House of Commons - Northern Ireland Affairs

Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Second Report

4 IMPLEMENTING CHANGE

81. The Prison Service has decided to accommodate the separated prisoners in the two most modern wings at HMP Maghaberry: Bush House and Roe House. A number of witnesses regretted this decision, pointing out that the two houses provided the most attractive accommodation in the prison and the 'ordinary' prisoners resented losing them to the paramilitaries.[98] The impact of this decision on the remainder of the prison is discussed in greater detail in paragraphs 148-155 below.

82. The Steele Review panel themselves did not recommend which parts of the prison should be used for separation, but nonetheless described Bush House and Roe House as "peculiarly suitable" for the purpose. While the corridors in the four original houses at the prison are square, like a cloister, the two newer houses were described as 'K'-blocks, in which all activity can be surveyed from a central control point. This layout makes it much easier for staff to maintain control than in the other houses:

"One of the problems at Maghaberry is the actual physical layout of the prison building …[Bush and Roe] have in fact gone back to a more traditional style …a better arrangement as far as staff visibility and therefore staff mutual support and protection is in effect. The layout of the four original houses at Maghaberry lends itself to a lot of nooks and crannies and corners and so on and contributes in its own way to a sense of insecurity …

The Director General asserted that the decision to locate separated prisoners in Bush and Roe was a necessary one, describing the older blocks at Maghaberry as "not really fit for purpose": "the sight lines are dreadful, the corridors are narrow and they are an awful environment in which to control prisoners", he added.[100]

83. Additional measures were being implemented to increase the physical security of these blocks, including new security grilles, search facilities and a number of security cameras. In view of the recent rooftop protests on these two houses a wire 'cage' has been erected over the exercise yard to prevent prisoners gaining access to the roof in the same way a third time.[101] The changes to Bush House were carried out first, and completed in early December 2003; the Service planned that the changes to Roe House would be completed, and the permanent regime implemented, during February 2004.[102]

84. The cost of the changes was £7 million, which we were assured had been provided to the Prison Service in addition to its ordinary budget.[103] We were pleased that the Prison Governors' Association supported the changes to the infrastructure, describing them as "as good security as anything we have seen".[104] While it is regrettable that the separated prisoners should be given what is currently the best accommodation in the prison, we recognise that this accommodation is best suited to the maintenance of control and of safety for both prisoners and staff. We welcome the enhanced security features which are being installed. If, once the separated houses open, it becomes apparent that further physical changes are required, the cost of these must also be met from outside the Prison Service annual budget.

Resources and targets

85. In addition to the capital costs of separation, we were told that the changes to the regime would add approximately £7 million to the Service's annual operating costs. As Peter Russell commented, this is "not a trivial sum".[105] Much of the money will be spent on additional staff, and on staff training and support. Issues relating to staff are discussed in the next section (see paragraphs 90-129 below).

86. Historically, the "cost per prisoner place" in Northern Ireland has been higher than in Great Britain, in large part because the Service needed a proportionately greater staffing complement to deal with its paramilitary and other high-security prisoners. In recent years, the Northern Ireland Prison Service has been under considerable pressure to reduce this expenditure: under the NIO's Public Service Agreement it faces a target to reduce the difference in cost per prisoner place between Northern Ireland and England and Wales by 17% by March 2004. Prior to the paramilitary protests of 2003 the Service was on course to achieve an interim target of 11.3%.[106]

87. The drive to reduce costs was not without its critics. We were told by Prison Service staff that establishments were being run below target staffing levels, which resulted in additional pressures on staff who were required to provide cover.[107] NIACRO, an independent organisation, considered the target to reduce spending to be inappropriate for a service which was still "in transition" to a model which would be recognised on the mainland. Their point—that in spite of the peace process the "reality on the ground" was that the prisons still had to deal with the particular pressures exerted by paramilitaries—has been dramatically proved by recent events.[108] Clearly, the premise that Northern Ireland's prisons are no different to prisons in England and Wales is inappropriate now.

88. As with the capital expenditure, we were assured that the new operating costs arising from separation would be met outside the Prison Service's ordinary budget. Nonetheless it appeared to us that there remained anxieties, beyond the proper degree of care in handling public money, about the need to implement separation as cheaply as possible. Thus, for example, we were told by Peter Russell that a considerable number of new posts created as a consequence of separation would be opened to civilian support staff in order to avoid the "training penalty" which was exacted in recruiting a full prison officer: he told us, "if it were not a money saver [this] would not be worth doing, frankly".[109] Others told us that this particular step could have implications for the effective running of the prison a few years down the line: these are discussed in paragraphs 125-129 below.

89. We are, of course, aware that the Northern Ireland Prison Service operates inefficiently in some respects, and that improvements (for example a reduction in sickness absence) would bring significant benefits to staff as well as reducing costs. But, as NIACRO and others have indicated, the extent to which this inefficiency has been caused by the particular and continuing difficulties of the situation in Northern Ireland has also to be borne in mind. The target to reduce the cost per prisoner place in Northern Ireland, and associated objectives, are inappropriate following the decision to implement separation and should be abandoned for the foreseeable future. Any attempt to impose further efficiency savings on the Prison Service while it is dealing with separation are likely to prove counter-productive and to undermine the already fragile relationships between the Government and Prison Service staff. Once separation is firmly established the requirements of the new regime, and the costs associated with it, will be clearer: a review should then be carried out to determine whether costs can be reduced without detriment to the safety of staff and the wellbeing of prisoners.

90. In connection with this recommendation we further believe that the direct capital and operational costs of running the separated regime should continue to be calculated, met and publicly recorded as items distinct from the Prison Service's main budget. This is, and will continue to be, vital if the regime for other prisoners is to be protected as the Steele Review recommended.

Staff management issues

91. Prison service staff are needed to observe, manage and control prisoners; they are also essential to the fulfilment of the Service's duty of care. Physical recreation, workshops and education, which are important to the prisoner's wellbeing and rehabilitation, cannot be provided without staff and consequently in their absence prisoners must remain locked in their cells throughout the day. Additionally, there is evidence that prisoners feel safer in the presence of staff.[110]

92. The relationship between staff and Prison Service Headquarters is at present a deeply uneasy one. It would appear that there is little communication between the different interests: the Minister complained that when she tried to communicate with the Prison Officers' Association (POA) she found them "elusive", while the local committee of the POA at Maghaberry equally complained that every formal meeting they had set up with the prison Governor between August and November 2003 had been cancelled at short notice.[111] The Board of Visitors described the two sides as being "at daggers drawn".[112] In November 2003 prison officers in Northern Ireland withdrew their goodwill; the police were called in to run all three prisons during an apparent wildcat strike on Friday 21 November.[113] A week later, the Government was granted an injunction to prevent prison officers taking further such action.[114] As we have noted in the introduction to our report, an improvement in the situation was achieved on 16 January, when the NIO and the executive officers of the Prison Officers' Association jointly recorded a recommendation to the Association that goodwill be restored in return for an end to the Government's legal action. Such developments are of course very welcome.

93. Staff are opposed to separation because of their concerns that conditions will be allowed to deteriorate until the paramilitaries gain control. They also have a number of other, more long-seated, concerns about practices and their safety in their own homes. We discuss these below. We should place on the record that while we understand and have sympathy for the prison officers' concerns, we cannot condone industrial action which jeopardises the safety and wellbeing of prisoners and other prison staff.

The threat to staff

94. Staff were particularly concerned about the threat posed to their safety by the paramilitaries. These concerns are not unreasonable: twenty-nine prison staff in Northern Ireland have been murdered over the years, both within and outside the prison estate.[115] Even more have been attacked, and some have also suffered injuries as an indirect consequence of paramilitary activity. Looking only at the very recent past, in the period 1-22 October 2003 14 attacks on current or former prison officers in Northern Ireland were reported: one of these, which took place within the prison, was said to be an act of frustration by 'ordinary' prisoners who resented what they perceived as the level of attention and resources being granted to the paramilitaries at their expense.[116]

95. Just as the paramilitaries had carried forward their campaign for separation on a variety of fronts, they were expected to adopt a variety of approaches to the intimidation of prison officers (see paragraph 61 above). We were told that "most" of the recent physical attacks on prison officers' homes had been attributed to Loyalist organisations.[117] Although the Steele Review panel believed these attacks were "down to mere criminality" we find it hard to believe that this is entirely the case.[118]

"THEY WILL GET US OUTSIDE"[119]

96. On the whole officers at Maghaberry took a robust view of the threat posed to them, repeatedly telling us that so long as adequate physical and psychological support was provided to them they would succeed in maintaining control within both the integrated and separated areas of the prison. Nonetheless the officers understandably felt a burden of responsibility for the safety of their families. It was this concern which appeared to be most directly related to the recent breakdown in relations between staff and management of the Prison Service.

97. Matters have been made much worse by two incidents outside the prison. The first was the discovery in late 2002 that personal information relating to over 1400 prison officers had found its way into the hands of paramilitary organisations.[120] Concerns over this incident had been compounded by the second incident (referred to in paragraph 32 above), in which dissident republican sympathisers raided a Prison Service office in Dundonald House in Belfast and allegedly sought to remove further files containing officers' personal details. In the event, they only succeeded in removing one file, marked "dirty protest", which was subsequently shown on local television.[121]

98. Individuals within the public service whose details are known to be in paramilitary hands are able to access certain Government-funded schemes which will enable them either to move house, or install security measures in their homes. These schemes include the Key Persons Protection Scheme (KPPS) run by the Government, and the Prison Service Protection Scheme (PSPS) run by the NIPS. Nearly all of the officers involved have applied to one or other of the schemes available.

DISPUTES OVER HOME SECURITY

99. The installation of home security measures under these schemes has been a source of considerable complaint. Initially, the charges made to us focused on the perception of inferior treatment, based on cost: it was alleged by the POA Northern Ireland that the Government had restricted the amount to be spent on any individual prison officer to £17,222 (after VAT) when "other members of the security services in a similar situation … had £50,000" spent on them.[122] They made the serious claim that:

"management has put in a tremendous effort in ensuring that prisoners are separated as quickly as possible, but no effort has been made by management or the Secretary of State to address the genuine concerns of prison officers and the families about the lack of security at their homes."

100. The Minister told us that the prison officers were mistaken in their claims about security expenditure.[123] In any case, we believe that this argument is a distraction from the main point. When we spoke directly to prison officers we were able to gain a more useful and detailed picture of their concerns. These were:

that individual officers were being provided with a universally prescribed security installation, rather than one customised to their particular needs and concerns;
that these measures only provided partial protection, thereby restricting officers in the performance of their domestic routines; and
that because the universal package which had been adopted was inflexible, it had failed to take account of changes in the methods of assault employed by attackers.

101. Both Peter Russell and the Minister strongly defended the Government's handling of the situation. The primary obstacle to providing officers swiftly with the protection they sought was simply the scale of demand: "the manufacture of bullet-proof glass is not geared up for such a sudden upsurge in the number of eligible people."[124] Faced with such exceptionally high demand, they had taken what steps they could to ensure everyone was provided with a measure of protection at the earliest possible stage. To facilitate this, the unusual step had been taken of seeking a generic group assessment of the threat to staff from the PSNI (ordinarily, a case by case assessment would be carried out). The prescribed set of measures provided to each officer had been determined on the basis of this group assessment and work to install security measures at individual homes had been phased, so that (for example) all officers received security lights before any received strengthened doors and windows. [125]

102. Both Mr Russell and the Minister believed that this was the most equitable way of dealing with the situation; Mr Russell also asserted that this approach had been explained to the Prison Officers' Association Northern Ireland at the outset, in late 2002.[126] We were told that all officers should have received the full set of security measures determined by the group assessment, by spring 2004.[127]

103. We find ourselves strongly in sympathy with the prison officers over their fundamental personal concerns for home security. The current situation is a profoundly difficult one: the original disclosure of officers' details—which we have not investigated in the course of this brief inquiry—should clearly never have happened. Equally clearly, the Government has accepted, and taken measures to fulfil, its responsibility to deal with the consequences. But the scale of the crisis has made it impossible for the Government to provide all the officers concerned with the timely, practical degree of reassurance they were wholly entitled to look for. The officers' frustration at the unavoidably slow rolling-out of the security installation programme can be readily understood.

104. It is not to be expected that any individual officer will perceive the threat to himself or his family to be less because he is one of 1400, rather than one of ten, or twenty. For this reason, while we understand entirely the reasons why the Government should have adopted blanket measures to tackle the immediate threat to prison officers' homes, we do not believe that any individual should ultimately receive a less careful assessment of his personal situation than he would have received in other circumstances.

105. Priority must be given to the completion of the current programme of security installations for all staff affected: in the light of the Minister's comments, we expect to receive confirmation that this work has been completed, as indicated, by spring 2004. But once this has been done, any officer who so wishes should be entitled to apply additionally for a personal threat assessment which would indicate whether or not security at his home should be upgraded further. Clearly, if many officers avail themselves of this option there will be further delays in meeting the demand. A degree of patience on the part of prison officers and their families will therefore be required.

Staff management

106. Within Maghaberry itself, the Steele Review panel noted problems relating to an inefficient shift system and high levels of staff sickness absence. Peter Russell confirmed that the panel's comments about the shift system were "undoubtedly true".[128] This inefficiency was responsible for much of the difficulty the prison was facing with overcrowding in the summer of 2003, as management could not find sufficient staff to enable the use of the then unoccupied cells in Foyle House (see paragraph 2 above).[129] The problem had been recognised, and "constructive" work had begun with the Prison Officers' Association to develop a more efficient working pattern. By June 2003 all governors had been trained to a basic level in the design of shift systems, and some governors had received more advanced training. Unfortunately, the paramilitary protests had intervened: Mr Russell told us that he was, understandably, reluctant to press on with change to the prison's basic routines when it was already coping with the introduction of separation.[130]

107. The level of staff absence is a concern beyond the inefficiencies of the shift system. It prompted comment from NIACRO, who took the view that inadequate staffing compromised both their and the Prison Service's ability to provide educational and resettlement services.[131] The Governor of the Prison agreed that the current rate of absenteeism was, at "just over 11% … by any stretch of the imagination unacceptable". However, he pointed out that the pressures of working in the prison environment were considerable and nearly half of all sickness absence was stress-related. The Prison Service had initiated a two-fold approach to the problem of sickness absence, combining a more tightly controlled system of monitoring and discipline with a greater focus by line management on communication with individuals, to encourage a return to work as soon as possible.[132]

108. We welcome the steps which have been taken by the Prison Service to address the problems of the inefficient shift system and high sickness absence at HMP Maghaberry. We believe that finding a solution to these problems would ultimately be beneficial for management, staff and prisoners alike and we are particularly pleased that the Prison Officers' Association have been willing to work on these problems with management. Nonetheless we accept that it will be difficult to make substantial progress in addressing the shift system in the short term, when other changes are already placing a significant new burden on the staff. While these changes may be put on hold, they have been a long time coming and we hope that all concerned will seek to make further progress at the earliest opportunity.

TOIL

109. Prison officers' contracts impose fairly strict conditions over the taking of leave, and working overtime. While leave entitlements are fairly generous staff are not allowed to take leave if their absence would compromise the Service in its statutory duty of care for prisoners. Staff may also volunteer, or be asked, to work overtime. The overtime system is sometimes referred to as TOIL (time off in lieu) as hours worked are repaid by leave, rather than additional payments.

110. The use of a TOIL system was introduced to the Prison Service in England and Wales in the late 1980s, under the "Fresh Start" contract. TOIL replaced the earlier practice of payment for overtime worked which had, in some prisons, been abused by staff seeking to maximise their income. Similar reforms were not extended to Northern Ireland until 1995, but the Framework Agreement of that year "provided for the phasing out of overtime as an endemic part of prison management", although it also "consolidated the NIPS payment into basic pay, thereby increasing pensionable pay significantly".[133] It was a fundamental assumption of this reform that overtime should be exceptional and the substitute leave owed to staff, therefore, should not accumulate.

111. We were told by the local POA committee at Maghaberry that arrangements for TOIL had gone badly awry. The pressures on staff to provide sickness and emergency cover had resulted in the accumulation of very large amounts of TOIL which officers had little expectation of being able to claim back. The representatives who appeared before us each claimed to be owed more than sixty days leave, with only three months of the leave year remaining.[134]

112. The Governor of Maghaberry confirmed that there was a problem with TOIL. He told us that staff had been granted special leave—up to three additional weeks—to facilitate the installation of home security or make other arrangements following the disclosure of officers' details in 2002. The need to provide cover for these leave periods had worsened an already complicated situation.[135]

113. In the circumstances we were rather surprised that the Service's senior management did not seem to perceive much difficulty: Peter Russell told us that the deterioration in the number of hours owed to staff was "not earth-shattering" and that "most staff like to keep two or three shifts in their back pockets … because they never know when things might crop up" for which they might want to take a day's leave.[136] When we drew his attention to the claims of earlier witnesses to be personally owed more than 60 days each, he suggested that these claims were a statistical anomaly, and not representative of the average.[137] The Minister told us simply that she was "staggered" by the evidence relating to TOIL, which had not previously been brought to her attention.[138]

114. When the claims of opposing parties are so very different in magnitude it can be difficult to pinpoint the facts. We therefore asked the Minister to make further inquiry into the facts of the matter. In January, she told us that the time owed to staff at Maghaberry was 36,091.25 hours, spread over 827 staff. The average debt was 43.6 hours per staff member: in other words, if the leave were distributed equally between all 827 members of staff each would receive a little over five days on top of their annual leave entitlement.[139] While this evidence supports the Director-General's suggestion that the very high claims put to us had been exceptions to the rule, the total sum owed is nonetheless substantial and the average is significantly more than the "two or three shifts" to which Mr Russell referred. We have also to bear in mind the Governor's testimony that undischarged TOIL is indeed a problem.

115. We asked Mr Russell how he intended to deal with the issue of TOIL. He rejected the idea that these officers might be paid for the days' leave they have accrued, telling us:

140

On the other hand, the Service's persistent failure to pay debts incurred—because, given operational requirements, it cannot do so through leave, and will not do so through money—has put a strain, to say the least, on its employees' goodwill.

116. This situation simply cannot be allowed to continue. It must be remembered that it has arisen in part because of the exposure of prison officers to paramilitary threat and the special leave that that entailed; in part because of longstanding operational inefficiencies; and in part because of an economy drive which has seen Northern Ireland's prisons attempting to operate with reduced staffing levels. Requiring staff to build up high levels of TOIL will only increase the already high levels of stress-related sickness absence: this in turn will hinder the important management reforms which the Service is trying to introduce.

117. Even more of a concern is the development of a dispute where there seems to be so little understanding, on both sides, of the other party's concerns and in which the claims of the parties are so considerably at variance with each other. Communication has been very poor, and there is a great deal of resentment and suspicion of senior management, who are perceived by prison staff to be remote and ignorant of operational realities. Responsibility for these communication problems must be accepted equally by both sides—but senior management in particular must recognise the damage ill-informed perceptions can do to the work of the Service, and take steps to change them.

118. Having investigated the claims put to us about problems with the provision of Time Off In Lieu (TOIL) at HMP Maghaberry, we have concluded that the amounts of TOIL currently owed to staff by the Prison Service, while not "earth shattering" (to use Mr Russell's words) are nonetheless unacceptably high. Urgent efforts must therefore be made to verify the amount of additional leave which is owed to each member of staff, and to facilitate early repayment of at least a significant part of the debt. Attention should also be focused on how to ensure that this issue, which has damaged relations between management and staff, does not recur.

INTERVENTIONS BY PRISON SERVICE HEADQUARTERS

119. In this context we should record that we received several reports of alleged interventions by Prison Service Headquarters that were perceived to undermine the authority of governors and staff at Maghaberry. We were pleased that certain of these reports were refuted directly by the Minister.[141] Having made inquiries about the remaining allegations (concerning a series of complications with a visit to the prison on a particular day) we do not believe it would be constructive to comment on them in detail. Clearly, communication between many of those involved was poor. If those within and outside the prison who were making decisions had made greater efforts to ensure they were fully informed about the situation, their judgement as to how to handle it might have been rather different.

120. It appears to us that the matter has been construed by staff in a way which was perhaps understandable, but mistaken. It is our judgement that in the case cited there was no deliberate attempt by Prison Service Headquarters to undermine prison staff, and we regret that staff alleged that there was. Nonetheless we should record our concern over one specific aspect of the events we have examined, which is that the first incident in the chain directly involved a member of senior management.

121. It has been confirmed to us that a member of the Ulster Political Research Group who was seeking to make a visit to a loyalist prisoner in Maghaberry chose, rather than telephoning the prison as he should have done, to telephone the Service's Director of Operations instead. He succeeded in contacting this senior manager, on a direct line, at the weekend, and the Director was thus inappropriately placed in a position whereby his involvement could—knowingly or otherwise—prove an obstacle to the upholding of prison rules. If the individual concerned had not been able to achieve such contact the events which followed might never have happened. It is particularly poor management practice when individuals have direct and privileged access to Prison Service Headquarters and can thus bypass the management systems within the prison. The Minister has told us that the policy on telephone access is being reviewed. It must be changed.

122. These allegations also serve as a further indication of the mistrust and misunderstanding among frontline prison staff concerning the actions of Government and senior management. Disputes and a lack of confidence between Prison Service staff and management play directly into the paramilitaries' hands. Urgent steps must be taken to resolve the breakdown in communication as quickly as possible.

STAFF SUPPORT

123. Looking to the future, staff working in the separated areas of HMP Maghaberry will need customised training and continuing psychological support to deal with the pressures of their work: there was considerable determination to avoid a repeat of the situation in the Maze, which had prompted a number of officers over the years to commit suicide.[142]

124. We were pleased that the importance of staff support was taken seriously by all the parties, although there was a degree of difference about the ways in which it should be provided. We were assured that all staff assigned to the separated wings would receive a special training course, would be fully briefed, and would be provided with regular opportunities to share their experience with others.[143] Staff would also alternate between the two houses on a shift-by-shift basis, which would reduce the risk of being subjected to continuous pressure by a particular group.

125. In spite of the difficulties of releasing staff to attend training,[144] Peter Leonard, the Director of Operations, gave us a clear undertaking that all staff would receive the initial package of training before working in the separated areas. It is essential that this undertaking is fulfilled. On the question of continuing psychological support, we welcome the provision of regular group 'debriefing' sessions for staff in the separated wings, but we believe that officers must be able to have individual meetings with psychologists as and when they need them. We look to the Government for assurances that this will be the case.

Rotation

126. In addition to the provision for staff to alternate between the two houses, we were told that the Service planned to change the entire staff complement in the separated areas approximately every eighteen months. This would ensure equitable treatment for all staff, and limit the exposure of the staff concerned to the difficult and stressful operating conditions within the separated wings, where the focus will be on management of a restricted routine rather than, as in the integrated wings, on welfare within a disciplined regime.[145] The former approach requires a 'hands-off' approach by staff to avoid the subtle conditioning tactics which paramilitaries have adopted in the past; the latter approach is completely different, requiring structured but friendly engagement with prisoners.[146]

127. The proposal to rotate staff was welcomed by both prison governors and officers, although some concern was expressed as to how this would be accomplished. We were told that, because the three prison establishments in Northern Ireland are some distance apart, staff generally do not like to be transferred between sites. Therefore it was believed that staff coming out of the separated conditions would probably still work somewhere within the Maghaberry estate—where, at least in some locations, it would be difficult to guarantee they would not have contact with the separated prisoners.[147]

Recruitment of support staff

128. In addition to the physical changes being made at HMP Maghaberry, the Service is planning to recruit more than 100 staff to provide extra support for the new regime.[148] As we have noted in paragraph 87 above, Peter Russell indicated that these staff would be recruited as support staff and placed in clerical and other jobs where they would have no direct contact with prisoners. The lack of contact with prisoners meant that these staff did not have to receive the full training required for a prison officer. This enabled the Service to save money.[149]

129. The Prison Officers' Association expressed concern about this proposal, and its implications for the rotation of staff out of the separated areas. At present, prison officers who are in need of a period of formal rehabilitation may be given 'non-contact' jobs such as operating the prison gates or monitoring CCTV footage in the control centre. If such posts are in future restricted to non-officer grades it will remove this particular opportunity for respite for staff coming out of the separated areas. The officers also noted that staff in these non-contact jobs can currently, if necessary, be called on to provide support in cases of emergency within the prison. If those filling the non-contact posts in future are not trained officers, they will be unable to provide this essential backup. For both reasons, the officers believed that the recruitment of support staff was a retrograde step.

130. Peter Leonard assured us that the recruitment of additional support staff would not lead to a reduction in the number of prison officers available within HMP Maghaberry: the intention was to release officers for front-line duties, including the strengthening of the search team, which will provide the first response to requests for emergency support on the wings.[150] Given the staffing problems at Maghaberry, any increase in resources must be welcome. We accept of course that there must be a proper restraint in the spending of public monies. But we remain concerned that the employment of support staff rather than fully trained prison officers—which is freely acknowledged to be a measure of economy—may be a false economy which will create difficulties for the effective rotation of prison officers and the provision of respite, where necessary, to those coming out of the separated areas. The Government must keep this under review over the first two to three years of separation and, if necessary, provide the resources to enable appropriate support staff to be retrained as prison officers, and remove the barrier to rotation.

98 See for example Ev 124 Back

99 QQ34, 65 Back

100 Q158 Back

101 Q325 Back

102 New £7 million refurbishment to keep prisoners segregated, Irish News 12 December 2003; New era for Maghaberry, News Letter, 12 December 2003 Back

103 Q229, 231 Back

104 Q486 Back

105 Q211 Back

106 Northern Ireland Office 2003 Departmental Report p20 Back

107 QQ517-518 Back

108 Ev 128 Back

109 Q150-153 Back