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Malcolm Bruce: I agree. The case that I intend to set out is an example of extremely bad business practice, which led to the company's being liquidated, but not before someone had lost his life.

Tony Lloyd: The hon. Gentleman will remember vividly the Piper Alpha disaster. Although I appreciate that it led to a change in attitude in the North sea oil industry, at the time the committee of inquiry found that, despite the business case for doing so, the oil companies did not have proper health and safety policies. It is important to recognise that when the oil companies that operate in the North sea operate in more marginal parts of the world—west Africa and the far east, for example—their safety record is nothing like as good as it is in their North sea operations. That is because public pressure and a legal framework to protect ordinary people are not present in such areas.

Malcolm Bruce: The hon. Gentleman anticipates my speech. I was going to say that there was plenty of evidence that Occidental did not have an acceptable safety culture, which is why the company no longer operates in the UK—indeed, it no longer operates. That makes the hon. Gentleman's point well, but it is no comfort to those who have been bereaved because of negligent practices. I agree entirely that good businesses and good business practices promote safety. Such companies have nothing to fear from the Bill, but in some cases good business practice does not apply, and negligence—wilful or otherwise—is a significant contributory factor in loss of life.
 
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The Cullen inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster examined various possibilities, including the Norwegian option, but decided, rightly, to propose an alternative regime, which has since been enacted in the UK. The Norwegians had tried to establish an extremely complicated legal framework to force everyone engaged in the operation of a platform to follow, in effect, a tick list, but the evidence showed that that did not produce as good a result as making the operator responsible for the safety case of its installation and for satisfying the Health and Safety Executive on how it was making the installation safe and what its procedures were. That was better than imposing a framework on operators, because they knew better than anyone where accidents were likely to occur and where risk was present. It was felt that engagement between companies and the HSE to produce an acceptable safety case was likely to lead to a better outcome, and experience suggests that that approach has been vindicated, although accidents have not been eliminated entirely.

Mr. Forth: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me a moment of immodesty, he has probably forgotten that the Minister who took through the safety legislation following the Piper Alpha accident was none other than your humble servant.

Malcolm Bruce: I am pleased to learn that. Although I have to point out that the offices of the HSE in Aberdeen are called Cullen house, not Forth house, I give the right hon. Gentleman credit for having listened to a sound judge who produced an extremely good report, which was translated into effective law.

One case encapsulates one of my points of concern about—not opposition to—the Bill. I agree with the approach of creating a general responsibility, rather than imposing specific restrictions. My concern centres not on that general responsibility, but on the role of the health and safety information director. I shall share with the House the specific constituency case that, more than anything else, makes me believe that a Bill of this sort is necessary.

A knackery in my constituency was for many years run by a company called Dundas Brothers. I cannot think of a year, or perhaps even a month, of the 22 years in which I have been an MP when I have not been engaged in correspondence with constituents who were concerned about the plant—the offensive way in which it was operated, the dreadful smells, which spread for miles, and the general incompetence, appalling negligence and wilful mismanagement that characterised the company. In the past 12 months, the company has gone into liquidation. As far as I am concerned, it is a happy event.

One of the problems is that no one really likes talking about knackeries—they are not mentioned in polite company—but they are an essential component of farming. Our farming industry has suffered some appalling traumas in recent years: first, there was BSE, the consequences of which were devastating to my constituency; then, there was foot and mouth disease. No cases of foot and mouth and no significant incidence of BSE were seen in my constituency, but being a beef-rearing constituency, it suffered all the consequences of
 
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the regulations and impositions that flowed from those dreadful problems, including the over-30-month scheme. Unfortunately, there was a clash between the urgent need for rendering capacity and the company's health and safety duties. I had numerous consultations with council officials and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, who more or less acknowledged that the plant was not fit to operate. If they closed it, however, they were not sure where rendering could take place, because there was not any alternative capacity.

Against that background, a teenage boy—I cannot recollect whether he had just left school—began work in the knackery yard. On his first or second day of employment, he climbed on to a forklift truck, even though he had never operated one before, and managed to start it. Tragically, it toppled on top of him, killing him. The plant was relatively small, and the case is unavoidable—people responsible for that plant should never have allowed circumstances to develop in which a boy could behave in that fashion. There is no justification for their conduct, and although I do not have the report with me, I have paraphrased the words of the sheriff who dealt with the case. In the sheriff court, as in the lower court, the maximum penalty is a fine of £20,000, and that was imposed on the company. The sheriff regretted deeply that he did not have greater powers to impose a much more severe penalty.

Unsurprisingly, the boy's parents came to see me. I supported their representations to the procurator fiscal to ensure that a prosecution was brought, but equally, when they came to see me afterwards, I accepted their argument that this was not justice. The fine was not adequate and was not an acceptable maximum penalty for their son's loss of life. A criminal prosecution of a director should have been pursued. Interestingly, the evidence in the briefing notes suggests that there have been few prosecutions—indeed, there have been only one or two. None of the authorities in the case that I have outlined believed that a prosecution would succeed. I cannot think of anything more extreme than that case, but clearly there have been such circumstances for prosecutions to be successful.

The principle of requiring directors to have a general responsibility is a good one. I agree, however, that we must determine what that means. Clearly, we must address the apprehension among directors that they could be held liable for something that takes place far from them and about which they could not possibly know. I would like an assurance that the Bill would not make them accountable for such things.

Mr. Forth: I shall seek to return to that point later, but does the hon. Gentleman not agree that there is a paradox? The smaller the company, the more a designated director is expected to have direct knowledge of what is going on—that applies to the case that he mentioned. However, the larger the company, the more levels of management and the more dispersed its operation, the less likely it is that a director will have sufficiently detailed knowledge to take responsibility for what happens in every workplace.

Malcolm Bruce: That is true, but it does not deliver a hammer blow to the Bill, which seeks to ensure that
 
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directors take responsibility before tests of reasonableness apply. In Committee, we can explore those mechanisms.

Jonathan Shaw: The research paper says:

"Between 1992/923 and 2003/04 the number of fatal injuries to the self-employed increased . . . from 63 to 67."

It goes on to say that workers in smaller companies are exposed to more dangers than employees working for larger companies.

Malcolm Bruce: That has been borne out by the flow of my argument. I pointed out that safety measures for oil and gas companies do not stop accidents, but in most cases, accidents are investigated by health and safety officials, and in Scotland, if appropriate, there is a fatal accident inquiry. As a general rule, lessons are learned, but there is not a demand for a criminal prosecution. Officials look at what happened, what procedure was applicable and why it was not followed. However, I take an alternative view to the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth). In the case of Occidental oil management and Piper Alpha, for example, there was liability and negligence. Occidental board members in the United Kingdom should have been aware of the safety case for such an installation and should have known what could happen. The same is true of onshore refineries or any particularly dangerous plants.

The vast majority of directors and companies would, I hope, act responsibly. My experience post-Piper Alpha is that that culture is strong in the oil and gas industry, and I do not think that anyone wants a queue of cases in which directors are prosecuted and brought to court. The primary objective is to create an awareness mechanism to reduce the number of accidents, not to increase the number of prosecutions. Nevertheless, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that, unfortunately, the worst practices may occur in medium-sized companies. They do not have the advantage of extensive training and corporate culture, but they should be aware of their responsibilities. They should be made aware that legally, if there is a serious or fatal accident in their company, they may be held liable, so they must ensure that they keep abreast of current practices in management techniques and operations.

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