Further memorandum from the Ministry of
Defence
Further information requested following the
evidence session with Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup KCB,
AFC, ADC on 20 October 2004.[6]
Q102-4. Details on progress with the
negotiations for the contract for the second tranche of Typhoon.
The collaborative arrangements for the Eurofighter
(Typhoon) programme require each of the four partner nations (Germany,
Italy, Spain and the UK) to negotiate prices with their national
industries, while NETMA (the NATO procurement agency that places
and manages contracts on the nations' behalf) negotiates the contract
terms and conditions. The UK Ministry of Defence is completing
negotiations with BAE SYSTEMS and the normal project scrutiny
and approval process. The other nations have also reached agreements
with their respective partner companies and are seeking their
own national approvals. All four partner nations expect to be
in a position to authorise NETMA to place the contracts before
Christmas.
Q114. Clarification of what financial
penalties, if any, would be incurred by the British Government
deciding not to proceed with the third tranche of Typhoon.
The Typhoon programme is organised under a series
of Memoranda of Understanding between the four partner nations,
Italy, Germany, Spain and the UK. Although not legally binding,
such MOU are the basis of most international collaborative defence
projects and are relied upon by nations. The key principle of
the Typhoon production arrangement is that each nation's industry
builds a share of each aircraft, that share being equivalent to
the nation's declared total "offtake" of aircraft. Each
nation's government is then responsible for paying its own industry,
with the end result that each nation's total share of manufacturing
work and cost equates to its share of the aircraft, and costs
are largely immune to currency exchange rate variations. If any
nation reduced its offtake of aircraft, for instance by not proceeding
with Tranche 3, it follows that manufacturing work would need
to be redistributed between the nations to restore the balance
of work and cost-share to aircraft offtake. This redistribution
would be a complex, time-consuming and potentially expensive process.
There is no question of a financial "penalty" but the
MOU requires any nation that changes its requirement to bear these
additional costs on behalf of the others, up to a ceiling based
on the amount the nation would have paid for its original requirement.
Such costs would not arise in the event that all four partner
nations were to agree to proportionally similar changes to their
offtake requirements.
Q142. Whether, and when, the business
case and investment appraisal studies being undertaken for each
individual site under the Defence Airfield Review will be published.
The Defence Airfield Review business case and
investment appraisal (IA) studies will be published after the
Minister for Armed Forces has announced any decisions that are
informed by the studies. The documents may need to be redacted
before publication. Any redactions will be made by reference to
the exemption categories in the Freedom of Information Act and
Environmental Information Regulations.
The Committee may find it helpful to note that,
whereas all options are assessed on the same criteria in the IA
process, some assumptions may differ. For example, in the IAs
being undertaken in respect of the future basing of Nimrod MRA4
it is assumed that RAF Waddington would remain open irrespective
of the outcome whereas for RAF Kinloss the assumption is that
the Station would close if the outcome were that the Nimrod MRA4
force would be established at Waddington. This reflects the fact
that RAF Waddington is home to a number of aircraft types and
a range of support units which, on current planning, would continue
to be based there in the future. RAF Kinloss, on the other hand,
is predominately home only to Nimrod MR2 and in terms of the IA
it is therefore appropriate to assume that the Station would close
if not chosen as a base for MRA4 or any other defence use. IAs
are technical documents, designed to balance the relative costs
and benefits of different options, which are used to by the Department
to inform the decision making process.
Q144. Why the Overall Force Levels table
in the Future Capabilities paper (Cmd 6269) lists only "deployable
force elements" for the offensive aircraft and "deployable
aircraft and the aircraft held at readiness for the QRA air defence
of the UK" for air defence aircraft rather than total holdings
as is the case for all other force elements?
The presentation of meaningful statistics reflecting
planned capability of fast jets is complicated by a number of
factors, principally the fact that capability is delivered by
a combination of combat ready crew and aircraft. As CAS explained
during the evidence session, the assumptions made about the number
of crew required to deploy on operations affects the number of
aircraft resourced to fly to support force generation of crew
and the number of aircraft procured to support the planned life
of the given aircraft type.
In the Supporting Essays to the SDR White Paper
of 1998 (Cmd 3999) we attempted to express the impact force generation
of crew had on the number of aircraft required to be held in squadrons
to support routine flying. However, for the tables in Cmd 6269
we took the view that the number of aircraft routinely flying
in squadrons is a management issue, rather than a measurement
of capability available for contingent operations. The latter
is defined by the numbers of aircraft held at readiness for operations
and for QRA air defence tasks.
Q153. Confirmation of the number of deployable
fast jets and of QRA aircraft.
The maximum number of deployable fast jets (held
at readiness) (shown in the Large Scale table) is 64 offensive
support and 16 air defence. In addition four air defence aircraft
are required in the UK to cover QRA tasks.
Q191. Whether the additional C-17 to
be purchased will include enhancements currently being fitted
to the US fleet as a result of experience in Afghanistan and Iraq?
Current plans assume that the fifth C-17 will
be fitted with the same enhancements as those that are fitted
to the US Fleet. Our understanding is that this will include those
enhancements fitted as a result of experience in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Indeed, the fifth UK C-17 aircraft will be manufactured
to the most current USAF production block standard, which will
be inherently more capable than current operational USAF C-17
aircraft. Furthermore, the existing four UK C-17 aircraft are
nearing the end of a return-to-works programme to have the same
enhancements installed as fitted to the US C-17 fleet.
Q212. Whether the first commander of
the Joint Helicopter Command asked that one of the three service
chiefs assume overall responsibility for the JHC, and if so for
what reasons it was turned down?
The first Commander of the Joint Helicopter
Command (JHC) was Air Vice Marshal Niven: he retired from the
RAF on leaving that post in 2002. Before taking up that appointment
AVM Niven led the study that examined the viability of a Joint
command arrangement for helicopters that operate in the land environment
and subsequently the team that implemented the Chiefs of Staff
(COS) endorsed recommendations of that study. Central to the recommendations
accepted by the COS in December 1998 was a proposal that all helicopter
units that fell within the scope of the review should have a clear
chain of command with no confusion as to who has authority, for
example, to issue regulations, conduct Boards of Inquiry and to
task Battlefield (BH) and Support (SH) Helicopters. As CAS explained
to the Committee, the Royal Navy's anti-submarine warfare and
airborne warning helicopters mounted from ships were excluded
from the review. So too were the RAF's search and rescue helicopters.
In addition to clarifying operational command
of all helicopters operating in the land environment a key argument
advanced in favour of a Joint command structure was that it would
facilitate improved balance of investment decisions thus enabling
and encouraging the realisation of economies of scale. The COS
agreed that the ability to rationalise and deliver efficiencies
would be restricted if full financial authority was not delegated
to a single TLB. It was therefore agreed that JHC would be funded
on the lead Command Model with operational and financial responsibility
placed with the Land Command TLB.
With effect from 1 October 1999 Operational
Command (OPCOM) of all helicopter units operating in the land
environment (ie all Royal Navy, Army and RAF helicopters, with
the exception of the Royal Navy's anti-submarine warfare and airborne
warning helicopters mounted from ships and the RAF's search and
rescue helicopters, was delegated to CINCLAND, and exercised by
Commander JHC. OPCOM of 16 Air Asslt Bde was formally delegated
to Comd JHC from April 2000, following completion of the major
part of its reorganisation.
However, the COS also endorsed the Study Team's
recommendation that it would be inappropriate for the Commander
JHC to assume Full Command (FC) (defined as "military authority
and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates
(and) covering every aspect of military operations and administration")
of personnel and units from another Service. It would not be in
line with Queen's Regulations and there is no clear procedural
mechanism within the UK Armed Forces for such an arrangement on
a permanent basis in peacetime. The single-Service front line
Command CinCs (FLEET, LAND and STC), therefore, continue to exercise
FC over personnel of their respective Service for units in the
JHC.
Q222. When and how the capability gap
caused by the non-availability of the Chinook Mk3s will be filled?
The capability gap caused by the non-availability
of the Chinook Mk3s is currently being filled by Chinook Mk2/2a
fitted with the Night Enhancement Package (NEP). Chinook Mk2/2a
(NEP) will continue to fill the gap until either the Chinook Mk3
is brought into service or new capability procured. A Combined
Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal (COEIA) concluded
that a "Fix-to-Field" solution is the probable best
value for money option for the Mk3. This solution has been ratified
by three independent technical advisors as being realistic. An
investment of around £13 million has been approved for preparatory
work including risk reduction, which will enable us to determine
with greater fidelity whether Fix-to-Field is both technically
and financially acceptable, which are not yet proven. If the Fix-to-Field
does proceed beyond the risk reduction stage, the likely in-service
date for Chinook Mk3 is currently assessed to be late 2007.
Q224. What measures has the RAF taken
to protect its control towers from terrorist attack and how, if
necessary, it would replace one which had been destroyed?
Air Traffic Control (ATC) towers are afforded
the same level of security as all other operational assets. Control
of entry to RAF Stations is effected by armed Service and armed
Ministry of Defence Police personnel. Regular counter terrorist
patrols are conducted by Station Guard Forces on all units. These
include patrols by RAF Police dog units. Specific defensive measures
are dependent on the threat and are driven by intelligence from
a variety of sources, including liaison with local Police Forces.
Additionally, regular routine unit security surveys and the application
of Risk Management processes assist in ensuring that defensive
measures against terrorist attacks are appropriate. Access to
ATC towers is restricted to authorised persons through control
of entry procedures and all visitors are checked and escorted.
RAF station recovery plans are designed to deal
with all losses of capability, including air traffic control.
The loss of an air traffic control tower through terrorist activities
would have a major impact on flying operations at the station.
In the immediate aftermath routine flying operations would cease.
Airborne home-based aircraft would divert to an alternate airfield:
all sorties have two identified diversionary airfields in case
of malfunction or bad weather. If deemed operationally necessary,
however, aircraft could operate using silent procedures even though
ATC services were not available. This would allow aircraft to
be redeployed to serviceable airfields if required. Mobile ATC
assets would then be made available to allow normal operational
fair weather flying to resume. In the longer term further mobile
ATC assets would be deployed to provide a bad-weather capability.
December 2004
6 Ev 19-37 Back
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