Examination of Witnesses (Questions 540
- 559)
WEDNESDAY 24 NOVEMBER 2004
ADMIRAL SIR
ALAN WEST
GCB DSC ADC
Q540 Richard Ottaway: Admiral, following
on from carriers to air defence, you made it pretty clear when
it was announced that the FA2s were going to be phased out in
2006, that you were not happy about it and at that time you were
under the impression that the Type 45s, the first lot, were going
to arrive in 2007. Given that it is now not going to arrive until
2009, I imagine you are even more angry, but just what is your
level of concern over the gap there and how do you propose to
fill it?
Admiral Sir Alan West: The answer
is that this was always a risk, and there was a period when there
was a gap and there was a risk and how long was that gap going
to be. One has to put it in context in that when we go out to
sea we find we have a layered air defence capability, and the
fighters are the long-range ones and we have medium range missiles
and we have close range, things like Goalkeeper, Vulcan Phalanx,
Sea Wolf, and then we also have soft kill capabilities which are
very efficient against certain missiles as well. So it is a whole
package of capabilities and this was one layer. When the decision
was made we had to look at the amount of money we thought it was
going to cost to re-engine and remove obsolescence from the FA2,
and I believe the decision was the correct decision because it
would have cost a lot of money, and I am not even convinced that
we could have actually got a bigger engine into that FA2 air frame.
I am sure some people say, yes, you can, but we are pretty scarred
with people attempting things like that. So I think, because of
obsolescence, because we could not get the bigger engine in it,
which meant we would have real problems in operating in some of
the areas of the world where we seem to operate more and more,
I believe that was the right decision, especially because the
real focus we wanted from this air carrier now was deep strike
and close air support for when we make theatre entry. Therefore,
the shift from FA2 to the GR7, or GR9 hopefully, I think was the
right thing. I was paying off 800 squadron earlier this year—very
sad; a very good squadron; they had actually shot down a number
of the aeroplanes that were trying to attack me in the Falklands—but
they were very bullish about where they were going, and in 2006
when 801 pays off 800 will stand up again, hopefully with all
GR9s, but, GR7s, GR9s, it will not have the same anti-air warfare
capability. It will not. Even when we get a data link in GR7s
or GR9s will not have that same capability, because there is no
doubt the FA2s have got a superb anti air warfare capability;
but, bearing in mind the limited capability they will have, the
layered defence we have, the fact of what it would have cost to
try to keep those other things running, bearing in mind all the
other pressures on defence, I think it was the right decision
to make. We will still be taking risks in that gap period in certain
types of operations, and I would not be too happy being in a very
high air threat, let us take something like the Falklands operation,
during that gap period. Unless there was someone there to help
you, we would still do it because we do what we are told to do
by the Government and we would still make a mess of the guys having
a go at us, but we would much rather have them around.
Q541 Richard Ottaway: Are you still
standing by the statement you made that unless you actually had,
in certain operations, some shore cover, you would actually tell
the Government you could not do something?
Admiral Sir Alan West: We do not
like saying we cannot do it. The Navy never says it cannot do
it; nor do our Armed Forces. What we would say is, "These
are the risks there and these risks are extremely high."
You have to make up some scenario where it would be, and if it
was that sort of situation then one would have to say how high
that risk was, and then one would start doing palliatives as to
how you stop it. Is there a way of making sure they cannot use
any of their airfields? Are we able to use special forces? Are
we able to use TACTOMS, for instance? So you can get round these
things, but in a general sense there is a gap, yes, and until
we get the JSF there will be a gap, but I still think it was the
right decision, on balance, for all those other reasons.
Q542 Richard Ottaway: One of the
reasons that you got sunk in the Falklands was due to fairly limited
airborne early warning radar cover. What is the requirement or
how do you expect to meet the requirement for AEW radar with the
new CBS?
Admiral Sir Alan West: It is MASC.
All these bloody acronyms!
Q543 Richard Ottaway: Maritime Airborne
Surveillance Control?
Admiral Sir Alan West: There we
are. Even we get caught out with these bloody acronyms! MASC is
the part of this whole package; and, the carrier package, everyone
focuses very much on aircraft carriers, but it is a £12 billion
package altogether. Most of the cost is the joint combat aircraft.
There is also a MASC part of it and then £3 billion is the
carrier. So it is actually a tiny amount compared with the totality
of this, giving you huge flexibility, of course. MASC, which is
this airborne early warning capability, at the moment the money
and funding that is in there is really looking at something rather
like the Sea King 7's capability, which is extremely good radar
and a control type fit, and we are looking at a series of options.
Should it still be a Sea King? I think they will be quite old
by then. EH101? They are looking at a number of options. What
will the options be? Should it be a UAV? Should it be an EH101?
I do not know, but I imagine the costings that they are basing
it on would be on an EH101 air frame with that same fit, I would
think. That is what is being looked at the moment and there is
lots of work going on there and no decisions have been made. The
Sea King 7s, we have been very, very pleased with. Not only are
they superb for airborne early warning, they also have this ability
over land which we were quite unaware of until about a year before
Telic, and, of course, in Telic they were controlling, they were
able to spot tanks and APCs coming out of Basra and they were
able to guide 847 Naval Air Squadron Lynxs onto these targets
and destroy them, and 847 destroyed, I think, 50 tanks, APCs and
various other vehicles coming out guided by the Sea Kings; so
extremely good radar and very good airborne early warning.
Q544 Richard Ottaway: So the least
you will have is the Sea Kings?
Admiral Sir Alan West: That would
be the absolute least, and in terms of timing, again I do not
think one can get too excited over a year here or a year there
or a year later, because Sea Kings are adequate to do the AEW
initially. A year here or there does not really matter. There
seems to be a place for it at some stage.
Q545 Richard Ottaway: Looking at
your artist's impression in your handbook of the Type 45, the
aerial is quite high up there. I suppose to a limited degree the
Type 45 cover without the Sea King?
Admiral Sir Alan West: Yes, it
gives a very good cover, but not as good as AEW. You are getting
your radar right up there and it means, with the Link and things,
you can stop transmitting on anything else so all you have got
maybe transmitting is that thing up in the sky, so people cannot
find you; but, yes, part of the reason the ship is so large was
to get that aerial, that five ton aerial that rotates, or whatever
it is, and I cannot remember the exact height, above the sea,
and that was quite a thing for the ship designers.
Q546 Richard Ottaway: Going back
quickly to a point we made about the gap, the FA2s, if you are
doing this type of operation which we were discussing, and you
would have to tell the Government what the risk was, would it
affect your decision-making? It is a fairly obvious question really.
Would the availability of shore bases and perhaps the United States
help you with that? How dependent do you have to be on it?
Admiral Sir Alan West: I think
if one looks at large and medium scale, we find it quite difficult
to conceive of an operation where the Americans would not be with
us. Therefore in terms of, for example, the CVF, I have talked
with the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) in America. He is very
keen for us to get these because he sees us slotting in with his
carrier groups.
Q547 Richard Ottaway: You are providing
cover for him?
Admiral Sir Alan West: I think,
although they might seem to have all sorts everything, they have
not. For example, in Afghanistan last year they had to call on
the French to bail them out with their carrier. He really wants
us to have these, but he wants us to have same sort of clout as
one of their carriers, which is this figure at 36. He would find
that very useful, and really we would mix and match with that.
It is always dangerous, as I say, because the thing you can guarantee
is the war you are involved in will not be the one anyone has
predicted, but I would find it difficult to conceive of a bigger
operation where we would not have the Americans with us, where
we are doing something completely without the Americans.
Q548 Mr Crausby: You are on record
as a big supporter of nuclear powered attack submarines, as I
am. How concerned are you about the loss of the capability as
a result of the reductions in the SSN fleet?
Admiral Sir Alan West: I think
I am on record as saying that I am concerned. It comes back, of
course, to the amount of money you have got to do all these things.
One of my concerns on the SSNs is we have now got an ageing fleet,
and one thing that we just will not do is take any risk with nuclear
safety. We are so safety conscious on it that it does cause us
problems sometimes because—it is quite correct—we
would just absolutely not take a risk. It would be different if
there were a world war going on, but when there is not we are
unwilling to take a risk. Therefore, as they get older, inevitably
little things might crop and you say, "Hang on, we want to
look at this more carefully." I think the figure from SDR
was 10 SSNs. We went from 12 to 10. From that ten, how many of
those, on average, am I able to guarantee running? The figure
is probably about six. My worry with going down to eight was:
how many of those can I guarantee running? As I say, they are
getting older and how can I be sure that I will have the numbers
I need for the sorts of operations that are laid down in the Defence
Planning Guide, and that requires actually six SSNs, five
or six, depending on the circumstances, and with eight of these
old ageing ones I am concerned. Can I actually provide that? When
I have got the Astutes, then, with eight, I will be able to do
all the things that I need to do, because they are newer, they
have got a different core, all of these sort of benefits. We are
working with the Americans about exchanging thoughts and things
on their capability—we work very closely with them—and
therefore I think I will be happier, but that was really my concern,
having gone down to this number of eight, because we just refuse
to take a risk. When I took over as Commander in Chief, because
of a number complexities -pintle welds and hydrogen cracking—it
does not matter what they are—there were things that we
were concerned about and having to look at very carefully. After
a huge amount of work, we found this was not such a big deal but
then I had one SSN, I think, when I took over as Commander in
Chief. We had nine running recently, but that is why I am concerned.
There is a lot of loose talk about, "If we did not have a
nuclear deterrent we would not need nuclear submarines".
The first nuclear submarine we got was before we got a nuclear
deterrent, and we had been running a deterrent. I think, Resolution
went on patrol on 14 June 1968 and since then we have done continuous
at sea deterrence, but we had SSNs before that, because SSNs are
the only true submarine still, even allowing for air independent
propulsion, and I could deploy them at huge speed at long ranges
around the world. They do carry TACTOMs. They frighten other navies.
Most navies in the world, if they want to fight you, will not
to go sea if you have got and SNS there. The only navies who will
go sea are the Americans, ourselves, the French to a limited extent,
possibly the Russians if they really had to. Other navies will
not to go sea, because they would be dead. The only thing I can
guarantee to kill a major surface combatant is an SSN. They are
able to do a SIGINT without anyone knowing, they are able to go
places and no-one knows they have been there and come away and
they give me huge capabilities, and that is why I like them.
Q549 Mr Crausby: There are some that
would argue that they are hugely expensive, and you have already
discussed the question of working within the budget. There is
a huge diversity of tasks that it faces. They are only of any
real use in war-fighting situations. How would you answer that,
and how confident are you that the next batch of Astute will be
ordered. Will the pressure not come on enormously to block the
next three orders?
Admiral Sir Alan West: In answer
to your question about war-fighting, in war-fighting they are
absolutely, they are the tops really, they are fantastic, ranging
from their TACTOMs, which Block IV, when we have got those, for
a 1,500 mile range, can re-programme in the air, are more accurate
than the current ones that are much cheaper and I can swap them
over with the Americans and they help me out on them anyway; but
actually in peace-time, in limited peace-time, they can carry
special forces, they can insert them and no-one ever knows they
have been there and get them back again, they can carry out SIGINTs
in places where people have not a clue that is going on, and we
have some really good coups in terms of anti-terrorist stuff because
of that; so they are able to do other things as well. The only
thing is that they are exceptionally expensive, I agree with you,
but for those capabilities, particularly in war-time and the other,
I believe they are worth it. We clearly cannot have lots of them,
because they do cost a lot of money. There is certainly a requirement
for them to protect our deterrent boats should there be a threat
to our deterrent boats. If we take all of that together, I am
convinced we need to keep them, and I believe we need to keep
building the Astutes, because once I have got those my worry about
the ageing fleet and my worry about having availability will go.
Three ordered; long lead for the fourth. I have seen nothing at
all at the moment that makes me think that there is an intention
not to go and order the remainder. There will be an interesting
debate about the future deterrent within this country which will
have to happen. I would be surprised if it did not happen in the
next Parliament, after the election, because when one looks at
time-lines for replacing, as was said in the SDR, we expected
the current deterrent, the Trident Force, to last 30 years—that
takes you up to the mid 2020s. If you think about the timescales
to replace that, then people have got to start talking about that
in the next Parliament. In the context of that, I am sure people
will also talk about what protection is needed. First of all,
there has got to be a decision made, an absolutely political decision:
do we want to keep nuclear weapons? Then, what is the best way
of doing it, and then on from there. So that is all going to have
to happen in the future, and that will all have an impact, I am
sure, on nuclear submarine numbers.
Q550 Mr Crausby: There have obviously
been problems with BAE and Barrow. Are you satisfied that things
are on track now and to what extent will that have an effect on
further orders?
Admiral Sir Alan West: The answer
is that there have been problems. I think it is firmly back on
track now, I think they have really gripped it, and some of the
things like the welding practices there and the levels—almost
no re-weld required at all—and the quality of that sort
of thing; they have started to master the computer-assisted design,
which was a much bigger issue than anyone thought it would be,
and I am very impressed that they are getting to grips with it,
but they had not initially, and there were lots of things wrong
and that is very unfortunate. I think British industry at times
has been its own worst enemy and I am glad now that people in
the ship building area seem to be getting their act together,
which is great.
Q551 Mike Gapes: Following on from
one of your earlier answers about the reduction in the number
of vessels, the mine counter-measure vessels, one has been paid
off, two more are to go in the near future, and, because of the
situation improving in Northern Ireland, three patrol vessels
are due to go in the next two years or so?
Admiral Sir Alan West: In fact
two of the MCMVs have gone already. That is my point. These things
have been going. I am sorry, this is me having a little moan about
this. I am losing regiments and things like this and the great
British public do not seem to care. I am very sad, and my sailors
are very sad as well.
Q552 Mike Gapes: We are giving you
the opportunity today to raise the profile a bit! I understand
that there has been no agreement yet, or discussion in detail,
with the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
about the question of fishery protection vessels in future. I
would like you to tell us whether you are confident that there
will be enough of the smaller vessels available, particularly
given the complex range of tasks that they might have to be engaged
in. You have already mentioned in an earlier answer the fact that
we have to have oil rig protection, or things of that kind, which
we saw in the Gulf. Frankly, we have got oil facilities around
the UK. I would be interested to know whether you feel we have
enough of the smaller vessels to do the jobs that we need?
Admiral Sir Alan West: In terms
of DEFRA and fishery protection, I am sure there will be on-going
work there, but I would be surprised if we did not keep the role
of fishery protection working for them with our three river class
and occasionally using some of the MCMVs looking to the future,
but I think the contract for the three rivers, for example, runs
out in 2005, I think—I would have to come back with the
exact figure—something like that, and that will have to
be renegotiated, because, as you know, they were bought and constructed
on a new scheme, effectively, where the company built them and
we effectively rent them and have contracted logistic support
for them and we would have to renew their contract, but I think
that will continue.
Q553 Mike Gapes: That is three vessels
to replace— There used to be five?
Admiral Sir Alan West: Yes. Those
are the three Rivers, and a huge success they have been. They
are much bigger, they are faster. They caught our clever fishermen
out initially because fishermen are not silly and they worked
out what the speed of the old ships was so they knew that if they
saw one how long it would take to get to the guy who was cheating.
Initially we had great success, because, of course, it goes about
five knots faster. I think they have now twigged with the speed,
but they have been a great success and it is useful to have them
and the MCMVs around UK waters, because, like you, I do believe
we need to have grey ships around the UK. We have the fleet ready
escort, we have the very worked up mechanism for maritime counter-terrorism.
I do not know if you remember the MV Nisha incident. I think that
showed how well that works, which involves special forces, which
involved the fleet ready escort, which involves helicopters and
everything, and it worked very well. There might have been some
issues as to exactly which bit of the police were responsible
because the Home Secretary is responsible in this country for
our territorial seas, but that worked well. We have ships working
up at places like Plymouth; so there are other ships around at
varying degrees of worked up status, some of them pretty worked
up, some not, so they are available to deploy in UK waters. I
think the loss of the three Northern Ireland patrol craft, which
was one on station at any one time, makes sense in the Northern
Ireland context, but when one looks at UK waters I think we will
have to look at how we deploy some of our units to make sure we
have got coverage. We are doing a lot more work now with all the
various Government departments, Sir David Omand and his team talking
about maritime security, looking in intelligence terms at what
is the maritime risk, and that is good because I think when one
looks back to 9/11 we were not well joined up at all, I think
very badly, and I think that has come on hugely. Looking to the
future, are we going to need to set aside ships specifically on
top of the fleet ready escort, for example, for this task? I think
that is still open for further work. I think that is something
we have to look at, do some more exercises practising it and perhaps
we might find we would like some more. Instinctively one feels
it would be nice to have more grey ships around, but at the moment
probably around UK waters on any given day we have enough around
to be called on if necessary. We also, of course, have the OD
Teams, the Royal Marine Group based in Faslane, which can go places,
and other Fleet diving teams; so there are other groups of maritime
who are available to help in these sorts of instances.
Q554 Mike Gapes: Were you concerned
that the reduction in the number of vessels overall will have
an impact in personnel in terms of opportunities for younger officers
to have an early experience in their career of the command of
a vessel?
Admiral Sir Alan West: Absolutely.
Mr Hancock raised that issue and it is absolutely right. It is
a wonderful opportunity for a young officer to learn his trade,
to make mistakes which are not going to be too devastating and
to learn things that will let him go on and become a much better
officer in the future. So, as I said before, we are looking hard
at how we can adjust things to make allowance for the fact that
we have got reduced opportunities there.
Q555 Mike Gapes: But it is a real
issue?
Admiral Sir Alan West: It is an
issue, yes, absolutely.
Q556 Rachel Squire: Admiral, can
I come back, surprise surprise, to the consequences for industry.
You said just a little bit earlier that British industry can be
its own worst enemy and needs to get its act together, and you
have referred to these talks that are now taking place between
the MoD and ship builders to identify ways to arrest industrial
decline and ensure the UK industry can manage the Navy's ship
building programme over the next 15 years. I am interested in
whether the Navy has any direct representation on such discussions.
For instance, I gather there was a meeting held and another one
at the beginning of this week, but also you seem to be thinking
that this is a positive thing that has happened, whereas what
I am hearing is that it is developing into yet another vague talking
shop which may not, in fact, facilitate and achieve progress.
I am interested in any further comment you want to make?
Admiral Sir Alan West: I have
to be careful because I could fall back on CDPs role, but I refuse
to, as I am Chief of Staff in the Navy and I think that everything
to do with maritime I have a responsibility directly through the
Secretary of State to the Prime Minister for the fighting capability
and morale of the Navy, and I think that takes every single line
whether it is to do with procurement, or whatever. So I am probably
going beyond my remit in some ways, but that has never stopped
me in the past. Yes, there are naval officers who are involved
in it, for example, the Controller who works for CDP, Admiral
Cheadle, is one of the driving forces. So there are naval officers
there, but clearly he works within the DPA and for CDP, and not
directly for me. I had not heard this had become a talking shop.
I would be rather sad if that were the case. I do not know because
I do not keep very close alongside it, but I will certainly ask
the question when I go back there, and I think that will be sad
because I think there is an opportunity there, and, looking at
the programme we hope to have in terms of building, we do need
this sort of discussion if we are to smooth it out properly and
not have these huge peaks and troughs and all the problems that
that causes. So, I hope that that is not the case and I hope it
will go on. Discussions like this are always terribly difficult,
are they not, because people are talking about profits and goodness
knows what. So I imagine it is very difficult at times. Of course
from our perspective and the MoD perspective we want to get the
best value for money, and there is only time and cost—quality,
time and cost—and I am sure that is what the CDP is demanding.
As I say, I hope it does not become a non-event, because I see
that with the maritime coherence work as rather important.
Q557 Rachel Squire: The points that
have been made about the importance of maintaining short and medium
term ship building skills for the future planned naval programme,
some of the concerns about the impact that it will have as much
on the Navy potentially as well as actually on the yards themselves.
Also it almost leads me to say that, if we ended up not maintaining
those skills, would you ever see an admiral advocating that work
should in fact be taken out of Britain if we no longer have the
skills available here because of the talking shop rather than
the actual action?
Admiral Sir Alan West: If within
the UK it was impossible to build the equipment that was required,
then I am sure that a First Sea Lord would say, "We will
have to go to wherever we can get it", because if that is
the requirement it has got to be done. I personally think that
would be extremely unfortunate. That is my own view. There are
some people who say it does not really matter in this global world
what way you go. I do not believe that. That is my personal view.
I am not saying that as the First Sea Lord of the MoD.
Q558 Mr Hancock: May I ask you a
supplementary? I share Rachel's view on the ship building capability,
which is important, but I am also concerned about the ship repair
and maintenance facilities. With only two ships due for major
work next year, three yards, all of them desperate to have at
least a share of that work, poses some real problems for the Navy.
I would be interested to know what the thinking is about how that
is going to work out, because it is a grave consequence to one
or other of those yards who are not going to have a Royal Naval
major ship refit underway, and that is potentially going to put
a lot of people out of work very quickly?
Admiral Sir Alan West: This is
another part of this package in terms of looking at industrial
capabilities. It is not just builders; it is also that as well.
I know that the Defence Logistics Organisation in particular,
what is the Warship Support Agency, but which will be changing
from agency status, is looking very carefully at that, because
we have to balance that also with base porting where our ships
are and where our people are, and that is very, very important
to us. Again, it becomes part of this total package. I would quite
to like see the build, repair and all of this become one, where
we are looking carefully at that whole balance, looking at the
yards there are and the work there is around to keep numbers of
skilled workers and to meet our requirement, as I say, to time
and cost and all those things, and also helping the yard, because
otherwise, if you have these great peaks and troughs and things
dropping away, at the end of day, if you have got huge overheads,
people will charge you for those overheads anyway. You have to
be quite careful about that. What we have managed to achieve over
the last few years is to really drive down the costs of how much
it costs to get these repair periods done, and that has been a
huge success. Having done that, I think we need to get a nice
balance across the piece so that we can get a sensible balance
of work in the various yards still delivering the efficiencies
and the value for money that we require in defence.
Q559 Mr Hancock: Do you see a time
coming where one or other of those yards are going to be so under
stress: because (you are right) the price has been driven down
so competitively that there is a suggestion that some yards might
take a loss just to keep work, and that is great for the Navy
and the MoD but hideously bad for the future of the yard if it
has to do that? There is a very real crisis about to hit the yard.
One or other of them is not going to get a job, and there is not
much on the horizon. I would be interested to know what the internal
thinking within the Navy is. If you want to maintain a strategy
of having three base ports for ships, then you have to have a
policy where the facility is maintained there, and that will not
be done through the largess of the companies that operate them;
it will only be done if they can see that they are going to get
enough income out of looking after war ships in their port?
Admiral Sir Alan West: There is
an over capacity, which is effectively what you are saying, in
terms of warship repair in the UK. That is why it is important
to tie this altogether with the build aspects as well. I would
have thought that it was not beyond the wit of man to achieve
something there, which is what I had hoped might come out of some
of this work that is going on. You are quite right, there is more
ship repair capacity than there is warship work, and it is impossible
to get other work to fill the void, although some of the yards
have tried very hard on that and have done quite well on bits
and pieces, but it is not enough to cover them. So it is an issue
that we are well aware of, it is one that we are concerned about
and I hope that in discussions we can come up with an answer.
I think the answer to that is to actually get it as part of the
package with build as well, and I think something could be done;
and that is what I hope Admiral Cheadle and people are talking
about as they move forward.
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