Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280
- 299)
WEDNESDAY 30 JUNE 2004
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
(RETIRED) RICHARD
HAES OBE
Q280 Chairman: Would you know offhand
how many of those 15 were disciplined?
Mr Haes: I could not tell you
because discipline—one of our problems which, maybe, we
will come on to when we deal with the split Chain of Command—was
dealt with by the Land Chain Command. Therefore, what happened
to anyone being disciplined I was not allowed to see. Again, that
was part of our problem; that we had responsibility for the behaviour
of those people but we did not get oversight—
Q281 Chairman: So when people are
disciplined—forgive my ignorance—are they just transferred
to other duties or are they simply sent home until the inquiry
is completed?
Mr Haes: No, it really depends
on the recommendation of the police report or the evidence, that
is presented. Probably in the majority of cases a charge would
be raised under the Armed Forces Act, or military law, and these
guys could be charged for disobeying a standing order; ie you
will not have relationships with your trainees. Therefore, they
would be charged and they could risk losing their rank; they could
certainly risk being returned to their unit, which would have
been quite disgraceful, to be honest. It was a severe discipline
problem. It was formal discipline. It was not just a slap on the
wrist and off you go.
Q282 Chairman: We must find out in
more detail about this because if this exacerbated the training
problem, then this is a matter of considerable concern.
Mr Haes: It was just one of the
factors that added to the overstretch of instructors. I have to
say that one of my main concerns, because I was concerned to see
in a previous report record that they thought that equal opportunities
was now a matter that was under control and had died down, was,
the presence of females. I will not call it sexual harassment
because that goes beyond what I am trying to describe, but females
training in the military environment, in the slightly macho environment,
were a concern for me. I think there was conflict between males
and females. We were trying to run an organisation where everyone
was treated equally and the females were expected to perform exactly
the same duties as the males and yet on occasions we had some
difficulties. I quote our SO1 Occupational Medicine, who was a
female Lieutenant Colonel, who described to us at one of the main
board meetings the problem that in fact women are not built to
stride out with an 80 pound bergen their back; they physically
have difficulty with that. In fact, we were finding that in Phase
1 training round about 27% casualty rates for female recruits
was the figure against 8% for males. This was in a physical testing
training stage. I remain concerned that there is an element of
conflict between the sexes in the Armed Forces training centres.
Q283 Mr Cran: Colonel, in answer
to a few questions by Mr Hancock you said that you did not know
of the various other reports but that you did know and indeed
had read the Surrey Police report, the final one?
Mr Haes: I was sent a copy.
Q284 Mr Cran: You have read it?
Mr Haes: I have.
Q285 Mr Cran: I think it is important
that the Committee does get on the record what you think of that
particular report? I think it is worth stating when I ask the
question that it was very complimentary of your report, the one
that was published in 2001.
Mr Haes: Yes.
Q286 Mr Cran: Could you tell us what
you feel about that report? Is it balanced? Is it fair? Does it
set the problems surrounding the various deaths in the manner
that you think right?
Mr Haes: My answer to that is
generally: yes, it was a balanced report within the limit of my
experience. Clearly, I did not get to read the other reports that
made input to their report. I can only say from the perspective
which they were looking at, yes, they picked out of my report
things which obviously helped them to come to their conclusions
on the problems of the suicide end of the line. From that point
of view, I think they scored a success.
Q287 Mr Cran: So you had no reservations
whatsoever about the standard of that report?
Mr Haes: No. Later on in their
conclusions I think they made comment that I made only one recommendation,
which was a slight contradiction to what they had put earlier.
In fact, they did note in other parts that I had made three recommendations
principally: either we cut training, or we have the resources
to do it, or we take a more minimalist approach, none of which
were attractive, none of which were really acceptable to the establishment.
Q288 Mr Cran: Laying that aside,
the Committee, as it goes around assessing the responses that
the armed services have made to various reports, has been in a
difficulty because all the right language has been used, of course,
but the question is: is it getting any further down? You did answer
a few questions by my colleagues over there. Let us just bring
it all together. I know you have been out of the Armed Forces
for some time, three years or whatever. Do your contacts tell
you that the lessons really have been learned and that action
is really going to be taken and that it will be long-lasting,
because of course that is the problem? Lessons can be learned.
The question is whether they are going to be learned and apply
for any length of time. What is your sense of all this?
Mr Haes: The first answer to that
is: yes, there has been a sea change in attitude to duty of care
and supervision. It is now flavour of the month, to use that phrase.
I do have some cynicism from long years of experience as to whether
it will be sustained. I think that the DOC report and the reappraisal,
which I have read, at the six-month reappraisal is fantastic.
I think that has hit the nail right on the head. They have picked
up the vast majority of the major concerns that I had. One of
my feelings was that the DOC report is having an amazing effect
because people accept that it's a high level MoD document that
cannot be ignored, and so we have got out of this phase of DOC
quoted corporate blindness. I think "cognitive dissonance"
was the phrase which I used. I think we have been able to set
that aside now and people are recognising that there is a real
problem; they have put resources into it; they are looking at
putting more resources into it. I believe that further bids for
money in STP 04 are being made, but again I would not like to
look into the crystal ball and say that that will continue for
ever more. We need to ring-fence these changes somehow and they
have to be written in in red so that at some later defence review,
or further cut-backs in demands on manpower, people then forget
what we have done when it is too easy in the height of an operation
to say, "This has operational priority and we will overrule
it at this time" because you then begin to erode what you
have achieved now. The DOC report has made a huge difference.
Q289 Mr Cran: Does that lead you
to believe that change must come from the top of the organisation,
or at least it has to be recognised there? You feel that is recognised
by the high command, as it were?
Mr Haes: I do, yes. That is my
gut instinct and the fact that 179 military instructors have already
gone to ATRA is indication at very high level: you will sort it
out. I think the message has gone down.
Q290 Mr Cran: Is not a problem the
fact that no matter the size of our Army, for instance, decision-making
takes place at all sorts of levels. The question is: is the edict
that comes from on high, as it were, going to be applied at each
level? Do you perceive that to be a problem or do you think this
is has just been such a wake-up call?
Mr Haes: I think where the edict
needed to work was at the top level. Really, it had to come from
MoD, the overarching organisation which tells the posting branch
to move soldiers from there to there. This is significant policy
stuff that could only have come from MoD with adjutant general's
full approval and so forth because he is Controller of Planning
and so forth as far as the Army is concerned. There has to have
been a major sea change. You ask: is it going to apply at every
level? I think the key level is at the top. Once you have put
those soldiers into the chain of command where they are needed
at the bottom, those guys are more than willing and able to do
the job they are required to do. The fact that they are there
I think will sort out the problem.
Q291 Mr Cran: With the background
that you have, not only as a former senior officer in the Armed
Forces but knowing how the adjutant works, are you sure this is
all going to last and, if you are not sure that it is going to
last, how should we ensure that it lasts because that is the question?
Mr Haes: I cannot be sure that
senior officers will not do what has happened in the past and
unless I suppose this "wilco" attitude of the military
officer, which is ingrained in every officer's psyche, which is
a battle-winning philosophy—You cannot remove that; it has
got to be there if we are going to go into war, that you go for
the objective and overcome all obstacles in your way.
Q292 Mr Cran: I have one last question.
My colleague, Mr Jones, referred to the fact that we were in Lichfield,
and a very enlightening trip it was. I, however, was quite surprised
to learn that the welfare officer, because that is the man who
is pulling everything together, at Lichfield is in fact not a
specialist; he is a welfare officer of one year and he could be
a gunnery officer the next year. I thought that was a weakness.
Do you think it is a weakness?
Mr Haes: No, I do not. Principally,
that is the way the Army has operated for ever basically because
we are posted from jobs every two, two and a half or three years
as part of, our career progression. We gain experience through
doing that. You do not lose the experience, having left the fact
that you have been a platoon commander or company commander where
you have managed soldiers. You take that experience on with you
and it is enriched by the other jobs you go to. You would not
be an officer if you could not do that job. [3]
Mr Cran: I am interested in your reply
because the reply we were given yesterday was that the high command,
as it were, are indeed looking to see whether these people should
be specialists or not.
Q293 Mr Jones: You are aware that
on 24 May Adam Ingram announced the appointment of the Adult Learning
Inspectorate, the independent inspection oversight of training
establishments. Could you tell us what your views are of that
decision and of external oversight and inspection of training
establishments?
Mr Haes: The Adult Learning Inspection
has come after my time and I am not in any way qualified to talk
on that. Was the second part of your question whether we should
have an inspector of actual duty of care?
Q294 Mr Jones: Yes. It is really
about external oversight of the duty of care regime in Army training
establishments.
Mr Haes: I have some reservations.
I can understand why people say: yes, the Army has failed to put
its house in order by itself and therefore we need an external
inspector to look at it in order to give it validity. I do not
see us as being like the Prison Service where you have your Inspector
of Prisons. In fact, I would much prefer to see that you put in
place a series of checks and balances within the system: you make
DGATR totally responsible, but he must have the ability to have
a red card that he can wave to a particularly senior officer in
MoD, be it DOC or someone who has been involved in this particular
aspect, without prejudice to his career. I think there is always
a worry, in my belief anyhow and I may be speaking completely
out of turn, that the senior officer is reluctant to tell bad
news upwards because bad news equals bad reports and so you get
on with it. I think that has been part of the problem as to why
commandants would not tell DGATR what the news was. I knew the
staff were briefing the commandants but it was getting filtered
out before it got to DGATR. My feeling is that you should keep
DGATR as totally responsible and wholly responsible, but he should
have the authority without prejudice. He should have working to
him a series of committees or, focus groups in each operating
division that works to something like the working group that I
set up that meets bi-annually, or however often is deemed necessary,
and that input comes through that group to DGATR. If you are to
have an external inspection, if it is possible, and I believe
that the DOC appraisal system seems to have worked the magic this
time and it has worked brilliantly well and it has really broken
the log-jam, why can that not continue as your external validation
of what ATRA is doing?
Q295 Mr Jones: Would you also agree
that there is an important element here in terms of ourselves
as politicians and the public in general, especially those who
have relatives who are sending youngsters into the Armed Forces,
that they have confidence in the system? I hear what you are saying,
that you are a retired officer, and I hear it when we have been
on various visits that somehow this is an internal problem that
can be looked at internally in the military. It is clear from
the history, starting with your report, that serious issues have
been raised. You raised the reasons why you think they were ignored,
but unless there is any pressure from outside, nothing is done.
In your case, your report was shelved, which raised a whole range
of issues. How do you ensure that in future, for example if somebody
is asked to do a similar report to yours internally, that is not
just shelved in the chain of command because it is unacceptable
or it raises issues that cannot be addressed at that time? Do
you not think if we are going to have confidence, and certainly
this is of relevance to youngsters joining the Armed Forces, that
they need that reassurance of an independent inspectorate?
Mr Haes: Yes, I can fully understand
why you are saying that. The answer to that is: even if you had
your independent inspector, I am not sure that he would be able
to find out actually what is going on and going wrong at the lower
levels. I think, working within the organisation, I was able to
work my feelers, into the system, because I developed a trust
with these people. They knew I was working on their side, and
I said to the people then within the closed door, the corporals,
the sergeants or whoever I was talking to, under Chatham House
rules, "Tell me what your problems are? Forget I am wearing
these. I just want to hear your grumbles". We sat
down with the whingers on the real stuff, and that is how we found
out what was really going on. The difficulty then is when I produce
a report, how are we going to stop that being shelved? I think
that the chain of command must acknowledge now that it will be
a very grave sin to shelve a report like that again. I believe
that if you have something like the DOC appraisal system that
is working so well now that would find out straight away if there
was a report. In fact, you probably should not need a report like
that if DOC was doing its job properly, and it is working well
now.
Q296 Mr Jones: I am told all the
time and I was told again yesterday that the main thing is the
chain of command with you reinforcing that. Clearly in your case,
in the case of your report, the chain of command, even right up
to the MoD, let you down, did it not? It also let down those youngsters
who actually suffered because of some of the things that were
not taken on board in your report. So this holy grail of the chain
of command, which I am told about all the time and I accept it
from the military in terms of the battle situation—and here
we are not talking about that but about a training establishment—has
failed in terms of those youngsters, has it not?
Mr Haes: It clearly did not work,
yes. I cannot argue with that. I know it failed. I saw the evidence
and we did not manage to put the right resources in place. The
answer is that I still believe that if you have got a military
inspector, from outside ATRA even, you would still have someone
coming in with an independent view who will stand probably a better
chance of understanding where things are not working than if you
have a non-military, external inspector who comes round. There
will be a formal visit or there will be all sorts of statistical
returns produced. I am not convinced that he would be able to
find out the nitty-gritty of what was going wrong by that means.
He would not have the trust within the organisation.
Q297 Mr Jones: I understand what
you are saying but, likewise, they would not have been allowed
to put your report on the top shelf in a dark corner because they
would have to spotlight that. What amazes me about your report
is that it was clearly instigated from concerns that were there.
You would have expected, would you not, out of it an action plan
but instead it was just put to one side, or hidden, and that was
allowed to happen because of the chain of command, was it not?
Mr Haes: My sincere hope, and
an element of optimism is there now, is that since we have got
to this level and the whole problem of duty of care within the
training organisation has been examined at such a high level,
it will always now be at the forefront of whatever budget processing
is done each year, so that every time there must be a line in
the budget process which looks at duty of care.
Q298 Mr Hancock: As a quick supplementary,
can you tell us how far up the chain of command you think your
report went?
Mr Haes: At the initial phase?
Q299 Mr Hancock: No. Did it ultimately
end up on the desk of the Minister, do you think? That is pretty
fundamental.
Mr Haes: I am sorry, I have no
idea. I cannot answer that. All I know is that it went to Headquarter
of ATRA and the Surrey Policy had a copy. Those are the only two
locations I know that it went to. [4]
3 Note from witness: By 2001 we had become
increasingly concerned about how units could get the right help
from DSS to support trainees with problems. It was my conclusion
that each major unit in every operating division needed a professionally
qualified welfare officer permanently based there with the knowledge
and expertise to tap into the social welfare system and build
a working relationship with the DSS. This task could not be properly
achieved by a unit officer on a standard two year posting. I totally
agree that we need professionally qualified UWOs. Back
4
Note from witness: With more time for recollection, I
heard that my report was requested by HQ AG staff during 2002
for work that was going on concerning discipline matters. I also
now remember giving a copy of my report to the senior RN training
Chaplain, then at HMS Sultan in 2001. I had previously discussed
the DoC&S problems with him as a friend to find out if the
RN had similar problems and how they were dealing with them. He
wanted to inform his own hierarchy of the report conclusions and
I understand that it was readily accepted and acted upon by the
Royal Navy. Back
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