| Civil Partnership Bill [Lords]
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Mr. Carmichael: The hon. Gentleman makes the fair point that Lord Lester of Herne Hill introduced a different Bill, but why I do not quite understand he keeps referring to that Bill during consideration of the Bill that is before us, which he seems to recognise is different. I am not suggesting that he should table more amendments, but asking him to explain the inconsistency in the amendments that he has tabled. Mr. Chope: The hon. Gentleman will be able to make his own speech, perhaps accepting some of my amendments, but saying that some further amendments are required to iron out inconsistencies. When he has developed his arguments in that respect and I have listened to the logic of his point of view, I am sure that I will be able to wind up this debate, give my verdict and see whether, in the light of his points, it is worth pushing the amendment to a vote or whether it should be withdrawn. That is the essence of an open debate. I do not need to speak at great length about the amendments. Essentially, I want to make it easier for people to get out of same-sex partnership Column Number: 145 arrangements. The fact that people can do so easily in France is a good thing. I would like it to be equally easy for people to do so in this country and in Scotland, to which these amendments relate. I hope that, even at this late stage, people will be able to accept that if there is to be a difference between civil partnerships and marriage, it would be as well to make that apparent in the Bill to a much greater extent, instead of trying to mirror marriage at every stage, including with regard to the complicated arrangements that relate to the breakdown of marriage.Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham) (Con): My hon. Friend has just lamented what he regards as the unnecessary complexity of the existing provisions. I put it to him that the way in which his amendments introduce a new concept of sexual infidelity causes him to be guilty of the very offence of excessive complexity of which he is effectively accusing the Government. Does he not accept that there is already provision for unreasonable behaviour to be considered a ground for dissolution—or, God forbid, if he got his way with his amendment, for cessation—and that therefore there is no good reason to introduce the concept of sexual infidelity? Mr. Chope: I do not know why my hon. Friend is so sensitive to this issue of sexual infidelity as a ground for establishing irretrievable breakdown. That is what we are talking about: the grounds on which irretrievable breakdown can be established. At the moment, there is no reference to being able to establish irretrievable breakdown on the basis of an act of sexual infidelity. That is pretty fundamental stuff. How can people have a firm civil partnership or relationship if one of them is indulging in sexual infidelity? If that is connived at or agreed to by the other party, that is fine, but if it is not consented to or connived at by the other party, the party who is the victim of that sexual infidelity should have an absolute right to be able to say that, on those grounds, the relationship has broken down. Ann McKechin: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in Scots law the definition of unreasonable behaviour would include sexual acts that are not covered under the definition of adultery? That has always been the case in family law in Scotland and it is covered specifically in subsection (3)(a) of the clause. Mr. Chope: It is some years since I studied law in Scotland, so I accept the information that the hon. Lady has provided. Perhaps that will be the explanation from the Minister as to why the amendment is thought inappropriate. However, in English law, adultery is still a specific ground and is specified as evidence of a breakdown of a marriage. If the provision is already implicit in the law in Scotland, I still think that there is no harm to be done by making it explicit in the Bill, which would be the effect of amendment No. 237. The provisions would then refer to the defender committing an act of sexual infidelity.
10.15 amChris Bryant: The thrust of the hon. Gentleman's contribution in Committee has been to try to make the Column Number: 146 Bill less like a gay marriage Bill. Does he not realise that introducing a concept of gay adultery makes the provisions of the Bill more like gay marriage?Mr. Chope: In trying to amend the Bill and to put forward arguments, the challenge has been that I have encountered resistance from the Government and from the majority on the Committee to any idea that we can make the Bill deal with civil partnerships outside marriage at a lower level of commitment. I am faced—against my will—with the fact that the Government and the hon. Gentleman are insistent on making the Bill as much like a same-sex marriage Bill as possible. I am trying to say that, if the Bill is going to be like that, I think that it is unfair and unjust that people should be tied up in long-standing relationships with a commitment to each other that they will not be able to break for up to five years without the consent of the other party, even if that other party is committing acts of sexual infidelity. It is important, therefore, that the party who is the victim of that sexual infidelity should be able to use, as a ground for dissolution or cessation of the partnership, the fact that the person with whom he or she is living has been guilty of an act of sexual infidelity. Mr. Bercow: I have always regarded my hon. Friend as something of a logician in this House. I am genuinely troubled by what he just said. Does he not see that there is a curious neurosis about his attitude to the various amendments to the Bill? Does he not accept the logic of what the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) just said—that, on the one hand, my hon. Friend is arguing for the use of the term ''cessation'' rather than ''dissolution'' to underline the essential difference between the institution of civil partnership and that of marriage and, on the other hand, he is arguing for a provision that makes the arrangement much more like marriage? It seems that my hon. Friend is guilty of a degree of turgidisation that is unworthy of him. Mr. Chope: I do not know whether you have read the Official Report of the last sitting, Mr. Cook. My hon. Friend sought to provoke me to recant for having nominated him to be a member of the Conservative party candidates list. I do not recant from that nomination because I think that the House would be a much poorer place without the presence of my hon. Friend. However, I thought that my hon. Friend understood the procedures of Parliament. Although we cannot express the amendments as being ''in the alternative'', that is essentially the way in which amendments Nos. 236 and 237 should be viewed. If amendment No. 236 is successful, I shall not seek to put amendment No. 237 to a vote. Amendment No. 236 seeks to simplify the way in which the arrangement can be brought to an end, by means of cessation, rather than requiring all the complications of dissolution. That is the answer to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland. If I am unsuccessful in getting amendment No. 236 to the vote and winning that vote, the alternative—if one was doing pleadings, whether in Scotland or in Column Number: 147 England, one would put that the latter pleading was ''further'' or ''in the alternative''—is amendment No. 237. That amendment accepts the decision of the Committee on amendment No. 236 to continue to pursue dissolution as the means to end the partnership. In amendment No. 237, I say, ''If you're going to insist on same-sex marriage in all but name, we might as well give the partner to that same-sex marriage the ability to bring that marriage to an end on the grounds that the person with whom he or she is living has been guilty of an act of sexual infidelity.''I turn the argument back to my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow). If, as I think he is, he is in favour of what are effectively same-sex marriages, why does he not think that sexual infidelity on the part of one of the partners to the marriage should be a ground for its dissolution? Mr. Bercow: The answer is that adequate provision is already made in the context of unreasonable behaviour. The term ''adultery'' has a specific legal connotation. As I am a generous man, may I simply say to my hon. Friend that my belief that he is at heart a logician is now confirmed? There is a certain logic to his position, at least according to his lights. Mr. Chope: Praise indeed. That is as far as my hon. Friend is prepared to go. I do not know whether his comment is fair, but it certainly amused me. There is no point in trying to develop my arguments further. As I understand it, for Scotland we are not talking about unreasonable behaviour but irretrievable breakdown. There is a series of grounds upon which a marriage can be dissolved on the basis of irretrievable breakdown, and the provisions set out what could happen—for example, if there has been at any time behaviour such that the pursuer cannot reasonably be expected to cohabit with the defendant. Unfortunately, I understand from what I read in books that these days some marriages or partnerships are open marriages or partnerships in which one or other, or sometimes both, of the partners has sexual relationships outside the partnership with one or more other individuals. I would call that adultery in the context of marriage or, in the context of a same-sex marriage, sexual infidelity. My understanding of the law is that if persistent sexual infidelity has been connived at or ignored by one of the partners in a partnership, that in itself could be used as a defence against a dissolution application made on the grounds of unreasonable behaviour. The argument would go this way: on the basis that my partner was quite happy with my sleeping around up until now, why is he suddenly calling a halt on this particular relationship outside the partnership? In order to prevent such an estoppel arising in a contested dissolution, if one party to the marriage is a victim of sexual infidelity, without any further argument that should be a ground for making an application for dissolution on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown.
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