Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Second Report


5  WIDER ISSUES

The consequences of separation for other prisoners

131. The paramilitary campaign for separation, and the subsequent implementation of a separated regime, have inevitably had consequences for others within the prison (generally referred to as 'ordinary' or 'ordinary decent' prisoners). Primarily, the problem has been the distribution of resources. Staff have had to be withdrawn from routine duties to deal with protests, and to provide more intensive support to those working with the separated prisoners. Because of these changes in staffing patterns, levels of constructive activity and access to facilities for ordinary prisoners have been cut back. The loss of Bush and Roe Houses to the separated regime has increased pressure on accommodation in the remainder of the prison, requiring more ordinary prisoners to 'double up', or share cells, even although Foyle House has now been opened.

132. The plight of the ordinary prisoners was a major concern for the majority of our witnesses, including the members of the Steele Review panel. The Steele Review took place during August 2003, a period when temperatures across the UK were exceptionally high. Father Kevin Donaghy told us that during the interviews they met an ordinary prisoner who had not been out of his cell into the open air for three weeks, until the previous day. He described conditions for the prisoners as "very unpleasant" and said that such experiences had led the panel, at an early stage, to view protection of the ordinary prisoners' regime as a priority in their work.[151]

133. NIACRO and the prison's Board of Visitors also expressed concern about the effects of a restricted regime on the prisoners' wellbeing and also for their rehabilitation. During periods of extended lockdown family visits were cancelled and earned privileges were effectively suspended. This was damaging to inmates' morale and potentially a disincentive to improved behaviour. The protests and subsequent changes had also served to disrupt educational provision, and the construction of resettlement plans for each prisoner—an area in which the Service had previously been making improvements.[152]

134. The Service's senior management recognised that provision of a regular regime for the ordinary prisoners was important. Peter Russell told us:

    "Part of the challenge is to make sure a prisoner's experience is not dominated by conditions in his cell and it should not be if we are succeeding. His experience should be dominated by what he does between getting up in the morning and going to bed at night. The more we fail the more time is spent in the cell and therefore the more the judgement about 'what am I getting from this?' will be based on the experience in the cell."[153]

However he admitted that the Service would this year be unable to provide as many hours of constructive activity per prisoner as in the past; Maghaberry in particular was struggling to meet the target.[154] Staff shortages, and the increased demand placed on staff by separation, were largely responsible for these difficulties. We were told that it would be the end of February 2004—following a recruitment drive—before the Service was able to deploy sufficient staff to run a regime comparable to that in operation before the protests began.[155]

135. In spite of the Prison Service's assurances that it intended to improve conditions for ordinary prisoners—as an incentive to potential applicants for separated conditions to remain within the integrated regime—it is clear that at present ordinary prisoners are not reliably receiving even a standard routine. This is, understandably, creating significant tensions for both prisoners and staff. A member of the Board of Visitors said:

    "There is a wait-and-see attitude amongst the prisoners. There is a feeling that they, the paramilitaries … are getting everything, that apart from anything they are getting staff. The officers on the landing … are telling us that they have 8 staff for 120 prisoners, whereas around the corner they have 8 staff for 23 prisoners. This just dramatically affects everything in the prison. There can be all the idealistic programmes and plans and futures but if they cannot address the staff issue … there is absolutely nothing that can be delivered but the lock turned in the keyhole of the door and prisoners on a 23-hour lock-up. This is just breeding tremendous insecurity … We have even had people say to us, "We will wreck up the house. We have almost been advised to wreck up the house, as it is the only way you get anything in this place". It is just horrifying and it is worrying … They sit in their cells and try to work out how they can make their own lot better all the time."[156]

136. There is evidence of these warnings being realised. Both the Prison Governors' Association and local members of the Prison Officers' Association referred to significant incidents of cell damage caused by ordinary prisoners venting their frustrations at the restrictions imposed on them as a consequence of separation.[157] The Governor of the prison warned that if the situation deteriorated further, he and his staff believed safety could not be guaranteed.[158]

Strategic direction

137. Similar problems have arisen in the past. In part, these were attributed to a lack of senior strategic direction for the mainstream prison regime, as Headquarters staff focused on control of the paramilitaries within HMP Maze. We therefore asked the Minister what resources were currently dedicated by senior management to the improvement of the integrated regime. She told us that an assistant governor at HMP Maghaberry was working "almost full-time" on regime improvement.[159]

138. We welcome the Minister's indication that strategic oversight for the integrated regime has not been forgotten. Nonetheless, we had hoped for a more specific assurance that governors have the full and active support of dedicated staff within Prison Service Headquarters in taking forward what is still the mainstream work of the service. We expect the Minister to provide further detail of the work being carried out by Prison Service Headquarters in support of integration in the Response to this Report. It is vital that the vision of Prison Service Headquarters does not become over-focused on the paramilitaries, as seems often to have happened before 1998.

139. We agree with the Steele Review panel that the restoration and maintenance of a full regime for ordinary prisoners is vital for the safe and effective management of HMP Maghaberry. Without it, the Prison Service is failing in its duty towards those in its care. The absence of a constructive regime is also liable to prompt a return of the unrest which has troubled the prison in recent months, albeit for different reasons. The Government must therefore provide any additional support and resources necessary in order to restore this regime as an immediate priority.

Pressures on accommodation at HMP Maghaberry

140. Staff and Governors also expressed concern about the pressures on accommodation within the prison. We have referred previously to the difficulties which can be caused by 'doubling up', or cell sharing, and the role that this played in the protests of 2003.

141. A key factor in the pressures on accommodation at Maghaberry is the number and variety of regimes staff are expected to manage within a single site. In addition to long-term and high security prisoners (of different paramilitary affiliations and none) it also houses: remand prisoners; female prisoners; fine defaulters (low security prisoners on very short sentences) and immigration detainees. Appropriate provision must be made for each different category. We were told that the prisoners themselves are unsettled by the variety of regimes in operation. Long-term prisoners find it uncomfortable to be in proximity to remand prisoners "because they are here one day and gone the next".[160] All categories are aware of differences in the regimes being provided to different groups, and may come to resent them.[161]

142. The Steele Review panel clearly believed that it would be desirable to reduce the number of regimes being provided within HMP Maghaberry. They suggested various ways in which this might be achieved. One was the full integration of remand and sentenced prisoners. We are unable to support this recommendation because of the different legal status of these groups and the danger that, while it would lead to greater management efficiency, it would significantly increase the risk of "contamination" between the two groups.[162] Therefore we welcome the Prison Service's decision to maintain separate provision for remand prisoners.

143. Steele also recommended that both fine defaulters and immigration detainees should be dealt with outside the prison system.[163] While the Government appears to have accepted the arguments for streamlining operations at Maghaberry, it has thus far taken a different approach. No action has apparently been taken to alter provision for fine defaulters; however, it is proposed that the small population of female prisoners should be transferred to the Young Offenders' Centre at HMP Hydebank Wood.

Immigration detainees

144. The Government has also issued a consultation paper on the accommodation for male immigration detainees. This small group (at the time of the consultation, four individuals from a variety of backgrounds) are currently co-located with the female prisoners in Mourne House. The suggestion is that if the female prisoners are moved they should also be moved, to provide urgently needed reserve accommodation within Maghaberry for other groups.

145. The consultation paper states that Steele's recommendation—that detainees should be dealt with outside the prison system—is "not currently an option". It therefore suggests three alternatives for their accommodation within the prison system:

  • Removal of the detainees to another small but discrete accommodation unit within HMP Maghaberry (the committal unit);
  • Full integration of the detainees within the (ordinary) prisoner population at HMP Maghaberry; or
  • Transfer of the detainees to HMP Magilligan, currently housing medium and low risk convicted prisoners facing only a short time in prison.

146. These detainees are not serving sentences as punishment for crimes committed, and in other parts of the UK would not be treated as such. Ultimately, the handling of these individuals comes down to the availability of resources: it is clear that their number is so small that the Government considers special provision in Northern Ireland to be uneconomic. Yet each detainee has rights as an individual, such as the right under the European Convention on Human Rights to freedom of association. If the numbers of detainees were to dwindle further to one or two, the Government would effectively be holding them in solitary confinement. It is very difficult for the Government to meet all of the competing requirements of human rights law while keeping these individuals within a prison environment.

147. We endorse the recommendation of the Steele Review, and other witnesses to our inquiry, that immigration detainees should be dealt with outside the prison system. We are disappointed that the Government for the moment appears to have rejected this important recommendation. All of the options presented by the Government as alternatives raise concerns for the wellbeing of the individuals concerned. Accommodation in the committal unit would be isolated, and with limited facilities. But both of the other options would immerse these individuals within a population of convicted criminals. If that is considered to be ill-advised for those on remand, it surely must be equally so in this case.[164]

148. We cannot endorse any of the Government's proposals for the continued retention of immigration detainees within Northern Ireland's prisons. It would be wholly wrong to integrate them into the prisoner population at HMP Maghaberry; the other options each have drawbacks. We urge the Government to reconsider whether further options may be available.

The prison estate

149. Both the size, and the nature, of Northern Ireland's prisons contribute to the management problems faced by the Prison Service. The estate consists of HMP Maghaberry; HMP Magilligan, which caters for lower-risk categories of prisoner; and the Young Offenders' Centre, HMP Hydebank Wood.

150. Throughout the estate there are grave problems with the nature of the accommodation provided. Although the estate is relatively modern, compared to provision on the mainland, we were reminded that the buildings within HMP Magilligan include both Maze-style 'H' blocks and Nissen huts.[165] Peter Russell told us that the older blocks at Maghaberry, which are now being used for the ordinary prisoners, were "not really fit for purpose" and were "an awful environment in which to control prisoners".[166] In 2002 Her Majesty's Chief Inspector similarly described the old houses at Maghaberry as "difficult to supervise, easy to barricade and therefore potentially unsafe environments".[167] In each case, the "nooks and crannies and corners" inherent in the physical layout created a requirement for more intensive staffing, as poor sight lines rendered isolated officers vulnerable.[168] Maintenance was a concern: we were shocked to hear from the Steele Review panel that many of the existing security cameras within HMP Maghaberry were not working.[169]

DOUBLING UP

151. The number of individuals within the prison population must also be considered when assessing the appropriateness of the accommodation provided. A cell which is tolerable, if not pleasant, for one occupant may become distinctly uncomfortable or even unsafe when shared. In the majority of cases, such discomfort is likely to be mainly physical, as individuals are kept in close confinement for extended periods (perhaps with limited natural light or ventilation). However we were also reminded that if individuals are arbitrarily forced into each others' company in such conditions violence may ensue.[170]

152. HMP Maghaberry currently has a population of 646 inmates, against a theoretical capacity of 718 in single cells (including Mourne House).[171] While, on the face of it, there is therefore no need to share we were also told that:

  • Lack of staff has meant the closure of certain cells, which cannot be supervised;[172]
  • A significant number of cells (possibly as many as 90) have been damaged in the prisoner protests; and
  • The nature of the separated regime requires that the whole of Bush and Roe Houses (96 cells each, 192 in total) be withdrawn from mainstream service, although in the short term less than half of each house will be occupied.

The actual capacity of the prison, therefore, is somewhat less than has been claimed.

153. Separation has resulted, directly and indirectly, in considerable pressure upon the accommodation for ordinary prisoners in Maghaberry. A significant number are required to share, and they are being housed in conditions which Her Majesty's Inspector and the Prison Service agree are undesirable. We have already noted that the loss of the most modern accommodation to the separated regime, while understandable from a management point of view, has caused resentment among the prisoners themselves. Doubling up compounds that dissatisfaction.

154. The Steele Review recommended clearly that the cells in Maghaberry were unsuitable for holding two prisoners "except perhaps those serving very short sentences", and called for a substantial reduction in the practice.[173] Peter Russell told us that if he could replace the old houses at Maghaberry "with something more like the two more modern houses [Bush and Roe] … I would be very well pleased." We were pleased to hear that two additional blocks, similar in design to Bush House and Roe House, are to be built on the Maghaberry estate to relieve the pressures on existing accommodation.[174]

155. We welcome the proposal to build additional new accommodation at HMP Maghaberry. We acknowledge the conclusions of both Her Majesty's Inspector and the Steele Review panel concerning the problems with accommodation in the prison: we therefore recommend that, in filling this new accommodation, priority should be given to reducing the level of doubling up among prisoners serving longer term sentences within the integrated regime.

156. Although the new build will help considerably, it cannot entirely solve the problems with the existing accommodation. The Minister told us that:

    "..it is simply not feasible to replace [the older houses] in the short term. Moreover they are less than 20 years old".[175]

While they may be comparatively modern, they are also clearly unfit for purpose as it is difficult for staff to maintain a safe regime within them: their age is no justification for inaction. Indeed, we note that in 2002 HM Chief Inspector stated explicitly that "the older units in Maghaberry are unsafe and unsatisfactory, and should be replaced as soon as possible."[176] The Government should review its timetable for redevelopment of HMP Maghaberry. Redevelopment of those parts of the estate Her Majesty's Inspector found to be potentially unsafe should be accelerated. In addition, it is unacceptable that significant security systems within the prison should be out of order. The Minister should discuss maintenance schedules with the prison's Governors and NIPS senior management, and resolve any problems with this routine requirement.

SPARE ACCOMMODATION

157. Prison Governors also pointed out that the estate was severely lacking in 'decant' accommodation which could be called into operation if the number of prisoners should rise or further cells should have to be taken out of commission for repair.[177] We were told in November 2003 that the prison population had already risen by about 120 compared to the previous year.[178]

158. The problem of decanting prisoners is exacerbated by the very small size of the prison estate. There is only one high-security prison: thus, while cells may be available in the other two institutions, not all individuals can safely be transferred into them.[179] To a degree, the problem is now being tackled through the proposal to relocate small numbers of lower-risk category detainees from Maghaberry to Magilligan, where a limited amount of decant accommodation is available, or to the Young Offenders' Centre at Hydebank Wood. Yet these numbers are very small, and the amount of accommodation freed by this action will remain limited. Peter Russell told us that in recent years the possibility of reducing the estate even further, to one all-category prison and the Young Offenders' Centre, has been seriously considered.[180] We must be thankful that common sense prevailed.

159. There remains also a risk that factionalism within the separated prison regime will increase the pressures on accommodation at Maghaberry further in the short to medium term. As we have noted above (see paragraph 58), some staff anticipated that 'stage 3' in the perceived paramilitary campaign for separation would see the various paramilitary factions ceasing to co-operate, and insisting (possibly through violence) upon private accommodation, group by group.

160. At present it is planned that paramilitaries who are broadly designated either Republican or Loyalist will be accommodated in either Bush or Roe House. Since each contains 96 cells, this accommodation ought to be sufficient (with some doubling up if necessary) for the numbers expected to be entering the separated regime. If, however, at some future date pressure were to be exacted for PIRA affiliates to be housed on separate landings from RIRA affiliates, or for the UDA and UVF to be kept apart it is likely to become increasingly difficult to avoid a physical expansion of the separated quarters.

161. It appears to us that the combination of a small prison estate, and the multiplicity of regimes the NIPS is required to provide within that small estate, have much to do with the difficulties the Service is facing. The major argument in favour of current practice is one of economy. In a situation where costs are already higher than on the mainland, it is reasonable to be concerned about expenditure: but Northern Ireland remains in transition and some of the decisions which have been taken in the interests of reducing costs would seem to be false economies. For much of the time, it appears that the Northern Ireland Prison Service is operating at the very edge of its actual (as opposed to theoretical) capacity. The need to run a multiplicity of regimes from a single site at Maghaberry, and the high staffing complement required to maintain safety in unsuitable accommodation at both Maghaberry and Magilligan is a significant drain on resources.

162. While the prison estate in Northern Ireland has been reviewed only recently, we believe that the change in policy to separation must be freshly taken into account. Recent events suggest that the requirement for Maghaberry to fulfil so many functions, while also constituting the only high security prison in Northern Ireland and, now, having to cope with a permanent and separated paramilitary presence, is simply creating too much of a burden both for staff and for the system. We therefore recommend that a new review of the prison estate should be carried out, to determine whether it would now be prudent either to open a third adult institution in Northern Ireland or to upgrade HMP Magilligan to a higher security level.

Discussions with external organisations

163. The Steele Review recommended that, as part of a programme of improved public communications, the Prison Service should "build constructive relationships" with "political and other groups representing the interests of prisoners".[181] Peter Russell accordingly told us that a programme of meetings had been set up between political groups such as the Ulster Political Research Group and the Irish Republican Prisoners' Welfare Association, and the Service's Director of Operations, Peter Leonard. The meetings took place about once a month.[182]

164. Other witnesses from within the Prison Service expressed profound concerns about these meetings. The Prison Governors' Association told us that, while they accepted the recommendation had arisen from the Steele Review and was not, in that sense, initiated by the Service, it was nonetheless "a mistake".[183] Peter Russell acknowledged that the issue was controversial, but expressed the view that the Steele Report had to be taken at face value when it said such meetings should take place.[184] He took pains to stress that these meetings were "a channel of communication not … a negotiating forum" for the external interests concerned.

165. Nonetheless, we can fully understand why governors and officers within the Prison Service are concerned about these meetings. The meetings take place in private, and their minutes are not published. Time and again we were told that the paramilitaries in the Maze had asserted control and status by refusing to deal with officers on the ground, and insisting on the personal attention of senior management. We were told that staff currently find it very difficult to gain access to senior management. Yet through these private meetings, the paramilitaries' external supporters are being given a direct line of communication to the very top of the service. It is resented, and the potential for staff authority to be undermined by these secret discussions is feared.[185]

166. If the panel's recommendation should indeed be taken at face value, then the Prison Service was probably right to set up these meetings. But the precise format of the meetings with prisoner support groups clearly has to change. There is an urgent need for senior management to consider how the reasonable fears of staff about these meetings can be allayed.

167. As a first step, future meetings should not be conducted by the Director of Operations of the Prison Service, but by one or more junior members of staff removed from any operational role who will report back to the Director of Operations and the Director-General of the Prison Service. We recognise that this may not be to the taste of the external groups concerned, but their desires must be balanced against the interests and needs of those in the Service itself. This step is essential if trust between senior management and prison officers is to be rebuilt. There is no reason why such an official should not be able to conduct and report on these meetings reliably and effectively—if they are indeed a channel for communication, rather than negotiation.

168. The Service should also consider what further steps might be taken to improve the transparency of the process. Ideally, the minutes of the meetings should be published; we recognise that in the current climate in Northern Ireland this may prove difficult to agree. However, there are alternatives: for example, as in other comparable situations an independent observer agreeable to both the Service and the political groups might be invited to monitor the discussion. Given the obvious problems in communication within the service, the NIO and Prison Service Headquarters should also consider running a parallel chain of briefings with representatives of the officers and governors: this would ensure that the content communicated to the political groups was understood within the Service itself.

The creation of an Ombudsman

169. The Steele Review panel noted that Northern Ireland was the only part of the United Kingdom which did not have a Prisons Ombudsman. It believed that the establishment of such an office would "make a valuable contribution to defusing the tensions which are bound to arise in prisons" there.[186]

170. We agree, the same recommendation having been made by this Committee more than five years ago.[187] In its response to that recommendation, in 1999, the Government undertook that proposals for an Ombudsman would be "taken forward as part of a broader review of the legislation underpinning the Prison Service".[188] It is therefore a severe disappointment to us that the question should still be outstanding now.

171. It appears that the creation of an Ombudsman has been subject to extended delays because it simply has not been a priority for either the Government or the Prison Service. Peter Russell told us that the Prison Service had been "a bit purist" in thinking that an Ombudsman's office could only be created through primary legislation, although he believed some other means might be found; he added that the development of such an office still needed "a bit of detailed work".[189] The creation of a Prisons Ombudsman for Northern Ireland was agreed to in principle by the Government in 1999, and must now be made a priority. We expect to see an Ombudsman appointed by the end of the Parliamentary session 2004-05.


151   Q25 Back

152   Ev 127; 124; QQ285, 288 Back

153   Q205 Back

154   QQ236-238 Back

155   Q874 Back

156   Q427 Back

157   QQ480, 708 Back

158   Q423 Back

159   Q877 Back

160   Q582 Back

161   Q482 Back

162   Q292 Back

163   Ev 108-9 Back

164   See paragraph 141 above Back

165   Q513 Back

166   Q158 Back

167   Report, paragraph 2.02 Back

168   Q34; Q513 Back

169   Q70 Back

170   Ev 133. In March 2000 Zahid Mubarek was killed in a racist attack by Robert Stewart after they were required to share a cell at Feltham Young Offenders' Institution. Back

171   As at 8 January 2004 Back

172   Q195 Back

173   Ev 109 Back

174   Ev 140 Back

175   Ev 140 Back

176   HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, Report of a full announced inspection of HM Prison Maghaberry, 13-17 May 2002, p24. Back

177   QQ514-5 Back

178   Q515 Back

179   Q786 Back

180   Q812 Back

181   Ev 110 Back

182   Q247 Back

183   Q462 Back

184   Q247 Back

185   See for example Q638 Back

186   Ev 107 Back

187   Fourth Report 1997-98, Prison Service in Northern Ireland, HC 716 paragraph 70 Back

188   First Special Report 1998-99 HC 299 Back

189   Q245 Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2004
Prepared 11 February 2004