Appendix 6: Memorandum from
the UK Working Group on Arms
The proliferation of arms is fuelling conflict,
facilitating human rights abuses and violent crime, undermining
development, threatening governance and increasing insecurity
across the world. Most of the world's largest producers and exporters
of arms are members of either the EU or the G8 or both. The negotiation,
by States, of a legally-binding international Arms Trade Treaty
would represent a major step forward toward curbing the proliferation
and misuse of arms.
Complimentary measures are also required to
regulate illicit arms trafficking. Arms brokers, for example,
operating worldwide, play a major role in supplying weapons to
conflict-zones. A succession of UN reports into sanctions-busting
have highlighted the role of these middle-men who often buy weapons
cheaply in Eastern Europe and organise their transfer to Africa.
States must also take action to tackle other factors facilitating
the trafficking of arms, including the lack of regulation and
control over the air transport sector.
The proposals set out below are specifically
focused on practical measures for action that the UK Government
can promote during its Presidencies of both the G8 and EU in 2005.
It was during the UK's last EU Presidency that the European Code
of Conduct on Arms Exports was initiated. In 2005, the UK is in
a unique position to strengthen its commitment to help reduce
arms availability and combat armed violence by:
(a) Strengthening legal controls on arms
exports through wider support for the ATT
(b) Tackling arms brokering and trafficking.
(c) Building capacity to address the availability
and misuse of weapons
THE G8
While the G8's implementation capacity is limited
by the fact it does not have a secretariat, it does have a key
leadership role in terms of developing norms and building political
will. It has special significance with regard to controlling arms
transfers, as it brings together most of the world's biggest arms
exporting countries. It also has an important link to African
countries now through the New Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD). Leadership of the G8 throughout 2005, therefore, provides
the UK Government with an excellent opportunity to advance the
international arms transfer control agenda.
The G8 has previously issued statements on arms
control, specifically around the proliferation of small arms and
light weapons. In July 2000, the G8 Foreign Ministers issued the
following statement:
"The G8 therefore strongly supports national,
regional and international efforts to ensure that transfers of
small arms are carried out in a responsible and legal fashion
. . . The G8 will not authorise the export of small arms if there
is a clear risk that these might be used for repression or aggression
against another country." [1]
THE UK GOVERNMENT
SHOULD WORK
WITH ITS
G8 PARTNERS TO:
Introduce international legal controls on arms
exports
— Support the establishment of an Arms
Trade Treaty. The UK Government has now signalled its explicit
support for an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and expressed
its intention to "start work soon with international partners
. . . to build support for an International Arms Trade Treaty".[2]
The Commission for Africa, which was launched by the UK Prime
Minister in February 2004 with the intention that it should generate
action for a strong and prosperous Africa, made explicit reference
in its Consultation Document of November 2004 to the need to "[promote]
an International Arms Trade Treaty to control small arms and light
weapons." [3]
Many governments and NGOs are now urging the 2006 UN Small Arms
Review Conference to mandate the negotiation of an ATT, based
on states' existing responsibilities under international law.
The UK Government should seek to persuade G8 leaders to state
their support for such a process within the context of a G8 communiqué,
and encourage members of the G8 to assist other states' efforts
to improve export controls at the national and regional levels
(see below). At a minimum, the UK should ensure that the G8 communiqué
endorses the principles of the ATT, namely that controls over
the supply of arms should be based upon states existing obligations
under international law.
The UK should hold bilateral meetings
with G8 members to seek further support for the ATT. France, for
example, has expressed a willingness to introduce arms export
control issues into the G8 process and recent discussions with
French NGOs suggest that the French Government is warm to the
idea of an ATT. The UK could also engage in bilateral diplomacy
to break down opposition from potentially hostile G8 members.
Tackle international arms brokering and trafficking
Arms brokers from or operating in G8 countries
play a major role in supplying weapons to conflict-zones.
— Push for an international agreement
on arms brokering. Governments agreed in the UN Programme
of Action to "consider further steps to enhance international
cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering
in small arms and light weapons". Yet most countries still
do not have controls on arms brokers, and most states seem unwilling
to act on international controls on brokering until the marking
and tracing of small arms has been addressed by the UN. Controlling
arms brokering is already part of the G8 Action Plan for Africa.
An agreement on extra-territorial controls on arms brokers during
the UK G8 Presidency would act as a stepping stone to the establishment
of an international legally-binding instrument, and would be a
welcome signal to the rest of the international community that
arms brokering should be treated as a priority. The US, Belgium,
Estonia and Finland all have full extra-territorial controls,
while arms brokering laws in Poland, Germany, France, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK all have an extra-territorial component. An
agreement on comprehensive extra-territorial controls amongst
all G8 countries is an important target for next year's UK Presidency.
— Set up a registration scheme for
arms brokers and transportation agents. To operate legally,
arms brokers and transportation agents should be required to register.
Brokering companies and transportation agents that fail to register
but continue to operate should be prosecuted. The G8 governments
should establish (and exchange information on) white lists and
black lists of arms brokers. The G8 should also press the UN Sanctions
committee to publish, update and maintain a list of brokers, companies
and individuals, including transport and logistics companies that
been identified as violating arms embargoes. G8 members should
also undertake not to contract transportation and logistics companies
that have been implicated in arms trafficking. Recent newspaper
reports have revealed that both the US and UK Governments have
recently used air transport companies which have been reportedly
involved in arms trafficking. [4]
— Agree and implement international
standards over the shipping and logistics of arms transfers.
It is clear from the ongoing glut of
arms in most of the world's "trouble spots" that regulations
and/or their implementation over the transport of arms are inadequate.
The air-transport sector has emerged as a particular problem area
in need of urgent international attention. Lax regulation or control
over aircraft registration and ownership; flight planning processes;
shipping documentation; inspections at transit and refuelling
stops; maintenance and safety checks and insurance services has
facilitated prolific arms trafficking to the world's conflict
zones in recent years. The UK Government should consider the merits
of a range of policy options to deal with this problem, for example
through setting up a joint Wassenaar Arrangement and International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) working group mandated to develop
best practice guidelines and documentation for the transport of
military goods by air. G8 governments should also commit resources
to train customs officers, particularly in known transit points,
to check shipping and flight documentation. Resources should also
be made available to extend Air Traffic Control, GPS and tracking
systems for all commercial aircraft.
Improve controls on Man-Portable Air Defence
Systems (MANPADS). The threat from the proliferation of MANPADS
has already been identified in several fora including the Wassenaar
Arrangment and the OSCE. Governments are acutely aware of the
proliferation risks associated with these weapon systems, particularly
in relation to the "war on terrorism". G8 leaders should
commit themselves to legally-binding international controls over
the trade and manufacture of MANPADS, including the use of new
technologies to prevent their unauthorised use. Consistent with
ongoing negotiations for an international Agreement on Marking
and Tracing Illicit Small Arms, every MANPAD system and missile
should indicate, at a minimum, the manufacturer, the country of
manufacture, a unique serial number, and the year of its production.
States should also begin to respond to tracing requests as quickly
as possible.
Provide for effective control over Licensed
Production Overseas (LPO). The recent globalisation of the
production of arms is attributable at least in part to Licensed
Production agreements. LPO presents particular challenges to the
control of conventional arms, as the proliferation of production
facilities means that future control is made far more difficult.
The spread of technology and production know-how, and the very
real proliferation challenges this presents, has largely been
ignored by governments. Support for an international Arms Trade
Treaty would help control proliferation from LPO facilities, but
G8 governments should also commit to pay particular attention
in their export control regimes to the dangers inherent in LPO,
ideally through the requirement that all LPO agreements should
be licensed. This is also relevant for EU member states, where
recent examples have shown how LPO has effectively allowed EU
arms exports to undermine the EU Code of Conduct.
EU
The EU is an ideal institution within which
to strengthen arms export controls. The EU Code of Conduct on
Arms Exports is the most effective and dynamic multilateral export
control regime so far in existence; through the carrot of possible
future membership the EU can wield considerable influence over
a number of Eastern European states widely regarded as a main
source for arms supplies into conflict zones; and it has strong
links with many countries that are suffering from an unwelcome
proliferation of arms in society, eg in Africa.
THE UK GOVERNMENT
SHOULD WORK
WITH OTHER
EU MEMBER STATES
TO:
Strengthen legal controls on EU arms exports
— Strengthen the EU Code of Conduct.
The EU Code has been in place now for more than six years, yet
it has not had the anticipated impact on member states' export
policies. Many of the criteria are ambiguous and provide too much
scope for national discretion. This is likely to become a greater
problem in an EU of 25 member states. Yet the current review of
the EU Code, which is approaching completion, appears to have
done little to tighten the Code criteria. There is an urgent need
for member states to give much greater clarity to how the criteria
should be interpreted. In 2004, the UK Government led a process
to elaborate more sophisticated guidelines for one of the Code
criteria (number 8). Following on from this welcome initiative,
the Government should now use its Presidency to set in train a
process to carry out similar elaboration for the other seven criteria.
In this respect, a focus on states' existing responsibilities
under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) would be particularly
useful.
— Agree common extra-territorial
controls on arms brokering. The UK government has taken action
to control the activities of arms brokers operating from the UK
by introducing the Export Control Act. However, it is still possible
for a UK broker operating overseas to transfer military equipment
such as small arms or tanks to countries such as Rwanda and Uganda
without needing a licence from the UK Government. The EU has agreed
a Common Position on controlling arms brokers (likely to be incorporated
into the Code itself as part of the current review). Although
the Common Position `encourages' states to introduce extra-territorial
controls, it does not require it. The UK Government should reconsider
its position on imposing extra-territorial controls on arms brokers,
and push member states to make such a level of control mandatory.
— Introduce a "presumption
of denial" of arms exports to countries that EU member states
class as "at risk of instability". This presumption
can be overridden if the recipient government can demonstrate
a legitimate defence requirement for the equipment in question
and that it poses no problem under any of the export criteria.
However, such a presumption would shift the onus of proof, making
it incumbent on the supplier Government to demonstrate why this
export is necessary, given the concerns that it already has about
stability of the recipient country.
WORKING IN
OTHER REGIONS
There are significant quantities of arms already
in circulation worldwide that are recycled from conflict to conflict.
Both the EU and G8 should help build local capacity to combat
the availability and misuse of weapons to ensure that progress
is sustainable.
In addition, if the above recommendations relating
to international agreements to control arms transfers are to have
a realistic prospect of success it is crucial that as wide a range
of states as possible make such a commitment. Indeed, any attempt
to internationalise arms transfer controls that comes solely from
the EU or the established Northern powers could be counter-productive,
as there is likely to be resistance from states who perceive that
such controls may be discriminatory. However, there is already
an acknowledgement in many parts of the world that unrestricted
flows of arms contribute to human rights abuses and play havoc
with peace, security and development, and a number of measures
are underway to address this problem. In Africa, for example,
the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture
of Light Weapons, seeks to prevent unwelcome imports of small
arms into West Africa, while the Nairobi Protocol is aimed at
combating the misuse and proliferation of small arms in the Great
Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.
The UK should be encouraging and supporting
these efforts from other regions to improve national and regional
export control systems, not only for their own sake but also as
a means toward the agreement of an international instrument. Regional
agreements are important stepping stones in the process toward
international agreement as they help develop norms and codify
existing responsibilities. Progress at a regional level would
greatly legitimise efforts to establish an ATT.
THE UK GOVERNMENT
SHOULD WORK
WITH ITS
G8 AND EU PARTNERS
TO:
Build capacity to control the supply and address
the availability and misuse of weapons
— Establish National Focal Points
and develop National Action Plans. Governments from around
the world have committed to establishing inter-departmental committees
(known as National Commissions or Focal Points) to coordinate
action against small arms. A number of governments, for example
in Africa, have now done this with good result but many have yet
to act. Once these committees are established the priority is
to assess the small arms problem and develop a National Action
Plan (NAP) to address it. These plans cover a wide range of measures
including, amongst others, legislative control, weapons collection,
development and community safety initiatives aimed at reducing
demand and capacity building of state institutions and civil society
organisations. The governments of Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania
and Uganda have all agreed NAPs. Countries such as Ethiopia and
Sudan have indicated their interest in developing NAPs, but will
require external support.
— Strengthen police and law enforcement
capacity. In many countries the capacity of governments to
implement controls is weak. Developing this capacity, ensuring
the police are responsive to local needs and building trust between
the police and local communities are critical factors in addressing
the problem of armed violence and insecurity. EU and G8 governments
should support the development of local and regional initiatives
for civilian crisis management, such as the African Union Peace
Support Operations Facility, which plays a critical role in intervening
in crisis situations. EU and G8 governments should also support
training programmes, encourage cross-border cooperation and second
staff to help build the capacity of national law enforcement institutions
and oversight bodies. All governments and police authorities should
promote, publicise, incorporate in law and practice UN standards
for law enforcement officials including the UN Code of Conduct
for Law Enforcement Officers and the UN Basic Principles on the
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
— Strengthen the role of civil society.
The need for governments to work in partnership with civil society
to address the small arms problem has been agreed in the UN Programme
of Action. Non-governmental and community-based organisations
have a significant role to play in implementing agreements and
raising public awareness. They also have an important watchdog
role in monitoring implementation by governments, as do the media
and parliamentarians. However, the capacity of civil society to
play these roles, and their knowledge of small arms issues is
often very limited. EU and G8 countries should support, promote
and finance training programmes to increase the capacity of civil
society organisations, and also to encourage governments to be
willing to work in partnership with such groups and be prepared
to tolerate their dissent.
— Support regional initiatives.
In a number of areas affected by arms proliferation, initiatives
to address the problem are underway at the regional level. In
some cases, as well as considering demand-side problems, states
are also addressing problems of supply. For example, the member
states of the Nairobi Protocol[5]
are currently developing a set of guidelines which will set out
minimum standards on the import, export and transit of arms. These
guidelines will inter alia elaborate a set of criteria on which
export decisions will be made. Once agreed, the guidelines will
be used by the member states of the Nairobi Protocol to harmonise
national transfer controls across the region. G8 and EU member
states should be encouraged to support this and similar processes
elsewhere not only as worthy initiatives in their own right, but
also as a means of helping to build-up other regional blocs, which
can then lead efforts to agree international controls on arms
transfers. Wherever possible, this support should be advancing
arguments in favour of basing export controls on existing obligations
under international law, through the use of language consistent
with the principles of the ATT.
December 2004
1 G8 Miyazaki Initiatives For Conflict Prevention. Back
2
"Delivering progressive values to the wider world",
speech by Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary, Labour Party Annual Conference,
Brighton Centre, 30 September 2004, http://www.labour.org.uk/ac2004news?ux-news-id=ac04js. Back
3
Consultation Document, Commission for Africa, November 2004,
p 9. Back
4
The Evening Standard reported in August 2004 that the UK Government
was using a Libyan-based company Buraq Air for aid flights to
Darfur, a company that has been named in a UN Report documenting
sanctions busting arms deliveries to Liberia. In May 2004, the
FT reported that the US Government had contracted a transport
company linked to notorious arms trafficker Victor Bout to support
its operations in Iraq. Back
5
The states party to the Nairobi Protocol are Burundi, Djibouti,
DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan,
Tanzania and Uganda. Back
|
