Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence


Appendix 6:  Memorandum from the UK Working Group on Arms

  The proliferation of arms is fuelling conflict, facilitating human rights abuses and violent crime, undermining development, threatening governance and increasing insecurity across the world. Most of the world's largest producers and exporters of arms are members of either the EU or the G8 or both. The negotiation, by States, of a legally-binding international Arms Trade Treaty would represent a major step forward toward curbing the proliferation and misuse of arms.

  Complimentary measures are also required to regulate illicit arms trafficking. Arms brokers, for example, operating worldwide, play a major role in supplying weapons to conflict-zones. A succession of UN reports into sanctions-busting have highlighted the role of these middle-men who often buy weapons cheaply in Eastern Europe and organise their transfer to Africa. States must also take action to tackle other factors facilitating the trafficking of arms, including the lack of regulation and control over the air transport sector.

  The proposals set out below are specifically focused on practical measures for action that the UK Government can promote during its Presidencies of both the G8 and EU in 2005. It was during the UK's last EU Presidency that the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was initiated. In 2005, the UK is in a unique position to strengthen its commitment to help reduce arms availability and combat armed violence by:

    (a)  Strengthening legal controls on arms exports through wider support for the ATT

    (b)  Tackling arms brokering and trafficking.

    (c)  Building capacity to address the availability and misuse of weapons

THE G8

  While the G8's implementation capacity is limited by the fact it does not have a secretariat, it does have a key leadership role in terms of developing norms and building political will. It has special significance with regard to controlling arms transfers, as it brings together most of the world's biggest arms exporting countries. It also has an important link to African countries now through the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Leadership of the G8 throughout 2005, therefore, provides the UK Government with an excellent opportunity to advance the international arms transfer control agenda.

  The G8 has previously issued statements on arms control, specifically around the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In July 2000, the G8 Foreign Ministers issued the following statement:

    "The G8 therefore strongly supports national, regional and international efforts to ensure that transfers of small arms are carried out in a responsible and legal fashion . . . The G8 will not authorise the export of small arms if there is a clear risk that these might be used for repression or aggression against another country." [1]

THE UK GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK WITH ITS G8 PARTNERS TO:

Introduce international legal controls on arms exports

    —  Support the establishment of an Arms Trade Treaty. The UK Government has now signalled its explicit support for an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and expressed its intention to "start work soon with international partners . . . to build support for an International Arms Trade Treaty".[2] The Commission for Africa, which was launched by the UK Prime Minister in February 2004 with the intention that it should generate action for a strong and prosperous Africa, made explicit reference in its Consultation Document of November 2004 to the need to "[promote] an International Arms Trade Treaty to control small arms and light weapons." [3] Many governments and NGOs are now urging the 2006 UN Small Arms Review Conference to mandate the negotiation of an ATT, based on states' existing responsibilities under international law. The UK Government should seek to persuade G8 leaders to state their support for such a process within the context of a G8 communiqué, and encourage members of the G8 to assist other states' efforts to improve export controls at the national and regional levels (see below). At a minimum, the UK should ensure that the G8 communiqué endorses the principles of the ATT, namely that controls over the supply of arms should be based upon states existing obligations under international law.

        The UK should hold bilateral meetings with G8 members to seek further support for the ATT. France, for example, has expressed a willingness to introduce arms export control issues into the G8 process and recent discussions with French NGOs suggest that the French Government is warm to the idea of an ATT. The UK could also engage in bilateral diplomacy to break down opposition from potentially hostile G8 members.

Tackle international arms brokering and trafficking

  Arms brokers from or operating in G8 countries play a major role in supplying weapons to conflict-zones.

    —  Push for an international agreement on arms brokering. Governments agreed in the UN Programme of Action to "consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons". Yet most countries still do not have controls on arms brokers, and most states seem unwilling to act on international controls on brokering until the marking and tracing of small arms has been addressed by the UN. Controlling arms brokering is already part of the G8 Action Plan for Africa. An agreement on extra-territorial controls on arms brokers during the UK G8 Presidency would act as a stepping stone to the establishment of an international legally-binding instrument, and would be a welcome signal to the rest of the international community that arms brokering should be treated as a priority. The US, Belgium, Estonia and Finland all have full extra-territorial controls, while arms brokering laws in Poland, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK all have an extra-territorial component. An agreement on comprehensive extra-territorial controls amongst all G8 countries is an important target for next year's UK Presidency.

    —  Set up a registration scheme for arms brokers and transportation agents. To operate legally, arms brokers and transportation agents should be required to register. Brokering companies and transportation agents that fail to register but continue to operate should be prosecuted. The G8 governments should establish (and exchange information on) white lists and black lists of arms brokers. The G8 should also press the UN Sanctions committee to publish, update and maintain a list of brokers, companies and individuals, including transport and logistics companies that been identified as violating arms embargoes. G8 members should also undertake not to contract transportation and logistics companies that have been implicated in arms trafficking. Recent newspaper reports have revealed that both the US and UK Governments have recently used air transport companies which have been reportedly involved in arms trafficking. [4]

    —  Agree and implement international standards over the shipping and logistics of arms transfers.

        It is clear from the ongoing glut of arms in most of the world's "trouble spots" that regulations and/or their implementation over the transport of arms are inadequate. The air-transport sector has emerged as a particular problem area in need of urgent international attention. Lax regulation or control over aircraft registration and ownership; flight planning processes; shipping documentation; inspections at transit and refuelling stops; maintenance and safety checks and insurance services has facilitated prolific arms trafficking to the world's conflict zones in recent years. The UK Government should consider the merits of a range of policy options to deal with this problem, for example through setting up a joint Wassenaar Arrangement and International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) working group mandated to develop best practice guidelines and documentation for the transport of military goods by air. G8 governments should also commit resources to train customs officers, particularly in known transit points, to check shipping and flight documentation. Resources should also be made available to extend Air Traffic Control, GPS and tracking systems for all commercial aircraft.

  Improve controls on Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). The threat from the proliferation of MANPADS has already been identified in several fora including the Wassenaar Arrangment and the OSCE. Governments are acutely aware of the proliferation risks associated with these weapon systems, particularly in relation to the "war on terrorism". G8 leaders should commit themselves to legally-binding international controls over the trade and manufacture of MANPADS, including the use of new technologies to prevent their unauthorised use. Consistent with ongoing negotiations for an international Agreement on Marking and Tracing Illicit Small Arms, every MANPAD system and missile should indicate, at a minimum, the manufacturer, the country of manufacture, a unique serial number, and the year of its production. States should also begin to respond to tracing requests as quickly as possible.

  Provide for effective control over Licensed Production Overseas (LPO). The recent globalisation of the production of arms is attributable at least in part to Licensed Production agreements. LPO presents particular challenges to the control of conventional arms, as the proliferation of production facilities means that future control is made far more difficult. The spread of technology and production know-how, and the very real proliferation challenges this presents, has largely been ignored by governments. Support for an international Arms Trade Treaty would help control proliferation from LPO facilities, but G8 governments should also commit to pay particular attention in their export control regimes to the dangers inherent in LPO, ideally through the requirement that all LPO agreements should be licensed. This is also relevant for EU member states, where recent examples have shown how LPO has effectively allowed EU arms exports to undermine the EU Code of Conduct.

EU

  The EU is an ideal institution within which to strengthen arms export controls. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is the most effective and dynamic multilateral export control regime so far in existence; through the carrot of possible future membership the EU can wield considerable influence over a number of Eastern European states widely regarded as a main source for arms supplies into conflict zones; and it has strong links with many countries that are suffering from an unwelcome proliferation of arms in society, eg in Africa.

THE UK GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK WITH OTHER EU MEMBER STATES TO:

Strengthen legal controls on EU arms exports

    —  Strengthen the EU Code of Conduct. The EU Code has been in place now for more than six years, yet it has not had the anticipated impact on member states' export policies. Many of the criteria are ambiguous and provide too much scope for national discretion. This is likely to become a greater problem in an EU of 25 member states. Yet the current review of the EU Code, which is approaching completion, appears to have done little to tighten the Code criteria. There is an urgent need for member states to give much greater clarity to how the criteria should be interpreted. In 2004, the UK Government led a process to elaborate more sophisticated guidelines for one of the Code criteria (number 8). Following on from this welcome initiative, the Government should now use its Presidency to set in train a process to carry out similar elaboration for the other seven criteria. In this respect, a focus on states' existing responsibilities under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) would be particularly useful.

    —  Agree common extra-territorial controls on arms brokering. The UK government has taken action to control the activities of arms brokers operating from the UK by introducing the Export Control Act. However, it is still possible for a UK broker operating overseas to transfer military equipment such as small arms or tanks to countries such as Rwanda and Uganda without needing a licence from the UK Government. The EU has agreed a Common Position on controlling arms brokers (likely to be incorporated into the Code itself as part of the current review). Although the Common Position `encourages' states to introduce extra-territorial controls, it does not require it. The UK Government should reconsider its position on imposing extra-territorial controls on arms brokers, and push member states to make such a level of control mandatory.

    —  Introduce a "presumption of denial" of arms exports to countries that EU member states class as "at risk of instability". This presumption can be overridden if the recipient government can demonstrate a legitimate defence requirement for the equipment in question and that it poses no problem under any of the export criteria. However, such a presumption would shift the onus of proof, making it incumbent on the supplier Government to demonstrate why this export is necessary, given the concerns that it already has about stability of the recipient country.

WORKING IN OTHER REGIONS

  There are significant quantities of arms already in circulation worldwide that are recycled from conflict to conflict. Both the EU and G8 should help build local capacity to combat the availability and misuse of weapons to ensure that progress is sustainable.

  In addition, if the above recommendations relating to international agreements to control arms transfers are to have a realistic prospect of success it is crucial that as wide a range of states as possible make such a commitment. Indeed, any attempt to internationalise arms transfer controls that comes solely from the EU or the established Northern powers could be counter-productive, as there is likely to be resistance from states who perceive that such controls may be discriminatory. However, there is already an acknowledgement in many parts of the world that unrestricted flows of arms contribute to human rights abuses and play havoc with peace, security and development, and a number of measures are underway to address this problem. In Africa, for example, the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons, seeks to prevent unwelcome imports of small arms into West Africa, while the Nairobi Protocol is aimed at combating the misuse and proliferation of small arms in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.

  The UK should be encouraging and supporting these efforts from other regions to improve national and regional export control systems, not only for their own sake but also as a means toward the agreement of an international instrument. Regional agreements are important stepping stones in the process toward international agreement as they help develop norms and codify existing responsibilities. Progress at a regional level would greatly legitimise efforts to establish an ATT.

THE UK GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK WITH ITS G8 AND EU PARTNERS TO:

Build capacity to control the supply and address the availability and misuse of weapons

    —  Establish National Focal Points and develop National Action Plans. Governments from around the world have committed to establishing inter-departmental committees (known as National Commissions or Focal Points) to coordinate action against small arms. A number of governments, for example in Africa, have now done this with good result but many have yet to act. Once these committees are established the priority is to assess the small arms problem and develop a National Action Plan (NAP) to address it. These plans cover a wide range of measures including, amongst others, legislative control, weapons collection, development and community safety initiatives aimed at reducing demand and capacity building of state institutions and civil society organisations. The governments of Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania and Uganda have all agreed NAPs. Countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan have indicated their interest in developing NAPs, but will require external support.

    —  Strengthen police and law enforcement capacity. In many countries the capacity of governments to implement controls is weak. Developing this capacity, ensuring the police are responsive to local needs and building trust between the police and local communities are critical factors in addressing the problem of armed violence and insecurity. EU and G8 governments should support the development of local and regional initiatives for civilian crisis management, such as the African Union Peace Support Operations Facility, which plays a critical role in intervening in crisis situations. EU and G8 governments should also support training programmes, encourage cross-border cooperation and second staff to help build the capacity of national law enforcement institutions and oversight bodies. All governments and police authorities should promote, publicise, incorporate in law and practice UN standards for law enforcement officials including the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.

    —  Strengthen the role of civil society. The need for governments to work in partnership with civil society to address the small arms problem has been agreed in the UN Programme of Action. Non-governmental and community-based organisations have a significant role to play in implementing agreements and raising public awareness. They also have an important watchdog role in monitoring implementation by governments, as do the media and parliamentarians. However, the capacity of civil society to play these roles, and their knowledge of small arms issues is often very limited. EU and G8 countries should support, promote and finance training programmes to increase the capacity of civil society organisations, and also to encourage governments to be willing to work in partnership with such groups and be prepared to tolerate their dissent.

    —  Support regional initiatives. In a number of areas affected by arms proliferation, initiatives to address the problem are underway at the regional level. In some cases, as well as considering demand-side problems, states are also addressing problems of supply. For example, the member states of the Nairobi Protocol[5] are currently developing a set of guidelines which will set out minimum standards on the import, export and transit of arms. These guidelines will inter alia elaborate a set of criteria on which export decisions will be made. Once agreed, the guidelines will be used by the member states of the Nairobi Protocol to harmonise national transfer controls across the region. G8 and EU member states should be encouraged to support this and similar processes elsewhere not only as worthy initiatives in their own right, but also as a means of helping to build-up other regional blocs, which can then lead efforts to agree international controls on arms transfers. Wherever possible, this support should be advancing arguments in favour of basing export controls on existing obligations under international law, through the use of language consistent with the principles of the ATT.

December 2004







1   G8 Miyazaki Initiatives For Conflict Prevention. Back

2   "Delivering progressive values to the wider world", speech by Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary, Labour Party Annual Conference, Brighton Centre, 30 September 2004, http://www.labour.org.uk/ac2004news?ux-news-id=ac04js. Back

3   Consultation Document, Commission for Africa, November 2004, p 9. Back

4   The Evening Standard reported in August 2004 that the UK Government was using a Libyan-based company Buraq Air for aid flights to Darfur, a company that has been named in a UN Report documenting sanctions busting arms deliveries to Liberia. In May 2004, the FT reported that the US Government had contracted a transport company linked to notorious arms trafficker Victor Bout to support its operations in Iraq. Back

5   The states party to the Nairobi Protocol are Burundi, Djibouti, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Back


 
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