Examination of Witnesses (Questions 660
- 679)
WEDNESDAY 12 JANUARY 2005
RT HON
GEOFF HOON
MP AND GENERAL
SIR MIKE
JACKSON KCB, CBE, DSO, ADC GEN
Q660 Mr Gapes: Would it be possible
for us to have the full list for our benefit?[7]
General Sir Mike Jackson: I can
do that once we are there, fine. I just make the proviso that
we are not there yet.
Q661 Chairman: 2008! I will be gone
by then, General.
Mr Hoon: No, Mr Chairman, surely
not!
General Sir Mike Jackson: We may
not implement everything until a little later.
Mr Hoon: We will provide you with
as much information as we possibly can, Mr Chairman, and as soon
as we possibly can.
Q662 Mr Jones: Can I now turn to
the important position of support? You can have as effective an
Army as you want if you get the support behind it in terms of
maintenance and in terms of support capability, so clearly it
is an important part. We took evidence from the former CDL and
he talked about the end-to-end review that is going on in terms
of that support. I think in our evidence, for example, that we
took on the Iraqi Op Telic inquiry, there were issues around,
clearly, support that needed to be looked at. One of the issues
which was raised was the substantial changes that were being proposed
for organisations—some of which had only just been set up—for
example, DARA. I wonder if you could tell us what state the new
proposals are at and whether or not it will lead to more effective
support in terms of operation?
Mr Hoon: Can I first of all set
out the principle? It is wholly consistent with what we have been
doing in relation to the reorganisation of the Army. The principle
is this: we, in effect, inherited a structure that was still very
much based on a Cold War concept of having, essentially, a deployable
Army with a single chain of support. The reason why we are trying
to invest in more posts in supporting trades is that we have found
from experience that, given the numbers of operations that are
being conducted at the same time, we need more than one chain
of support. I use that phrase loosely because it covers a wide
range of positions—logisticians, engineers, signallers,
intelligence and so on. At the same time, we need to ensure that
we have the right kind of support in UK for those lines of support.
As we have engaged more and more in joint operations it also becomes
clear, if you look at the Ministry of Defence estate and the way
that it is organised, that there is a great deal of duplication.
A lot of that is historical because each service had its own systems
for delivering a whole range of equipment. For example, we had
three separate systems for procuring fuel, even though they were
procuring fuel on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. It makes
a lot of sense, and that is the whole point about these considerations,
to look end-to-end, and that is why that phrase has been used.
What kind of support functions do we need both in the United Kingdom
and that are capable of deploying to support an increasingly joint
operation across the three Services in order to gain—and
I make no apology for saying this—the maximum financial
benefit from that kind of co-ordination of activity. It simply
does not make sense to have three separate sets of everything
as we move increasingly towards joint operations.
Q663 Mr Jones: Can you update us
then on the other issues which they have raised from our Op Telic
inquiry—the issue you have referred to about logistics and
the three separate, for example, computer systems that work for
different Armed Forces? There are quite obviously historical reasons
for it. It was clearly seen by the MoD as a priority. That is
part of this review, but are some going to be quicker than others
because that seemed to be quite an important issue to get right,
certainly if we are looking to deploy in future overseas operations?
Mr Hoon: Again, there is a difference
between the kind of computer system that you have in the United
Kingdom in order to ensure that you can track equipment here,
to ensure that it is in the right place, and the kind of equipment
you need in the heat of battle to ensure that deployed forces
on the front line have access to the right kit. There has to be
an interface and a relationship between the two. To share some
of my thinking with you, Mr Chairman, one of the things I am increasingly
nervous about is the idea of a single computer system that does
everything from A to Z, because the risk from that is enormous.
It sounds great but if you put all of your effort into that one
system and it does not deliver in time you have big problems.
I think the Government has faced that in a number of different
areas, and so we are looking at a somewhat more evolutionary approach.
Ultimately, we would expect that the system would work right across
the piece but I am, for the moment at any rate, nervous about
the idea of having a commitment to one single system that tries
to do everything.
Q664 Mr Jones: I agree with that.
Let us be honest, the previous Conservative government and, I
think, we have learnt as a Government, have not had great success
in terms of procuring computer systems. One of the important things
that came from Op Telic was the issue of trying to get different
Services to talk to one another in terms of equipment—one
to know where it was and, also, being able to inventory what is
different between the RAF and, for example, the Navy and the Army.
I think there were examples where clearly people did not know
where things were. Where are we at—I know you cannot tell
us today but you can give us an update—today in the work
promised and trying to get that working more efficiently? I am
not suggesting one single computer system but making sure the
system works in terms of that deployable—
Mr Hoon: I mentioned some of the
work that has been done now, obviously, to try and develop a system
that quickly allows us to identify the contents of a particular
container as it arrives somewhere near the front line, because
the equipment was there, the problem was making sure that it could
be distributed quickly to those who needed it in the time frame
involved. That means having a system, for example, that allows
someone who is opening that container load to know what it is
in there and know, crucially, where it has to go, in a very short
time frame. That is why I say it is a different kind of system
to the one required back in the United Kingdom, where this equipment
can be allocated in a more reasonable time frame to where it has
to go.
Q665 Mr Jones: Can you send us an
update?
Mr Hoon: Of course.[8]
Q666 Mr Havard: Can I just press
you on DARA because there is a significant change going on. This
was a trading fund that, as I understood it, was partly set up
to protect the MoD against falling into dependency on manufacturers;
it was an alternative way, it was not government-directly employed
civil servants any more. It was a halfway house and it was intended
to do a number of things in terms of defence industrial policy,
and all sorts of things. So it is quite a complex issue this,
and we have asked questions about it, and its future is now uncertain
and it may well be that it is going to be sold off, and so on.
I am particularly interested, as you will understand, in DARA
in, say, Merthyr and their support for the Air Force. It is really
a question about whether policy and delivery of that, and operational
effectiveness, are jeopardised by some of the moves that are taking
place in terms of being able to provide that capacity and support.
The End-to-End Review encompasses this, as I understand it. My
information from a lot of anecdotal information locally is that
the RAF are bending air frames and then pretending they have not
and putting them back on jigs—I hear all sorts of stories,
as you would imagine. I hear stories about how their "lean
machine" or "lean efficiency process" is actually
working, and the fact that RAF personnel are having to work 24
hours a day, or whatever it is, around the clock, double-up shifts,
and all the rest of it. So the questions about criteria against
which efficiency is judged is very much in play, as far as the
efficiency of DARA is concerned vis-a"-vis what its alternatives
are as far as the military continuing to do it for itself, which
is the other alternative of not falling into dependency on industry.
So there is a series of detailed issues about this that we are
obviously not going to pursue today but it raises a question in
my mind that what is said to me is that the real driver here is
the crisis manning levels that the RAF need now to have, and the
formations, if you like, of the three Services—how many
are going to be in each and what it is going to be able to do
and not do and how many personnel it requires—is now feeding
back into the support activities and its relationship with either
the industry or the other alternative bodies, such as DARA, which
have been set up. So there is an expediency which is driving the
process that comes from the RAF needing to keep these personnel
and keep them busy which has distorted the argument about what
is the best way to actually provide the support.
Mr Hoon: I would not accept the
final observation, although I think much of what you said earlier
I would agree with. Again, the world is changing. I have mentioned
already to Mr Jones the points about the kinds of joint operations
that we are now seeing, and that is a factor in the kind of support
that we provide back in the United Kingdom. The other crucial
change which affects all equipment—I do not know what kind
of car you drive or what the service intervals of your car are
today—is that modern military equipment no longer requires
the same kind of service and maintenance; the intervals are much
fewer and they are more efficient, more effective and they last
longer. We need fewer people to maintain equipment.
Q667 Mr Havard: If you have got fewer
aeroplanes you are trying to keep them flying longer, are you
not, so maybe they do need more maintenance?
Mr Hoon: But that is true, aircraft
do not need the same kind of maintenance that they required in
the past. They had shorter service intervals, to put it in layman's
language, and the truth is that that necessarily has implications
for the number of bases and number of people. Frankly, the Royal
Air Force (perhaps it has not received as much attention) has
faced up to that in an extremely robust way. I think it would
be quite unfair to suggest that somehow the Royal Air Force were
trying to preserve positions in the announcement made before Christmas.
There are a very considerable number of RAF posts that will go,
and they are all in the area of maintenance because we do not
need that number of people into the future; there simply is not
the work there because of the nature of modern equipment.
Q668 Mr Viggers: Would you share
with us your latest thinking about the unit to support Special
Forces? Is it to be called "Rangers"? Where will they
be based? Has it been carved out of the Parachute Regiment? Can
you explain your current thinking, please, on this point?
General Sir Mike Jackson: Yes.
Firstly, the name. "Rangers" should be very much in
inverted commas.
Mr Hoon: I did say "so-called"
earlier on.
General Sir Mike Jackson: It is
an American term which I do not think would import that well.
It is a question of nomenclature. It is a very important additional
capability, in my view. We have had for some while some, not ad
hoc but certainly less than optimised arrangements, to produce
semi-conventional support and we need to get it on to a proper
footing. The way it will be done is by taking 1 PARA (1st Battalion
The Parachute Regiment) out of the infantry order of battle thereby
coming to the 36 battalions, we then have a nucleus of experienced,
well-trained soldiers. Add to that some elements from, particularly
I suspect, the Royal Marines and the Royal Air Force, we are going
to get something which is, really, I think, a very powerful addition
to the order of battle.
Q669 Mr Viggers: Have you decided
on the location for this unit yet?
General Sir Mike Jackson: There
are some options in a Westerly direction. I cannot think why.
Q670 Mr Viggers: Will they all be
parachute trained?
General Sir Mike Jackson: I imagine
the vast majority. Obviously, the 1 PARA personnel will be, by
definition. Whether it would be required of each and every person
is a matter that has yet to be worked out. There will be a maritime
dimension as well in this intimate support.
Q671 Mr Viggers: And the costings,
please? How much will it cost to train, re-role and re-equip?
General Sir Mike Jackson: The
first thing is that as far as manpower is concerned that has been
done within the limit of around 102,000 which the Army has, and
very rough order costings, at the moment, I think are up to about
£20 million over the four years we are looking at.
Q672 Mr Havard: Does this mean the
Paras will be losing their Pathfinders?
General Sir Mike Jackson: No,
the Pathfinder—it is actually a small company—is very
much a formation reconnaissance ability in the 16th Air Assault
Brigade, and there is no change there.
Q673 Richard Ottaway: You have spoken
about the benefit of the arms plot.
General Sir Mike Jackson: Ceasing
the arms plot.
Q674 Richard Ottaway: Would it be
possible for the Army at its present size to meet the requirements
of the defence planning assumptions without ending the arms plot?
General Sir Mike Jackson: I think
it would be very much more difficult. I think I have given evidence
before, on a previous occasion when I was here, that in 2004-05
planned were 22 battalions moves, most of which involved re-roling—not
all but most of which involved re-roling. Put that another way,
at any one time 7 or 8 battalions out of the current 40 are unavailable
for use because they are in baulk during their movements.[9]
So you will see that the way we have done things traditionally
over the last few decades has got that built-in penalty. In the
future, when we have ceased arms plotting and changing roles,
there will still be a requirement for some limited change of location—for
example, probably, duties in Northern Ireland, perhaps, whilst
it is still an operational theatre—but that will be the
exception rather than the rule. There is no reason, by and large,
why those 36 battalions are not all available, but that is the
prize; that is why we are going through what is—as has been
reflected this afternoon—a somewhat painful exercise to
restructure the military and to get it on to a proper basis, I
hope, for a generation or two. The Secretary of State mentioned
the long history of changes to the infantry as well; some of those
have been because change has not actually been grasped when it
should have been. Does that help?
Q675 Richard Ottaway: I will take
that as a maybe.
General Sir Mike Jackson: No,
it was more than that.
Q676 Richard Ottaway: It was a yes,
then?
General Sir Mike Jackson: I think
I have laid out pretty clearly what it is.
Q677 Richard Ottaway: So it could
not have been done without ending the arms plot?
General Sir Mike Jackson: It could
have been but you would have had shorter tour intervals, more
instability, and more movement.
Q678 Mr Jones: To me it is a no-brainer,
this one. Why has it not been done before? It seems to me, just
in the 21st Century—
General Sir Mike Jackson: I gave
evidence on this on my last occasion and I can almost remember
the words I used. I started by saying, "I will choose my
words carefully" that previous Army Boards, three times in
my service, have realised where the logic takes them but, for,
no doubt, very valid reasons at the time, came to the view that
the inevitable turbulence which follows such a decision outweighed
the logic.
Chairman: It may happen again.
Mr Jones: The Diplomatic Corps calls
you.
Mr Havard: He has pulled the pin and
rolled it across the floor this time. See who jumps.
Q679 Richard Ottaway: General, you
have described the process as painful. Earlier the Secretary of
State said that you were completely happy with the proposals.
Are you completely happy?
General Sir Mike Jackson: Are
we talking about the ramifications of stopping the arms plot?
7 Ev 174 Back
8
Ev 175 Back
9
Note from Witness: and re-roling. Back
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