Memorandum by the Greater London Authority
(GLA) (DRA 40)
1. SCOPE OF
THE EVIDENCE
1.1 The Mayor strongly supports the campaigns
in the English regions for greater democratic control over key
policy and investment decisions. The experience of the Greater
London Authority (GLA) to date provides powerful evidence for
Elected Regional Assemblies in the English regions to be given
greater powers over transport, fire and police than those currently
proposed in the Bill.
1.2 On the basis of the GLA's experience
the Mayor also supports submissions made by others that Elected
Regional Assemblies should have greater powers over learning and
skills and over regional sports and arts budgets and should take
over the regeneration role of the Government Offices for the Regions.
1.3 The Mayor would be pleased to give oral
evidence to the Committee.
2. SUMMARY OF
EVIDENCE
2.1 This memorandum makes the case for increased
powers to be devolved from central government to the GLA in line
with the principles expressed in the draft legislation for the
proposed Regional Assemblies.
2.2 As presently drafted, the Bill does
not cover London. The effect of this is that the yet to be created
new Regional Assemblies will have a number of powers which will
be denied to the GLA. By the time any Elected Regional Assembly
comes into existence the GLA will be into at least its sixth year.
A summary of the existing structure and powers of the GLA is attached
as Appendix A.
2.3 In particular, this submission sets
out the case for increased GLA powers in regard to:
— Culture, tourism and sports.
— Regeneration, Structural Funds, Training
and Skills.
3. THE CASE
FOR DEVOLVING
MORE POWERS
TO LONDON
3.1 We do not argue for exact parity of
powers between London and other regions. Nonetheless, it seems
perverse that the Government intends to give certain powers to
bodies which do not exist and have no track record, yet it is
regarded as premature to give these powers to a body which has
existed for more than four years and has a demonstrable track
record of achievement.
3.2 London is larger, in terms both of population
and economic activity, than each of the three regions where elected
assemblies are proposed:
| Region | Population 2002 (thousands)
| Gross Value Added 2002 (£bn) |
| London | 7,355.4 | 146.9
|
| North East | 2,513.3 | 29.5
|
| North West | 6,771.0 | 93.1
|
| Yorkshire and the Humber | 4,982.5
| 65.7 |
| | |
3.3 For the Government to achieve its aim "to give
the people of the UK a greater say in the way they are governed
and in the delivery of policies" requires further devolution
of powers to the GLA alongside the proposals to establish elected
regional assemblies elsewhere.
3.4 Current arrangements represent incomplete devolution
to London in respect of activities that are unarguably regional
in nature. It is unsatisfactory that central government and a
range of unelected quangoes continue to play such a large role
in running London. The range of powers and duties of different
levels of government is confusing, and the system suffers from
a lack of accountability.
4. HOUSING
4.1 Housing investment and strategy is a clear candidate
to be included in the powers of the GLA. The Herbert Commission,
which set up the GLC, the Layfield Report into the Greater London
Development Plan and the Marshall Report into the GLC in the 1970s,
all supported the idea of a strategic housing authority. In 1998,
the IPPR/KPMG report Greater London Authority: Principles and
Structure advocated a strong strategic role for the GLA and recommended
that the GLA should have "complete control over housing funding
in London through the devolution of GOL's housing responsibilities
and the transfer of the Housing Corporation's budgets to the GLA."
4.2 The wording is strikingly similar to the current
proposals to devolve housing to elected regional assemblies: "[Assemblies']
work would include work currently undertaken by the Government
Office and the strategic and resource allocation roles of the
local office of the Housing Corporation" (Paragraph 52 of
the Policy Statement).
4.3 Currently, housing strategy development and recommendations
to Ministers on housing investment are the responsibilities of
the London Housing Board, chaired by the Government Office and
including representatives from the GLA, the London boroughs, the
London Development Agency, English Partnerships and the Housing
Corporation. In practice, the "corporate existence"
of the London Housing Board, as distinct from acting as an advisory
body or loose partnership, is not clear. Moreover, lines of accountability
are blurred—who is responsible for delivering the London
Housing Strategy, and to whom? The Government Office for London
(GOL) both chairs the Board and provides the secretariat, with
the result that the centre of gravity of the Board is far closer
to central government than to elected regional and local government.
4.4 Giving the Mayor responsibility for housing strategy
and housing investment in London is clearly in line with government
policy on regional devolution and with the findings of all previous
and current studies of London's governance. It would bring clear
benefits in terms of accountability, clarity and efficiency. And
crucially, giving the GLA responsibility for housing investment
and strategy would enable strategic housing investment decisions
to be aligned more closely with the Mayor's statutory role as
the regional planning authority (in line with the recommendations
of the Barker Review) and with the GLA group's own long term investment
in transport infrastructure and major economic development schemes.
4.5 We therefore argue that the investment and strategic
functions of GOL and the London Region Housing Corporation be
taken into a new functional body "Housing for London".
The Board members of "Housing for London" would be appointed
by the Mayor according to statutory guidelines, as with Transport
for London (TfL) and the London Development Agency (LDA). The
Mayor would be required to present his Housing Strategy to the
Assembly for annual scrutiny.
5. CULTURE, TOURISM
AND SPORTS
5.1 The Government proposes that a number of powers in
respect of culture, tourism and sport should pass to elected regional
assemblies. The Mayor already has statutory responsibility for
some of these activities including the preparation of a Culture
Strategy for London, supported by a statutory Culture Strategy
Group; and the promotion of tourism. The Mayor is using his powers
to the maximum effect—for example to provide leadership
to London's 2012 Olympic bid; to celebrate the capital's vitality
and diversity through a year round, pan-London programme of events;
to support London's creative industries; and to revitalise Trafalgar
Square as a visitor attraction and place for Londoners at the
heart of the city. He has established a strong track record of
success.
5.2 But the Mayor has no budget to deliver the Culture
Strategy; nor does he have responsibility for or formal influence
over the various NDPBs and agencies responsible for funding culture
and sport in London. For example, the Mayor currently appoints
two members to the Arts Council London Council and Sport England
London Board—whilst Assemblies will be given power to appoint
all the ordinary members including the Chair. More generally,
the Mayor should have a stronger role in co-ordinating and managing
the flow of funds to culture and sport in London, given the patchwork
of agencies that exists and the disparities in funding and support
for some communities and areas of the city.
5.3 The Mayor is taking action to strengthen relations
and co-operation with the key agencies in London by developing
a London Cultural Consortium, seeking to build on the role for
the Cultural Strategy Group set out in the GLA Act 1999. But whilst
much can be achieved through informal negotiation and brokerage,
more effective co-operation and delivery would be enhanced by
giving the Mayor at least the same responsibilities as proposed
for Assemblies, including a requirement for the regional Arts
Council and regional sports Board to consult the Mayor on their
spending plans and for them and other regional NDPBs to report
to him on the delivery of the Mayor's Culture Strategy.
6. WASTE MANAGEMENT
6.1 London currently produces 4.4 million tonnes of municipal
waste and this is growing as the capital's population increases.
Some 73% of this waste goes to landfill and is mostly exported
to sites outside London. It is vital that we reduce our dependency
on landfill. Though some recent progress has been made by London's
waste disposal authorities to improve recycling rates, London's
record is currently the second worst of any English region and
the Government-set statutory recycling targets are at risk. Since
London accounts for some 15% of England's waste, the capital's
performance will have a significant bearing on whether the UK
meets its obligations under the EU Landfill Directive. We therefore
need to increase dramatically our capacity to recycle, compost
or recover, and to enhance our technological capability to deal
with our growing waste stream.
6.2 Current arrangements are inadequate. Since the abolition
of the Greater London Council only one new municipal disposal
facility has been built within London. Existing arrangements do
not encourage waste disposal authorities to think wider than their
own boundaries. Optimal locations for facilities do not always
match borough boundaries. But waste authorities wishing to develop
and locate strategic sites with their neighbouring authorities
can be faced with significant challenges and opposition.
6.3 London needs an effective strategic approach to deliver
sustainable waste management. This can best be achieved by a single
waste disposal authority to replace the present fragmented arrangements
involving 12 single and 4 joint waste disposal authorities. This
could be exercised through a new functional body. Waste collection,
except for the management of reuse and recycling centres (civic
amenity sites) should remain the responsibility of London boroughs.
6.4 A single, strategic waste disposal authority would
be able to:
— absorb a greater degree of risk on new technology
and benefit from economics of scale on research;
— use its greater financial resources to gain maximum
value from contracts;
— deploy greater flexibility in the way it manages
waste;
— deliver strategic facilities in London taking
into account wider local needs rather than borough boundaries;
— attract greater competition from the private sector
to deliver its Strategy;
— use its links with the LDA and TfL to ensure strategic
development of new waste management facilities and better integration
with the Mayor's statutory planning responsibilities;
— improve development and integration of waste management
for key priority areas, for example in relation to London's 2012
Olympic bid and Thames Gateway (the Olympics master plan area
in the Lower Lea Valley is currently split across three waste
disposal authorities and the Thames Gateway five).
6.5 The Mayor has statutory responsibilities for producing
a Municipal Waste Management Strategy. However, the Mayor's powers
to implement his strategy rest on a power of direction over waste
authorities and to the provision by waste authorities of information
about waste contracts. This provides limited effectiveness for
the following reasons:
— Waste disposal contracts can be as long as 30
years. The Mayor's powers of direction cannot require an authority
to do anything that would mean terminating a contract before its
expiry date nor breach any term of a contract.
— The Mayor's powers allow him to examine contract
documentation to ensure it is not detrimental to the Strategy.
However, documentation is often not available at the First Information
Notice Stage. This limits the Mayor's power as he may only give
a direction in relation to the awarding of a contract up until
the Second Information Notice.
— An increasing number of contracts follow a "negotiated"
procedure and many PFI/PPP contracts are not settled until they
are signed. Contract documentation can continue to change after
the Second Information Notice and could become detrimental to
the Strategy despite earlier consideration by the Mayor.
7. REGENERATION, STRUCTURAL
FUNDS, TRAINING
AND SKILLS
7.1 Responsibility for regeneration programmes is split
between GOL and the LDA—the former is responsible for community
and neighbourhood renewal programmes, and the latter for physical
renewal, business promotion, skills and knowledge, equality and
diversity. London First has argued that "the programmes of
each have their own objectives, which do not necessarily coincide
at local level." Better co-ordination and clearer accountability
could be achieved if community and neighbourhood renewal programmes
were administered by the GLA/LDA, a view supported also by the
London Assembly in their report on targeting regeneration resources
(Breaking Down the Barriers July 2003).
7.2 Elected regional assemblies will take over the role
currently performed by the Government Regional Offices on structural
funds. This seems sensible. Regions should be able to negotiate
on their own behalf. It is equally sensible for elected government
in London to be given the powers to do the same.
7.3 The Mayor should be granted corresponding powers
to elected regional assemblies with regard to the appointment
of members to the Learning and Skills Council (LSC). The Mayor
welcomes the statutory requirements on the LSC to consult at a
regional level on its strategies and to deliver greater focus
in the deployment of resources by the LSC towards the priorities
of the Regional Skills Partnership.
8. FUNDING
8.1 The proposed funding and budget setting arrangements
for the Regional Assemblies are very similar to those for the
GLA but reflect the differences in nature and responsibilities
of these bodies. Of particular note however is a power proposed
in the draft bill, which has not been conferred on the GLA, to
allow a regional assembly to agree with a functional body conditions
to be attached to payment of funds payable by the Assembly to
a functional body. This ability to attach conditions to funding
would be helpful in a range of circumstances, including providing
incentives for service improvements and for ensuring that monies
are used effectively on matters which the regional assembly would
inevitably be held accountable for. For the same reasons it would
be sensible and helpful for the GLA to also have this power.
8.2 The United Kingdom is unique amongst the world economies
in the level of dependence of local authorities on central government
funding. Making regional assemblies, like the GLA, subject to
the existing financing arrangements for local government, will
mean that national government will heavily influence and in effect
constrain their ability to exert local choice in respect of many
of the proposed powers. For instance, the explanatory notes to
the draft Bill advise that an assembly could use its general power
to make proposals to the national organisations responsible for
highways and rail. But proposals in respect of such services are
likely to require funding and therefore would be reliant on additional
government grant; since it is difficult to use council tax precepting
powers to provide significant additional income while remaining
at an acceptable level.
8.3 National government's influence on regional and local
services through its control over funding is most acute in London
where the GLA's council tax precept funds less than 10% of the
GLA and the functional bodies' spend. Although the percentage
of spend covered by council tax is likely to be higher in a regional
assembly, the absence of similar powers over transport which give
access to fare revenues will mean that the financial flexibility
and hence autonomy in the regions is likely to be even more constrained
than for the GLA.
8.4 In short, although the greater democratic control
over key policy and investment decisions, which regional devolution
provides, is welcome, the extremely heavy reliance on national
government funding means that a weak version of devolution is
being proposed. This will remain the case unless the GLA and other
regional assemblies are able to raise more of their revenue independently.
Appendix A
STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE GLA
A.1 The Greater London Authority comprises a directly
elected Mayor, a separately elected 25 Member Assembly, and four
functional bodies: The Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), The
London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA), the London
Development Agency (LDA) and Transport for London (TfL). The Mayor
leads the preparation of statutory strategies on transport, spatial
development, economic development and the environment. He sets
budgets for the GLA, Transport for London, the London Development
Agency, the Metropolitan Police and London's fire services. The
Mayor chairs Transport for London.
A.2 There is a clear separation of powers within the
GLA between the Mayor—who has an executive role, and the
Assembly, which has a scrutiny role and is responsible for appointing
GLA staff.
A.3 The GLA's main areas of responsibility are: transport,
policing, fire and emergency planning; economic development; planning;
culture; environment and health. The total budget of the GLA group
is £8.8 billion in 2004-05. The budget of the GLA itself
is about £73 million in 2004-05.
A.4 The overwhelming majority of the Authority's executive
powers are vested in the directly elected Mayor. The Mayor can
exercise these powers without constraint other than that he or
she must act within the law. Also the Mayor must report all of
his or her significant decisions to the Assembly, and must consult
them on his statutory strategies. The Assembly may challenge the
Mayor about his actions and decisions but they have no statutory
sanctions which they can impose on the Mayor which would overturn
his or her decisions, other than in the Courts.
A.5 In addition to the specific powers set out in the
Act, the Mayor has a general power to do anything which will further
any one or more of the Authority's principal purposes—Clause
30 of the 1999 Act—subject to the constraints of Clause
31. In particular this constraint says that the Authority may
not incur expenditure in providing—(a) any housing; (b)
any education services; (c) any social services; or, (d) any health
services.
A.6 The Assembly's principal role is to scrutinise the
actions and decisions of the Mayor, and to expose any failings
it identifies. It also examines the Mayor's proposed budget and
may, by a two-thirds majority, make amendments to what has been
proposed.
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