon as the general election occurs, the fledgling secretaries of state and foreign secretaries come into office and they are immediately got at by their officials and so, for a period of about two and a half years, they walk around gagged and blindfolded, Guantanamo Bay-style, and they get some sense that there may be a world out there. This is the frustration we feel.
Mr Straw: It is not usually a description offered me, but in my case the record shows the reverse, I am afraid.
Q69 Mr O'Neill: You mean it has got worse?
Mr Straw: I would not put it as worse but, anyway, it is for you to go through the historical record on this. There will be movement, as Patricia's letter will show. It is not as much movement, I know, as the committee wants, but there we are. I am not sure my officials would say that I go around the Foreign Office being bound and gagged, dragging the leg irons of which Mr Chidgey would disapprove.
Q70 Chairman: After that scurrilous attack on the officials -----
Mr Straw: Can I, Dr Berry, just before we finish, and entirely on a light note, say that I was noting yesterday that we are three days off 28 February 2004, which will be the 30th anniversary of an event in which Sir John and I both took part, namely, the election in Tonbridge and Malling, which he won and in which I came third.
Chairman: A brief right of reply.
Q71 Sir John Stanley: On the Foreign Secretary's comments, may I congratulate him on subsequently rising to a higher state in politics than I have ever managed to do.
Mr Straw: Thank you very much; that is very generous!
Q72 Chairman: Foreign Secretary, I am aware of the fact that time is rapidly running out and I know that colleagues have also got other engagements. If you are agreeable, there may have been one or two questions in confidential session and, if it will be all right, we will put those in writing and look forward to written replies, hopefully not contentious but some information may be confidential. If we could do it that way I would be grateful. Could I thank you very much, and your two officials - or slightly more than two officials, actually; the last count we made was 14.
Mr Straw: It is they who provided the encyclopaedia.
Chairman: Thank you very much again. We are very grateful for your time.