"EXTERNAL PRESSURES"
36. Just as it is questionable that the paramilitaries'
protests were truly exclusively founded on safety concerns,
so it is doubtful that the Government's decision to separate was
wholly and simply about safety. The Minister told us that she
was advised repeatedly by members of the Prison Service that the
existing regime was safe and that, in spite of heightened tensions,
the protests could be contained.[44]
The difficulty, as she saw it, was not the actual management of
the situation but a developing public perception, in light of
reports of the dirty protest and associated events, of "a
regime that could not hold". This led to attempts by a number
of interested parties and commentators, including political parties
and religious leaders, to pressurise the Government into a change
in policy.[45]
37. It is important to remember that the protests
at Maghaberry in the summer of 2003 took place in an atmosphere
of political uncertainty. Following a breakdown of trust between
the parties to the Belfast Agreement, the Northern Ireland Assembly
had been suspended in October 2002 and elections which would lead
to its restoration, originally scheduled for May 2003, had been
deferred. Further acts of decommissioning by the paramilitaries
had been demanded as a prerequisite for the renewal of power sharing
by the political parties. Relations between the parties and, by
extension, the future of the peace process, were very fragile.
38. In the circumstances it is not difficult to see
both why the dissident paramilitaries should have identified this
moment as the time to press their case, and why the Government
might have felt themselves under pressure to take a step which
would prevent a further deterioration of relations between the
communities.
39. In this reading of the situation we would suggest
that a further critical factor—beyond the incidents which
actually took place in and around Magahaberry during the summer
months—was the threat of a hunger strike at such a sensitive
time. The dirty protest and the rooftop protests were, as we were
told, being "managed" by the Prison Service. The threat
of a hunger strike, however, continues to have a real and potentially
destabilising political resonance through the deaths of Bobby
Sands and other hunger strikers in the Maze in 1981, and the tradition
of hunger strikes as a republican tactic in extreme situations
at earlier dates.[46]
Given the historical resonance of hunger striking within the nationalist
and republican communities such a strike, although threatened
by dissident republicans, would have been profoundly unwelcome
to pro-Agreement parties on both sides of the community divide
at this time. The nationalist pro-Agreement parties might, indeed,
have felt bound to support a strike, despite their political differences
with the groups in question.
40. While the Minister, Rt. Hon. Jane Kennedy MP,
did not assent to the proposition that a potential hunger strike
was a factor in the review process, [47]
it seems to us to be the most plausible explanation for a decision
which appears to be unsupported by the weight of the evidence
presented to us. Some of the discussions we had, formally and
informally, hinted at the political pressures of the time. For
example the Steele Review panel related that:
"There was intelligence that there was going
to be a hunger strike … we believed that there were men there
who would have gone on hunger strike and who would have carried
it through … when we saw Sinn Fein they were saying to us
that there had been several protests on the streets and Sinn Fein's
natural supporters were on the streets on the question of separation
… Take the sympathy away now by giving them a degree of separation.
That was the argument … Hunger striking is such an emotive
issue that I do not think it would only have been their own political
supporters who would have been behind them. They would have gathered
a lot of people…"[48]
The continuing political resonance of the Maze hunger
strikes was further demonstrated when, following the elections
to the Northern Ireland Assembly on 26 November 2003, party leader
Gerry Adams dedicated Sinn Fein's success in becoming the largest
Nationalist party to the memory of Bobby Sands.[49]
41. Our examination of the full reasons which may
have led to separation was, to some extent, hindered by the current
limitations on select committees' ability to question staff of
No. 10 Downing Street. Following evidence from the Minister that
staff of No. 10, whom we are not able to question, had been in
discussion with the Northern Ireland Office during the period
of the protests,[50]
our concerns were expressed about this gap in accountability
to the Prime Minister at the meeting of the Liaison Committee
on 3 February. This question was not raised with the Prime Minister
in order to criticise the fact that No. 10 has taken a special
and detailed interest in the Northern Ireland problem, but because
it highlighted a gap in oversight in these unique circumstances.
We feel it is important to establish the full facts of such
decisions and this can only be done by questioning the officials
concerned in No. 10.
42. The Prime Minister was unable to recollect the
extent of No. 10's involvement in discussions on the matter, but
he acknowledged that ordinary policy considerations are from time
to time over-ruled in the particular circumstances of Northern
Ireland. He also indicated that he was aware of the arguments
surrounding select committees' access to officials within No.
10 and wished to look at how things might be done differently
in future. We welcome this sympathetic response from the Prime
Minister, and his commitment to reassess the policy on the appearance
of his staff, in exceptional circumstances, before committees
such as ours.
43. The possibility that the Government may (in deed
if not in word) have made concessions because of a sophisticated
dissident campaign which crossed the community divide is, in the
context of the political environment in the summer of 2003, understandable.
But it is also profoundly depressing. A threat which has succeeded
once is likely to be used again and may be more difficult to withstand
a second time. This expectation forms the background to many of
the concerns we have heard about the practical consequences of
the decision to separate, which we shall discuss in the remainder
of this Report.
44. We believe that the separation of paramilitary
prisoners at HMP Maghaberry was demanded by dissidents for political
reasons and acceded to by the Government for (other) political
reasons. We accept that the prevailing political conditions in
Northern Ireland in the summer of 2003 placed the Government in
an extremely difficult position. Nonetheless we have to record
our belief that the decision—taken, as we see it, contrary
to the balance of the facts and arguments presented to us—was
a dangerous one, most especially for the public servants who will
have to implement it and live with its consequences.
45. In our judgement, it seems very likely that
the new policy of separation will have to remain in place for
as long as there are any prisoners in Northern Ireland who can
reasonably claim a paramilitary affiliation. This may be a very
long time. The Government's decision is therefore also a very
significant one, regardless of the political environment of the
time, although it was made very quickly. Having made that
decision—from which we accept there is now no turning back—the
Government must accept full responsibility for the implementation
of separation, and the additional demands it will place on the
resources of the Northern Ireland Prison Service.
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