Memorandum from John Smith MP
THE DEFENCE AVIATION REPAIR AGENCY, ST ATHAN
I believe your committee has agreed to investigate
the above matter as part of a wider investigation into future
capabilities. As you are no doubt aware, following a comprehensive
review of air logistics, in September the Minister of State for
the Armed Forces announced his "preferred option" of
re-locating Tornado GR4s from the Defence Aviation Repair Agency
(DARA) at St Athan to RAF Marham. This follows a decision earlier
this year to "roll forward" the Harrier jet to RAF Cottismore.
This means, for the first time in 50 years,
the "deep" repair and maintenance ie upgrades, major
repair, overhaul and factory maintenance of the RAF's front line
fleet of offensive jets will no longer take place in Wales. Instead,
it will be undertaken by untried and untested military personnel
and facilities at operational bases in central and eastern England.
As recently as April 2001, following the Strategic
Defence Review (SDR) and in the face of opposition from the RAF,
Her Majesty's Government turned DARA into a "Trading Fund".
Its strategic role was to provide an alternative source of deep
repair to that of the commercial sector (Defence Committee, Fourth
Report, 2000-01). As well as being able to competitively bid for
foreign and civilian repair work it would provide the Ministry
of Defence with a vital benchmark for quality and cost in air
depth support.
Since its creation DARA, St Athan has downsized
a workforce of approximately 4,500 military personnel to 1,450
civilians carrying out essentially the same tasks. This has been
achieved by the workforce before occupying a publicly funded £80
million, state of the art, military "super" hangar,
commissioned by the minister just last year. It is the size of
six football pitches and with 47 fighter bays it was purpose built
to repair the RAF's fast jet fleet. Instead of exploiting these
huge economies of scale it is destined to remain empty!
To the shock of many of us, the Ministry is
now considering giving this work back to the RAF to be undertaken
"in house". This is being proposed even though nobody
seriously believes, in Britain or throughout NATO, that there
is any military case whatsoever for service personnel to undertake
depth support.
Because the RAF has identified a "Crisis
Manning Requirement", they conclude these uniformed personnel
should be trained as highly skilled aeronautical engineers to
undertake depth support financed by the Vote and replace the proven
skills and benchmark capability at St Athan, financed by customer
revenues, to deliver "better value for money". I contend
this is the "economics of the mad house" and heralds
a return to the bad old days—pre-SDR—of the military
undertaking non essential tasks instead of focusing on the front
line.
If this decision is implemented, I confidently
predict it will be bad news for the military in that it will reduce
front line capability. It will be bad news for the tax payer as
costs will, once again, spiral out of control. The RAF will become
dependent on a single monopoly supplier, namely the design authority
for these aircraft. It will also be bad news for the South Wales
aviation industry whose success is predicated on the centre of
excellence in military aviation at St Athan.
It is wrong in principle and wrong in practice.
It turns the Government's "smart acquisition" policy
on its head and makes a mockery of attempts to modernise the delivery
of public services. It is my view that it should be stopped now
before a final decision is taken and the damage is done. Or, at
the very least, if the Government is determined to press ahead
with this misguided policy then a programme of gradual implementation
should be adopted. Objectively and Accurate evaluation of the
roll forward of depth support to MOBs should be undertaken to
ensure air availability and value for money is being achieved
at each stage of the transition.
John Smith MP
Vale of Glamorgan
November 2004
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