Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs Joint First Report


4  PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS AND SECURITY

86. Apart from signing the registration form, there is no requirement under the present system for either a head of household or an individual to prove their identity. Individual registration could make a significant contribution to cutting fraud by requiring the provision of personal identifiers to prove eligibility to vote. This matter is closely linked to the requirement for greater security measures to ensure that a voter is who they claim to be under electronic or postal registration and also to the suggestion that electors should be required to produce proof of their identity at the ballot box.

87. In Northern Ireland electors are required when applying for registration to provide their name, date of birth, address, national insurance number and signature. Upon voting, they must produce one of four forms of photo identification, with special electoral cards available for those who do not possess the three most common forms (passport, driving licence or senior SmartPass). These requirements were laid down in the context of combating fraud in the electoral process.

88. When the Electoral Commission came to make recommendations on introducing individual registration to the rest of the UK, it decided that the only necessary identifiers would be name, date of birth, location-identifer (ie address, declaration of local connection or service declaration), signature and unique registration number.[194] The unique registration number would be allocated to an individual upon first registration and would remain the same whatever their change in circumstances.

89. There was no dissent among witnesses over the principle of providing personal identifiers when registering, only about what they should be and the criteria for that decision. The Government's memorandum told us merely that "we have looked at the issues around the use of addresses, NI numbers and birth dates, and will continue to do as part of our continuing work on the registration system".[195] In oral evidence, however, Ministers implied that the choice of personal identifiers was one of "the principles of the mechanism that we can use for individual registration" which had to be decided before decisions could be taken on its introduction.[196] The Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Department for Constitutional Affairs, asserted that "if we have a system of individual registration that requires pin numbers or specific passwords ... that is obviously of a different character to a form of individual registration that perhaps rests on the signature or a date of birth as the individual identifier."[197] Later he clarified that the considerations were about how easy identifiers were for the individual to recall and how easily they could be stored in the database held by EROs.[198] We agree that these are important factors to be considered in defining acceptable personal identifiers. We would also expect the issues of ease of portability and checking, access for the disabled and others with specific difficulties and compatibility with remote registration and voting to be taken into account. Finally, the Deputy Information Commissioner recommended that built into the system should be safeguards of "narrowness of purpose, minimisation of the information and minimising the information that appears on the public register and ... adequate security safeguards and access rules about obtaining the remaining information".[199]

Identifiers required at registration

90. There are certain identifiers which are clearly essential and beyond question and which should be included in the registration form. The most obvious of these is name. We found little disagreement over the inclusion of date of birth as well, although Help the Aged pointed out that this could be difficult for refugee communities.[200] Also in this category is the provision of an address. Although individual registration would allow the compilation of a register on a basis other than a geographical one, neither the Electoral Commission nor any witness submitting evidence to this inquiry proposed this change. In these circumstances, proof of connection to the locality would be an essential requirement of registration, although it would not be a reliable proof of identity given the frequency with which many people move home.

91. There are many supporters of the Northern Ireland system of adding national insurance numbers to the list of identifiers, but reasons for support varied widely. The Conservative party saw the possibility of verification of the NI number with the official records as an important aspect in combating fraud,[201] whilst the British Youth Council argued that "the NI number is the only universal product provided by the state to all citizens of voting age" and that its use "would reignite the debate around votes at 16, which BYC support, as that is the age that citizens receive their NI number".[202] Meanwhile, SOLACE put NI numbers forward as "a most attractive solution".[203]

92. There are, however, difficulties with requiring national insurance numbers from electors. Chief amongst these drawbacks is that the coverage of the NI number system is not universal. For example, we were told that "many BME women will not have an NI number, particularly Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Romany" women.[204] The same would apply to citizens of other EU countries.[205] It is also well-known that duplicate numbers exist and indeed that there are more NI numbers in circulation than people requiring them, which might create opportunities for fraud, at least in theory. We note that the credit reference agencies have agreed criteria with the Information Commissioner for "the most robust way to uniquely identify data" which expressly do not include NI numbers because they are "duplicated and reused".[206] As far as people with disabilities are concerned, Scope argued that "the use of National Insurance numbers ... would add a level of unnecessary complexity" and prove too great a change from the current system.[207] More widely, the request for this information could meet resistance from the public.[208] On balance, we agree with the Electoral Commission that it would not be necessary to include provision of a National Insurance number as a requirement of registration in Great Britain.

93. On the face of it, signatures seem to meet most of the criteria necessary for robust identifiers, being unique, memorable and portable. Their use was advocated by the Electoral Reform Society as "the most logical identifier … personal to each elector"[209] and by Operation Black Vote.[210] The Minister for Regional and Local Government and Fire, ODPM, advocated the use of a signature as "one of the most effective aids to prevent and uncover attempts at fraud" during postal voting.[211] We note that it would be of little use as security for remote registration or voting where a signature could not be entered unchecked. Nevertheless, we believe that the inclusion of a signature in the list of required identifiers is the correct approach. As a corollary, we would stress that the use of signatures to prevent fraud is only as efficient as the checking mechanism employed to compare registration forms with submitted postal votes. Where signatures are being used, some effort must be made to check at least a sample. Otherwise, signatures provide scant deterrence to fraud.

94. It may be suggested that in future identity cards may be used as a personal identifier for electoral registration purposes. We have three reasons for rejecting this suggestion at this stage. First, Parliament may decide not to make identity cards compulsory, thus limiting their coverage. Secondly, there are categories of people who may be eligible to vote who will not be required to hold identity cards, for example citizens of Ireland or Commonwealth countries. Thirdly, the question of the electoral registration system in Great Britain should not be put on hold while decisions are awaited on the development of the identity card system.

Unique registration numbers

95. The Electoral Commission proposed that a unique registration number be allocated to each elector to be used in addition to the personal identifiers provided by that elector upon registration. The elector would not be required to remember his or her number since "the individual identifiers would provide sufficient identification where necessary" to allow EROs to access the records in order to make any necessary amendments.[212] This proviso answers many objections which could be raised to unique registration numbers. The Scottish Assessors Association were strong advocates of this proposal, believing that it "would greatly assist in the electoral process". As examples of areas where a unique reference would assist, the Association believed that

    it could be used in the process of confirming existing registration details by electronic (or telephonic) means during canvass; it would be required for electronic voting; it would assist in the referral of change information from third party sources (Council Tax changes etc) if these other sources were to adopt the same identifier(s); and it would assist in the confirmation of Absent Vote requests.[213]

Mr Lithgow of the Scottish Assessors Association further clarified in oral evidence that in an electronic system it would provide the means to ensure that an elector who was registered in two constituencies with the same number had not voted twice in the same election.[214] With a sufficiently sophisticated system, there is no reason why a unique registration number could not accommodate the legal ability of a such an elector to vote for different authorities in elections on the same day, where qualified to do so.

96. The Labour party's memorandum expressed support for "a unique portable electoral number similar to a National Insurance number" as part of the shift to a national register.[215] Ministers, however, were less enthusiastic, with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Department for Constitutional Affairs, arguing that "We already have a sort of unique reference number in terms of the polling district number and the electoral roll number".[216] Whilst this is true and undoubtedly it could be used as part of "the verification process between the receipt of e-mail traffic and confirmation and the individual sending that information",[217] it does not meet the need for the number to be portable and hence allocated to that individual for life. We believe that there is merit in the creation of a scheme of unique individual identification numbers for electoral purposes, allocated for life upon first registration, provided that they are used for administrative purposes and do not create an additional burden on electors.

Security issues

97. Various means of ensuring the security of registration and of voting were suggested to our inquiry. These included the use of PIN numbers and electoral registration cards, as well as the less technologically-demanding signature. The issue of security measures has not been of great moment previously in Great Britain because it has been assumed that the level of fraud is low. This, however, is changing to some extent and the move towards electronic forms of registration and of voting make the introduction of adequate security measures a more pressing issue. We found some concern about a requirement that all electors should use PINs as confirmation of their identity, specifically from among those representing the elderly and disabled, although most suggested ways in which their concerns should be met. For example, Sense recommended that the keypads "should be designed to be as easy as possible for people with visual impairments to see";[218] Scope wanted "the shortest [number] which could guarantee security";[219] and Mencap identified the need for help for those with a learning disability who found it difficult to remember PIN numbers.[220] These comments highlight the need for such groups to be involved in the consultation on the development of requirements for security measures. Speaking on behalf of the electoral administrators, the Association of Electoral Administrators expressed the view that "PIN numbers are fine in principle as long as adequate and additional identifiers are in place to validate the user's entitlement".[221] The idea of an electoral card, rejected by the Electoral Commission, found no notable support among witnesses to our inquiry.

98. We recognise the validity of the view of the Minister for Regional and Local Government and Fire, ODPM that "one of the tasks we have is to find a way forward without producing an unnecessary proliferation of different secure forms of security".[222] Nevertheless, as he himself argued, "There are different factors to take into account in terms of security between different types of voting".[223] In order to achieve multi-channel voting and registration, it will therefore be necessary to adopt more than one type of security measure. This means that not every voter should be allocated a PIN number, for example, since this might only be applicable to those who wished to vote remotely, although in devising a system of PIN numbers the needs of those who might be more reluctant to use them should also be considered. We are persuaded that PIN numbers might be necessary to ensure the security of electronic registration and voting where these methods are used. They would work in conjunction with a unique registration number, in the same way as a PIN number with a bank account number. We recommend that the Government consult on the best means of developing and supporting an electoral PIN number. Where signatures provide better security, as with postal votes, these should be relied upon rather than PIN numbers which should not then be required of the elector.

99. Finally, on security matters, we note the suggestion of the Electoral Reform Society that voters attending polling stations should sign for their ballot papers, creating a simple means of checking for fraud and personation when put alongside a signature collected on a registration form.[224] This basic level of checking is not available under household registration where no record is held by the authorities of individual signatures but we see value in making it part of the move towards individual registration. We recommend that under a system of individual registration there be a requirement for electors to sign for ballot forms at polling stations. We do not recommend that any further means of identification be required at that point in Great Britain.

Form of names on the register

100. A curiosity raised in evidence during this inquiry was that EROs are required to use the official form of people's names on the register. It was put to us by the Liberal Democrat party that "electoral registration should as a matter of course request people's preferred titles and also means of address".[225] In oral evidence, the three major parties agreed that "salutation is desperately important".[226] The representative from the Liberal Democrat party explained that they received far more complaints about this than any other electoral issue.[227] It would seem a simple matter to rectify and we recommend that the Government enable EROs to compile the register on the basis of preferred names, whether this requires a change in legislation or the issue of best practice guidelines. It would be necessary to ensure that this change did not lead to registration under false or assumed names which might make detection of bogus or multiple entries more difficult. To address this difficulty, we further recommend that the preferred name permitted by EROs be restricted to the commonly used name of the elector.


194   Ev 15, para 11.3 , HC243-II [Electoral Commission] Back

195   Ev 4, para 37 , HC243-II [DCA/ODPM] Back

196   Q226 [Mr Leslie] Back

197   Ibid Back

198   Q295 [Mr Leslie] Back

199   Q76 [Mr Aldhouse] Back

200   Ev 69, HC243-III [Help the Aged] Back

201   Ev 64, para 4 , HC243-II [Conservative party] Back

202   Ev 62, para 19, HC243-III [BYC] Back

203   Ev 66, HC243-III [SOLACE] Back

204   Ev 69, HC243-III [Help the Aged] Back

205   Ev 63, para 32 , HC243-II [SAA] Back

206   Ev 42, para 30, HC243-II [Information Commissioner] Back

207   Ev 38, para 7.1, HC243-II [Scope] Back

208   Ev 63, para 31, HC243-II [SAA] Back

209   Ev 81, para 27, HC243-II [ERS] Back

210  Q177 [Mr Wooley] Back

211   Q266 [Mr Raynsford] Back

212   Ev 16, para 11.12 , HC243-II [Electoral Commission] Back

213   Ev 63, para 33 , HC243-II [SAA] Back

214   Q203 [Mr Lithgow] Back

215   Ev 57, para 1.7, HC243-III [Labour party] Back

216   Q297 [Mr Leslie] Back

217   Ibid Back

218   Ev 18, para 15 , HC243-II [Sense] Back

219   Ev 38, para 8.2, HC243-II [Scope] Back

220   Ev 48, para 9, HC243-II [Mencap] Back

221   Ev 34, para 34 , HC243-II [Association of Electoral Administrators] Back

222   Q299 [Mr Raynsford] Back

223   Q266 [Mr Raynsford] Back

224   Ev 82, para 30-31, HC243-II [ERS] Back

225   Ev 59, para 6, HC243-III [Liberal Democrat party] Back

226   Q144 [Mr Simpson, Mr Pack, Mr Watt] Back

227   Q144 [Mr Pack] Back


 
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