10 CONCLUSION
449. If the Armed Forces are to remain dedicated
to creating an effective fighting force a robust training regime
will have to be maintained. The question is whether robust training
in itself creates, promotes or fosters an environment in which
duty of care is stifled? We have concluded that duty of care and
operational capability are not mutually exclusive. The evidence
we have heard, particularly in talking to Service personnel themselves
persuades us there need be no conflict between providing proper
levels of duty of care, and a training regime which is sufficiently
robust to maintain operational effectiveness. The Royal Marines
are a good example of this. It is apparent that senior officers
in the training organisation share that view. What is not clear
is how far that approach has been actively promulgated down the
chain of command to those who are actually providing the training.
450. If robust training is not a bar on providing
a duty of care a further question is whether existing training
programmes take sufficient account of the nature and abilities
of the young people joining the Armed Forces. It is clear from
our discussions with all ranks during our visits to units for
this and other inquiries that many individuals within the Armed
Forces have concerns about the qualities of the young people coming
into the Services today. Changing that attitude is a challenge
to senior officers within all three Services.
451. In our predecessor's Report on the Strategic
Defence Review: Policy for People, published in February 2001,
it stated:
Many of the personnel whom we met during our
visits, both officers and other ranks, believed that discipline
standards had slackened since they joined the Services; and this
was a view heard even from people who had joined as recently as
five years ago. Some expressed the view that recruits were 'wrapped
in cotton wool' these days...[653]
In the same Report we quoted Professor Christopher
Dandeker's view of change of military ethos. He said:
... there are some changes in society to which
it is in the interests of the military to conform. There are some
changes in society which are not helpful to its ethos and some
which are positively unhelpful to the ethos. However, not every
social change should necessarily be seen as undermining the ethos
of the armed services ... insofar as the younger generation become
more questioning, become more self-reliant, become more effective
in using new technologies, that is something which the armed services
will embrace. Along with that may come a more questioning view
of hierarchy and 'why should we be doing this'; which may undermine
elements of traditional military ethos, but may actually be used
to transform the military ethos in a way which helps the armed
services in terms of the issues they face in the 21st century.[654]
We do not believe that today's recruit population
is less suited to the current demands of the Armed Forces than
their predecessors.
452. The personnel aspect of the operational capability
of the Armed Forces depends on having sufficient manpower, trained
for the task and motivated to perform in highly stressful combat
situations. The performance of the training organisation is crucial
to providing that capability. The training organisations have
by and large been efficient at taking civilians through the training
process and delivering them to the front-line in large numbers
and swiftly. The quality of the training should not be underestimated:
the success of the Armed Forces in the numerous operations on
which they have been deployed in recent years is testament to
it.
453. The Army has been the primary focus of this
inquiry. First, because it is the largest Service and the largest
training organisation. Second, the Army has had more, and higher
profile incidents of duty of care failure over the years than
the other Services. Third, the evidence from the outset of this
inquiry, based in part on the results of previous reviews and
investigations into aspects of duty of care, suggested that the
Army had further to go in improving its duty of care regime. The
Army is distinct from the other Services. Warfare training in
the Army prepares individuals for greater proximity to personal
combat than in the Royal Navy and RAF.
454. The Army has made great efforts to change
the image and the reality of its training regime. An article on
the changes in Soldier magazine, in November 2004, said: "Where
once (long ago) foul-mouthed bullies held despotic reign over
quivering recruits, now instructors are motivators, inspiring
their charges to achieve fitness and new skills rather than beasting
them into a military mould". That sentence encapsulates both
what is wrong and right with the current approach to training.
We believe the incidents that we have discussed earlier in relation
to bullying would suggest that sometimes "foul-mouthed bullies"
still hold "despotic reign over quivering recruits",
and yet the desire to produce well-motivated and trained instructors
is real, and is having results.
455. MoD state that since 1988 the Army has been
subject to significant and various reorganisations and review,
such as Options for Change. Much of that reorganisation pre-dates
the formation of ATRA. Included within this period is the Army's
fundamental review of its training organisation—the Review
of the Training Base—that resulted in the formation of the
Army Training Regiments and the re-design of phase I and phase
2 training. In its evidence to us MoD argue:
The frequent reviews need to be considered against
this background of change and within the context of the day—some
12000 recruits passed through Deepcut between 1995 and 2002, the
period over which the four deaths occurred. The death in 1995
was the first such incident for 30 years. Furthermore during this
period the Army were heavily committed and were undertaking major
operations in a number of theatres including Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra
Leone or providing support to the civil authorities at home, for
example in the foot and mouth crisis or fire fighting. At the
height of the Kosovo operation in 1999, for example, 44% of the
Army were committed to operations, an increase from 36% during
the previous year. With hindsight it is always possible to see
where more could have been done. But the Army was active in making
improvements to the training and care regimes during the 1995-2002
period. Surrey Police however rightly identified a greater focus
to the Army's efforts to learn and implement lessons from 2002
onwards.[655]
456. Colonel Eccles explained that:
There is the chain of command, the hard core,
in the middle and that is where any concerns should go up, but
if a person has a worry about the chain of command and is reluctant
to complain up the chain of command, which is the best way to
do it, there are routes to go round the sides. The empowered officer
is one route. If the person is not comfortable about that, there
are other agencies outside that, and you have come across the
WRVS and other agencies—the doctors, the chaplains—all
of which are alternative routes to make their concerns felt. I
do not believe there is one single solution but it is an amalgam
of different systems which give us our strength and ability to
deal with any issues which arise.[656]
457. The Armed Forces argue that they have put into
practice the lessons learnt by the various reviews of initial
training. We have been told that all but one of the 26 recommendations
of the Joint Learning Account are complete.[657]
We acknowledge that much has been done that will be of benefit
to recruits, trainees, instructors and the Forces as a whole.
Unfortunately it is clear to us that it is not enough for MoD
to 'tick the boxes' recommended by DOC, Surrey Police and others.
What matters is to have a regime that provides the duty of care
culture that engenders confidence, both within the recruit population
and the public as a whole.
458. The Army has failed to recognise that it
is not sufficient simply to put structures in place. What matters
is that they work. As we concluded earlier, the Empowered Officer
concept is not working and does not provide sufficient independence
and advice as envisaged by Directorate of Operational Capability.
We have also highlighted difficulties with chaplains, the WRVS,
medical services and helplines. Concerns also remain about the
ability of supervisors to fulfil their duty of care obligations.
Put together, therefore, we remain convinced that despite the
considerable efforts made to date, there is still more to be done.
In addition, we are concerned that the advances that have been
made may stagnate or be reversed once the spotlight moves away
from welfare issues. We therefore seek assurances from MoD that
duty of care will remain a primary area of its work. We therefore
recommend that our successor Committee should carry out a further
inquiry, in say three years, to monitor progress and the maintenance
of high standards in this area.
653 HC 29-I (2000-2001), para 112 Back
654
Ibid, para 114 Back
655
Ev 269 Back
656
Q 1341 Back
657
Ev 269. The outstanding issue relates to recruit screening, research
into which is 'in hand'. Back
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