Supplementary submission from Hon Mrs
Gwyneth Dunwoody MP
1. I strongly support proposals which strengthen
Members' engagement with European matters, and which increase
the House's influence over the Government. I very much welcome
the fact that select committees have been given the explicit task
of examining policy proposals from the European Commission as
part of the "core tasks". My Committee takes this extremely
seriously. I attach a list of European matters we have looked
at over the last year (Annex 1), and an example of a letter from
one of the clerks of my Committee (Annex 2) asking the Department
for Transport for more information about an online consultation
the European Commission has launched on the reform of EU passenger
car taxation systems. We have put in place better links between
our staff and the staff of the European Scrutiny Committee to
help us keep abreast of European matters. However, competence
for transport remains shared between the European Community and
the Member States. As a result it is very rare that our inquiries
are solely concerned with European policy. This means the extent
of our interest can be easily overlooked.
CORE TASKS
2. Although I am a strong supporter of select
committee examination of European matters, I do not think that
asking select committees to operate the scrutiny reserve will
improve European scrutiny. I believe there is a real risk that
it could reduce the effectiveness of departmental select committees.
We do not have time to consider every important transport development
in the United Kingdom at present; we choose inquiries carefully.
Our freedom to set out our own agenda has already been limited
to some extent by the new emphasis on Liaison Committee "core
tasks", which of course I support. The Committee has been
making a conscious attempt to ensure that its work engages with
the work of the House, and with Government proposals. We have
looked at the transport aspects of two Bills and two draft Bills
this session, and last session we engaged with the Government's
consultation on the Future of Air Transport. This necessarily
restricts our time for "agenda setting" inquiries, although
such inquiries can be very useful in ensuring that the Government
has to address policy issues which are of interest to backbenchers,
no matter how politically inconvenient. A formal requirement to
operate the scrutiny reserve would restrict our freedom of action,
and freedom to address matters which the Government would rather
ignore, still further.
3. You will see from the list attached to
this note that in many cases we are interested in the way in which
the United Kingdom implements European legislation once it has
been agreed, as well as the evolution of policy proposals. Too
much emphasis on prior scrutiny would limit our ability to undertake
this important work.
THE SCRUTINY
RESERVE
4. I believe that the operation of the scrutiny
reserve by the European Scrutiny Committee is fundamentally different
from the type of scrutiny that departmental committees are well-placed
to perform. The only way in which departmental committees could
operate a scrutiny reserve and retain their independence would
be if the reserve was no longer to be rigorously applied to all
European business, but simply to those documents which attracted
the attention of the departmental committee concerned. I would
not support such a limitation on the powers of the House.
5. Mr Jack made a useful distinction between
"upstream" and "downstream" scrutiny. The
"scrutiny reserve" can be seen as essentially a "downstream"
mechanism. This is an oversimplification, because the European
Scrutiny Committee tracks documents from a very early stage (I
understand that it had reported on the Commission discussion document
floating the car taxation proposals mentioned above two years
ago, although consultation has only now begun.) Nonetheless, in
essence that Committee looks at documents and the associated Government
negotiating position, and decides whether it is appropriate to
keep a matter under review, lift the reserve, or require a debate.
This is a valuable, but extremely rigorous and extremely resource
intensive process. Moreover, the speed with which a particular
proposal advances is not within either the Committee's or the
Government's control, and the Committee can end up recommending
a proposal for debate to find that it is not debated for several
months, or that only one day's notice of the debate is given.
A departmental select committee could only cope with the unexpected
nature of this work by postponing carefully arranged evidence
sessions, and frequent rearrangement of its programme. I believe
this would harm select committees' credibility with witnesses,
as well as inconveniencing and annoying Members.
6. The European Scrutiny Committee is also
well placed to identify proposals which are interrelated, although
they affect different departments; for example, when we intervened
on a Framework Decision on control of pollution from ships, we
received a reply from the Home Office. There are or should be
links between some transport Directives and environmental Directives.
Departmental committees cannot give this overview.
7. It is important to remember that in most
cases even if the House has a theoretical veto over the Government,
the United Kingdom Government has no veto over European Union
legislation. It is usually better for the United Kingdom if the
Government can engage actively in negotiations; a Government which
was forced regularly to abstain from voting because the reserve
had not been lifted would lose influence in Europe. I do not think
that anyone in the House would want that. Indeed the scrutiny
reserve explicitly allows a Minister to agree to a proposal while
scrutiny continues if "he decides that for special reasons
agreement should be given". Effectively, a departmental select
committee would find itself either having to agree to the Government's
negotiating position at short notice without proper scrutiny,
to ensure that the Government could engage properly, or delay
a scrutiny, and take the risk that a Minister might agree to proposals
for "special reasons". If Ministers did this routinely,
the credibility of the House's European scrutiny system would
be undermined.
8. Moreover, as Joan Ruddock made clear,
European businesses is whipped. Since it concerns the United Kingdom's
international negotiating position, it is hard to see how it could
not be. If departmental select committees formally operated the
reserve, there would inevitably be pressure to whip European business
in them. That would, in my view, be a most undesirable precedent.
Once whipping was accepted for EU business, it would be easily
extended to other matters under consideration by the select committees.
"UPSTREAM SCRUTINY"
9. As far as a departmental Committee is
concerned, in many cases it will be interested in the development
of policy, rather than the particular documents before the House;
in Mr Jack's "upstream" considerations. The Transport
Committee already undertakes such "upstream scrutiny",
although it is not necessarily identified as such. European policy
issues often arise during the Committee's examination of broad
topics, such as "aviation" and "ports"—matters
which I referred to as "thematic inquiries". In these
cases, our reports contain recommendations which leave the Government
in no doubt about the Committee's view on European matters. For
example, we have already expressed our reservations about Community
accession to ICAO and IMO, which is currently under observation
by the European Scrutiny Committee (and has been for at least
two years). There seems no point in requiring the Transport Committee
to repeat its views every time the proposals return to the Council
agenda.
INTERACTION WITH
THE EUROPEAN
SCRUTINY COMMITTEE
10. As I said in my evidence, the European
Scrutiny Committee does not usually have a direct influence on
our programme. Given the inherent uncertainties about the timing
of European legislative proposals, this is unsurprising. It would
be perfectly possible for us to start an inquiry on a particular
document only to discover either that the proposal had been shelved
indefinitely, or that it was agreed almost immediately after our
inquiry had been announced. This does not mean that we do not
draw upon the European Scrutiny Committee's work. Once an inquiry
has identified a particular European matter as of interest, the
Scrutiny Committee's reports provide the best and most accessible
briefing available, and an extremely valuable way to trace the
development of a particular proposal over the years. In addition,
we use Scrutiny Committee reports as a way of keeping an eye on
developments in Europe.
11. There is one exception to this rule;
after a European Scrutiny Committee recommendation for debate,
we have issued a call for evidence on the GALILEO satellite programme
in the knowledge that it is likely to be discussed at the December
Transport and Telecoms Council. At this stage we have not decided
whether we will limit our intervention to publishing the evidence
we receive so that our colleagues in the House can use it in any
further debate, or whether we will conduct a brief inquiry. Our
decision will depend on what the written evidence reveals, and
on other decisions we make about our programme. Normally, we would
not expect to call for written evidence alone, but the time pressures
may make it impossible to do more. This illustrates the difficulty
of expecting a departmental committee to operate the scrutiny
reserve. I believe it is rare to have such long notice that a
particular project will be discussed at a Council, but even so
we may not be able to find time to deal with it.
PROPOSALS
12. If the House and the Government seriously
want departmental select committees to engage still more with
European business, we need to do different things and to use a
different sort of information from that provided for the European
Scrutiny Committee.
13. We have already asked the Department
for Transport for agendas of forthcoming Council meetings. However,
there could be great value in regular updates about working groups,
so that we knew what was being addressed at official level. This
would not necessarily lead to a greater number of readily identifiable
"European" inquiries; but it would help us determine
the timing and precise terms of reference of broader, thematic
inquiries, and ensure those inquiries were well informed. Early
warning would increase the likelihood the Transport Committee
had already looked at matters which the European Scrutiny Committee
identified for debate, and had reported on those which concerned
it. There may be circumstances where a full inquiry is not feasible,
but a departmental committee still has concerns, or where recommendations
about European matters are one part of a wide-ranging report.
In such cases select committees could be given a power to draw
particular proposals to the attention of the European Scrutiny
Committee with a request that the departmental committee should
be alerted when the relevant document appeared, so that the two
committees could consider whether they wish to work together.
14. Such a system would retain departmental
select committees' freedom to set their own agenda, and all Members'
right to participate in debate on the scrutiny reserve, while
ensuring the House was better informed about European matters.
September 2004
Annex 1
EU CONTENT OF TRANSPORT COMMITTEE REPORTS
Aviation (HC(2002-03) 454-I
Air Service Agreements;
Slot allocation and public service agreements;
EU membership of the International Civil Aviation
Organisation;
Air quality;
Noise regulation.
Ports (HC(2002-03) 783-I
Access to Port Services Directive
Maritime Statistics Directive
State Aids
Habitats Directive
The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency
(HC(2003-04)500
European legislation on licensing of masters
of inland waterway vessels.
Financial Protection for Air Travellers (HC(2003-04)806-I
Possible EU consumer protection legislation
for travellers.
ONGOING INQUIRIES
European Community Competence and Transport
All areas of Community competence, but focussing
on
— Negotiations with the US on aviation
agreements;
— Proposals for the "Euro vignette"
system for road user charging;
— The draft directive and draft framework
decision on the enforcement of the law against ship source pollution;
— The third rail package.
Galileo
EU satellite project.
Tonnage tax
European tax regimes.
Cars of the Future
Directives on emissions and pedestrian safety.
Annex 2
Letter from Second Clerk, Transport Committee to
Department for Transport
21 July 2004
TAXATION OF PASSENGER CARS
On 20 July, the European Commission launched
an online consultation on the reform of EU passenger car taxation
systems (IP/04/970, enclosed). This has its origins in the Commission's
Communication COM(2002) 431 of 6 September 2002 and is accompanied
by a working document which is a precursor to the impact assessment.
This move appears to send a clear signal that
the Commission intends to propose a Council Directive. While this
would not harmonise levels of taxation, the Commission
appears to envisage a requirement that Member States implement
particular forms of taxation and abolish others: Registration
Tax would be gradually abolished in those Member States which
have it; Member States would be required to have an Annual Circulation
Tax (road tax) and fuel tax which take account of CO2 emissions.
The European Scrutiny Committee considered the
original Communication in its 41st Report of the 2001-02 Session
(HC 152). The Chief Secretary to the Treasury told the Committee:
"Whilst the Government welcomes the sharing
of best environmental practice in the field of passenger car taxation
and notes that the Commission has effectively identified the UK's
policies as best practice in the Community, the Government does
not believe that it is necessary to introduce Community wide legislation
mandating member States to adopt any specific environmental approach.
Decisions on how to tax passenger cars should continue to rest
with individual Member States, subject to the importance of ensuring
the smooth functioning of the single market." (paragraph
17.4)
The Commission's consultation ends on 10 September.
We would be grateful for an update of the Government's position
on European legislation on car taxation. In particular, we would
find a response useful if it covered the following points:
— Given that The Future of Transport:
a network for 2030 (Cm 6234) suggests, albeit only as an option,
that road pricing might replace other forms of vehicle taxation,
does the Commission's intention now offend in its substance as
well as a matter of principle?
— Would the Government accede to the
type of legislation which the Commission envisages?
— How convincing does the Government
find the Commission's argument that tax differentiation is a key
way of encouraging manufacturers to improve the fuel efficiency
of passenger cars?
— How would the Government react to
any attempt to use a Qualified Majority Treaty base, on the grounds
of environmental or single market benefits, rather than the unanimity
Treaty base which might otherwise be assumed?
— What comments does the Government
have on the adequacy of the Commission's public consultation arrangements
in this case?
— What representations have Department
for Transport and/or Treasury Ministers made to dissuade the Commission
from making a proposal in this area?
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