Examination of Witnesses (Questions 780
- 799)
WEDNESDAY 10 NOVEMBER 2004
BRIGADIER MUNGO
MELVIN OBE, GROUP
CAPTAIN STEPHEN
HOWARD AND
REAR ADMIRAL
SIMON GOODALL
Q780 Mr Jones: Can I just follow
up on that point. In terms of the ramifications of Deepcut and
everything else the media spotlight has been on all three Services
on how you perform duty of care. Clearly that has led to the frenzied
activity we have with these three reports. I agree with Peter
that some of the things we have seen on our visits are, frankly,
encouraging and things are actually in place. I have this nagging
doubt, though, that we will be sat here in ten years' time when
the media spotlight is off this area. How are you convinced that
the MoD and more importantly the people in charge of new recruits
et cetera will continue on this rather than just think,
"That was a thing we did ten years ago because we had a problem
with the media?" Brigadier Melvin: Group
Captain Howard may answer that question but the first thing I
said when I came into the Directorate was the word "verification";
how are we going to make sure this is followed through? You will
note at the back end of the report we have put measures in place
to make sure that what we have done will be rigorously verified.
This is a subject that we have struggled with all the way through
because lessons are very easily identified and very easily forgotten.
What we did not want to do is produce another report—and
I heard the Chairman say this—to be shelved on the bookshelves
and never to be actioned. What we did establish, and we have asked
this question as we have gone round, is that the culture has changed
sufficiently post-Deepcut, if you like, post the DOC reports,
to now be a way of life. From the most junior corporal coming
into that training organisation, through COs, right the way through
defence, it has been a sufficient wake-up call all around to reappraise
the way we do business and what we want from defence. Coming back
to the earlier question, does that affect front-line capability
and operational capability? Is the recruit we get today the same
as it was when we went through? The answer to that is obviously
no. I think things have changed for the better and it has been
a cultural change. What we now need to do though is to put in
the Adult Learning Inspectorate and all of the other checks and
balances that form that feedback view to make sure that those
lessons are not forgotten as personnel change over down at the
training units.
Q781 Mr Jones: One of the key things
that came out of the Surrey Police inquiry was that there was
no shortage of reports and studies done, but they went nowhere,
they did gather dust. All I am a bit concerned about is whether
this will go the same way as that in terms of over time people
will take their eye off the ball and think, "Oh well . .
. " Rear Admiral Goodall: Could I just
interject and say that I think there has been a step change and
that was the creation of the post that I currently occupy, the
post of Director General Training and Education, which sits at
the centre of MoD and is responsible for policy and strategy.
Hitherto the activities of the single Services were all relatively
silo-ed in this respect and so with this focal point at the centre
of the MoD, we now have an individual who can direct the implementation
of recommendations. I have created, in essence, within my organisation
a smaller clone of the DOC in the Directorate of Individual Training
Capability, and I intend to use that aspect of my organisation
to keep the pressure on and the momentum on with revisits by DOC
and, in conjunction with the ALI, keeping our foot to the pedal.
I think that is a significant change in the last two years.
Q782 Mr Jones: But this is more about
cultural change because the other thing that struck me from the
various visits we have done is clearly there are different things
within the different Services. The RAF is clearly different from
the Army. I have got to say 10 out of 10 to the MoD in terms of
the Commanding Officers and people we have met, they are all singing
the right hymn tune, they are all saying they will not let go,
but I also get this sneaking feeling that, frankly, they are doing
it but are they really signed up to this? We got the attitude
on one occasion where, how can I put it, referring to what Peter
has just been referring to, the fact that when they went got through
their training they got tucked up and that was the way they did
it, why are we now being less — I just wondered if in some
areas where it is being done there is a feeling we have got to
go through the hoops rather than being fully committed in terms
of this being a new way of doing it? Group Captain Howard:
We have identified areas exactly as you have said in the report
where we have found areas of best practice, where that training
covenant for instance has become a complete ethos and way of life
for that particular training unit. In other units we found it
was a piece of paper which a recruit signed on day one along with
all the other reports, and obviously there is a lot of work there,
which is where the Admiral's Best Practice Working Group and this
new Directorate comes in, to then export that best practice across
the others units.
Q783 Mr Jones: Are there not big
differences between the RAF and the Army, for example? Certainly
the RAF when we went to Halton — is David Murray the Commanding
Officer there? Group Captain Howard: Yes, David
Murray.
Q784 Mr Jones: — who clearly
had given a lot of thought to, for example, occupying recruits
who were waiting to go on to Phase 2, et cetera. It was
quite an imaginative way he had done it, to be honest. I did not
get the impression that there was the same emphasis in the Army. Group
Captain Howard: David hosted a best practice working group
at the Admiral's behest the other week to do exactly that, to
export best practice to other units but of course there is the
issue of scale. If you take the numbers involved with Army unit
training, particularly with 16 different trades from the Logistics
Corps of Deepcut alone, and trying to work that matrix to keep
those people employed all the time, it is a very difficult nut
to crack. Brigadier Melvin: If I may, Mr Jones,
I think there is another aspect to the work. I think you did refer
to the anecdotal evidence where people say, "I was not treated
like this when I was a recruit," and all the rest of it,
and we have all in our careers found that old practice is by no
means necessarily the best practice; in many cases that is not
the case. I think by the rigorous imposition of good practice
(becoming best practice) across the three Services, with the young
officers, senior NCOs, junior NCOs and indeed the recruits themselves
being exposed to what I could characterise as a hard but fair
rigorous training regime, with the emphasise on the duty of care
we have highlighted, then that will over time institutionalise
itself provided the three mechanisms we have talked about are
in place: the external validation from the Adult Learning Inspectorate;
the internal training inspection role from the Admiral's Directorate
of Individual Training Capability; and, indeed, as we have recommended
in our report, every new DOC comes along and does another check
to make sure that that best practice is not just complacently
left on the side, it is progressively developed. Group
Captain Howard: I am sure you will identify from your
visits as well that one size does not fit all. What is good for
a graduate artificer apprentice down at HMS Sultan would not necessarily
suit an infantry recruit up at Catterick, so it is very difficult
to say that we have got best practice here and—
Q785 Mr Jones: In the Army I think
you have got a long way to go, certainly at a place like Catterick,
to get that ethos taken seriously. Clearly, in the RAF I accept
they are different types of individuals as well as smaller numbers,
but I get the impression in the Army that you have got a way to
go to get this installed in the attitudes of some of the Commanding
Officers, I have got to say, and ask whether they see this as
just the latest battle we have got to go through and then we will
return to what we used to do once the spotlight is off us. Rear
Admiral Goodall: One of the strategic initiatives we are
pushing forward, which is outside DOC but which is part of my
strategic change agenda, is the creation of defence training establishments
which will essentially focus on Phase 2 training. This does not
address Phase 1 training but those defence establishments would
bring the three Services together in a training environment where
they are bound to rub off on each other and gain best practice
from each other by bringing them together. Really we are codifying
our defence approach and bringing people up to the best standard
we have across defence, whereas it maybe tucked away today in
a Royal Air Force silo, an Army silo or a Royal Navy silo. Chairman:
Thank you. I think one of the last decisions our Committee will
make prior to the Election is to ask our successor Committee to
keep this issue on the agenda. Each Committee determines its own
agenda but I think it would be very important to pass that on.
Thank you, Kevan, for raising that. Mike Hancock please?
Q786 Mr Hancock: If I may, can I
ask you, Brigadier, and you, Admiral, do you report both to the
same Officer up the chain? Rear Admiral Goodall:
No.
Q787 Mr Hancock: You do not? Rear
Admiral Goodall: No.
Q788 Mr Hancock: Part of the problem
we have experienced is this disparate way in which a report is
produced, a recommendation is delivered and then little or no
action is taken, and we have yet to find out where that stops.
I am interested to hear that you are both doing this job, which
is dedicated to improving the mess that we had in certain aspects,
and you are both reporting through a different Chain of Command.
I want to know how your report and your recommendations, Admiral,
in the end come together somewhere and who it is who will make
the final decision about what happens to the various recommendations
that you both produce individually? Rear Admiral Goodall:
Right, I think the key point is that I report directly to DCDS
(Personnel), General Palmer, who is responsible for all personnel
issues across the Ministry. He in turn reports to the Vice Chief
of the Defence Staff. In terms of implementing the recommendations,
I drive forward the creation of policy and strategy where the
recommendations demand them or, indeed, bring the three Services
together to implement the best practice that has been identified.
That of itself is conducted under my authority as the lead for
training and education across defence. If I had an issue with
that and I found that the Services were proving, let's say, slightly
recalcitrant, then it would be elevated to the next level up in
which DCDS (Personnel) would address the issue with the principal
Personnel Officers—the Second Sea Lord, AMP and Adjutant
General. So to that end it is a relatively concise and closed
loop because the key players are literally one step above my position
here. In terms of where DOC's report goes to perhaps I will let
Mungo explain that but, essentially, if the Services need resources
to support the implementation of the recommendations then they
bid for those resources through the normal financial bidding processes
and those are taken by the DMB. Brigadier Melvin:
I think you raise a very important issue and I would like to answer
on two aspects. First of all, I think it is very important that
my Directorate's work is not subordinate to anybody else's, so
we were not in the planning or in the execution of this audit
in any way influenced, with all due respect, by the Admiral's
organisation. I think it would have been profoundly wrong to do
so. There is cross-referencing to make sure that the highlighted
work is put in place and that is absolutely the crux of the issue
so you will see that one of the things that we did in this report
was to highlight, where appropriate, again with respect to the
Admiral, where actions were recorded as being complete or underway.
Where we found that to be not exactly the case we thought it was
our duty to highlight that and we had to do that independently
from Admiral Goodall, but there is the check and balance between
that. We produce the recommendations independently of Admiral
Goodall and Admiral Goodall has not only to execute the recommendations
in order to address the issues, but we, on this occasion, and
in the future, will then be part of the verification system to
make sure those actions are completed.
Q789 Mr Hancock: So where do your
recommendations go directly from you? Brigadier Melvin:
The recommendations which you have seen in our report internally
will be looked at by the Chiefs of Staff and studied very carefully
and by all the personnel commands. In common with our other audits
and indeed our operational lessons, this focal point for the action
side lies with the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, and he will appoint,
normally through a three-star officer or directly through a two-star
officer a senior responsible officer who is charged with that
action. In this case that two-star officer is Admiral Goodall.
Q790 Mr Hancock: For the record then,
because it is important because this is the issue we took much
of our time over trying to find where things ended up, your recommendations
will go directly to Chiefs of Staff? Brigadier Melvin:
They have gone already to the Minister for the Armed Forces but,
in parallel, to the Chiefs of Staff.
Q791 Mr Hancock: Through the Military
Chain. It goes direct to Chiefs of Staff so all future DOC reports
will go there. This brings us to the issue that Admiral Goodall
raised because your recommendations are all very well but some
of your recommendations will have to be resourced, so if you set
milestones for implementation of these things they are geared
to what resources are available. One of the issues we discovered
was that was the issue that was never answered—the question
of how you resource change. Recommendations were made, for one
reason or another they were not implemented, and the excuse was
given several times "we simply did not have the resources
to implement change". I want to know if you make a recommendation
now, do you have to, one, set some milestones and targets and,
two, do you have to recommend resources are put in to pay for
it? What happens if you then discover that they are not? Group
Captain Howard: The best way of describing it is by presenting
a report and the evidence, with discussion and recommendations
that you see in this report to the Chiefs of Staff we allow the
Chiefs of Staff then to make an informed choice where resources
are concerned. So if they decide not to resource accommodation
at Catterick, as an example, and put money into aircraft in the
Royal Air Force that is done in the knowledge of the risk that
we have identified within our report. No longer are things done
in penny pockets of arbitrary decision. It is taken across the
three Services and the decision is an informed decision based
on our report.
Q792 Mr Hancock: This is probably
an unfair question to three military officers but because of the
importance of the duty of care to the families of those who currently
feel they have been let down and the potential that other families
in the future might go through same trauma, do you think that
your recommendations in your reports ought to be publicly available
through the Library of the House of Commons or in some way available— Group
Captain Howard: — they are.
Q793 Mr Hancock: They are? In future
I mean. Brigadier Melvin: There is no reason
to suppose why this sort of report, which is already in the Library,
should not continue to be so. In terms of confidence by the public
I think it is very important that it should be there. Group
Captain Howard: As far as I am aware, all three reports
have been placed in the Library in the House of Commons. This
one was placed there yesterday at 2.30.
Q794 Mr Hancock: That is good news.
Who takes full responsibility then for implementing your recommendations?
Will you be told or your successors be told? You submit your
recommendations and they go up through the Chain of Command and
then there is feedback to you. What is the process for you knowing
what has happened about the implementation of the recommendations
you have put forward so that you can judge whether or not the
desired action has actually occurred? Brigadier Melvin:
From my perspective there are two ways—informal and formal.
First of all, part of our job is to monitor the actions on such
a report. Then if I felt personally that this was not being conducted
I would have a personal responsibility to go to the Vice Chief,
or in this case I would go direct to the Minister, Mr Adam Ingram
who has told me personally to do so. He said, "If you have
got any concern on this come to me", so I have a direct line
to the Minister on this. Secondly, as I articulated in the report,
we have a formal verification method where we will go back, as
we did on this occasion, through the previous DOC reports, to
analyse very carefully where action has been taken or, more importantly,
where action has not been taken. Group Captain Howard:
We also get a very broad view of defence by virtue of the nature
of the work we do. For instance, during the last 12 months we
have looked at defence language training, float support, mounted
operations, where we get to visit a huge number of units and talk
to a lot of people. A great deal of our work is self-generated,
so we will identify weaknesses when we are looking at one area.
For instance, in this report we suggest how risk is passed into
the front-line and if that is just a perception or if there is
a real risk that training issues are pushing forward. I think
if anybody in Defence gets a good idea of where holes are and
which areas should be examined we are probably as good as anybody.
Q795 Mr Hancock: How do you feel
about that, Admiral? Rear Admiral Goodall: We
produced a process arising out of the first DOC report in which
I created an action grid which then addressed the recommendations
through a DOC working group. That DOC working group was chaired
by one of my officers at Captain/Group Captain level and involved
representatives from the single Services, and the action grid
charted our progress towards implementing the recommendations.
I produced quarterly reports to Vice Chief on that action grid
and those reports were copied to Minister and copied to senior
personnel across Defence. That process is a very effective process
to drive the change. What we have done as a result of achieving
many of the objectives of DOC1 is to move the emphasis slightly
now and change the DOC working group into what we have called
the Best Practice Working Group, and that Best Practice Working
Group will still retain a focus on DOC but also address other
training and education issues that lie outside DOC that we have
identified through other areas and that, too, will meet regularly.
I am required to give quarterly reports on the progress of that
group and on the progress of the implementation of issues arising
from DOC3 and the previous DOCs we have not buttoned down. DOC3
has highlighted areas which we thought we had got buttoned down
but need further work, and I am grateful to them for that. So
we have a process that is transparent and enduring and the Best
Practice Working Group will be a standard working group for the
foreseeable future. It will drive change across Defence, and I
think that is right.
Q796 Mr Hancock: I think that is
very helpful. You have partly answered my final question in your
earlier answer about the length of time anyone stays, but I would
be interested to know, as neither you nor your assistant were
in post at the initial stages, has the lack of continuity been
a problem or not and how many of your staff who are currently
with you were there when the first appraisal was made? Brigadier
Melvin: To my knowledge, none of the current staff was
present during DOC1 in December 2002.
Q797 Mr Hancock: Do you think that
is a good thing, bearing in mind the importance of this issue
and the impression given that nobody took enough notice of what
was being said and what was going on, to actually give people
confidence that this is being done properly now? Brigadier
Melvin: I think we would have to distinguish carefully
between the period 2002 to date where, as Mr Jones has highlighted,
the spotlight has been on and even though I was not involved personally
in DOC1 or DOC2 and only came in during the latter stages of DOC3,
I think it is fair to say everyone to my knowledge, and certainly
to my rank in the Army, and my colleagues in the other Services,
were well aware of it. This in some ways really reminded people
why we had an institution such as DOC. What we did not address
in this report—it was not part of our remit—was any
historical or forensic examination (in the manner that Surrey
Police did) to look into the reasons why reports highlighted in
the past had not been actioned.
Q798 Mr Hancock: They cannot get
to the bottom of it. Brigadier Melvin: I was
just going to say that. I cannot fathom that out myself but I
think the one general deduction is that this matter is so important
that the spotlight must remain on and so we cannot have a situation,
as we had in the past, for whatever reason, that good people were
writing reports and for some reason they did not get the attention
of the decision-makers right at the top. In this case it is not
because we put it to the top. Mr Hancock: Thank you,
Brigadier. Chairman: You are too polite to ask how
many of our staff who began this inquiry are still with us at
the present time! Mr Hancock: But we are here, Chairman! Chairman:
We are to provide continuity but I am afraid it is difficult to
keep people on indefinitely, even though there are profound advantages.
James Cran please.
Q799 Mr Cran: The opinions of recruits
are obviously very important and one of the more rewarding things
that the Committee has found as it has walked around the MoD training
establishments is actually to meet the recruits. I think to your
credit, Brigadier, in October 2002 your predecessor was tasked
with conducting an independent cross-cutting examination. I do
not know what a cross-cutting examination is so maybe you could
explain that. That then involved two and a half thousand recruits
answering questionnaires. There were interviews which were followed
up again on 8 April. I am just interested in the mechanics of
all of this because I was interested in a comment made by Mr Corfield
to the Committee on 16 June 2004 when he said this: "I know
myself from visits to establishments that they take on the smell
of paint when you visit them". That therefore raises a question
in my mind as to whether you got the right answers to the questions
you asked. Talk me through this process. Brigadier Melvin:
I will add a comment but of course I cannot comment on the initial
task nor that language. I think what was meant, just to answer
your question, was to make sure—this is the case in DOC1
in the autumn of 2002 and certainly has been the case in the subsequent
audits—that we covered the breadth of the Armed Services,
I suppose cross-cutting could be interpreted in that way as going
into depth into the units to make sure that we did not just speak
to the Commanding Officer but went down the Chain of Command to
the lower ranking officers, senior NCOs and junior NCOs right
down to the recruits. Group Captain Howard:
We were acutely aware of the concept of fresh paint and whatever
audit we conducted or appraisal we conducted we were acutely aware
that a visit by a DOC can be a career-defining moment, so we are
often steered into the way the CO wishes us to go and it is our
job to break out of that mould. What we did with recruits is we
went as Steve, John, Tim and Edward, and they did not know we
were in the military, we went in civilian clothes. We put them
together in a theatre at the beginning of the day before we met
any of the staff on the unit and we issued them a questionnaire.
We explained basic military language, ie what we meant by front-line
and so forth, and we gave them about 20 minutes to fill in the
questionnaire. We then left the recruits to conduct the rest of
our visit. Then we broke them down into small groups of ten or
12 people in the afternoon and spoke to them in small groups to
go into a little bit more depth and explore any issues we had
discovered during the day. If we were told that accommodation
was bad we asked them what block we should then go and visit or
if we had picked up the food was bad which meal should we come
and sit and eat with them, and they were very open and very honest,
surprisingly so actually. We were quite taken aback on occasions,
probably because we did not expect the response we got from military
people.
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