CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
1. The Army is the largest Service,
it has the largest training organisation, and it is also the Service
in which duty of care concerns have most regularly been raised.
A large proportion of this report therefore deals with the Army.
Where we have made recommendations we would expect MoD to consider
their tri-Service applicability as appropriate. (Paragraph 8)
Definition of Duty of Care
2. We accept that MoD's distinction
between moral obligations and legal requirements may aid its internal
process of identifying responsibilities in law. However, we do
not consider the distinction helpful to the development of duty
of care policy. By maintaining a dividing line between its legal
and moral obligations, MoD is open to the criticism that it considers
obligations that are not legally enforceable to be less important.
A precise and unambiguous statement setting out the moral obligations
of the Armed Forces to their personnel would provide clarity for
those charged with providing duty of care, and for those entering
the Services. We therefore recommend that MoD produce a clear
and concise statement of its duty of care and welfare obligations
for recruits and trainees in the three Services. We would expect
such a statement to go beyond reiterating the ethos and standards
of the Services. (Paragraph 30)
Recruitment
3. In the Armed Forces, pressure remains
on recruiting officers to meet recruiting target numbers. MoD
must make it clear to the Services' recruiting organisations that
pressure to meet recruiting targets should not lead recruiting
staff to dilute standards or admit applicants who do not meet
the mandatory minimum entry criteria. (Paragraph 37)
4. We
expect MoD to build on work to identify aspects of the recruitment
processes that would benefit from greater tri-Service harmonisation,
and better sharing of best practice between the Services. (Paragraph
40)
Socio-economic background
5. Some young men and women may join
the Services as a last resort, that does not necessarily mean
that they have made a wrong choice. Military life will not immediately
appeal to all young people, who may perceive it as too disciplined
or prescriptive. There is no reason why those who join the Services,
as "a last resort" should not find it a satisfying
and rewarding career. (Paragraph 42)
6. MoD
has acknowledged the need to collect more relevant data about
is recruits. We welcome MoD's intention to collect more information
about the socio-economic background of recruits to all three Services.
We recommend that, in parallel with collecting data on socio-economic
background, MoD should research whether socio-economic background
influences Service personnel's subsequent careers. We acknowledge
that, for many youngsters, particularly those from deprived or
disadvantaged backgrounds, the Armed Forces provide an opportunity
that may have been denied them in civilian life. (Paragraph 44)
Character of recruit population
7. The nature of recruits inevitably
reflects changes in society as a whole. Training regimes must
be able to adapt to changes in the characteristics of the young
people from whom they recruit. (Paragraph 48)
8. The
recruits and trainees we met during our visits to initial training
establishments clearly possessed initiative and ambition, qualities
that have always been rewarded in the Armed Forces. Young people
coming into the Armed Forces today may possess highly relevant
and desirable abilities that are perhaps less readily identified
than those previously looked for in recruits, but which we believe
nonetheless can be harnessed and developed to the benefit of the
Services as well as to the individuals themselves. (Paragraph
49)
Information for applicants and parents
9. We recommend that MoD review the
material provided to those making enquiries at Armed Forces Recruiting
Officers to ensure that it sets out clearly recruits' rights and
responsibilities and the nature of the commitment they are making
in language that potential recruits will understand. (Paragraph
53)
10. We
recommend that the recruitment process includes a requirement
on recruits to acquaint themselves with the documentation setting
out their rights and responsibilities. Recruiting officers should
ensure that potential recruits are assisted in fulfilling that
requirement. (Paragraph 54)
11. We
recommend that MoD ensure that Armed Forces Careers Offices provide
tailored literature for parents explaining the commitment made
by the recruit to the Armed Forces and the commitment the Armed
Forces make to the recruit. (Paragraph 57)
12. We
acknowledge MoD's preference for an appropriate adult, whether
parent, guardian or other mature adult, to be involved in the
recruiting process. However, we recommend that MoD produce clear
guidance and direction on this issue, such that recruiting officers
are obliged to discuss with potential recruits the desirability
of involving their parents or an appropriate adult in the recruiting
process. (Paragraph 58)
Entry criteria and risk
13. Much of the material we received
relates to the risk factors associated with young people, particularly
those from disadvantaged backgrounds. Undoubtedly some individuals
who apply to join the Armed Forces are vulnerable. It is not necessarily
the case, however, that that vulnerability will impede an individual's
Service career. (Paragraph 61)
Age
14. Concerns have been raised about
the appropriateness of recruiting under 18 year olds into the
Armed Forces. We recommend that MoD examine the potential impact
of raising the recruitment age for all three Services to 18. (Paragraph
62)
15. We
recommend that the Armed Forces ensure that those under 18 years
of age are only placed in training environments and accommodation
suitable for their age. (Paragraph 63)
16. The
cadet organisations provide a valuable resource for the Armed
Forces. Members of the cadet organisations are exposed to a taste
of Service life, including discipline, physical hardship and self-reliance.
Experience as a cadet can motivate people to join the Armed Forces
once they are old enough. We recommend that cadet organisations
provide advice to older cadets, drafted in collaboration with
the Armed Forces, to ensure that cadets are fully aware of the
challenges of a Service career. (Paragraph 67)
17. The
cadet organisations have a more comprehensive approach to their
responsibilities to duty of care than the Armed Forces because
they are subject to child protection legislation. We recommend
that MoD consider whether some aspects of the cadet organisations'
duty of care arrangements might be appropriate in caring for the
youngest recruits to the Armed Services. (Paragraph 68)
18. We
are concerned that, by relying on a narrowly legal argument, MoD
is not accepting the appropriate responsibility for under 18 year
olds in its care. We recommend that MoD formulate policy for care
of under 18 year olds as if it acted in loco parentis. (Paragraph
69)
19. We
are concerned that there seems to be an inconsistency in the MoD's
approach to Criminal Records Bureau checks for personnel who supervise
recruits and trainees under 18 years of age. Best practice must
be for MoD to use all available avenues to protect recruits and
trainees from unsuitable supervisors and instructors. We recommend
that all instructors who will supervise under 18 year olds are
subject to Criminal Records Bureau and military records checks
before they take up a post in which they will supervise recruits.
(Paragraph 71)
20. When
the Armed Forces recruits people under the age of 18, they take
on additional responsibilities. DOC found that insufficient effort
had been put into ensuring that these are met. We note that 'urgent'
work is in hand to provide guidance on the policy relating to
under 18 year olds. We consider the lack of current guidance to
be a serious failing by MoD. (Paragraph 74)
Applicants from local authority care
21. MoD does not currently have statistics
on the number of recruits who have left local authority care.
There would be benefits for the Armed Forces in identifying, for
management and pastoral purposes, care leavers entering the Services.
Recruitment processes should provide applicants with an opportunity
to provide this information. (Paragraph 76)
22. We
recommend that MoD investigate whether those who have been in
the care of a local authority are at greater risk of duty of care
failures in the Armed Forces. We expect MoD to report the findings
of that research to us in its response to this report. (Paragraph
77)
23. The
Armed Forces need to acknowledge that care leavers should be regarded
as a special group with special needs and should take steps to
identify and meet those needs. We recommend that the Armed Forces
explore the possibility of enabling care leavers to continue
to have access to social workers. (Paragraph 78)
Education
24. Recruits can have low educational
achievement but still be bright. The Armed Forces have been highly
effective in taking recruits with little educational achievement
and turning many of them into highly trained, capable and successful
service personnel. (Paragraph 84)
25. We
recommend that Armed Forces' training organisations review their
literature to recruits to ensure that it is clear and understandable.
(Paragraph 86)
26. We
commend the Army for its commitment to remedial educational programmes;
although we do not consider lack of educational achievement when
entering the Services to be a bar to a successful military career.
(Paragraph 89)
27. We
recommend that MoD undertake a cost-benefit analysis of remedial
educational programmes to determine the benefit of extending their
use. We further recommend analysis of the impact of remedial educational
programmes on the future careers of Service personnel to determine
whether such programmes offer benefits beyond improving basic
skills. (Paragraph 90)
Screening
28. We acknowledge the limitations
of psychological screening for potential recruits. Nevertheless,
we recommend that the Armed Forces continue to pursue ways of
extending screening used in recruitment in order to improve initial
filtering of applicants. We further recommend that MoD consider
techniques to identify and monitor Service personnel through their
careers in order to determine whether vulnerabilities displayed
later in a career can be linked to factors at recruitment or during
training. We further recommend that the Armed Forces place a greater
emphasis on training supervisors to enable them to better identify
those displaying 'at risk' behaviour. (Paragraph 96)
Wastage and right to leave
29. The number of recruits entering
training is not the only measure of the success or failure of
the recruitment process. MoD should identify and promote best
practice recruitment procedures that have been shown to reduce
wastage rates. Wastage costs the Armed Forces money, and has welfare
implications for recruits who leave, and their instructors. (Paragraph
100)
30. We
recommend that all the Services adopt procedures that allow recruits
who express a wish to leave training an opportunity to leave their
training establishment and contemplate further before making a
firm decision on their future. We recommend that the Armed Forces
apply commonsense and understanding while dealing with recruits
who ask to leave or are due to be discharged, particularly in
respect of recruits who are retained in the Armed Forces solely
for purpose of serving out punishments that have been awarded
as a result of actions associated with the recruits wish to leave
the Service immediately. (Paragraph 105)
Resources
31. Since the first DOC report, MoD
has acted to address some duty of care issues. The desire to find
an immediate response, and to implement those changes that can
be made with the minimum additional resource is laudable, but
of greater importance is a demonstrable commitment by the Armed
Forces to longer-term improvements in initial training establishments.
We recommend that the Armed Forces devise a programme of improvements
that is affordable, reviewable and consistent with the high priority
the issue merits. (Paragraph 133)
32. Initial
training competes with front-line operations and other MoD activities
for the limited resources available. We do not intend to argue
the merits of all those activities, but we note that, compared
to some aspects of defence spending, the sums necessary to deliver
appreciable benefits in initial training are relatively small.
(Paragraph 134)
Duty of Care information
33. The Service training agencies
have produced duty of care policies for senior officers to implement
within training establishments. What is not clear to us is whether
those further down the chain of command—the junior officers,
senior and junior NCOs—are provided with sufficient support
and advice on duty of care issues. (Paragraph 135)
34. We
have found that there is insufficient awareness of duty of care
policy throughout the chain of command. Effective implementation
of policy is hampered by a lack of understanding of its purpose,
particularly on the part of those delivering the policy objectives
to trainees. (Paragraph 136)
35. We
looked at how duty of care information is given to recruits. We
commend MoD for providing clear and concise material on duty of
care issues, and improved contact with and information about front-line
units for trainees. We commend the use of contracts and covenants
to set out clearly what is expected of recruits. (Paragraph 142)
36. During
both phases of training, unless a recruit decides to exclude his
or her parents from their Service career, parents or guardians
should be provided with contact details of welfare officers and
Commanding Officers. Parents or guardians should receive information
on possible behavioural changes in their children that may indicate
they are having problems; in addition parents and guardians should
receive advice on what to do if they notice such changes. Parents
should be given advice on who to contact if their concerns are
serious or have not been dealt with to their satisfaction. If
a recruit's parents are divorced or no longer live together, both
parents should receive information and advice. (Paragraph 147)
Duty of Care structures
37. We were told about the Navy's
approach to assessing trainee's deemed at 'risk'. We were impressed
by the use of a traffic light system of designating risk and tracking
individuals. (Paragraph 158)
38. We
are concerned at the ad hoc nature of duty of care structures.
A formalised structure, locally adapted as necessary, would help
with monitoring the support provided by training establishments.
We recognise the benefits of a range of people and agencies being
involved in welfare provision, but note that the fragmented nature
of support structures may create a situation in which there is
no single "owner" of welfare issues. (Paragraph 163)
39. The
three Services share many components of their duty of care structures.
The common elements are intended to encourage recruits to voice
their concerns and ensure that people and agencies are available
to listen to those concerns and act on them. Those goals will
be thwarted if recruits do not feel able to seek assistance; if
people and agencies are not easily accessible or approachable;
or are unable to reassure recruits that they have the necessary
or appropriate authority to bring about a resolution. (Paragraph
164)
40. The
welfare forums provide an opportunity for frequent discussion
on welfare issues. Units should provide MoD with information on
the frequency of meetings, the attendance of key figures, such
as the Commanding Officer and any changes in the frequency or
arrangements for meetings. (Paragraph 165)
41. MoD
should ensure that best practice for duty of care structures is
shared within and between Services. (Paragraph 166)
42. The
Armed Forces regard the chain of command as the backbone that
enables them to work effectively. The importance of the chain
of command and the role of the Commanding Officer in setting the
standards that the rest of the unit's commanders will follow should
not be underestimated. Therefore, it is imperative that Commanding
Officers are made fully aware of their role and responsibilities
in delivering appropriate duty of care across initial training
establishments. (Paragraph 168)
Empowered Officers
43. We are not convinced on the limited
evidence currently available that Empowered Officers are an approach
that is working. We have heard throughout our inquiry that recruits
are reluctant to discuss their concerns with the chain of command.
Recruits who are not comfortable talking to an NCO may be even
less inclined to seek out an officer. (Paragraph 176)
44. The
approachability of officers varies both among the Services and
within Services. From our observations at units in the UK and
abroad, we have noticed that the degree of proximity does influence
the relationship between officers and other ranks. For example,
in the Royal Navy, submariners who serve in close proximity to
one another may feel more at ease with officers than those serving
on surface vessels. The Empowered Officer is less likely to be
an effective resource for recruits and trainees who are have not
had the opportunity to build relationships with officers. (Paragraph
177)
45. MoD
seems to have no contingency plan in the event of the Empowered
Officer model failing. We are not convinced that the Empowered
Officer model will work. We therefore recommend that MoD, consider
urgently alternative approaches to providing a conduit for recruit
and trainee complaints outside the chain of command. (Paragraph
178)
46. We
recommend that MoD urgently review the possibility of SSAFA or
similar qualified civilian staff providing an alternative to the
Empowered Officer. (Paragraph 182)
47. We
are persuaded by the arguments in favour of a non-military model,
in which a civilian would have a position equivalent to the Empowered
Officer, with direct access to the welfare services within a unit,
and authority to make binding recommendations. (Paragraph 183)
48. We
further recommend that MoD consider introducing professionally
trained counsellors in training establishments who would be available
to recruits and trainees. Such counsellors should be able to initiate
monitoring and support for individuals at risk without hindrance
from the chain of command. We expect that MoD will consider best
practice in this area from other disciplined organisations including
the police force. (Paragraph 184)
Chaplains
49. Traditionally, the chaplaincy
has provided more guidance and advice to recruits. We are concerned
that chaplains may not be regarded by all recruits to be as approachable
as the Armed Forces assume. As the nature of the recruit population
changes, it is possible that chaplains will become a less recognisable
source of advice for new recruits. This is an issue the Armed
Forces will need to address if they are to ensure that the role
of the chaplaincy is not diminished and that chaplains remain
a source of counsel for recruits. (Paragraph 187)
50. The
Armed Forces have relied on chaplains being perceived by recruits
as removed from the chain of command. We suspect that for some
recruits the Chaplains are as remote as any senior officer. There
is evidence that recruits find Royal Navy Chaplains more accessible
because they lack a fixed rank. We recommend that the other Services
consider adopting that approach. (Paragraph 188)
SSAFA
51. The Army's desire to have full
control of welfare support is understandable, and may be desirable.
However, we have heard many witnesses urge the introduction of
an independent, civilian, trained welfare service, such as SSAFA
provide. (Paragraph 189)
52. We
commend SSAFA's commitment to provide a source of advice and support
to Service personnel and their families. (Paragraph 191)
WRVS and other non-uniformed welfare providers
53. We commend the work of individuals
working within the non-uniformed welfare services. We recognise,
however, that there is considerable variation in the services
provided by these organisations at different establishments depending
not least on the Commanding Officer's support and interest. We
are concerned that Commanding Officers may be tempted to 'tick
the box' of welfare provision merely on the basis that an organisation
is present within an establishment and not give that provision
the importance it very much deserves. (Paragraph 196)
Medical services
54. We recommend that MoD provides
induction courses for civilian medical staff taking up posts at
initial training establishments to ensure that they are fully
acquainted with the implications of working in a military environment
and the sensitive boundaries between patient confidentiality and
justifiable service concerns. (Paragraph 201)
55. We
recommend that instructors and supervisory staff receive more
comprehensive advice about medical issues and instructions not
to order recruits to take part in physical exercise against medical
advice. (Paragraph 205)
Access to welfare staff
56. It is difficult for an individual
with psychological problems or stress to seek help. That difficulty
may be compounded in the Armed Forces, where there is a culture
that complaining is a sign of weakness. Ease of access and encouragement
to use welfare services are therefore crucial in order to ensure
a further and unnecessary obstacle is not placed in the way of
a vulnerable recruit seeking assistance. (Paragraph 206)
57. We
recommend that MoD reinforce the message that recruits and trainees
should have unhindered access to welfare services and that the
chain of command cannot impede such access or demand explanations
for or need to know why such access has been sought. MoD should
monitor the availability of welfare providers outside normal working
hours and ensure that welfare services are available at appropriate
times. (Paragraph 207)
Supervision
58. MoD has recently provided the
resources necessary to increase instructor numbers at training
establishments. We would welcome assurances that appropriate funding
will continue thereafter. (Paragraph 211)
59. The
phase 2 benchmark supervisory ratio of 1:38 has been set without
regard to whether supervisors are military or civilian. The wider
use of civilian instructors at phase 2 initial training establishments
means that the ratio of military supervisors to recruits may actually
be higher. In setting benchmark supervisory ratios, MoD should
also state the acceptable ratio of military to civilian personnel.
(Paragraph 212)
60. We
are not yet convinced that the supervisory ratios are appropriate
in all establishments and at all times of the day and night. (Paragraph
213)
Instructors: selection and training
61. On 7 September 2004 Leslie Skinner
was convicted of five counts of indecent assault relating to 4
male soldiers at Deepcut barracks between 1992 and 1997. In the
view of Surrey Police there was no connection between the Skinner
case and the deaths at Deepcut. (Paragraph 219)
62. We
recommend that MoD bolster vetting procedures for both civilian
and military instructors. The case of Leslie Skinner suggests
a disturbing level of indifference or incompetence; neither of
which is acceptable. (Paragraph 220)
63. We
visited the Armed Forces Chaplaincy Centre at Amport House and
the ITGIS where instructors are trained. We were impressed by
the quality of the Chaplain instructors. (Paragraph 223)
64. The
importance of training for instructors and supervisors has been
recognised by the Armed Forces' recent actions. Such action taken
to address the training needs of instructors and supervisors has
helped improve the lot of both trainers and trainees. (Paragraph
226)
65. Commanding
Officers explained to us the difficulties which they faced in
ensuring that instructors had received training before taking
up their post. However, it is imperative that trainers start their
new role fully equipped for the task. MoD should consider how
posting arrangements to initial training establishments can be
restructured to ensure that sufficient time and resources are
available to enable all instructors to receive pre-employment
training. (Paragraph 227)
66. We
recommend that MoD bring forward proposals to improve conditions
for instructors. We further recommend that the Armed Forces make
definite proposals to show that satisfactory completion of an
instructor tour will have positive effect on an individual's subsequent
career. (Paragraph 231)
Managing the training regime
67. We are concerned that in some
cases recruits pass out of phase 1 without the necessary preparation
to attempt phase 2 training. (Paragraph 234)
68. The
division of phase 1 and phase 2 is recent and seems not to have
been entirely successful. We recommend that the Armed Forces consider
the opportunities for greater integration of the two phases. (Paragraph
237)
69. We
heard evidence about the problems experienced by soldiers awaiting
trade training SATT. The Army seem to be resigned to SATT as a
fact of life. We are not persuaded by arguments that SATT is an
inherent and unavoidable characteristic of initial training and
consider the substantial reduction of SATT levels should be a
major priority for MoD. The management of SATT could be improved
by, for example, using time held on SATT for additional training,
such as improving recruits' basic skills. We recommend that MoD
set out guidance on the types of activity that should be encouraged,
and funded, for trainees on SATT. The guidance should describe
activities to be avoided or limited in application. (Paragraph
242)
70. The
Army explained that SATT derived in part from recruiting practices.
We recommend that the Army advise recruits of the implications
of starting phase 1 training at a time which will lead to SATT
at the start of their phase 2 training. We do not agree with the
Army that recruits should not postpone entry. We also recommend
that the Army consider restructuring phase 1 and phase 2 in order
to diminish SATT by, for example, sending recruits on basic skills
courses when they would otherwise be on SATT. We further recommend
that MoD apply, across the three Services, the best practice for
trainees on SATT we saw at RAF Halton. (Paragraph 243)
Accommodation and facilities
71. Poor accommodation and recreational
facilities create a depressing environment and add to feelings
of alienation and isolation among recruits and trainees. Poor
quality facilities may also increase the prevalence of vandalism
and other anti-social behaviour that can undermine morale. We
expect MoD to resolve the planning issues that have blighted infrastructure
improvements as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 247)
Monitoring and data collection
72. We have found patchy data collection
to be a problem throughout this inquiry. MoD should produce a
comprehensive list of issues for which data is lacking and prioritise
the need for data collection in relation to each item. (Paragraph
252)
Bullying and harassment
73. We recommend that MoD review its
working definition of bullying in order to bring it in line with
definitions used in other organisations. (Paragraph 265)
74. The
Armed Forces' policy on bullying relies on the victim reporting
incidents. We recommend MoD revise its policy to place the emphasis
on prevention. (Paragraph 266)
75. We
conclude that bullying exists in the Armed Forces and that it
is under-reported. We further conclude that it is not possible
to identify trends based on the currently available statistical
evidence. We therefore recommend that MoD identify robust methods
of capturing data on bullying trends that take account of the
extent of under-reporting. Nevertheless, the assertion that the
Armed Forces does not tolerate bullying does not sit well with
the levels of bullying MoD acknowledge. (Paragraph 274)
76. As
this Committee has previously noted, the Services are engaged
in changing working environments and practices to reduce harassment.
However, sexual and racial harassment remains a problem throughout
the Armed Forces. Recent press reports have highlighted incidents
of sexual harassment in the RAF, which is considered to perform
relatively well in relation to most duty of care issues. MoD must
ensure that all three Services are vigilant and guard against
complacency. (Paragraph 277)
77. We
recommend that MoD ensure all instructors are made aware that
punishments involving physical activity should not be imposed
against medical advice. (Paragraph 280)
78. As
we have stated earlier the inconclusive nature of the information
on bullying makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions. On
balance, we consider it likely that more bullying occurs among
recruits than by NCOs and junior officers on recruits. Nevertheless,
we find it difficult to discount the evidence that members of
the chain of command are responsible for some bullying. Reducing
bullying by the chain of command requires cultural change and
improved support. (Paragraph 284)
79. We
recommend that MoD undertake research into the relationship between
low educational attainment and duty of care problems, in particular
bullying and self-harm. (Paragraph 287)
Culture and ethos
80. The Armed Forces generally and
the Army in particular should consider whether their adherence
to a culture and ethos that discourages complaint is detrimental
to implementing the improvements necessary to the training regime.
Recommending that the Armed Forces change their culture may seem
a big step, but the culture can change relatively quickly and
painlessly, as the Minister himself said in relation to racial
and sexual intolerance. We believe that cultural change is both
possible and necessary. (Paragraph 296)
81. We
recommend that the Armed Forces, and the Army in particular, consider
how to promote a culture that discourages bullying and encourages
all Service personnel to take action to reduce harassment and
bullying. (Paragraph 297)
Armed Forces response to bullying
82. We urge MoD to consider how mechanisms
could be established to provide independent advice for all non-commissioned
personnel. (Paragraph 302)
83. We
are concerned that, given the general recognition that much bullying
goes unreported, these relatively low figures suggest that there
may be a significant number of incidents that should lead to disciplinary
action, but have not been reported or investigated. (Paragraph
303)
84. We
have concluded that in the past insufficient weight has been given
to the issue of bullying, which led to a tolerance of, or at least
insufficient action being taken against, bullying. In recent years,
attempts have been made to implement what is termed "zero
tolerance", but much bullying by both superiors and peers
will continue to go unreported unless the culture changes. Accessible
and independent channels for reporting are essential. The Armed
Forces, and in particular the Army, still do not seem to understand
the extent to which their hierarchical structures make it likely
that abuses will not be reported. (Paragraph 308)
85. The
Armed Forces' approach puts the emphasis on the victim of bullying
as a weak individual. While maintaining and improving the process
for victims, MoD must explore ways to bear down on the bullies.
(Paragraph 309)
Suicide and self-harm
86. We note that supervisors are trained
to identify risk factors in recruit behaviour. We recommend that
such training be extended and provided to all permanent staff
at initial training establishments. We further recommend that
recruits and trainees be trained to identify 'at risk' behaviour
in their peers. (Paragraph 322)
Access to firearms
87. The MoD should ensure that the
regulations on access to firearms are clear, understood and implemented
throughout initial training establishments. (Paragraph 326)
Guarding
88. Guard duty has a training value.
It would not be appropriate to bar trainees from undertaking a
role which they will probably have to conduct once they are deployed.
We therefore recommend that trainees continue to undertake guard
duty but do so only in pairs. The MoD should ensure that the guidance
on guard duty is fully implemented at all initial training establishments.
MoD must ensure that under 18 year olds do not undertake armed
guard duty. (Paragraph 327)
Investigations
89. MoD and Service Police have clear
guidelines they must follow in the even of a serious incident
at training establishments. It is not clear, however, how widely
those instructions are disseminated, and whether, for example,
all those in the guard room at a unit who would be expected to
be the first to be informed of an incident would be fully aware
of the imperative of protecting the scene and ensuring that evidence
is not tampered with. We recommend that MoD ensure instructions
are not only available to units, but are adhered to. (Paragraph
334)
90. We
note that the Service Police have emphasised the need to "think
murder". Nevertheless, previous failings on the part of both
civil and military police forces cannot pass without comment.
The lack of transparency in the investigative process and its
outcome has fuelled the disquiet surrounding incidents. In relation
to the Deepcut investigations, we recommend as full a disclosure
of information as possible. We would encourage the publication
of Devon and Cornwall's Police's review of the Surrey Police investigation.
(Paragraph 338)
91. We
note the MoD's intention to agree a protocol between the Home
Department Police Forces and the Service Police. MoD and the Home
Office should consider whether that protocol and the existing
protocol with Ministry of Defence Police should extend the offences
for which civilian police should have primacy. We consider that
the protocols may establish a presumption of civil police primacy
for allegations of grievous bodily harm or sexual assault. We
expect MoD to conclude the new protocol and amend the existing
protocol as a matter of urgency. We expect MoD's response to our
report to indicate when those changes are to be implemented. (Paragraph
339)
92. We
note the curious wording of MoD guidance (on 'suspected suicides'),
which refers to the "current climate of accountability and
public awareness". We strongly recommend that MoD redraft
this guidance to remove any suggestion that investigations into
cases of sudden death should be exacting only because of the current
spotlight on such cases. (Paragraph 340)
Boards of Inquiry
93. Next of kin and other interested
parties should be made aware of the time and location of a Board
of Inquiry as early as possible, irrespective of whether they
have expressed a wish to attend. We are disappointed that MoD
has taken the view that next of kin should be allowed to attend
Boards of Inquiry only in exceptional circumstances. We consider
that the presumption should be that next of kin should be allowed
to attend and only in exceptional circumstances should they not
be. Where the deceased is under 18 the parents, whether or not
named as next of kin, should be included. (Paragraph 343)
94. We
believe that there should be a presumption that the Report of
a Board of Inquiry should be provided to the next of kin as a
matter of course. The appropriate liaison officer should brief
the next of kin on the content of the Board of Inquiry, and explain
distressing or technical issues to them. (Paragraph 344)
Coroners' inquests
95. We are concerned by the evidence
we have heard on the conduct of Coroner's inquests and Procurator
Fiscal's investigations. We are aware that improvements have been
made and Coroners are becoming more professional. We expect inquests
into non-combat deaths at initial training establishments to be
conducted to the highest standards. (Paragraph 346)
96. Investigative
procedures need to be, and need to be seen to be, independent
and effective in order to provide confidence in the system. Despite
the primacy of civilian police in serious incidents, concerns
remain about the immediate response at training establishments
to ensure that all possible evidence is retained and preserved.
(Paragraph 350)
Treatment of bereaved families
97. We recommend the Armed Forces
redraft the next of kin forms to take account of potentially complex
parental relationships. Consideration should be given to a section
that explicitly states if certain people are not to be contacted
directly by the Services. The procedures for briefing soldiers
on the implications of what they write on the form should be reviewed
to ensure that they fully understand what will happen in the event
of certain individuals being included or excluded. (Paragraph
353)
98. We
have to conclude that the level of support given to the families
of those who die in non-combat circumstances falls well short
of what is provided to families of combat casualties. It seems
that the established procedures for informing next of kin, and
supporting bereaved relatives were ignored in the cases presented
to us. (Paragraph 360)
99. We
accept that it is not always possible to ensure those who are
appointed as Casualty Notification Officers have received appropriate
training. We recommend that MoD ensure that Casualty Notification
Officers receive appropriate briefing before informing the next
of kin, and that such briefing takes account of the failings that
have occurred in the past. We further recommend that all Casualty
Visiting Officers are trained in appropriate counselling techniques.
Casualty Visiting Officers should also be able to advise families
on all aspects of the investigative processes, including the Coroner's
inquest (or Procurator Fiscal's investigations) and Board of Inquiry.
Casualty Visiting Officers should, as a matter of course, provide
families with advice on the appropriate bodies to which they can
turn for financial and legal assistance for those processes. (Paragraph
361)
Disposal of effects
100. The way in which personal items
were returned to those families who gave evidence to us was unacceptable
and contributed considerable additional distress. The procedures
in place at the time were clearly not followed. We welcome the
improvements in the procedures that MoD has made. It is essential,
however, that MoD not only ensure that the revised procedures
are followed in all cases, but that they are also implemented
with sensitivity and an awareness of the distress that can be
caused. (Paragraph 365)
Review and implementation
101. For far too long in the past
the Armed Forces, and the Army in particular, failed to grasp
the nettle of duty of care. Arguments about the level of resources
available and the need to divert resources to the front-line should
not have been used to mask the Armed Forces' failure to tackle
these issues in that period. (Paragraph 375)
102. It
was not until the summer of 2002, some five months after the death
of Pte. Geoff Gray whilst on guard duty at Deepcut, that a significant
and coherent attempt was made by MoD and the Army to address duty
of care issues in its initial training establishments. (Paragraph
376)
103. We
recognise the commitment and integrity with which the Directorate
of Operational Capability has approached its three evaluations
of initial training. We also recognise that these appraisals have
successfully brought to the attention of MoD and the Armed Forces'
chain of command the need for a focus on welfare and supervision
issues in initial training. This has resulted in MoD providing
extra resources for more supervisory personnel and to improve
accommodation. We also welcome DOC's highlighting of areas of
good practice, particularly in the management of SATT. The internal
audit role of DOC is important and clearly has credibility in
MoD. We recommend that DOC appraisals of initial training should
be regular and ongoing. (Paragraph 383)
104. We
welcome the establishment of the post of Director General of Training
and Education as an important step in the development of a coordinated
joint approach to training and education. We recommend that his
remit be expanded to include responsibility for developing policies,
priorities and targets for welfare across the three Services'
training establishments. This would include the identification
and active promotion of good practice across the Services. (Paragraph
385)
105. We
welcome the fact that MoD has provided the necessary funds for
the implementation of many of the DOC report recommendations.
We recommend that MoD commits itself to providing the necessary
additional resources for the full implementation of the DOC report.
(Paragraph 389)
106. MoD
needs to ensure that the chain of command drives through a permanent
change in attitude in the Army from one that accepts unnecessary
risk in its training regime to one that considers effective welfare
and training as vital to producing operationally effective Servicemen
and women. (Paragraph 391)
107. We
recommend that regular conferences of Commanding Officers and
expert welfare professionals be established, at which changes
in policy would be discussed and good practice identified and
shared. We recommend that such seminars should also be a forum
for the consideration of future reports on the Army's training
system. The output of those meetings should then inform the work
of the Director General of Training and Education (Paragraph 393)
108. We
recommend that MoD encourage development of a community of welfare
practitioners. This could include instructors, the Army Welfare
Service, chaplains and medical officers. Such a community of practitioners
could be a vehicle for the exchange of information on areas such
as changes in legislation or policy, approaches to particular
welfare issues or the identification of good practice. The process
might involve conferences, web-based groups or in-house journals.
We believe that such measures would promote an integrated approach
to welfare concerns across the three Services. (Paragraph 394)
109. We
note the effective way the Armed Forces shares best practice on
flight safety between air and ground crew. We recommend that MoD
consider providing resources for the establishment of a similar
forum for welfare practitioners in all three Services. An in-house
magazine and website could provide instructors with the means
to share experiences of providing welfare in training establishments,
promulgate good practice and provide instructors with a means
of discussing welfare issues. We believe that such a magazine
could significantly contribute to the sharing of good practice
within the three Services. (Paragraph 396)
External assurance
110. The Adult Learning Inspectorate has,
since May 2004, been inspecting Armed Forces training establishments
We welcome MoD's decision to introduce external oversight of the
Services' training systems as a necessary measure to add assurance
to the audit process conducted by the Director of Operational
Capability. (Paragraph 398)
111. We
note the Minister's judgment that Adult Learning Inspectorate
has the requisite experience and analytical skills to overcome
an initial lack of familiarity with the Service training environment.
Any external organisation could be criticised for lacking familiarity
with the unique characteristics of initial training in the Armed
Forces. With independence necessarily comes a degree of professional
detachment, and we regard that as an important component of the
credibility of such audits. An assessment of ALI's work, however,
must await publication of its first report. (Paragraph
410)
112. Although we recognise that the chain
of command is central to the culture and ethos of the Services,
we do not believe that a Military Ombudsman or an external complaints
mechanism would constitute an obstacle for the chain of command.
We criticised earlier in this report the effectiveness of Empowered
Officers and other existing complaints procedures. We noted how
Service personnel have recourse outside the chain of command for
allegations of sexual and racial discrimination.
(Paragraph 420)
113. There
is an increasing expectation among the general population that
public bodies will be subject to some form of independent scrutiny
of their actions. We therefore recommend that an independent military
complaints commission be established. It would have the authority
and capability to make recommendations which would be binding
on the Armed Forces. It would also have a research capacity that
would enable it examine trends that it had identified. (Paragraph
423)
114. It
would be for the commission itself to decide whether to undertake
an investigation, but we would expect it to take into account
the seriousness of the allegation. The commission should have
the authority to consider past cases. In deciding whether to pursue
a past case, the commission might consider any investigations
or inquiries that had already been conducted as is the case for
the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland which has retrospective
powers. (Paragraph 424)
115. The
primary goal of the commission would be to resolve complaints
made to it. If the commission decided to pursue a complaint, it
would have the right of access to all documentation, and to Service
personnel, in order to enable it to establish whether the correct
procedures had been followed and whether there were matters that
required criminal investigation. We do not envisage that, for
matters unrelated to duty of care, the commission would replace
existing grievance mechanisms. (Paragraph 425)
116. The
commission should be required to make an annual report to Parliament.
(Paragraph 426)
117. We
recommend that the commission be established in such a way as
to assure both complainants and the public of its independence
from the Armed Forces. We believe that the commission would help
MoD identify lessons that need to be learned. We also believe
that a truly independent scrutiny mechanism would contribute to
bolstering public confidence in the Services. (Paragraph
427)
Public inquiries and the Blake Review
118. We are not persuaded at this
time of the case for a public inquiry into the non-combat deaths
of trainees at Deepcut barracks or other training establishments.
Unless the Blake review unearths significant new evidence, there
are no grounds to believe that a public inquiry could add substantially
to the investigations that have already taken place. We also note
that some of the physical and forensic evidence that would be
fundamental to any new investigation has been lost. (Paragraph
446)
119. We
are not persuaded that a public inquiry is the best means of investigating
the culture of training at Army training establishments. We believe
that the internal audit of initial training by DOC, augmented
by the external assurance provided by ALI, will be more effective
in addressing cultural issues in initial training. We recommend
that the effectiveness of DOC's internal audit and ALI's external
assurance are reviewed. (Paragraph 447)
120. We
recognise that there have been non-combat deaths in the Armed
Forces that merit further investigation. We are not convinced,
given the statutory framework under which it would have to be
established, that a public inquiry would be the most effective
way of investigating those deaths or importantly bringing closure
for the families. However, the independent military complaints
commission that we have recommended would have the retrospective
power to investigate any individual case referred to it. The final
decision whether or not to investigate would rest with the independent
commission. (Paragraph 448)
Conclusion
121. The Army has failed to recognise
that it is not sufficient simply to put structures in place. What
matters is that they work. As we concluded earlier, the Empowered
Officer concept is not working and does not provide sufficient
independence and advice as envisaged by Directorate of Operational
Capability. We have also highlighted difficulties with chaplains,
the WRVS, medical services and helplines. Concerns also remain
about the ability of supervisors to fulfil their duty of care
obligations. Put together, therefore, we remain convinced that
despite the considerable efforts made to date, there is still
more to be done. In addition, we are concerned that the advances
that have been made may stagnate or be reversed once the spotlight
moves away from welfare issues. We therefore seek assurances from
MoD that duty of care will remain a primary area of its work.
We therefore recommend that our successor Committee should carry
out a further inquiry, in say three years, to monitor progress
and the maintenance of high standards in this area. (Paragraph
458)
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