Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Written Evidence


APPENDIX 4

Memorandum submitted by the Prison Officers Association Northern Ireland

  Thank you for inviting me, on behalf of the Prison Officers' Association (NI), to communicate our views to the Committee in relation to this inquiry. Before we deal with the issue of separation, we believe it would be useful to the Committee to explain the history and events which led to the present situation.

  As a result of the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, paramilitary prisoners were released from Prison early and the Maze Prison closed in September 2000 with approximately 1,100 staff leaving the Service. As a result of the closure of the Maze, the management of the Northern Ireland Prison Service decided that it would need 1,697 staff to run the remaining Prison estate which included the Prisoner Escort Group. All staff were encouraged to attend seminars called "Future Positive" at the Prison Service College and the emphasis was on the new Prison Service which we would be running in the future, with no paramilitary influence and management insisted that the Northern Ireland Prison Service was now a normal Prison Service, similar to Prisons throughout the UK. Management's efforts since then have been directed towards reducing staffing levels and, at the time of writing, we are 60 staff below the complement which was set following the closure of the Maze Prison, despite the fact that the prisoner population has increased by 13%.

  The Prison Officers' Association (POA) made many representations to Prison Service Headquarters over this period and stressed that their analysis of the situation was wrong ie there was still evidence that ex- paramilitary prisoners who had been returned to Prison for new crimes which they had committed and new prisoners with paramilitary affiliations who had been committed to Prison were actually recruiting within the Prisons, particularly at HMP Maghaberry, and they were responsible for many of the acts of in-discipline which had occurred. The POA also pointed out to management that the reasons for these acts of in-discipline were leading up to a joint effort by the paramilitaries to push for segregation at the appropriate time. Management dismissed our views and denied that there was any paramilitary influence within the Prison system, despite the fact that attacks were taking place on Prison Officers' homes on a regular basis. Since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and the release of paramilitary prisoners, attacks have continued on the homes of Prison Officers. You will be well aware of the collapse of the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont because of the activities of paramilitaries gathering information. As a result of this action the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has stated that information on 1,426 Prison Officers was in the hands of a paramilitary organisation. As a result of this security leak, 448 Prison Officers moved home, 551 Officers had security measures installed in their homes under the Key Persons Protection Scheme (KPPS), and 313 staff have availed themselves of the Prison Service Protection Scheme (PSPS) which is operated by the Northern Ireland Prison Service. We have discovered that the security measures installed are totally inadequate to protect our members. The Northern Ireland Office, in consultation with PSNI, restricted the budget for these security measures to £20,000 (including VAT) per Officer's home. In effect, only approximately £17,222 is actually spent on staff's homes because the VAT is recovered by the government. We are aware that other members of the security services in a similar situation as Prison Officers had £50,000 spent on their homes under KPPS.

  Owing to staff shortages at HMP Maghaberry, the management there decided that they would double up prisoners in Roe and Bush Houses. The local POA Committee objected to this decision as they believed it would allow these paramilitary prisoners to gain control of the wings and, furthermore, they pointed out that these prisoners would refuse to double up and this would lead to protests by them. However, if management insisted on carrying on with their decision, then to prevent paramilitaries gaining control through lack of supervision there should be and increase of staffing levels on these wings by one. Local management refused this request by the local POA Committee and passed the dispute to senior management at Prison Service headquarters. Myself, along with the local POA Committee, met with the Deputy Director of Prison Operations from Prison Service headquarters, and we put suggestions to him as to how the overflow of prisoners could be accommodated without doubling up at Roe and Bush Houses. We even identified how we could get the staff to manage them without any additional cost to the tax payer. All our suggestions were refused. The dispute was then passed to the Director of Finance and Personnel at Prison Service headquarters. Again, myself and the local POA Committee put new proposals as to how this could be managed. Again, the proposals were rejected and the Director of Finance and Personnel said that she fully supported the Governor's decision to double up prisoners in Roe and Bush Houses. We reiterated our view that to follow this policy would lead to protests by these prisoners. Management refused to listen and decided to go ahead with the decision to double up paramilitary prisoners in Roe and Bush Houses. On 21 June 2003 one prisoner gained access to the roof of Roe House and protested against the decision of management to double them up. This single protesting prisoner eventually came down off the roof. Management introduced doubling up on 2 June 2003 and the prisoners started to protest. Eight prisoners gained access the roofs of Roe and Bush Houses on 27 June 2003, and four prisoners gained access to the roofs of Roe and Bush Houses on 7 August 2003. (It is interesting to note that these protesting prisoners contained prisoners who had no paramilitary affiliations.)

  The "dirty protest" started on 30 June 2003 with prisoners in Bann and Bush Houses, followed by prisoners in Roe House on 30 July 2003. During these roof-top protests and "dirty protests", attacks of Prison Officers' homes continued. Protestors supporting the republican inmates' campaign for segregation gained access to the Northern Ireland Office on 2 July 2003 and made their way to Room 617 on the sixth floor of Dundonald House. This room holds all the personnel information on Prison staff. They attempted to seize information from the desks of staff who were working on personnel files of Officers. Fortunately, the staff in Room 617 managed to secure the files which they were working on and locked the filing cabinets. Only for the prompt action of these staff the personal details of staff would have been compromised again. The POA commends the actions of these staff as they prevented another disaster in relation to private information on Prison Officers falling into the hands of a paramilitary faction. This group of protestors remained in Room 617 for approximately 30 to 45 minutes and no attempt was made to remove them. In fact, they were allowed to leave the building without being searched by the PSNI! During the whole incident, the PSNI remained outside the main building. After the protestors left, it was discovered that they had removed a file marked "dirty protest", and this file was later shown on local TV. This file contained correspondence between the POA Area Chairman and Prison Service headquarters. We have asked for an explanation from management as to why the protestors were not arrested, why they were not searched, why has no one been charged with entering Room 617, why has no one been charged with criminal damage to the front doors, and why did senior management take no action when they were warned by the Security Department at Maghaberry Prison that protestors were on their way to Prison Service headquarters? This warning was passed on approximately two hours before the protestors arrived. To date, we have received no answer to our questions.

  The POA (NI) is concerned that, once again, our members are being used as "pawns" in a political game which is taking place and we can only draw our own conclusions because we are kept in the dark. Paramilitary factions are once again being given centre stage in the penal system at the expense of our members. We have called for an inquiry to be held into how our names and addresses were allowed to fall into the hands of a terrorist organisation but our request has been ignored. We have called for an inquiry into why management, following the leaking of this information, did not take steps to secure all information in relation to Prison Officers. If this had taken place, the take over in Room 617 would never have happened. Again, we have been ignored. It is our view that management cannot afford to have these inquiries as it would show that they failed as a management team in their responsibilities.

  In regard to the Steele report, we would like to place on record our appreciation for the professional way which the Review team carried out their function. Everyone who had an interest in this matter had the opportunity to put their views and for that we are grateful.

  The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee wishes to look at the reasons behind the change in policy and the factors which were taken into account. As the Trade Union which represents Prison Officers, we have not been made aware of the reasons behind the change in policy, other than what the Secretary of State has said—"This announcement should be seen in the context of the safety of staff and prisoners being of paramount importance to myself, Prison Service management and the government." The Director General of the Northern Ireland Prison Service issued a message to staff on 8 September 2003, issue 10/03, stating "As the Secretary of State has said, this is not a comment on the work we have been doing in recent years and it definitely does not represent failure on behalf of the Prison Service. It acknowledges that there are those in society who are living in the past. They will not be persuaded to act democratically and they now have the numbers, opportunity and determination to undermine the safe management of prisoners and, through that any political agreement that does not suit their purposes."

  When you consider these two statements, it appears that there is a difference of emphasis upon the reason for the change and the factors taken into account behind the policy of moving from a totally integrated Prison system for prisoners to a Prison system which includes a separated system.

  In relation to the practical consequences of separation for the management of the Northern Ireland Prison Service, the decision to separate these prisoners has been made by the Secretary of State, therefore it is the duty of Prison Officers to carry out his decision. However, the POA is concerned about the consequences of this decision in respect of the safety of our own members and their families. The Secretary of State said in his message to staff on 8 September 2003, issue 9/03—"I want you to know that I am aware of the potential difficulties, both short and long term, associated with this development. Both the Prisons Minister, Jane Kennedy, and myself, are committed to supporting the Service through this difficult time in any appropriate and practical way we can." This statement should reassure Prison Officers, but unfortunately they do not believe it as our experience over the 35 years of our troubled history has shown that politicians pay little regard to the concerns of Prison Officers and their families. We have been given a difficult task to do within the penal system and we must also face dangers to our families and ourselves whilst living in the community. Since the announcement by the Secretary of State, paramilitary factions have continued to attack Prison Officers' houses and this is despite the fact that they have been given separation. What message does that convey for the future? Since the announcement by the Secretary of State, management has put in a tremendous effort in ensuring that prisoners are separated as quickly as possible, but no effort has been made by management or the Secretary of State to address the genuine concerns of Prison Officers and their families abut the lack of security at their homes. The inability of government to provide proper security to those members of the Prison Service who feel vulnerable in their homes because of the security leak, the break-in at Room 617 and now the decision to grant paramilitary prisoners separation, is unacceptable to the POA. Twenty nine Prison staff have lost their lives standing up to terrorism and it is our view that some of these killings could have been prevented had Prison Officers been given proper security measures. We are determined that no more Prison Officers will lose their lives because we have to implement political decisions without the proper protection which some staff feel that they need. The Steele report made reference to the morale of staff, penny pinching on security measures, and the fact that the security measures are being implemented too slowly. The combination of these factors and the reduction of staffing levels by 60 has lead to low morale among staff which has culminated in all establishments passing a vote of no confidence in the management of the Northern Ireland Prison Service. Management's action since the announcement of separation has only reinforced this opinion. Management have already recognised the leaders of these paramilitary factions within the Prison and they have decided to reduce the number of Prison Officers they are going to recruit by redefining Prison Officer's jobs which can be done by people other than Prison Officers. This is despite the fact that management and the POA had already done this in an exercise some years ago and management at that time agreed that we could reduce no further Prison Officer posts as it would undermine the operational stability of the Prison Service.

  Considering the environment which the Northern Ireland Prison Service operated in, at that time we redefined 104 Prison Officer posts and replaced them with 104 Civil Servant clerks and we recruited 170 Prison Auxilliaries. Since then the Civil Servant input has increased to 157 and we further recruited 100 Prison Auxilliaries making a total of 270 Auxilliaries. Two years ago, management and the POA agreed to regrade these 270 Auxilliaries to Prison Officers as management and the POA both felt that because Auxilliaries were restricted in the type of work which they could do it would be a better use of resources if they could carry out all the duties of a Prison Officer. Previously, they were unable to work on their own with inmates. It is our opinion that this decision to redefine Prison Officer jobs at this stage, considering the crisis which the Prison Service is in, shows that senior management is trying to run the Northern Ireland Prison Service with no knowledge of the Northern Ireland penal system as their judgements are based on experience gained in Prisons throughout the UK and not based on experience gained in Northern Ireland.

  The decision to separate prisoners has serious practical consequences for the management of the Northern Ireland Prison Service unless all of the Steele report is taken into account, not just the parts of his report which are politically beneficial to move forward the Good Friday Agreement.

  In conclusion, Prison Officers have shown over the years that they are capable of responding to any challenge demanded of them, and are committed to carrying out the Secretary of State's decision, provided it can be demonstrated that they have the support, protection and resources to do the job. Furthermore, the Secretary of State's decision can only be successful if the workforce morale is high, the staff are shown leadership and they have confidence in their superiors.

9 October 2003



 
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