Examination of Witnesses (Questions 880
- 899)
WEDNESDAY 10 NOVEMBER 2004
BRIGADIER MUNGO
MELVIN OBE, GROUP
CAPTAIN STEPHEN
HOWARD AND
REAR ADMIRAL
SIMON GOODALL
Q880 Chairman: Why did you not distinguish
between bullied by one of the staff or bullied by somebody in
the next bed to you? Group Captain Howard: Because
it just was not an issue. We almost had to explain what we meant
by bullying to the recruits; it just was not an issue. It was
far more of an issue to us than it was to them.
Q881 Chairman: It is an important
issue actually. Group Captain Howard: Very important. Chairman:
If the corporal is doing it or somebody who does not like
the fact that you are from South Wales, Walsall or Glasgow.
Q882 Mr Roy: It is if it means you
are going to blow your head off or hang yourself. Group
Captain Howard: I agree entirely, but we had to explain
to the recruits we spoke to what we meant by bullying, really.
We took that as a positive sign, that we needed to fish for it.
Q883 Chairman: Perhaps in any future
study you might give some thought to distinguishing. A brief question:
when we went to Sultan yesterday the time they spent in moving
personnel awaiting training was fairly swift from one posting
to another. But I can think of another place we went to where
it could be as high as six months. What can you recommend or have
you recommended or could you recommend to try to bring a greater
degree of rationality to this process, because people hanging
around for a course to go on is a monstrous waste of time and
resources? It looks as though maybe the Army is a bit behind the
Air Force and the Royal Navy. Group Captain Howard:
I think we would agree, Chairman, that we found most of our issues
with disillusioned recruits or trainees, poor motivation, lack
of commitment to the Service in exactly those areas where people
were kept on hold waiting for training, more than anywhere else
actually. As far as what we are doing about it, best practice,
we would definitely say, is where that pipeline of the recruit
pitching up at the Careers Information Office to arriving on a
Front-Line unit is most actively managed, and courses and intakes
are tailored to meet that requirement. But I would counter that
with degrees of scale. It is actually quite easy to do in terms
of, say, a Royal Marine, or in certain terms with the Air Force
within certain trades than it is with maybe 3,800 odd recruits
going through a major Army depot. Brigadier Melvin:
If I could add, not to presume your next question, Chairman, but
to add a footnote. As Group Captain Howard said, we saw that where
the two phases of training were co-located that there was significant
improvement there, and where organisations took a very close interest
where Phase 1 and Phase 2 were separate, the best practice were
where those in the Phase 2 looked into Phase 1 and drew them through.
But there is still a problem, as we have highlighted in the report,
on holdovers and therefore the best way to reduce these instances
of soldiers awaiting training is to take a number of measures—an
alignment of the training organisations would help, but better
course scheduling would help as well, and I think that is probably
what you were alluding to.
Q884 Chairman: Can you set SATT targets
and then admonish any unit that does not meet those targets? Rear
Admiral Goodall: I think the problem is probably too complex
to deal with like that because the problem is matching the pipelines
of different trades; and in a perfect world, clearly you would
have a course start every Monday for 52 weeks of the year, so
that you were always rolling on, and that is clearly not possible.
So there is probably an irreducible minimum of SATT and the Army,
as you say, has the biggest problem. There is a weekly Recruit
Allocation Planning Committee at HQ ATRA to try to address this
issue and, indeed, I am aware that the Army has prepared a paper
on the management of SATT, which is being prepared for the Director
General this month. So the Army is addressing this issue. Whether
it is as simple as just saying that targets are needed but I look
to that work with great interest. Brigadier Melvin:
Could I interrupt and add one word of detail? Paragraph 45d in
the report highlights the current ATRA policy. There is indeed,
Chairman, a target of 14 days, but that is for those who have
completed their training. But in some areas there are some targets
already available. The question is to what extent are people meeting
those targets and we did not provide the detailed statistics for
that. Rear Admiral Goodall: But that target
would be at the end of training, and I was referring to the process
of joining up courses, which would be more difficult. It may not
be impossible, and I would value looking at the work that the
Army is doing to prepare this paper. The second thing I would
draw attention to is that, as we move to the strategic intent
to bring a lot of this training on to defence establishments,
we are also looking now at improving the pipeline management through
both technology and the co-location of our trainees in future
years, which, again, will have impact on this problem. But you
are absolutely right, young people hanging around in the training
machinery with little to do is a recipe for disaster.
Q885 Mr Viggers: A noticeable feature
of the summer 2003 appraisal is that where you have a word of
favour for an establishment it gets mentioned, but where you criticise
the establishment does not get mentioned. Is there a policy for
not naming and shaming where there is a fault been found, or is
this something you have thought about? Group Captain
Howard: It is certainly not a policy, no. If our predecessors
did that then I cannot say why they did, but we do not currently
run a policy. We try to identify best practice rather than point
a finger at where things have gone wrong, to make sure that best
practice is adopted. But we certainly do not have a policy of
not naming them.
Q886 Mr Viggers: I am just anxious
that best practice should be picked up by those where best practice
does not currently exist. Brigadier Melvin:
I think that is a very fair question. I think editorially throughout
all the reports there has been a policy of identifying specifically
the best practice and hence, as you say correctly, those units
have been highlighted.
Q887 Mr Jones: Gentlemen, can I turn
to the support systems for recruits. The first reappraisal in
summer 2003, there was comment that WRVS and other support systems
were seen in some areas as "busy-bodies" or berated
by trainees for those who actually went to them. We met numerous
of these ladies and gentlemen up and down the country on our visits,
and I have to say what very dedicated individuals they are as
well. What evidence did you find in the recent reappraisal as
to the role of welfare officers? Are they widely accepted now
and what is the perception now amongst instructors and others
of their role? Group Captain Howard: It comes
back to this cultural shift that we talked about earlier on, in
that they are far more integrated into the overall welfare system
of a unit, where, again, most units we visited usually held a
weekly meeting of the support group, for want of a better phrase,
where maybe the Empowered Officer, the WRVS, the padres, doctors,
would get together to talk about any trends, basically to see
if they picked up any group trends or any wider issues. But we
were also very confident that if any individual issues were raised
they had a mechanism that could be dealt with there and then.
We still came across one or two junior NCOs that saw WRVS, the
Salvation Army as interference, but it was very, very isolated,
and I think it is now part of a culture where they are accepted.
Indeed, at some of the units the junior NCOs were also leaning
on that support mechanism to cope with the pressures within their
own life.
Q888 Mr Jones: Did you make any recommendations
for improvements in terms of the current system? Group
Captain Howard: Not in this report, no.
Q889 Mr Jones: Clearly, if that is
what you say it is very different from what it was in summer 2003.
Do you think that has been a cultural change that will stay, or
is it one of these things where, again, it has just been done
because the spotlight of publicity is on duty of care? Group
Captain Howard: It is personality dependent. If you had
a CO that came in that was against that sort of thing then I do
not think it could change. But at the moment, on the units we
visited, it was a system that is working very well.
Q890 Mr Jones: It is interesting
what you said there because there are some good examples where
COs work very closely with these individuals and they have a good
relationship, and certainly WRVS personnel and the Salvation Army
have indicated that they feel that they can actually approach
the COs, which I think is important in terms of the support relationship.
But how is that cultural shift, which you say has happened, being
instilled in Commanding Officers that this is not just a passing
fad, this is something that is going to be there for some time? Group
Captain Howard: All staff do not change over at once,
and I think as a CO you would have to be a fairly strong-willed
character now to stop that machine moving, in that the spotlight—a
term we have used so many times—is on and COs at training
units are acutely aware of the fragile line they are treading
at the moment and how in the spotlight that particular role is.
I think that any CO that did not use that support mechanism to
support his role as a CO in his own pastoral care would be picked
up by that support mechanism as a failing in himself.
Q891 Mr Jones: It is important though,
is it not, that COs, no matter what Service they are in, that
it is instilled in them that this is an important part of the
duty of care process? Group Captain Howard:
Absolutely.
Q892 Mr Jones: Have any steps been
taken to ensure that does happen? I accept there will be certain
dogs you will not be able to teach new tricks to. Group
Captain Howard: It is taught as part of staff training
and it is taught throughout staff training, your role as a Commanding
Officer and the pastoral care and so forth. I think most COs take
it as a very serious responsibility. Indeed, as a CO people can
be one of the biggest issues you deal with but also one of the
most rewarding, and I think any CO that does not recognise that
probably should not be in the job. Rear Admiral Goodall:
It is an interesting point that there may be room—and I
do not know the answer to this—for emphasising this as part
of the CO's notes or some form of induction. But of course you
grow up in the Service with these people helping you. If I take
an example from my own background, when I commanded the barracks
in Plymouth I had a very strong support network through the Navy
Personnel and Family Services. But I experienced that as a young
Divisional Officer, and therefore it was something that was natural
for me as a CO to turn to, because I had trust in that system,
having experienced it as a junior officer.
Q893 Mr Jones: I accept that, but
it boils down to the personality of the CO, does it not? To what
extent should it be, for example, an important part of staff training
in terms of not just about being aware about the individual, but
also the importance, in terms of man management, which you referred
to, Group Captain, of these people being an asset to you rather
than an hindrance, and which have clearly been seen as a hindrance
in the past by certain people. Group Captain Howard:
There are CO designates courses, so a course you go on once you
are designated to be the CO of a ship—they actually go out
and visit the training units as well. So they are seeing what
support mechanisms are being put in place in training units and
I think that will spread best practice into other units as well,
because one of the areas that was raised as minor concern from
some of the junior NCOs we met—and this may be something
you picked up from your own visits—is that now we are putting
all of this duty of care into the recruit when he goes through
training, will he expect those mechanisms when he gets to a Front-Line
unit, when perhaps there is just one padre covering the whole
of the garrison? By getting COs before they take over their command
to go and see what is in place in other units, I think that is
spreading out through the rest of the Forces. Brigadier
Melvin: To give you an Army perspective here, I was just
referring to the ATRA Code of Practice for Instructors which I
have here, which makes the point about units using the welfare
service, and I think it is explicit in Army land management terms
that the welfare organisations are to be used. The very question,
Mr Jones, you point out is what is that doctrine, for want of
a word, being met on the ground and what resources, welfare services,
WRVS, padres and others, social workers, Salvation Army, are available?
That would be an area which would need to be validated—the
difference between theory and practice. Rear Admiral
Goodall: I think the point is well made that this is an
area where you can have a lot of benefit with relatively little
effort to really emphasise the point.
Q894 Mr Jones: One last question
in relation to this area—and if you do not have the information
now I am sure you can provide us with it—do you have any
figures, from recent reappraisal, concerning the frequency in
which the help lines are being used, which we have seen when we
have been going around? Group Captain Howard:
I am sure we could get that information. It was a question we
did as a snapshot, and it was pretty low but it was being used.
Q895 Mr Jones: Could you provide
that? Rear Admiral Goodall: Yes. Chairman:
Just a couple of more questions—we finish at 5.30. Mike
Gapes, please.
Q896 Mike Gapes: Group Captain, you
have mentioned Empowered Officers. Your most recent report, which
has just come out or at least will be out, refers to them being
in evidence at all establishments. Can you clarify, does that
mean all units or all establishments? Group Captain
Howard: All of the training units we visited. So each
of the stations, barracks or units we visited, right across the
board. They varied from what an Empowered Officer meant within
units. Some units had a specific retired officer, post-established,
where that was his prime role. Other units, it was somebody else
on the station out with the training Command Chain that was available
to be contacted by recruits, but each unit had installed somebody
under the concept of an Empowered Officer, ie outside of their
Command Chain.
Q897 Mike Gapes: The first appraisal
report found that NCOs displayed particularly strong loyalties
to each other and that recruits and trainees found it difficult
to bypass the Chain of Command in cases of alleged grievance
or dispute, and then it recommended that this system be established.
But the first reappraisal seemed to imply that there was a "discernible
reluctance" amongst recruits and trainees to approach an
officer with a problem, on the grounds that immediate change of
command would be sure to find out and that, in any way, direct
contact with officers was considered "abnormal". Group
Captain Howard: I think that varies between the Services.
Q898 Mike Gapes: It is in the report,
from 2003. Group Captain Howard: I mean now,
from our current series of visits. We found a great difference
between the Services and I think that is just a cultural issue
in that in the Royal Navy and in the Air Force airmen and sailors
work alongside officers and that is a relationship that is established
from day one. The Army is very different. An officer in the Army
is a different beast to an Air Force officer, and I think that
cultural issue is there right from day one. Chairman: Beast?
Would you rephrase that and reconsider that word!
Q899 Mike Gapes: What you are saying
then is that in the Army it would be regarded as abnormal to go
to an officer, whereas in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force
that would not be regarded as abnormal? Group Captain
Howard: I think so, yes. But what we also found this time
was that recruits were very free and willing to go and talk to
the Empowered Officer, to a padre.
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