Memorandum submitted by The Joint Council
for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI)
1. INTRODUCTION
AND SUMMARY
1.1 The Joint Council for the Welfare of
Immigrants (JCWI) is an independent national non-governmental
organization working on all issues concerning migration policy—primary
economic migration, family reunification, asylum and refugee policy,
integration and naturalisation. Based in London, JCWI's network
of supporters extends includes local community organisations,
legal advisers, academic researchers, other NGOs, and individuals
concerned with the rights of migrants and refugees. As well as
our work in the UK, we also contribute to discussions involving
participants in Europe and internationally.
1.2 JCWI has maintained a close interest
in the emerging discussion on the relationship between development
and migration and has reviewed and commented on many aspects of
this work. In our view, the key issues which have to be understood
at this time are:
(i) Migration as a phenomenon is closely
related to the development process, and begins to occur at the
point at which national economies begin to take on aspects of
a modern form. The displacement of traditional modes of production,
trade and commence by national markets, the reorganisation of
rural life in accordance with the needs of these new markets,
the rise of the city in the national social structure, and the
emergence of a new class of workers with skills and education
enabling them to compete for a position in the new society, are
the key indicators of this "modern form".
(ii) This process of development is always
uneven. Some sections of society draw benefits from the new economic
growth earlier and in greater quantities than others. Further,
even when the evidence of economic development can be seen unambiguously
across the whole of society problems are likely to be created
because of the impact of rapid change on the environment, family
life, and traditional forms of welfare and belief, and authority
structures.
(iii) This stage of development invariably
produces a "migration hump"—a period of time during
which the disruption caused by development will cause a significant
proportion of the population to migrate. There will be many reasons
for migration within each population, such as a basic survival
strategy for those left without the means to support life; a means
to gather resources and skills which can be used on return to
the home country; for the purpose of permanent settlement in the
new country; to escape instability and persecution resulting from
social and political turbulence; and the elite migration of skilled
workers and professionals in response to the conditions of global
skill and labour markets.
(iv) The complexity of the relationship between
migration and development, the numerous factors which facilitate
and drive "people flow", the large range of factors
which determine the circumstances in which a given migration can
be judged successful or not, the difficult criteria for reaching
such a judgment, all have to be acknowledged at the onset of this
discussion. The existence of this complexity means that the full
benefits of migration and development are unlikely to be served
by simplistic "managed migration" schemes which fail
to take into account anything other than a narrow range of interests
and policy objectives.
(v) JCWI is concerned that current UK immigration
policy, whilst containing a number of innovative features, is
still focused far too narrowly on this narrow range of interests.
Its asylum policies belong to the "conservative alliance-containment"
typology which has been elaborated in recent writings on refugee
policy (Chimni, 2003). Managed migration policies, which have
contributed to the opening up of channels for legal economic migration,
are still focused on an assessment of the needs of British business,
and lack any real sense of the space which needs to be opened
up for migrant workers to act with greater certainty in the pursuit
of legitimate survival/welfare-promoting projects. Until UK immigration
policies are refocused agendas aimed at promoting reform, redistribution,
and development the benefits to be derived from migration are
likely to be very limited.
1.3 We will elaborate on these points during
the rest of our submission, with reference to the issues the Committee
has asked us to address.
2. DEVELOPMENT,
POVERTY REDUCTION
AND MIGRATION
What is the predicted pattern and scale of migration
over the next 25 years?
2.1 The general pattern and scale of migration
over the next 25 years will depend on such factors as the rate
of economic growth in developing countries; its character and
impact in the specific circumstances of different countries and
regions; and the progress towards democracy and political and
social stability. Aspects of this migration will be determined
by policies adopted in the developed countries, in such areas
as to whether it takes place in conditions of legality and through
stable administrative structures, or facilitated instead through
irregular procedures. Most experts assume demand across the EU
member states to continue at a rate of a need for around 1.4 million
extra people a year up until 2050 to maintain the ratio of the
working population at its 1995 level. (UNHCR, 2000). The gap between
what is permitted and what, by most conventional criteria, is
needed remains large and it can be anticipated that a high proportion
of the difference, over half a million people, will be met through
irregular migration.
2.2 The contribution made by forced migration
to these flows can be expected to remain significant in the years
ahead, despite the recent successes of the EU member state governments
in the interdiction of refugee flows at the external borders.
Studies suggest the apparent success of such policies tends to
be temporary and in its short term effect is mainly redirecting
forced migration flows to alternative destinations. (Zetter, et
al, 2003).
What is the nature of the link between development
and migration?
2.3 In our view, the probability of rising
levels of migration in the period ahead is not explained solely
by the presence of "wealth gap" between the developed
and underdeveloped nations. If that was the case we would expect
to see a decline in levels of people flow between countries where
this gap is being reduced by development. In fact the contrary
can be expected to happen, as more citizens of developing countries
gather the resources necessary for migration from rising living
standards. Stalker agues that a combination of factors, including
disparities between rich and poor countries, and "the upheavals
of modernisation and globalisation" need to be invoked to
explain why the conditions for emigration are being created. (Stalker,
2001). The concept of a "migration hump" is used in
literature on development and migration to describe a situation
which occurs during a stage in development where a people's proneness
to migrate increases with a rise in income and expectations. It
is only when national average per capita income rises above $4,000
per annum (1985 dollars) that migration begins a lengthy process
of tapering off. It is likely that this figure is now somewhat
higher, bearing in mind that Mexico, with an average per capita
income of $7,000 dollars, is still an immigrant-sending country.
(Martin and Taylor, 1996). In November 2001 it was estimated that
half the world's population lives on an income of $700 a year,
of whom 1 billion receive half that amount, at $1 a day. This
suggests a large potential for migration for many years—and
almost certainly, generations—to come.
What rules, structures and incentives are needed
to maximise the (development) benefits and reduce the (development)
costs of migration?
2.4 The general approach to migration now
favoured by the governments of the developed nation is to step
backwards from overt control and to let markets decide, with the
consequent flows then being policed by a mixture of broadly tolerant
measures (worker permits, sector based approaches) and harshly
restrictive (asylum procedures, seasonal migration schemes, other
temporary schemes). The problems that this creates for development
is that the market tends to privilege the position and interests
of those with most purchasing power, and marginalise those who
have less, or are altogether without. Since those who are most
in need of the benefits of development are concentrated in these
latter groups, market-based managed migration schemes are likely
weak devices at best for the protection and promotion of their
interests.
2.5 JCWI believes that, in order that the
development potential of migration be fully realised, its management
should be grounded in the principles of international governance,
with a radically reformed WTO establishing the gateways for migration,
and the United Nations providing the legal guarantee of basic
human rights for migrants, both forced and voluntary. The current
unfettered discretion of nation states to pursue their individual
interests in the field of migration can only produce negative
outcomes for development. The state attempting to bring about
positive benefits from individual liberalisation measures is a
hostage to policies of other countries which decide it is politically
expedient to tighten controls. A raising of standards, and the
optimisation of benefits from progressive migration policies requires
that countries act in concert on agreed objectives and strategies.
In Europe some of these objectives might be agreed through the
structures of the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the
network of cooperation agreements which bind the countries of
Euro-Med, and the EU-ACP arrangements.
2.6 The reform of the WTO is a precondition
for this body assuming the role of arbiter of migration rights
in global society. Its current bias in favour of free trade and
the opening of markets in the developing world needs to be replaced
with a commitment to sustainable development as a primary objective.
Developing countries should be allowed to take reasonable measure
to protect nascent industries, and the unfair practices which
discriminate against their agricultural products should be ended.
Within a framework where the developing nations could be more
confident about short-term economic prospects, migration policies
could be adopted which would allow aid and commerce to be supplemented
by remittances, for skills to be developed and retained within
the migration circuits, and for essential human rights to be protected
(by signing the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers,
and stricter application of the Geneva Convention on the Status
of Refugees) for otherwise vulnerable groups of people. Robust
structures could be built on these principles which, working with
national governments, would provide a framework of the management
of migration and economic development.
Can— and should—aid try to prevent
migration by promoting local development?
2.7 In our view, the "prevention"
of migration should be explicitly excluded from the stated goals
of development policy. The pursuit of immigration objectives through
developmental policy is bound to distort and damage the viability
of legitimate development goals. An example of this is seen in
the work of the EU's High Level Working Party, which has sought
to link aid and trade issues to agreement on readmission agreements.
It has achieved very little of note during its several years of
work in terms of the adoption of such agreements, but has damaged
the reputation of the EU states in their dealings with partner
countries in the developing world.
2.8 We would again want to emphasis the
fact that development in itself, local or otherwise, is not likely
to dampen demand for migration. For all the reasons stated above,
the short and medium term effect of development will, in most
cases, lead to an increase in migration. This increase will last
for as long as the "migration hump" is traversed by
the initial stages of development.
3. MIGRANTS AS
A DEVELOPMENT
RESOURCE, AND
THE IMPORTANCE
OF REMITTANCES
How can migrants be mobilised to complement aid
for the purposes of development?
How can aid and remittances best supplement each
other?
How to reduce the "transaction costs"
of remittances?
3.1 The mobilisation of migrants as a complement
for aid and other development sources will require recognition
on the part of the authorities of their position as stakeholders
in any viable system of managed migration. Migrants already contribute
one and a half times greater investment in developing countries
each year than is provided in the form of development aid and
humanitarian relief ($75 billion compared to just over $50 billion
from aid sources). For many of these workers, the conditions under
which the remittance resources are gathered are marked by insecurity
and poverty levels of subsistence in the developing countries
in which they reside. Obstacles to remittance-sending are generated
in the form of poor financial infrastructures generating high
transaction costs, or low levels of participation in "official"
procedures. If the potential utility of migrants as a development
resource is to be realised a significant improvement in their
employment and social conditions in the host countries will certainly
be required, and the financial infrastructure changed to encourage
high participation in official procedures (at a minimum, migrants
operating bank accounts) and much reduced transfer costs.
3.2 In a recent report on global development
finance, the World Bank described workers' remittances as "an
increasingly prominent source of external funding for many developed
countries". (Ratha, 2003) In 2001 remittance receipts for
developing countries stood at $72.3 billion—"much higher
than total official flows and private non-FDI flows, and 42% of
total FDI flows to developing countries." They were also
more stable than private capital flows, since the later generally
respond to cyclical developments, raising incomes during boom
and depressing them during downturns. Remittances are less volatile,
and are possibly even counter-cyclical, as migrant workers in
developing countries take advantage of lower prices at home by
remitting a larger share of their income. In countries with sound
financial infrastructures, remittances are more likely to be invested,
and hence contribute to the development of services, productive
capacity and job creation.
3.3 The World Bank report argues that the
development of financial sector infrastructure and the facilitation
of international travel could increase the value of remittances.
At present the transaction costs of remittances can account for
20% of their value. A significant reduction in these costs would
make an extra $3.5 billion available for investment. But even
more substantial increases would be gained from an increase in
access to migration opportunities by workers. Concerns about "brain
drain" are generally offset by gains in remittances and positive
network effects on commerce and investment. Commentators such
as Bhagwati (2003) have argued that developing countries should
adopt a "diaspora approach" to emigration seeking to
maximise the flows of capital, remittances and other transfers
which flow from their overseas workers. Networks for promoting
trade, tourism and training young people at home could be maintained
by these means. The "multilateralisation" of migration
procedures, overseen by a reformed WTO (see above, though Bhagwati
calls for a "World Migration Organisation") would standardise
best practices and limit negative spill over effects on third
countries. Most importantly, the grounding of migration in a firm
structure of international law would allow migrants to plan their
projects with greater certainty and take a longer view of the
enterprise they have engaged in. The increased availability of
rights for migrants—which at a minimum would extend to those
provide for in the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers—would
create a more secure environment and protect many from the worst
consequences of a marginal existence in the host country, such
as exploitation, forced labour and below minimum health, education
and welfare standards. The effect of making migration an undertaking
in which there is a greater likelihood that the individual will
prosper would in itself increase the capacity for productive investment
in developing countries.
3.4 In recent years there has been innovation
in economic policies on the part of developing countries which
have facilitated even more effect use of remittances. The use
of "financial fairs" in the United States has shown
ways in which constructive engagement with migrant communities
can increase good financial habits in their savings and remittance
activities. In Mexico schemes run by the authorities allow investment
from remittances to be supplemented by funds from the authorities,
for the purpose of support for innovation in the industries and
services which promote growth and employment gains (cf the "3-for-1"
scheme operated by the Zacatecas State Government in Mexico).
The future flow of remittances can also be used as security for
financial organisations providing credit facilities to developing
countries. Katkar and Ratha (2001) give the example of the Banco
do Brasil issuing $300 million worth of bonds in 2001 using the
future yen earnings of migrant workers in Japan as collateral.
If the financial infrastructure for handling remittances was developed
to the extent that it could guarantee low transfer costs, the
value of remittances processed through these channels has been
estimated as having the potential to provide security for $5 billion
worth of loans for the purpose of investment every year.
4. BRAIN DRAIN
VERSUS BRAIN
GAIN
Do skills acquisition/preferential quota systems
in Europe strip developing countries of their talent?
4.1 There is a strong sense in which migration
can be represented as a form of subsidy provided by relatively
poor, labour surplus countries to capital rich nations. (Castles
and Miller, 2003) The Age of Migration: International Population
Movements in the Modern World, Stephen Castles, Mark J Miller).
In this system the wealthy developed states have the benefit of
labour resources with the cost of supply (rearing from childhood,
education, training, etc) is met by the country of origin. This,
of course describes any transaction in a system of trade and commerce.
The question of equity arises not so much from a simple of description
of the transaction, but the rules which underpin the exchange.
If in return for their relatively abundant labour the sending
countries receive compensation in the form of relatively scarce
capital, then migration should be considered to have achieved
a fair and equitable settlement. Developing countries are no more
"stripped" of talent in these circumstances than the
Ford Motor Company is "stripped" of motor cars by the
purchasers of vehicles.
4.2 In our view, the proper way to pose
this question is to ask whether sending countries are operating
within a system of exchange which allows the optimum level of
advantage for their role as exporters of labour. In the situation
which exists in the world today it has to be said that this optimisation
of benefits from migration is unlikely to occur in conditions
where all the major aspects of the migration control and management
system is set by one side only—ie the recipient nations.
The immigration rules and procedures of the developed nations
are deliberately designed to maximise the advantages of their
domestic consumers of migrant labour. This is done by:
— rigidly controlling the access points
to their labour markets and passing the costs of recruitment to
the parties in the sending countries (visa and work permit procedures);
— policing the movement of the workers
who are admitted by tying them to particular employers or categories
of employment;
— limiting prospects for upward mobility
over time by placing time limits on periods of stay;
— limiting the possibility for movement
between the host and sending countries by imposing the loss of
residence rights on those who return voluntarily for work or business
reasons; and
— withholding important "social
advantages" generally available to other workers in the domestic
labour market from the migrant workforce, such as family reunification,
education and re-training, tax and social welfare entitlements.
4.3 Within this system the cost of participation
in the labour markets of the developed countries is dramatically
increased for the migrant worker, and this has to be regarded
as a loss to the revenue which is likely to flow outwards to the
developing countries in the form of remittances. The mechanisms
which seek to transfer the costs of migration to the sending countries
are a negative factor of greater significance than the damage
imputed to brain drain, since they impose a high degree of rigidity
on the movement of the migrant workforce and block the channels
through which the benefits of remittances and the positive network
effect on trade and investment might otherwise flow to developing
countries.
4.4 The optimisation of the benefits of
migration for sending countries—necessary in order for negative
brain drain effects to be overcome—requires a radical overhaul
of current immigration procedures. At the very least the restructuring
of current visa arrangements being considered, with requirements
being imposed only on the grounds of public security. Visa fees
should be abolished as these represent an attempt to transfer
the costs of administering a system run in the interests of the
host countries to the sending countries. The gateways to economic
migration should be expanded, with opportunities for visits to
investigate employment or business prospects being extended. On
becoming established as a worker or service provider the migrant
should be provided with a secure residence status which allows
movement within the domestic labour market and access to the full
range of social advantages available to host country workers.
Where this migration takes place within the framework of a quota
system, the rules governing its operation should conform to the
standards required by a competent international authority (reformed
WTO or a new World Migration Organisation) which would require
these arrangements to demonstrate their optimum value to sending
countries in the context of concrete development plans.
Do returning migrants bring with them skills and
capital, and thereby build capacity?
Is the export of skilled labour a development
strategy for some countries?
How important is the mobility of lower-skilled
workers?
What will be the role of GATS Mode 4, temporary
movement of natural persons?
4.5 There is ample evidence in the literature
on migration and development to show that returning migrants do
bring skills and capital back to their home countries. (See the
case studies covering Afghanistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka set out
in Van Hear and Nyberg Sorensen, 2003). The export of labour is
a viable strategy for developing countries; with the Philippines
and Mexico the most often cited examples of governments pursuing
deliberate goals within a coherent policy framework. Given these
facts, the issues of importance are less whether this can or should
be done, but rather what overarching framework is needed to ensure
that the benefits are equitably distributed throughout the system.
In our view, an essential component of a progressive, development-orientated
system of management migration is the scope it creates for migrants
themselves to determine their projects and trajectories, within
a framework of policy which seeks to encourage virtuous behaviour
through such means as trade agreements, FDI, tax schemes, welfare
benefits, education and training and other social and economic
incentives. Widgen and Martin (2003) and Olesen (2003) have set
out an approach to policy which would focus on the types of overarching
policy measures which would be needed as a framework for this
progressive approach. They stress the need for a policy mix which,
though providing a structure for the management of migration would
not see control over the numbers of people moving as its primary
goal. Once placed on the route to sustainable growth over the
medium and long-term, the volume of migration would be determined
by the interaction of policy instruments, rather than police actions.
4.6 In our experience, opportunities to
migrate in low skill categories often provide the gateway for
migrants to upgrade existing skills and move upwards in the occupational
hierarchy. Surveys of migrants who, in the early stage of their
migration, are often employed in menial jobs, show that many are
relatively highly educated and have a range of work experience
which fit them well for upward mobility. Migration via these routes
is likely to help many migrants from working class backgrounds,
who have gained high school plus levels of qualification, but
who lack the contacts and network skills of similarly qualified
middle class would-be migrants to gain access to professional-level
employment, to find their way within the system. The existence
of high levels of demand from employers in developed countries
for less skilled workers is well documented. These positions should
be regarded as a further opportunity to facilitate the migration
of the widest possible people from different social and economic
backgrounds.
4.7 The GAT Mode-4 proposal for supplying
services has been described as a "positive, though somewhat
limited step in the direction of greater international labour
mobility." (Ratha, 2003). The proposal will allow routes
for the temporary migration of individuals who are involved in
the supply of services. It is presently limited in scope to managers,
executives and professionals. Countries which are not significant
foreign investors and those with a high proportion of less skilled
workers are not expected to benefit much from the present round
of negotiations. It is therefore difficult to see it functioning
as an important tool for promoting development.
5. CONFLICTS,
REFUGEES AND
MIGRATION
Can aid prevent violent conflicts and reduce the
number of international asylum seekers?
5.1 There is evidence which establishes
a link between poverty and conflict, but the contribution made
by aid to alleviating conflict is less clear. It seems to be the
case that whilst poverty is a factor in a conflict situation,
for it to erupt on a scale which projects populations into refugee
movements complex political issues have to be engaged, in which
society is polarised into irreconcilable contesting groups. This
polarisation may be facilitated by the existence of long-standing
tensions between ethnic or tribal groups, but the entry of external
forces into the situation can sharpen differences and make the
resulting conflict more deadly.
5.2 The trigger point for this development
comes when regional or global powers seek to intervene to influence
the outcome of local conflicts. In some instances these interventions
have taken the form of international aid relief or ostensibly
humanitarian peace-keeping operations; in others, it is the more
cynical decision to favour one group against the other for reasons
of expediency in the struggle to gain advantage. In all cases,
conflicts are exacerbated by the availability of relatively cheap
modern arms which multiply the killing and maiming power of the
adversaries. Castles, Crawley and Loughna (2003) have argued that
concerted action to control arms trade activities, as well as
measures directed against illegal trading in diamonds, cobalt,
coltan and other commodities which fuel conflict may be the most
beneficial form of aid.
5.3 Only a relatively small number of refugees
are projected into international movement (as opposed to internal
displacement, or the crossing of nearby national borders) as a
result of overt conflict situations. Most refugees arriving in
Europe from outside the region are fleeing state repression which
takes place at levels below widespread armed conflict. Those coming
from states operating repressive regimes are often nationals of
middle income countries, such as Turkey/Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran,
or the former Soviet countries, rather than the poorest of the
developing nations. Increased levels of aid are not likely to
assist people in this predicament.
What are the differences in developmental terms
between voluntary economic migration and forced migration?
5.4 For migration to be related to development,
circuits have to be opened which keep the people in the diasporas
closely connected with their home countries. Such close contacts
are likely to exist when the extended family remains involved
in viable business projects (including farming), or educating
young people or looking after the elderly. Optimum benefits also
arise in conditions of good governance in the country of origin,
where people have confidence that their investments will retain
their value and property rights will be respected. These are generally
the conditions which pertain in countries from which refugees
are fleeing.
5.5 Even so, refugees can still positively
influence affairs in their countries which will, over time, promote
more favourable conditions for development. These will include
the establishment of a vocal, critical opposition in exile, the
publication of newspapers and journals which will be circulated
clandestinely back home, the raising of funds to support the internal
opposition, and a centre for international lobbying aimed at forcing
change on repressive governments. Refugees also often prosper
in exile, and acquire capital, skills and expertise which can
be placed at the service of their countries when more favourable
conditions arise.
6. SOUTH-SOUTH
MIGRATION
Most migration takes place within the south. How
important is this migration from a development perspective and
what can be done to improve the protection of migrants' rights?
6.1 The destination of the migrant is likely
to be less significant than the circumstances in which her migration.
For example, there is evidence to show that there are development
gains from such migrations as that of the people of the south
Indian state of Kerela to the Gulf states. The per capita income
of households has been significantly raised by remittances from
these sources and there has been investment in land and business.
Similarly, the emergence of countries such as Mexico as a major
immigrant receiving, as well as sending nation, reveals a mechanism
by which skills and vacancies are recycled through a complex movement
of people, with Guatemalans and Hondurans moving into parts of
Mexico from which migrants to the United States have departed.
The necessity for such flows of people is often deplored, and
the disruptive effects they can have on the life patterns of indigenous
tribes should be noted and appropriate steps taken to ameliorate
their worst effect. Nevertheless the best indication of the beneficial
effects of such movements remains the extent to which migrants
are able to retain a degree of control over their lives, to plan
their migration over time, to have the leverage to establish a
place for themselves in the host society, and to earn sufficient
to make remittances a practical possibility.
6.2 Contrariwise, it is also the case that
a higher proportion of people in South-South migrations are moving
in conditions of greater disadvantage than those in the South-North
counterparts. In West Africa and South Africa, the movement of
people from the poorer to the relatively better-off countries
in the region is unlikely to take place within a framework of
established law and policy which properly respects basic rights.
Young people are more likely to be trafficked in exploitative
and dangerous conditions. The authorities in the host states seldom
have the resources or the inclination to provide adequate protection
in such cases. Where the state does get involved, it is more likely
to be in the form of mass round-ups and expulsions, during the
course of which already poor people are often separated from what
little property and personal belongings they do have, and our
pushed into exposed situations across borders into the immediately
neighbouring countries.
6.3 The south also contains a higher proportion
of forced migrants than the north. If their exile situation becomes
prolonged their situation can become intolerable by most standards
of human existence. With no adequate structure of jobs or business
to facilitate their integration into the host society, their presence
can in itself become a source of tension and conflict. If this
exists on a sufficiently large-scale the development prospect
of the host country will itself be retarded.
Does aid to those countries which border conflict
areas act as a pull factor and increase the number of refugees?
What should the UK (DFID) role be in relation
to south-south migration?
6.4 A study published in 1995 by the EU
IGC (IGC 1995)on the "exclusive approach" to asylum
processing ( out-of-country processing, then favoured by the Dutch
government) found that there was clear evidence arising from experiences
in Indo-China of aid in the border areas acting as a significant
pull factor for more refugees. Even without the element of international
aid, the fact that refugee camps demonstrate a pull factor can
be grasped intuitively. A refugee camp is precisely a place where
displaced people gather because they believe they will find the
resources needed for their survival. This might be, at the minimal
level, because if offers the possibility of respite from attacks
by hostile persons, through to its placement near fresh water
supplies, food, and some form of shelter. If this minimal level
of resource is then augmented by aid, providing health care, higher
standards of food, sanitation, and possibly the means of earning
a livelihood, then this will exert a pull factor for those who
are without these requirements of life.
6.5 In many ways the issues that should
concern the UK authorities in respect of south-south migration
do not differ in principle to those involved in south-north movements.
The task is to ensure that all movements across the globe take
place within a framework of law and policy which properly allocate
the rights and obligations of all parties participating in the
process. We have set our views on what these should be above.
There will be a need to ensure that the overarching framework
of law and policy within which South-South migration occurs will
need for these to be flexible enough to accommodate the particular
needs of countries at different stages of economic development
and with labour markets which operate in ways which differ from
those in the North.
7. DEVELOPMENT
COHERENCE AND
POLICY ON
MIGRATION
How consistent (in both a national and international
context) are donor governments' approaches to migration with their
policies on development co-operation, humanitarian relief, and
refugee protection?
Should DFID adopt a less neutral approach and
develop a policy on development-friendly migration? If so, how
should it fit with DFID's own Country Assistance Strategies and
how should DFID promote such a policy across government?
7.1 The recent literature on migration and
development has argued that two basic options are before governments
as frameworks within which coherent policies might be developed.
(Chimni, 2003) These are the "alliance-containment"
approach, and the "distributive-developmental" approach.
Within this schema, UK current policies are squarely within the
conservative orbit of the former, and set against reformist modernising
approach of the latter.
7.2 The distinguishing features of the "alliance-containment"
approach are described by Chimni as:
(a) A non-entre«e regime (interdiction,
interception, visas, carrier sanctions, safe third country rule,
etc);
(b) Deterrence measures (detention, withdrawal
of social security payments, etc);
(c) Readmission agreements;
(d) Harsh border controls to check smuggling
and trafficking;
(e) A temporary protection regime to deal
with mass influx;
(f) Minimal humanitarian assistance to first
asylum countries without serious debt relief;
(g) Humanitarian intervention (safe havens,
armed intervention, etc);
(h) Involuntary return of refugees to the
countries of origin; and
(i) Some bilateral and multilateral aid for
reconstruction of post-conflict societies to ensure return. (Chimni
2003, p. 53)
7.3 This approach is wholly determined by
a narrow conception of the interests to be represented in migration
management as those of the developed country in question. Developing
countries are essentially expected to order their affairs in such
a way as to make the movement of people amenable to this style
of management. It is important to note that nothing within the
alliance-containment approach presumes a prejudice in favour of
"zero immigration". Alliance-containment is compatible
with the movement of people in comparatively large numbers, particular
as economic migration. However, the rules for the entry of workers,
their residence conditions, access to welfare benefits and state
services, rights to family reunification, and long-term settlement
prospects are governed entirely by the national authorities of
the developed, without consideration being given to the legitimate
interests of either the workers of the sending countries. In our
view, this characterisation of a particular approach to migration
policy fully describes the one favoured by the UK government.
7.4 The implications for such an approach
for development have to be understood as being retrograde. Circuits
designed to make global migration work for the interests of developed
countries cannot be easily switched to promoting the rights of
migrants and wider growth.
7.5 The alternative distributive-development
approach provides a more robust framework for progressive, modernising
policies. Its central features are:
(a) Recognition of the connection between
refugees, relief, aid and development;
(b) A more complex account of root causes
of migration, which include the impact of development and globalisation
on the countries of the South;
(c) The need for meaningful and institutionalised
dialogue with the states affected by the immigration policies
of the developed world;
(d) A standstill, flowed by a rolling back
of the non-entre«e asylum regime in a spirit of responsibility
sharing;
(e) Extended debt relief and "peaceful
structural adjustment" policies for developing countries;
and
(f) Attending to the growing North-South
divide. (Chimni 2003)
7.6 For UK policies to be made consistent
with policies on development co-operation, humanitarian relief,
and refugee protection we believe that that the entirety of its
immigration and asylum policies have to be wrenched free from
the alliance-containment approach and re-thought along the lines
of distribution and development.
7.7 The DFID current "neutral"
position on migration is not really neutral, but a commitment
to the conservative approach of the UK government. We think this
is a mistake and the department should recognise the crucial importance
which a progressive migration could play in promoting development.
We believe it could to re-orientate public discussion on immigration
policy away from its current, narrow, "British interests"
approach, and insist on a better understanding of the development
potential for the right policies.
8. GENDER ISSUES
AND MIGRATION
8.1 The "feminisation" of global
migration has become one of the most frequently commented upon
developments in the recent period of people flows. (Kofman, Raghuram,
Phizacklea and Sales 2000) The reasons for this are rooted in
the combined effects of globalisation on the labour markets of
the developed countries and the delivery of welfare services,
and the profound changes wrought in kinship and traditional communities
in the developing world. The consequences of these developments
have been to create new types of demand for gendered migration
in such areas as domestic services, care of the elderly and infirm,
public sector health and education, low skill industry, and the
hospitality industries. Women now make up around 50% of migration
flows to Europe, and their circumstances demand particular care
sensitivity in terms of personal security and protection from
exploitation. Further, women migrants are more likely to be supporting
dependent family members in their home countries, remitting more
of their income abroad and retaining less for personal use in
the host country.
8.2 The implication of the feminisation
of migration flows has not been taken into consideration to any
serious extent by the UK authorities to date. Policy makers continue
to operate with a model of controls which presumes that young
single males continue to make up the largest part of migratory
flows. Controls are predicated on the belief that firm measures
to detain and expel this ideal type raise no fundamental issues
of human rights or other special considerations. Women are only
now beginning the task of consolidating their position in the
host society and forming the sort of self-help community groups
which are capable of representing their interests to the national
authorities. In the meantime control policies have moved in a
draconian direction, with detention and expulsion becoming much
more routine, without any consideration being given to the consequences
of these actions for the integrity of migrant projects and a their
ability to perform important functions in promoting development.
8.3 We would urge that DFID gives further
consideration to this issue, and commission studies on the implications
of the feminisation of migration for development, and the ways
in which management policies need to be adapted to accommodate
the legitimate interests of female migrants.
November 2003
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