Examination of Witnesses (Questions 300
- 319)
WEDNESDAY 30 JUNE 2004
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
(RETIRED) RICHARD
HAES OBE
Q300 Mr Roy: Colonel, back on the
theme of the Chain of Command, you describe a culture that appeared
to lack confidence in the use of the Chain of Command as a mechanism
for tackling important or difficult issues and specifically you
suggest that operating divisional commanders failed to give HQ
ATRA the information necessary for it to act in response to resource
shortfalls. Why do you think they were unable to pass this information
on?
Mr Haes: I touched on it just
now. This philosophy, the "wilco" attitude of the officers,
is that they do not like telling their boss bad news because it
looks like they are not doing their job or they cannot do the
job. These are my words. I never reached that level of service,
so I might be out of order. I think there is this element of:
we will sort out our own problems and get the job done, however
painful it is and however frustrating it is.
Q301 Mr Roy: Can I stop you there
and I understand why you are saying that, but that could also
be seen to be, quite frankly: this is the way I will try to cover
up, because that is what you are saying. You are saying that you
are covering up. If you are not going to spread the news on to
somebody else, then you are covering up.
Mr Haes: I am almost certain that
they believed that they were making the system work in the way
that it needed to work. In one way there was no point in saying,
"I have got these problems" because all the boss can
say is, "Well, I have given you your resources. You have
got your budget. You sort it out".
Q302 Mr Roy: If you do not sort it
out, then you are covering up by not allowing it to go up the
Chain of Command?
Mr Haes: I think that is a fair
statement. I do not like the words "cover up" because
that smacks of something devious and underhand, and it certainly
was nothing to do with that. The fact that you had me coming in
to this staff position for the first time in ATRA, I was able
to find those things out, and I acted as DGATR's telescope by
reporting them direct back to him.
Q303 Mr Roy: You could use the word
"devious" because it is a cover up to me. You want to
be devious; you do not want to pass on the truth to someone else
and therefore you want to hide it. With all due respect, then
that to me is devious.
Mr Haes: I think "devious"
smacks of preconceived ideas of trying to pretend that you are
doing something better than you are, and I do not accept that
at all. These guys were working their hides off and doing a really
good job with the resources they had available. I am afraid the
system did not provide enough resources for duty of care.
Q304 Mr Roy: Can you just expand
on why there is this "wilco" attitude. Are you a failure
then if you cannot fulfil that type of attitude? Are you labelled
a failure and therefore that is the reason why you do not pass
it on up the chain?
Mr Haes: I think it is in the
psyche that you believe that you can do it. You have to have a
very strong sense of self-belief. I think the damage that was
done that would have to be undone and which may go the other way
to the way you were looking is that the troops under command,
the instructors and so forth, developed this widespread cynicism
because they knew things were not going particularly well; they
knew they did not have the resources and no one was representing
their case upwards. I think that I find the most difficult point
to accept that commanders would not fight the corner for their
men, and this is where I believe the business attitude in ATRA
began to take over. They were running it as a business at the
top end to do the budgets, resources, the budget accounting system.
Budgetiers almost took over and said, "You cannot do that.
You have not got the money". Our commanders were essentially
taking decisions that were more politically based in order to
suit the cutbacks in budget they had been ordered to make to satisfy
Treasury or political needs, and there were some political decisions
coming down like working time regulations that imposed huge extra
problems on the ATRA. That was one of my principal first jobs.
Q305 Mr Roy: Or huge protection for
the men at the bottom?
Mr Haes: Trying to implement it
actually created, given the protection that you are talking about,
even greater over-stretch because of total anomalies. It had not
been thought out before it was given to ATRA to implement. A key
example I will give you is that when we read this through, we
had to ask the question: "Does this apply to trainees, for
example, when you are under training and under duress to prove
that you can operate under pressure? Does it also apply to the
instructors?" The answer came back that the trainees were
exempt working time regulations on exercise under duress when
it was designed to put pressure on them, but the instructors were
not. Therefore, technically, the instructor had to knock off,
at the end of a normal working day on exercise when he clearly
could not do that because ethos and leadership mean the instructor
has got to provide the leadership; he has got to be there in front
of the men. Not only is he running the exercise but he is providing
the leadership and saying, "This is how it should be done"—copy
me type of idea. Therefore, we had to look at how we gave compensatory
rest to the instructors later on in the period—I think 49
days was the period of the working time regulation cycle—and
within that period we then had to say, "Look, this instructor
has worked X number of hours on an exercise. That puts him so
many hours over the working time regulations and we therefore
have to give him a week's compensatory rest period at the end
of the 17 weeks", or whatever the period was. That meant
we took him out of the training cycle. This was one of our great
dilemmas, how to apply this in a training organisation. I actually
wrote the orders which implemented this. Certain categories of
training and certain parts of the establishment, selected operating
divisions, we categorised as operational training establishments.
There was no way round it. If we were to produce operationally
effective trainees, they had to work at this pitch, and you could
not avoid it. But the sheer fact that working time regulation
was imposed on us did put on extra pressure because you had to
reduce the hours worked by the instructors, basically.[5]
Q306 Mr Crausby: You have already
touched to some extent on how military instructors were selected.
Could you tell us a bit more how the trainers were selected and
trained during time at ATRA?
Mr Haes: I can only go back to
my previous experience. I was not party to the precise selection
process, other than that I know, from my life's experience, that
you do not get posted in as an instructor to the ATRA unless you
are recommended by your commanding officer on your confidential
report. When instructors' jobs become vacant, and we know after
two years one guy will go back to the unit and another guy will
come in, we know that there will be a cyclical process that goes
out to the various administrative organisations, like Queen's
Division, as it was then, who would be tasked to provide X number
of infantry instructors, corporals, sergeants, officers and so
forth. They would then say, "Right, the following battalions
will produce so many corporal instructors and so many lieutenant
commanders for the training establishment." The pain was
spread thinly in those terms. I have to accept that not everyone
going was a volunteer. Word had got back to the Field Army that
a job in the ATRA was about as welcome as Blind Pugh giving you
a black patch because the view was that there was so much to be
done, and there were so many pitfalls that you could fall into
as an instructor, that the chances of you getting away without
making a mistake, and therefore having a black mark on your career,
were pretty low. Therefore, people were not keen to come. It was
no longer the accolade; it was not the feather in your cap it
should have been. I understand that we are now looking to reduce
the posting to the training organisation to 18 months because
the pressure is so great. That is a complete turnaround from what
it was, say, 10 to 15 years ago. The selection process was part
selection on reports and part to be nominated by the commanding
officer who had recommended the guy.
Q307 Mr Crausby: I went to Lichfield
as well recently and the impression I got was that they were a
pretty enthusiastic bunch of people who felt they were doing something
really valuable and they got some self-satisfaction out of taking
new people from civvies and turning people into soldiers. You
say they were not generally volunteers. Is that still the case?
Mr Haes: May I correct that then?
There were some people who did not see this as a popular job.
I think that probably was a great minority and that if you are
picked as an instructor to go to the ATRA, it should be and in
my book is an accolade; it is a credit to you that you are selected
to do it. You are not just an ordinary guy any more. It must be,
I believe, a step up on the promotion ladder.
Q308 Mr Crausby: Would you make it
known to your commanding officer that you were interested in that
field or would it purely come from your commanding officer?
Mr Haes: I think it comes from
lower than that. If you are talking about corporals and lieutenants,
it will have started at the company level and the company commander
who has worked with these guys, who probably in his own time has
been an instructor at the training establishment, will say, "That
guy is good. I think he is a suitable candidate for the depot".
Therefore, he will write on the man's report and this will then
feed into the system. I think it would be unusual for a corporal
or an NCO or an officer to say, "I volunteer to go as an
instructor". Basically, you have got to be picked. It is
not something you stand up without being recommended for
and say, "I will go".
Q309 Mr Crausby: What mechanism was
there to prevent those individuals that were temperamentally unsuited
to be instructors? Was it just in the hands of those that sent
them to you?
Mr Haes: I think to a large extent
in the initial case, yes. I do not believe that the commanding
officer would send a guy to the depot or to the training agency
as an instructor if that person was not the right temperament.
I am differentiating between temperament and attitude here.
Q310 Mr Crausby: I suppose it would
depend on the commanding officer. Some commanding officers would
be better at judging that than others?
Mr Haes: No, I would disagree
with you on that. I think the commanding officers have all been
lieutenants at the depot at some point. We have all done it. That
is the strength of our officer system. They have a vast amount
of experience, wide experience, and they know exactly what is
required at the depots, the training establishments.
Q311 Mr Crausby: Were you overall
satisfied with that method of selection?
Mr Haes: I cannot think of a better
one, to be honest. It has come on personal recommendation.
Q312 Chairman: Please tell me what
the difference is as you see it between temperament and attitude
in the military context?
Mr Haes: I think that temperament
is something that is innate in the man and that attitude is something
that we can change. For example, we can persuade people to change
their attitude about equal opportunities, racism and sexual harassment.
You can only mask a temperament.
Q313 Mr Hancock: You cannot have
it both ways, can you? If the commanding officers are such good
pickers of people and they send people there, you described one
training unit which had at one time 15 of the instructors suspended
because of breaking the rules. You cannot really have it both
ways, can yon? These guys were not all hand-picked, perfect soldiers,
were they, by any means?
Mr Haes: I am afraid I have worked
with soldiers sufficiently long to be aware that there are some
characteristics of the male nature and in which case, do not send
anybody to the training establishment because they are all men.[6]
Q314 Mr Hancock: But 15 of them at
one time in one establishment seems to be a bit high?
Mr Haes: It could have been that
this was symptomatic of a particular situation, perhaps a certain
group either of instructors or females at that place at that time
where perhaps, as I have mentioned, there were certain predatory
females who sought out their instructors and placed it in his
way.
Q315 Chairman: We will move on. We
have been around this. Someone will pursue that with the Ministry
of Defence for more information.[7]
Mr Haes: I hope I am not letting
that person in for a real problem.
Q316 Rachel Squire: Like others before
you, the MoD has acknowledged that lack of continuity and supervision
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 training has been a problem. Can you
say what your reaction is to the suggestion to merge Phase 1 and
Phase 2 across the board or create a "family friendly"
superbase?
Mr Haes: My view on joining Phase
1 and Phase 2 training is that you are just reinventing the wheel.
We only split Phase 1 and Phase 2 training when ATRA was set up
or the ATO was set up as a cost-effective measure. It was cheaper
to have only five initial training regiments, they were called
ATRs, Army training regiments at that point, as opposed to individual
depots for every regiment or every division. So we concentrated
our initial training because all soldiers entering the Army have
to go through that, so there is a complete phase that everybody
in the Army has to do. You put them all into geographically sited
places that people would feed into and then logically they would
go from there to their technical Phase 2 training. I was not happy
when I heard they were going to split it. To prove the point,
I think the Infantry have already reunited them and do one single
course right the way through at Catterick and it has proved its
worth. Having the gap in Phase 1 to Phase 2 is a significant problem
in wastage rates; people have just begun after 11 weeks to build
up friendships and suddenly they are split again. A lot of them,
at the end of Phase 1, are still wavering as to whether or not
they want to go on. Perhaps they have got used to their instructors
there or they have made friends and the fact that you are now
moving them to a totally new place with totally new instructors,
new conditions and whatever, may be enough to unsettle them. The
other factor that comes in is the discharge as of right, DAOR
window, which all recruits are entitled to. Am I talking about
a common phrase here? That DAOR window came just at the wrong
time for too many people in that by the time they had just got
into Phase 2, they may only have been there two or three weeks
when the DAOR window opened and they said, "No, this is my
chance. I am going". From that point of view, it caused quite
serious retainment problems keeping the recruits going. I am surprised
more did not leave. The other factor was, and mentioned these
difficulties, the welfare problems that the kids brought in with
them, that we had probably begun to analyse and sort them out
in Phase 1 and reports were written, but by the time the instructors
at Phase 1 had managed to write those reports and get them to
Phase 2, it was probably almost too late; the guy had been there
and said, "Look, I have a problem", and Phase 2 staff
said, "We do not know about it" and the trainee had
to begin explaining all over again. This cannot be good for morale.
It looks like no one cares. This is where the Chain of Command
system when in place would handle this man's problem from start
to finish. You would have continuity of leadership. That would
overcome a huge number of problems.
Q317 Rachel Squire: So you are very
much in favour of merging and finding that continuity in Phase
1?
Mr Haes: Yes, I am completely
in favour, if I am absolutely honest. I know it will present some
difficulties in the resourcing. If you go back to training all
the Logistics Corp people through Deepcut, for example, Phase
1 and Phase 2, you are going to have to provide more Infantry
instructors to do the infantry training part, but at Deepcut,
at Logistics, so there will be manpower implications for that.
Q318 Rachel Squire: Although someone
coming in has identified by the time he gets into Phase 1 which
area he is particularly interested in specialising, would merging
not put the pressure on somebody who decides when he is six weeks
through his initial training that maybe he does not want to be
front-line infantry but would rather go into something else? Will
it not create additional barriers to someone after six weeks in
initial training who decides he would actually rather go somewhere
else and it would mean being at Deepcut or being at another place
just was no longer relevant to them?
Mr Haes: I think the answer is
not to as great an extent as you may imagine. First of all, the
selection of cap badge is done at a very early stage. A person's
qualifications, their aptitude tests, will dictate which particular
branches of the Army are open to him for a start.
Q319 Rachel Squire: Some of us were
at Glencorse on Monday; that is the pre-initial phase?
Mr Haes: Right, but that is not
to stop somebody, even if he started at Deepcut, saying, "Look,
actually I think I would rather be a signalman", and then
arrangement being made either to say, "Complete your Phase
1 training here" and if you pass that, then we will pass
you to the Signals if that person has the aptitude to do it. I
believe that the system is flexible enough to cope with that and
I do not think there would be a huge cross-referencing. I think
the system at the moment where you get people changing their minds
in Phase 1 is that they form friendships in Phase 1 training with
someone who is going off to the Tank Corp and they put down Logis,
and they say, "I want to stay with that guy. Can I change
to there?" The chances are, as it is now, we will get more
people chopping and changing for that reason because they have
formed allegiances.
5 Note from witness: That the way Working Time
Regulations and other edicts were passed down to ATRA from MoD,
without any understanding of the impact on resources and the functioning
of the training organisation, reinforced the cynical attitude
at more junior levels that MoD and that senior military and civilian
officers were completely out of touch with frontline conditions
in ATRA, and showed no concern for its welfare. Communication
was one way. Lip-service was paid to the maxim that "our
people were our most valued asset". Back
6
Note by witness: The question implied that the capability
and flare to make a good instructor depended also on moral fortitude
and that the CO was responsible for identifying both qualities.
No selection system is infallible, not even the selection process
of MPs, as witnessed by revelations of some senior politicians
including prime ministers, foreign secretaries and leaders of
political parties. Bill Clinton said he did it because he could,
perhaps therefore, it is the very flair that makes good leaders
that also leads to a flair for other excitement-power corrupts.
My point was that ATRA dealt with its problem most effectively
establishing the instructor school. Back
7
Ev 376 Back
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