Select Committee on Work and Pensions Fourth Report


6  HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMISSION AND EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

  63.  Under the Health and Safety at Work Act, the Health and Safety Commission has overall responsibility for policy on health and safety at work and, in this capacity, advises Ministers on relevant standards and regulations, as well as making arrangements for conducting research and providing information and advice. The Health and Safety Executive advises and assists the HSC and has a statutory duty to make adequate arrangements for the enforcement of the Act and other relevant statutory provisions in Britain.

  64.  The constitutional roles of the HSC and HSE, as well as the relationship between them, have received a good deal of support in the evidence submitted to the Committee. The CBI, for example, said that the legal requirement to consult 'has been the trigger for a culture of openness and consultation which has benefited all stakeholders.'[108] Those who have to deliver health and safety performance were engaged in the process of developing policy. There were some sectors which felt they were not involved. The Institution of Occupational Safety and Health argued that the Commission needed to be 'more representative of…..the changed world of work, and particularly it should include at least one competent health and safety practitioner'.[109] RoSPA recommended a 'consultative mapping exercise' was needed to provide a firmer foundation for partnership working between the HSE and others.[110]

  65.  HSE was much praised for the quality of its staff and its output. UCATT, for example, said the advice, guidance and research provided by HSE and HSC 'are excellent, and reflect the qualified and committed staff they employ'. [111]

  66.  Some submissions to the Committee questioned the continued value of the division between the HSC and HSE and raised concerns about the role of the HSC (although others were supportive[112]). In particular, Alan Osborne, who was appointed in November 2002 as a member of the HSE Board with responsibility for rail safety, and subsequently resigned in October 2003, reports that, in his view, HSE/C is 'dysfunctional across its policy and inspectorate functions, not listening to its stakeholders, lacking in modern corporate governance processes and grossly inefficient'.[113] In particular, he argues that the 'two-tier structure of the HSC/E is extremely cumbersome and old fashioned', that the composition of the Commission means that it involves ' a group of people coming together to develop their patches rather than being a cohesive group developing a shared vision'. He argued that the entire process of governance of HSC/E 'requires a fundamental review before it can begin to function as an effective and modern regulator.'

  67.  The HSC operates by seeking consensus. This is seen by some to be a strength - the involvement of employer and employee representatives seen as leading to legislation which is workable[114]. Lack of consensus was a key factor leading to regulations to improve consultation with employees being dropped, for example (see Chapter 14). However, the Committee was concerned that the decision to seek consensus may act as an effective veto to legislation to improve health and safety standards in disputed areas.

  68.  HSC has a range of advisory groups relating to particular industries or topics. These committees are serviced by HSE to help achieve the outcomes in the Commission's strategic plan.[115] They may recommend standards and guidance, comment on policy issues, or recommend an approach to a particular new problem. Each includes a balance of people nominated by employer and employee organisations and, where appropriate, public interest representatives and experts in the area. Many witnesses to the inquiry considered these committees to be an important part of the HSC's tripartite approach and were concerned that their role was being downgraded. [116]

  69.  The Graphical, Paper and Media Union (GPMU), for example, described Industry Advisory Committees (IACs) as an important way of maintaining and developing trade union input and one of the best vehicles HSE had to use to give advice but 'a structure that HSC and HSE senior managers continue to attack'.[117] The Royal College of Nursing considered that the disbandment of the Occupational Health Advisory Committee compounded a sense of a lack of coherence, leadership and accountability on occupational health issues in the health service. [118] In the construction sector, both the employer (the Construction Confederation) and union side (the GMB) were concerned that HSC was reducing the scale of its consultation in the industry by downgrading the relevant Industry Advisory Committees.[119]

  70.  In oral evidence, Mr Bill Callaghan, Chair of the HSC, told us that he had looked at the range of existing committees and how they worked. He was not sure they all performed as well as they could, although there were some very good examples, such as the Paper and Board Advisory Committee (interestingly, one in which the GPMU is involved).[120] On the subject of the Occupational Health Advisory Committee, work was underway to engage a wider range of partners to develop new ways of working and in this context, HSC felt it more appropriate to get input from former members of the committee as part of a wider group of experts.[121]

  71.  Overall, the Committee notes that HSC/E's tripartite approach has strong support from those involved but questions how much evaluation has been done to demonstrate the outcomes such an approach actually produces.

  72.  The Committee recommends a wide ranging and open review of the role and effectiveness of HSC's Industry Advisory Committees to help to address concerns that they are being downgraded.

Resources

  73.  HSE charges for some aspects of its work - mainly in relation to regulating the major hazard industries and through sale of publications.[122] Otherwise the budget is set through the Spending Review process. HSC/E explained that following a period of modest increase in resources, Spending Review 2002 set a baseline which rose slightly in 2003/04 and 2004/05 and drops back in 2005/06. It said that 'when rising costs are taken into account, this represents a significant reduction in spending power.'

Table 1. HSE's budgetary position for the years 201/02 to 2007/08

  
2001/02
2002/03
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
  
£m
£m
£m
£m
£m
£m
£m
Gross Budget
254
262
278
279
271
271
271
Income
51
52
58
Forecast
Income level subject to further work on charging
Gross Spend
255
(outturn)
256
(outturn)
260
Forecast
  
  
  
  

Source: Health and Safety Executive

Notes
1.  SR2004 projected budget (06/07 and 07/08) assumes roll forward of 2005/06 baseline.
2  .The ring-fenced Cullen funding of £4m is included in figures for each of years 03/04 and 04/05.

  74.  Spending Review 2004 commits the Department for Work and Pensions to 'realising total annual efficiency gains of at least £960 million by 2007-08.' As part of this, by 2007/08, DWP will reduce its workforce by 30,000, redeploy 10,000 posts to front-line roles and reduce its administration budget in real terms by 3.0% per year.[123] The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions described this as a 'challenging but deliverable settlement' for the Department.

  75.  In oral evidence, the Minister referred to an opportunity to consider how HSE uses its funds:[124]

    "Whilst every organisation can do more, and spending ministers can always use more money, we can always make a case for more money, we also have to look at maximising the value that we are getting from the money that we are spending and that is why we strongly support the HSE's strategy, because we believe it very much measures the work of the HSE and gives us an opportunity to look at their performance in terms of the funds that they receive".

  76.  A key aspect of HSC's current strategy, therefore, is to 'be clear about our priorities and focus our activities on our core businesses and the right interventions. This means concentrating more on the areas and interventions where we can make the greatest impact and developing new ways to exert influence.'[125] Some of the evidence the Committee received agreed that HSE was not yet sufficiently focused. For example, EEF, the manufacturers' organisation, questioned HSE's desire to engage in corporate social responsibility agenda with 'the great and the good' when it should be focusing on the smaller, harder to reach businesses. [126] Alan Osborne argued that 'in the context of the need to do things differently in the future, it was difficult to consider whether the budget needed to increase'.[127]

  77.  However, the majority of organisations giving evidence to the Committee suggested that lack of resources was having a negative impact on HSE's capacity to ensure compliance with health and safety legislation.[128] The Construction Confederation said that constraints posed by a lack of resource, were leading HSE to concentrate on short-term policing rather than genuinely trying to help the industry with a long term strategic improvement and to HSE delays in issuing important pieces of guidance. [129] Furthermore, driven in part by lack of resources, HSE had been increasingly 'unable to provide sufficient prescription in regulations and guidance'.[130] The Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH) supported increased resources to allow HSE to 'adequately discharge its statutory duties and to establish and implement evidence-based interventions, ensuring competent stewardship of an effective occupational health and safety system for Great Britain.'[131]

  78.  Concerns about the reductions in HSE's in-house expertise (reduced staffing levels in the Employment Medical Advisory Service and the abolition of the Chief Medical Officer) were raised by a number of organisations.[132] EEF pointed to reductions in the National Engineering Group, a unit set up to provide expert advice on difficult or complex engineering issues to front-line inspectors. This is, they said, 'no longer effectively resourced, which is detrimental to the consistency of inspection and prevents a strategic approach being taken by HSE in this sector.' [133]

  79.  The impact of resources on HSE's ability to enforce the legislation was a key concern for many organisations, including trade unions and some employers.[134] Organisations such as the Centre for Corporate Accountability and Prospect point to a direct link between HSE's resources and the number of inspectors. This in turn, it was argued, was resulting in a 'resource driven enforcement strategy'[135] (see Chapter 9).

  80.  There was some criticism that HSC does not campaign openly for increased resources.[136] The Institution of Occupational Safety and Health, for example, was disappointed to see an assumption that resources cannot increase running through HSC's draft strategies.[137] The Committee asked HSC/E, if more resources were made available, what they would spend them on. Mr Bill Callaghan, Chair of the HSC, said that a 'strong case' had been put to Ministers for more resources and that priorities were occupational health support and communications (see Chapters 12 and 15).[138] Contrasted with the evidence we received on the core functions that are being cut back due to lack of resources, these demands seem far too modest.

  81.  The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents argued that HSC/E and HM Treasury should consult stakeholders 'on macro economic 'spend to save' projections, comparing additional HSC/E inputs with the savings that might be achieved as a result of meeting the agreed targets.[139] It was also argued that if the Government believed there was a 'business case' for health and safety, this should apply equally to its own spending plans.[140] The 2004 Spending Review Settlement, announced on 12 July, set the Government's spending plans for 2006/07 and 2007/08 and confirm the spending plans which were set for 2005/06 in the 2002 Spending Review[141] (see paragraph 74).

  82.  The Committee received some evidence that HSE could make better use of the resources it has and such arguments need to be examined carefully by HSC/E. However, the overwhelming view was that HSE is a high quality organisation, constrained by inadequate resources, seriously adversely affecting its ability to deliver adequately core activities such as inspection, which have a direct impact on ensuring compliance. We endorse the view of Prospect that the number of inspectors in HSE's Field Operations Directorate should be doubled (at a cost estimated by them as £48 million a year after 6 to 7 years).[142] We recommend that substantial additional resources are needed in the next three years.


108   Volume III (No. 42) Back

109   Volume II (Ev8,Q26) Back

110   Volume III (No. 14) Back

111   Volume III (No. 35)See also Volume III (Nos. 4, 5, 20 and 26); Volume II (Ev 50, Ev 50, Q148) Back

112   See, for example, Volume III (Nos. 33 and 42) Back

113   Volume III (No. 2) Back

114   Volume III (No. 42) Back

115   www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/iacs/index.htm Back

116   See, for example, Volume II (Nos. 26 and 4) Back

117   Volume III (No. 4) Back

118   Volume III (No. 13) Back

119   Volume III (No. 20), Volume II (Ev 107,Q401) Back

120   Volume II (Ev 133, Q519) Back

121   Volume II (Ev 140), Note 4 Back

122   Volume III (No. 36) Back

123   HM Treasury (2004), 2004 Spending Review: New Public Spending Plans 2005-2008. July 2004. Cm 6237. London: TSO, page 160; Spending Review 2004, Press Notice PNA13, Improved Work and Pensions Services.www.hm-treasury.gov.uk Back

124   Volume II (Ev147, Q557) Back

125   Volume III (No. 36) Back

126   Volume II (Ev51, Q151) Back

127   Volume III (No. 2) Back

128   Volume III (Nos. 4, 5, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 25, 26, 30, 35, 41, 45, 50 and 51) Back

129   Volume III (No. 20), Volume II (Ev 119, Q455). See also Volume III (No. 51) Back

130   Volume III (No. 20) Back

131   Volume III (No. 25) Back

132   See, for example, Volume III (Nos. 12, 30, 32 and 33); Volume II (Ev95, Q360 ) Back

133   Volume III (No. 33); Volume II (Ev50,Q148) Back

134   Volume III (Nos. 5, 11, 12, 14, 17, 25, 26, 30, 35, 41, 45, 50 and 51) Back

135   Volume III (Nos. 41 and 30) Back

136   Volume III (No. 41) Back

137   Institution of Occupational Safety and Health, response to HSE's second consultation on HSC's draft strategic plan for 2004-2010. 01.12.2003 Back

138   Volume II (Ev 137, Q539) Back

139   Volume III (No. 14) Back

140   The Institution of Occupational Safety and Health, Response to HSC's draft strategic plan, A Strategy for Workplace Health and Safety in Great Britain to 2010 and heyond. Back

141   www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spending_review Back

142   volume II (No. 30). Prospect explains that the cost of employing an additional 700 inspectors in FOD would cost 'something like £48million after say 6 to seven years' (Volume II, Ev39). There were some 700 frontline inspectors in FOD in 2003 (Volume III, No. 41). Back


 
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