Examination of Witness (Questions 20-39)
Rt Hon Tony Blair, a Member of the House, Prime Minister,
examined.
Q20 Donald Anderson: That is, they
had contained the weapons programme of Saddam Hussein and you
were saying that the containment process had failed.
Mr Blair: With respect, it is
a different thing to say that they had achieved quite a bit than
for him to say that the containment programme was working. If
I could actually quote to you, he says this in fact in respect
of the question put to him by Senator Warner: "Senator Warner,
I think the world is far safer with the disappearance and removal
of Saddam Hussein. I have said I actually think this may be one
of these cases where it was even more dangerous than we thought.
I think when we have the complete record, you are going to discover
that after 1988 it became a regime that was totally corrupt, individuals
were out for their own protection and in a world where we know
others are seeking WMD, the likelihood at some point in the future
of a seller and a buyer meeting up would have made that a far
more dangerous country than even we anticipated".
Q21 Donald Anderson: But that was
surely some time in the future. He was saying that you had said
consistently that the containment policy of your friend President
Clinton had failed and, therefore, there needed to be a change
of policy.
Mr Blair: Exactly and if I can
then read what he also says, and incidentally this may be of help
to the Committee and I hope it will be of help to Parliament tomorrow,
that I have asked the permission of Senator Warner to put in the
Library of the House of Commons the full evidence of David Kay
to the Senate Intelligence Committee, and I really ask people
and I ask our media particularly to read the whole of that evidence
because the idea that this is a man saying that weapons of mass
destruction and Saddam Hussein were a load of boloney and nothing
really existed, he is saying precisely the opposite of that. If
I could just read this because it is important, and he says this—
Q22 Donald Anderson: But briefly.
Mr Blair: Well, I just think it
is important that we deal with the point. "In my judgment,
based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq
Survey Group, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of Resolution
1441. Resolution 1441 requires that Iraq report all its activities,
one last chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered
hundreds of cases based both on documents, physical evidence and
the testimony of Iraqis"—
Q23 Donald Anderson: But it is not
concluding that he was an imminent threat.
Mr Blair: Well, I have not got
this exact quote, and I will look it up, but he does in fact go
on to say that he does perceive it as a threat. The point I am
telling you, and, with respect, I think this is clear, what is
true about David Kay's evidence, and this is something I have
to accept and it is one of the reasons why I think we now need
a further inquiry, it is true, David Kay is saying, that we have
not found large stockpiles of actual weapons. What is untrue is
to say that he is saying that there was no weapons of mass destruction
programme or capability and that Saddam was not a threat.
Q24 Donald Anderson: Let's turn on
to weapons of mass destruction. Wolfowitz said, "We settled
on one issue of weapons of mass destruction". Do you regret
now in that respect that you placed your case wholly on that one
issue of weapons of mass destruction?
Mr Blair: No, I do not regret
it and neither do I regret the action that we took—
Q25 Donald Anderson: It is a pretty
flimsy foundation, is it not?
Mr Blair: I am afraid I really
do not agree with that, Donald, and I think that people who want
to see what the true situation is should look at the whole of
what David Kay has said to the Senate Intelligence Committee.
What he details are breach upon breach of the United Nations Resolutions.
It is true, as I say, I have just accepted the fact, I have to
accept, that David Kay has said that he has not found large stockpiles
of weapons—
Q26 Donald Anderson: Nor the prospects
of.
Mr Blair:— and he says that
in his view he does not believe that that will happen, but what
he goes on to say, however, is that he has found ample evidence
both of breaches of UN resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction
programmes and capability, and he goes on to say that he actually
believes that Iraq was possibly a more dangerous place than we
had thought, that the conflict was justified and that if we had
refused to go to conflict, then the security of the world would
be put at risk. I think it is as well that all of his evidence
is taken, not simply one part of it.
Q27 Donald Anderson: The intelligence
community are effectively technicians in that they provide you
with the technical assessments and it is for the politicians to
make the judgments on that raw material. Are you confident that
you asked the right questions?
Mr Blair: Yes, I am confident
I asked the right questions. Perhaps I can just say this: that
after the announcement that will be made to Parliament later today
by Jack Straw, we will then have what is effectively the fourth
inquiry into this. We have had the Foreign Affairs Committee,
which you chaired obviously, we have had the Intelligence and
Security Committee, we have had Lord Hutton's inquiry, and I think
it is right, as a result of what David Kay has said and the fact
that the Iraq Survey Group now probably will not report in the
very near term its final report, that we have a look at the intelligence
that we received and whether it was accurate or not. I think that
is important. Of course the political judgments that are in the
end made by the politicians, that is right, but I do simply say
that whatever is discovered as a result of that inquiry, I do
not accept that it was wrong to remove Saddam Hussein or the world
is not a better and safer place without him.
Q28 Donald Anderson: That is a different
argument. Can I finally, Prime Minister, put this to you: when
Dame Pauline Neville Jones appeared before the Foreign Affairs
Committee, she said that there are no groundrules regarding links
between the press and the intelligence agencies. We, as a Committee,
recommended that this should be reviewed[2]
In the light of what has happened, are you prepared to review
the rules of engagement, the contact rules, between the intelligence
agencies and journalists?
Mr Blair: Well, I certainly think
that we need to look at issues to do with presentation and I think—
Q29 Donald Anderson: Not presentation,
contacts.
Mr Blair: I do not quite know
what is the difference between us. You mean contacts in what sense?
Q30 Donald Anderson: Contacts between
journalists and the members of the intelligence services.
Mr Blair: Well, it depends what
those contacts are obviously. What should not happen in any set
of circumstances is that members of the intelligence services
give classified information that they should not give to people.
That must be right.
Q31 Donald Anderson: But even informal
contacts you are prepared to countenance?
Mr Blair: I think it depends on
the situation. There are rules already. People are given authorisation
to speak to journalists in certain circumstances, but I think
it is important that we remember we are talking about intelligence
for the country and I do not think we should do anything that
puts the basic security of the intelligence work that we do at
risk. Is that not what you mean?
Q32 Donald Anderson: The lesson to
be learned from the contact between Mr Gilligan and in this case
a member of the Ministry of Defence, but surely there must be
some case for groundrules, as Dame Pauline Neville Jones suggested?
Mr Blair: Well, I think there
is. Again I am sure that what the Ministry of Defence or any of
the security people would say is that there are groundrules. You
do not have contact unless it is authorised.
Q33 Donald Anderson: And the former
Chairman of the JIC said there were none.
Mr Blair: As I say, I do not know
whether you have a set of formal guidelines. I am not sure that
that exists, but what should surely not happen is that somebody
makes an unauthorised contact with a journalist and starts talking
about intelligence. That cannot be right. The one thing I want
to say about this which I feel very, very strongly about is that
I think our intelligence services in this country do a fantastic
job for this country. I think they are good people, I think they
are dedicated public servants and they do an immensely difficult
job. Intelligence is not some absolute science, as we all know,
but let's be under no doubt about this at all, that we cannot
have a situation where we simply treat intelligence or security
advice that is given in a way where we just throw it open to whoever
wants to pick it up. You have got to have some very, very clear
boundaries on this and the basic rule, as far as I am aware, and
I am sure people are going to look into the issue of whether you
need some more formal guidelines, but the basic rule surely has
got to be this: that you do not make contact with a journalist
unless it is properly authorised and when you are dealing with
intelligence, that must be surely the right thing in the interests
of the country.
Q34 Tony Wright: On the question
of journalists, Prime Minister, the world of journalism has been
shocked and outraged at Lord Hutton's suggestion that they should
endeavour to tell the truth and that they should not gratuitously
impugn the integrity of individuals. Do you agree with the editor
of The Financial Times who wrote on Saturday, "Let
this dreadful misadventure serve as a wake-up call for journalists"?
Mr Blair: Let me choose my words
diplomatically. I hope that people read Lord Hutton's Report and
realise that there is a world of difference between the freedom
of the press and its independence and broadcasting something that
is completely untrue and refusing to retract it. Those are two
totally different things and, to be fair to parts of our media,
I think that they are concerned about some of the issues to do
with the Hutton Report and you can see that there is a healthy
debate at least in one part of journalism about that. Incidentally,
I have no doubt at all that government itself has got all sorts
of lessons to learn as well, but that is another matter.
Q35 Tony Wright: But if the offending
BBC report had simply said that there were people inside the intelligence
and defence community who had concerns about aspects of the dossier,
or that Number 10 was seeking to play a role in the construction
of the dossier, both of which we now know to be true, presumably
there would be nothing at all for the Government to object to?
Mr Blair: Of course if what had
been broadcast was true. Incidentally, we never made any secret
of the fact that we were involved in how the dossier was presented.
Of course it was a statement to Parliament. I was making the statement
to Parliament, so it would be, in my view, rather bizarre if we
were not involved in it at all. What we never did, however, was
interfere with the intelligence judgments of the intelligence
community. Yes, you are absolutely right, that obviously if that
had been broadcast, then it would have been perfectly justified.
Q36 Tony Wright: If we just move
to the intelligence judgment, when we met you here last July,
you said, and I quote you now, "I stand entirely by the intelligence
we put in the September dossier. I do not believe that our intelligence
will be shown to be wrong at all. I think it will be shown to
be right". Do you stand by those assertions now?
Mr Blair: I have to take account
of what David Kay has said in the last few days. He was the Head
of the Iraq Survey Group and I said all the way through, "Let
us wait for this Survey Group". It is not a question, as
it were, of changing our position; it is a question of recognising
the fact that though there has been ample evidence of weapons
of mass destruction programmes and capability, the actual weapons
have not been found as yet in Iraq and the view of the Head of
the Iraq Survey Group is that he does not believe that the intelligence
in relation to the stockpiles of weapons was correct. Now, that
is exactly what we need to look into. I think it is sensible for
me to say I have to take account of that. I said let us wait for
the Survey Group. The Survey Group has come up with certain findings.
All I ask, again as I said earlier, is that people do not clip
one part of what he is saying and not take the rest of what he
is saying because the rest of what he is saying is ample justification
for the decision to go to war.
Q37 Tony Wright: This matters because
the legal basis for war that you were quite clear in advancing
was the fact of weapons of mass destruction. Last July you told
us, "The truth is that to take action we had to have the
proper legal basis and that was through the weapons of mass destruction
issue. I accept entirely the legal basis for action was through
weapons of mass destruction." In the absence of weapons of
mass destruction what happened to the legal basis for war?
Mr Blair: The legal basis is the
breach of the UN Resolutions, that is the whole issue to do with
weapons of mass destruction. If Saddam was continuing to develop
weapons of mass destruction capability in breach of UN Resolutions
then there is no doubt at all of the legal justification.
Q38 Mr Beith: But the UN Resolutions
were based on your having persuaded other countries in the UN
of the reliability of our intelligence.
Mr Blair: It was not simply that,
with respect, the question was whether there had been a breach
of the UN Resolutions and the UN Resolutions were to do with the
development of weapons of mass destruction and also to do with
making full declarations to the UN inspectors, they were also
to do with weapons of mass destruction programmes and they were
to do with weapons of mass destruction capability. I have been
honest enough to come along and say—and this is the reason
for having a fresh inquiry—that I have to accept that Dr
Kay, the head of the Iraq Survey Group, has said he has not found
large stockpiles of weapons, I have admitted that, but the critics
must also admit the rest of what he has said, which is that he
has also said he has found evidence of weapons of mass destruction
programmes, capability, Saddam's intention to develop those weapons
and the breaches of the UN Resolution that that entails. So the
legal basis of the action, with respect, if Dr Kay is right, is
entirely secure because if you go through the UN Resolutions—and
I have not got 1441 and 687 in front of me—there is a whole
series of things that he was supposed to do and as Dr Kay says,
the breaches of the UN Resolutions he has probably breached eight
or ten times.
Q39 Tony Wright: Let us just try
this another way because this gets a bit confusing, does it not?
Mr Blair: I think it is simple.
2 HC 813, Session 2002-03. Back
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