Memorandum from Brigadier (Retired) G
C Barnett OBE
I was Colonel of The Black Watch for 11 years,
handing over to my successor, Lieutenant General Sir Alistair
Irwin (currently the Adjutant General) just over a year ago. I
served in the Regular Army for almost 37 years.
I have read the uncorrected record of your Defence
Committee questioning of the Secretary of State, CDS and PUS on
15 September. I have to say that some answers seemed to be misleading.
For instance it is not current Army policy to arms plot all battalions
every two years. The current MoD plan is that armoured infantry
arms plot very six years, most of the others at three- to five-year
intervals with a very few (on Public Duties etc) every two. General
Jackson's article in The Spectator was not wholly true
and I enclose a copy of my letter in reply.[1]
I think it totally misguided to reduce the numbers
of soldiers on the ground, replacing them with technology (to
quote Mr Hoon) at a time when we have moved from the cold war
to a war against terrorists. We must maintain our military strength
(particularly the Infantry) as it is, if we are to continue to
pursue foreign policy objectives that require armed forces to
support them. If the Army continues to be tasked as frequently
as present there will be very great difficulty in retaining the
numbers required and the situation will become worse.
If, as reported, The Black Watch, currently
the British Division reserve, is redeployed to support the Americans,
we will be breaking one of the principles of war, that is to always
have a reserve for the unexpected. Our commander in Basra (General
John McColl) has already asked for more troops and has been told
he cannot have them.
It makes no sense to reduce the numbers of Regulars
when the Regular Army has to be reinforced by an increasing number
of TA soldiers. My local TA battalion has provided over 200 reinforcements
to the Regular Army over the last three years. There will be a
time when the goodwill of the employers of these part time soldiers
runs out.
As you know, large Regiments are to be formed
out of the current small ones and that each battalion of all large
Regiments is to be permanently based in one location with trickle
posting between each to ensure variety and reinforcement as required.
It is alleged to be more operationally efficient and cheaper.
This sounds good but I must comment on this.
A paper written in the MoD some 10 years ago
compared the costs and found that if soldiers moved around every
three to four years or at more frequent intervals, there was no
cost advantage and that the extra staff required to manage individual
postings to permanent bases could actually increase the cost.
Operational efficiency is a judgement but having
served in Germany commanding my battalion I have no doubt that
those who did not move regularly became stale. Taking on a new
role is a challenge which battalions relish. They rise to the
occasion and there is no better example than The Black Watch who
moved to Fallingbostel in Germany, converted to Armoured Infantry
and were given high praise by their commanders in the war against
Saddam in Iraq. What I say applies to all battalions, of course.
Staying in one place in one role not only results
in staleness but could mean a lack of flexibility in the Army
when deploying troops because if each permanently based battalion
has one role it cannot easily adapt to another which may be required
at short notice.
When The Black Watch were sent to Fallingbostel
they were sent for six years but then short-toured by the MoD.
I believe Arms plotting should continue but perhaps at longer
intervals of four to eight years. I also have no doubt that wives
and families like to move as part of the family—the whole
village—rather than as individuals to a strange place with
new friends to make. This would encourage recruiting and retention.
The formation of large Regiments is another
issue. It is argued that it is easier to cross post and reinforce
with such a system. Looking at the experience of The Black Watch
and The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (a large regiment) in 7 Brigade
in the war against Saddam, both battalions had to be reinforced
from other units and only one soldier from the other Fusilier
battalion was posted because the others could not be spared. So
there was no advantage on that occasion.
But the unquantifiable ethos, comradeship and
fighting spirit of the small regiments with support from the home
area does so much to ensure operational success. I was very struck
by the support from individuals, many organisations and local
authorities in Tayside for The Black Watch in 2003. They all arranged
activities for wives and parents of soldiers. I was equally struck
by those who came along uninvited from other Corps and told me
they needed this type of support.
With large Regiments and permanent basing comes
another problem. If, for the sake of example, a large regiment
of three battalions is formed with one battalion of armoured infantry,
another in the light role and the third responsible for something
less glamorous, we will end up with a first team, second team
and third team because the able individuals will go to the first
team, those less able to the second and the weaker, but still
valuable, to the third.
The end result will be the first will be fully
manned, the second battalion will lose all those who aspired to
the first and now realise they will not reach the top. Because
they are able they will leave and find a job outside. The third
team will stay for their pension—not the ideal motivation.
The MoD has suggested that the formation of
large regiments and permanent basing will help recruiting or retention.
I, like many others, living in Perthshire joined my local Regiment
because I knew some of those serving and once serving knew much
about the areas from which many other members of the Regiment
came and I do not believe that soldiers would prefer to join a
large Regiment recruited from all over Scotland, nor will their
wives, who prefer to live alongside those whom they know. If this
is true of Scotland it must be even more true for the Guards.
Would a Mick from Belfast prefer to serve with Scots or Welsh
Guards in preference to his own kith and kin?
On recruiting, it is frequently pointed out
by the MoD that battalions are under strength, yet it is never
admitted that until very recently training bed spaces were capped
and not surprisingly many who wanted to join up found another
paid job rather than wait six months to start in the Army. This
is not the way for an employer to convince potential recruits
that you wish them to serve in the Army.
May I comment on the selection of battalions
to be cut? I do not favour any cuts at all but if there have to
be any:
— I fail to understand why we need
three Parachute battalions, last used as paratroopers at Suez.
One of these could go, if cuts have to be made. They cost more
than infantry battalions in the light role.
— The Grenadier, Coldstream and Scots
Guards each currently have an extra company for ceremonial duties.
We should look at how we can cut the duties. And anyhow, if necessary,
other Regiments can do them.
— If the Northern Ireland situation
is really much better surely it makes sense to reduce the numbers
of Home Service Battalions of the The Royal Irish—they are
not deployable world wide.
— The Gurkhas could be considered for
cuts but I believe their logistical element is essential to the
rest of the Army—but are we wise to rely on them with an
ever-worsening Maoist situation in Nepal?
If the reductions were made as outlined above
there would be no diminution of operational efficiency and no
need to form large Regiments.
The Government has increased the number of civil
servants by more than 300,000 since 1997. The proposal is to cut
four battalions—roughly 2,500 men. I have to ask which organisation
will make most contribution to our foreign and defence policy
and be available for firemen's strikes, foot and mouth etc.
Garry Barnett
1 Not printed. Back
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