Memorandum submitted by Statewatch
INTRODUCTION
1. Statewatch welcomes the opportunity to
submit comments to the inquiry of the International Development
Committee into "Migration and Development". This submission
focuses on the third question that the inquiry is considering:
How coherent is UK and EU migration policy with
policy on other development-related matters and how might a more
holistic and longer-term approach to migration be beneficial to
the UK and its development partners?
2. It is our view that the migration (and
security) policies of intergovernmental organisations, particularly
the EU, are already "contaminating" the international
development agenda by making aid and trade increasingly dependent
upon migration control. It is logical that in the longer term
this will result in developing countries diverting resources to
meet these obligations. We believe that this approach contradicts
and will undermine development policy and reproduce rather than
alleviate global inequalities. In this context we are very concerned
that any "holistic" approach would be at the expense
of UK and EU "development partners".
BACKGROUND
3. The current links between the EU development
agenda and migration control should be seen in a historical context.
4. The EU has pursued ever-more restrictive
immigration and asylum policies. The visa regime makes it impossible
for genuine refugees to reach the EU without recourse to illegal
means while the demand for migrant labour in EU countries (among
other things) encourages people to enter illegally and use any
possible legal means to stay here. The criminalisation of entry
has thus created the market in illegal travel and "trafficking",
fuelling crime and corruption in countries of origin and transit.
5. At the EU summit in Tampere (Finland)
in October 1999, six action plans of the EU's High Level Working
Group on Immigration and Asylum (HLWG) were adopted. The policies
were an attempt to pass responsibility for prevention of immigration
to the countries of origin of refugees and migrants and the countries
through which they pass by tying trade and aid to the prevention
and return of "refugee flows". The plans targeted Afghanistan,
Albania (later extended to Kosovo), Iraq, Morocco and Sri Lanka.
The UK was responsible for the development of the Sri Lanka plan.
6. The plans included detailed statistics
showing the size and age structure, life expectancy and infant
mortality of the population, imports and exports to and from the
EU and the rest of the world, GDP, development aid and existing
trade cooperation and readmission agreements—all of which
are to be used to cajole these countries into accepting EU readmission
policies. Of the six countries targeted for action, at least four
can be described as refugee-producing countries. Yet none of the
action plans contained any proposal which would allow refugees
from those countries to seek asylum in Europe. The plans were
about making people stay where they are—either in an unsafe
country of origin or in precarious conditions in the region of
origin—and about sending back those who made it to Europe.
7. The HLWG proposed a combination of vague
and aspirational recommendations to improve the social, political,
economic and human rights situation in the targeted countries
but managed specific, clear and implementable recommendations
to stop migration from and through them (these include more airline
liaison officers stationed at airports to prevent people boarding
aircraft bound for Europe; new laws criminalizing trafficking
and illegal exit; equipment and training to detect forged documents
and arrangements for the identification and documentation of returning
refugees).
8. The levers of trade and aid have been
used explicitly in this process, particularly in the pursuit of
readmission agreements. The EU demanded the insertion of a clause
on readmission and repatriation during the final stage of the
negotiation of the Lome« Convention on aid and trade (between
the EU and 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific states). The ACP
states argued that there was no basis in international law for
such a demand (the Legal Service of the EU concurred), but with
little choice the ACP countries capitulated and Lome« IV
was signed in February 2000. Its successor, the Cotonou agreement,
which will run from 2007-20, strengthens the EU's position in
regard to imposition of readmission obligations. The EU will no
longer sign any association or cooperation agreement unless the
other side agrees to these standard obligations.
9. To further these objectives, the Seville
European Council agreed upon the establishment of a single body
for General Affairs and External Relations in June 2002. This
means that development policy no longer has an independent role
in foreign policy and is instead be considered alongside security
and defence and external trade and aid, creating, as the European
Parliament has noted, "a risk of development considerations
being seen as less important, even ignored" [Working Paper,
DEVE 106 EN 01/2003].
RETURN OF
MIGRANTS TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
10. The EU has so far signed readmission
agreements with Hong Kong and Macao, completed negotiations with
Sri Lanka and Albania and is negotiating with Morocco, Russia,
Ukraine, Pakistan, China, Algeria and Turkey. More are planned.
11. Readmission agreements are vital to
the EU countries, obliging signatory states to take back their
own nationals. The European Commission has proposed the extension
of the Cotonou readmission obligations to cover "other third
country nationals" (ie undocumented migrants from the region).
We share Amnesty International's view that this amounts to "trading
human beings in exchange for financial aid".
12. We are also concerned about the two
EU "Return" Action Plans for repatriation from the EU,
preferably voluntary (but if not then forcibly) of all illegal
migrants and refugees whose countries are now "safe".
The first is a specific programme for Afghanistan [EU Council
doc 15215/02, 4.12.02] and the second is a wider plan on increased
expulsion across the board [EU Council doc 14673/02, 25.11.02].
The former makes few provisions for the security of the people
returned, contains no obligation not to go ahead if the human
rights situation in Afghanistan does not improve and chooses to
completely ignore ongoing and at times fierce military action
and calls from agencies working on the ground in Afghanistan not
to return refugees.
13. Some of the funding for the repatriations
will come from the recently established "European Refugee
Fund". This is hugely disappointing given that this budget
line was created to assist in the "support and integration"
of refugees in the EU.
14. The EU and most member states have set
ambitious expulsion targets. With the "political agreement"
at this month's Justice and Home Affairs Council of EU Decisions
on financing expulsions [EU Council doc 14204/03, 31.10.03] and
joint expulsion flights [EU Council doc. 14205/03, 31.10.03)]
we are concerned for both the safety of people being expelled
and that increasing returns could have a detrimental effect on
developing countries.
THE UK GOVERNMENT
PROPOSALS FOR
"SAFE HAVENS"
15. The UK government's "new vision
for refugees" is a "global network of safe havens"—"particular
camps whose prime purpose is to provide a place of safety and
process claims". The underlying principle is "protection
not migration"—there will be "no need to flee".
Like the HLWG plans before them, the UK proposals contain no meaningful
proposals as to how this utopian vision will be achieved.
16. To secure the cooperation of developing
countries the UK government proposes that:
at every level of governance (domestic, EU, international)
in development, trade, conflict resolution and promotion of human
rights, the factor of reducing forced migration should be explicit
and played into the wider agendas of these objectives [Home Office
draft, "A new vision for refugees", 5.2.03].
17. Under the "safe havens" plan
it is proposed that those fleeing conflict, poverty, persecution
or environmental disaster will be housed in UNHCR administered
camps, if not in the actual country they are fleeing, then in
the region. All would be entitled to six months' temporary protection
while their asylum applications are being processed. Those that
actually manage to reach the EU to make an application would be
sent immediately to a safe haven in Europe—but potentially
outside the EU—for processing (possibly the Ukraine post-EU
enlargement or even Albania in the short-term).
18. Internally displaced refugees—there
are some 20 million worldwide—will not have access to these
"safe havens". There will be "some form of internal
policing to avoid internal violence and prevent entry of combatants",
though refugees would be "free to leave" (but then ineligible
for any form of international protection elsewhere).
19. We are alarmed that these proposals
are now being discussed at the EU level and that the lack of transparency
in EU Council proceedings has all but hidden these discussions
from scrutiny. The Swedish government stands alone in its criticism
and firm opposition. It has also written to the UNHCR to express
their disappointment at its position (the UNHCR is in favour of
"protection in the region" (camps) but opposes the external
processing of asylum-seekers). The Netherlands, Denmark and Austria
have backed the UK strongly. The European Commission's work programme
of 2004 says that it will produce a report on a "single [asylum]
procedure, resettlement programmes and external asylum applications"
by June 2004 [COM (2003) 645, 29.10.03]. This appears to contradict
public declarations by EU and UNHCR representatives that the former
could not accept the UK proposals.
20. We are also concerned that the draft
Constitution contains a provision for "partnership and cooperation
with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people
applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection"
[Article III-167(2)(g)]. Without clarification, this provision
is clearly open to misuse by Member States seeking to "sub-contract"
their protection duties to third countries.
20. We share the view of Ian MacDonald QC
and Nadine Finch that the "automatic removal of asylum seekers
to a location outside of the European Union before substantive
consideration of their application would not conform with internationally
recognised human rights and refugee protection standards and is
likely to be in breach of the United Kingdom's obligations under
the Refugee Convention" and would give rise to "a serious
possibility of a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights"
[Opinion obtained by Justice, see press release, 20.6.03].
21. For decades more than 6 million of the
10 million refugees in UNHCR care around the world have been trapped
in exile, unable to return home or settle in their country of
asylum. The UK proposals amount to the creation of camps by some
of the world's most prosperous countries in some of the world's
poorest and most unstable regions. It should be inconceivable
that the UK government can associate these plans with "development
policy".
THE CURRENT
EU AGENDA
22. The Seville European Council adopted
conclusions on a number of immigration and asylum issues. These
state that each future EU association or cooperation agreement
should include a clause on "joint management of migration
flows and compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration".
The Conclusions also declared the EU's willingness to offer financial
assistance to third States to assist with readmission of their
own and other countries' nationals and with broader "joint
migration management". Undefined sanctions for non-cooperating
countries are also envisaged. A recent treaty between the EU and
Central American states is the first to contain the "new
generation" migration management clause in an agreement.
23. This was followed-up in December 2002
by a European Commission Communication on "migration and
development and on financial resources for return policy, border
management, assistance to non-EU countries" [COM (2002) 703,
3.12.02] and then in June 2003 by a formal Commission proposal
for an EU Regulation to create a budget providing "financial
and technical assistance" in this area [COM (2003) 355, 11.6.03].
The programme has five objectives:
— The development of their [developing
countries] legislation in the field of legal immigration, in particular
on admission rules, on the rights and status of persons admitted.
— The development of legal migration
in accordance with an analysis of the demographic, economic and
social situation in the countries of origin and in the host countries.
— The development of their legislation
and national practices as regards international protection, with
a view to satisfying the provisions of the Geneva Convention of
1951 on the status of refugees.
— The establishment in the third countries
concerned of an effective and preventive policy in the fight against
illegal migration.
— The readmission, in the full respect
of law, and durable reintegration, into the third country concerned
[From latest draft of this proposal in EU doc. 14052/03 ADD 1,
28.10.03].
24. In May the EU Council adopted Conclusions
on "migration and development" in which "migration
management" is the primary "strategic policy priority"
for the EU [Council doc 8927/03, 5.5.03]. To this end and not
unlike the UK government proposals on "protection in the
region", the EU calls for the "coordination of development
and migration related policies, and cooperation with regional
processes and international organisations operating in the field".
The Conclusions propose that "the opportunity of the mid-term
review of Country Strategy Papers . . . allow for a case-by-case
reassessment of migration issues in concerned countries".
25. Security concerns also have the potential
to "contaminate" the development agenda with recourse
to the powers of persuasion assured by aid and trade. Financial
Intelligence Units from the USA and EU member states in the pursuit
of terrorist funds and assets have designated non-cooperating
countries to face sanctions, potentially as part of wider anti-terrorism
clauses to be imposed on the developing world in the same way
as readmission clauses. The European Commission has suggested
that a greater allocation of resources to developing countries
to combat "crime and terrorism" will also feature in
its 2003-04 review of Country and Regional Strategy Papers.
26. The EU is also targeting its future
EU "neighbours" (post-enlargement): Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova and Belarus plus the "Western Newly Independent States
(WNIS)" of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro,
Macedonia and Kosovo plus the "Southern Mediterranean"
states of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,
Palestine, Syria and Tunisia (only Ukraine and Moldova are seeking
accession to the EU). The plan is to create a "friendly neighbourhood"
of "prosperity" and "peace" with the underlying
motivation being to protect the EU from trans-border threats of
terrorism, crime and migration. These countries will be expected
to institute "reform" and to implement key parts of
the EU's acquis communautaire—especially on "enhanced
cooperation on justice and security issues" including illegal
migration, judicial and police cooperation and "threats to
stability".
CONCLUSION
27. "Unsettled" as the links between
migration and development may be, a number of concerns are obvious.
The vast majority of the world's refugees already stay within
their region in the developing world. Estimates as to the global
number of refugees suggest a fall in recent times from 17.6-18.2
million in 1992 to 12-14.5 million in 2000 [S'rensen et al, 2003:
7]. The European Commission cites 1.9 million refugees in EU territory
(15% of this total) [COM (2002) 703, 3.12.02], yet EU governments
are increasingly insistent that as many as possible should be
returned and in future seek "protection in the region"—all
by forcible means if necessary.
28. If, as EU governments have consistently
argued, refugees are a "burden" for developed countries
(though there is much evidence to the contrary), they are, by
rationale, clearly a greater burden for developing countries.
For example, Iran currently hosts and supports 1.4 million refugees
from Afghanistan and Pakistan as against less than 100,000 in
Europe—who are to be returned as quickly as possible to
this supposedly "safe" country.
29. The EU has already exported its responsibility
for countless refugees onto the developing world. By funding "protection
in the region", border controls and "migration management"
in developing countries it will export responsibility for countless
more.
30. "Migration management" as
"development" strategy is a thinly veiled global extension
of the "buffer states" policy that was central in relations
with the applicant states. However, this was part of a wider,
more comprehensive approach to social and economic development
to enable the enlargement of the EU. The EU's global approach
makes no such provisions—it is increasingly unilateralist
and focused on migration control. The use of "sticks and
carrots" (aid and trade and the threat of sanctions) and
increasingly harsher rhetoric smacks of neo-colonialism. Development
policy should not be part of this process and must have an independent
role in EU foreign policy. The EU is not asking developing countries
whether domestic immigration and asylum policy is among their
priorities, it is coercing them into accepting its demands.
31. It is claimed that this strategy will
not divert funds or priorities away from development programmes.
It is our view that in the longer term this will be unavoidable
as developing countries are forced to divert resources away from
social and economic policies to meet these obligations. We believe
that this can only undermine development and reproduce rather
than alleviate global inequalities.
32. It also seems likely that as successive
"waves" of developing countries introduce border controls
and restrictive immigration and asylum policies, vulnerable people
from the world's poorest countries will be denied access to more
and more of the world's resources. The market in illegal travel
("trafficking") and false documents is likely to grow
together with all the associated crime and corruption.
33. We believe that the EU policies are
unbalanced, inhumane, and internally contradictory. This is highlighted
not least by the migrant labour needed by the EU (mainly unskilled
but also skilled). At a Greek EU Presidency conference in Athens
in May this year the Foreign Minister, George A Papandreou, suggested
that the EU needed 30 million immigrants by 2020. This is because
of a predicted 30% fall in the working population (and a drop
from 22% to 12% of the EU's share of world trade). By proposing
the idea of "quotas in return for readmission", the
EU threatens to develop into the biggest trafficker in human beings
of all.
34. All this comes at a time when assistance
from "Official Development Aid" is falling and developing
countries are increasingly dependent on remittances [Gammeltoft,
2002]. In 1997, ODA dropped to the same level of funding as 1981
in real terms; there has been "no serious debt relief";
and since 1992 donor countries have even been able to include
in their ODA figures, money spent on refugees and asylum-seekers
living in the donor country. In 1998, 20% of total humanitarian
assistance was spent on supporting refugees and asylum-seekers
in donor countries. The sums amounted to just under a billion
dollars, or more than a third of bilateral humanitarian assistance
[Chimini 2003: 81].
35. We urge the Committee to consider EU
policy carefully in the course of its deliberations. In this regard
the Committee might benefit from oral evidence from UK delegates
to EU working parties (such as the HLWG) or from officials in
the European Commission.
For more information about Statewatch's work,
see http://www.statewatch.org/.
This submission develops and updates Hayes,
B and Bunyan, T (2003) "Migration control, security and the
EU development agenda" in BOND (ed) Europe and the World
(London: Bond).
Statistics from "The Migration-Development
Nexus...", International Migration Quarterly, vol
40 (5) Special Issue 2/2002.
November 2003
| 
