Memorandum from the Institution of Occupational
Safety and Health (IOSH)
1. IOSH: founded in 1945, IOSH has
over 27,000 members, is Europe's largest occupational safety and
health (OSH) professional body and has strong OSH links worldwide.
A chartered body and registered charity, we are the guardian of
OSH standards of competence in the UK and provider of professional
development and awareness training courses. The Institution regulates
and steers the profession, maintaining standards and providing
impartial, authoritative, free guidance on OSH issues. Our members
work at a variety of strategic and operational levels across all
employment sectors. Our vision is: "A world of work which
is safe, healthy and sustainable" IOSH welcomes this opportunity
to provide written evidence to the Defence Committee on The
Duty of Care in the Armed Forces, looking into the duty of
care regimes in initial training establishments in all three services
of the Armed Forces. We respond to your specific Terms of Reference
in section 4 below.
2. Summary: the IOSH position is
that whilst we understand that in combat situations the military
cannot be required to meet all the usual civilian standards for
OSH, the same arguments for exemption do not apply to initial
training establishments. The processes of risk assessment and
a control regime based upon a combination of safe systems, training
and supervision are what we stand for as a professional body.
We support bringing the military into the normal ambit of OSH
except where there are strong arguments to the contrary, rather
than a regime that is based on the default assumption that they
should be exempt.
3. Legal position: from early times
the common law has placed duties on the employer with regard to
his employees. More recently, the "duty of care" has
also been incorporated into statute law in the Health and Safety
at Work etc. Act (HSWA) and there is no Crown exemption from this
Act and relevant statutory provisions. Although the Crown cannot
currently[44]
be prosecuted for breaches of the law, including failure to comply
with improvement and prohibition notices, there are administrative
arrangements by which Crown bodies can be censured in respect
of offences which would have led to a prosecution. Under HSWA,
employers must ensure so far as is reasonably practicable, the
health, safety and welfare at work of all their employees. Furthermore,
the employer has a specific duty under the Management of Safety
and Health at Work Regulations to conduct suitable and sufficient
risk assessments and under regulation 19 must ". . . ensure
that young persons employed by him are protected at work from
any risks to their health or safety which are a consequence of
their lack of experience, or absence of awareness of existing
or potential risks or the fact that young persons have not yet
fully matured."
4. Specific comments in respect of your
Terms of Reference:
A. To examine how the Armed Forces
discharge their duty of care responsibilities to recruits under
initial training: we believe there may be issues concerning
the Armed Forces culture in which the overall aim of training
is to "remove" the civilian, and "build up"
the soldier/sailor/airman, using a training cycle geared around
being tough, but not so tough as to "break" the recruits.
The common military syllabus strives to do. this by challenging
young men and women to the point where individual untrained civilians
can only succeed by developing militarily and as a team. There
are obviously careful and crucial judgements to be made here.
It is felt that incidents in "basic
training" are relatively uncommon, due to the highly disciplined
structure in which recruits are supervised practically 24 hours
per day, with a training NCO always on hand, even at night. This
structure is augmented by strict Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) for recruit training personnel. However, this high level
of supervision subsides as recruits "pass-out" and move
on to their "specialist trade training" and we believe
this to be a potential risk area. These recruits are now considered
to be "trained" and so have access to firearms for guard
duties, etc. and are trusted to be sufficiently disciplined to
behave responsibly. Possible problems can arise because as many
recruits move from their basic training to trade training they:
lose their first supportive team; have the pressure of further
specialist training, which for "Teeth Arms" (fighting
arms, divisions, regiments, units, corps, rather than the support
arms/services) can be as tough as basic training; and have the
opportunity to behave as an individual for the first time in 10
or 12 weeks, meaning that alcohol, drugs and poor lifestyle become
available.
Previously, army recruits did their basic
and trade training in smaller groups that were more closely connected
to their parent regiments/units. This has now changed, with much
larger training establishments dealing with basic training (from
all corps/regiments/arms) and recruits then moving on to their
specialist training centres, which could almost be described as
"training factories". It is believed that this change
could have resulted in a reduction in continuity, level and quality
of supervision, and care.
B. To consider what improvements
might be made to the duty of care regime for these recruits, consistent
with maintaining operational effectiveness: though some risks
associated with being a member of a fighting force cannot be avoided
or eliminated, in common with other employment, they must be managed
by ensuring staff are adequately trained, supervised and resourced
to do the work expected of them. Whilst "combat zones"
cannot be fully controlled, most training environments can and
should be and when doing this, the following factors will need
to be considered:
i. Young people—recruits
can be particularly vulnerable due to factors such as: peer pressure
and a desire to "win approval"; poorly developed communication
and social skills; inexperience; immaturity (physical and emotional);
and separation from their usual support network. We note that
the Armed Forces have recognised the problems of bullying and
initiation ceremonies and taken some action to prevent them (1989—RAF
policy letter; 1993—Army published instructions to counter
bullying and banned initiation ceremonies; 1994—Royal Navy
published policy on bullying). We also note that further to these
initiatives, in January 2000 the Ministry of Defence issued its
"Armed Forces Code of Social Conduct".
We would be interested to know whether there
has been an independent review and assessment of the effectiveness
of these policies.
ii. OSH culture—as
the military working environment is necessarily one which values
qualities such as stoicism; perseverance; courage; loyalty; obedience;
and discipline, those in senior positions must recognise that
OSH failures may not always be readily reported and therefore
may not be investigated. It is essential that trainers and senior
staff are watchful for this, so that they can identify potential
problems early. Also, team spirit and peer pressure should be
harnessed to help ensure safe behaviours are embedded as "the
group norm". Significant hazards and serious work-related
injuries and illnesses need to be investigated, so that root causation
is established, lessons learned and recommendations implemented
to prevent recurrences (Annex G of revised BS8800: 2004 Occupational
health and safety management systems—Guide, will cover investigation
and is due to be published in June 2004).
iii. Adequate controls—to
help fulfil the duty of care, we feel it is important to maintain
supervision and discipline levels in trade training and to restrict
the opportunities for things to go wrong. We note from the Occupational
Safety and Health Journal (October 2002) that of the approximately
1,000 deaths that have occurred in non-combat over a 10-year period,
around 100 resulted from gunshot wounds. Whilst it is necessary
for initial training to prepare recruits adequately for the rigours
and challenges of military life and therefore to be reasonably
realistic, trainers must take measures to minimise risk eg by
adequately controlling access to live ammunition and using simulation
wherever practicable. We believe there should be restricted access
to firearms unless on operational duty and that those required
to use firearms in a non-operational setting, for guard duties
etc, should undergo an annual psychological evaluation. Furthermore,
we suggest that recruits undergoing training should not be allowed
access to firearms until they are fully trained, have joined their
"parent units" and have undergone psychological evaluation
(similar to some police forces). We would also suggest that greater
use be made of the civilian "Military Guard Service"
to guard military establishments. More generally, we advocate
a suitably disciplined environment, with restricted access to
alcohol and any poor lifestyle options that might endanger recruits.
As mentioned earlier, we feel this could be helped if there were
better continuity between basic and trade training.
C. To examine the Armed Forces' ability
to assess risk to recruits under training and their ability to
recommend improvements to the care regime: military personnel
are generally conversant with risk assessment techniques, as these
are the very techniques used to guide military operations. However,
it may be necessary to overcome any misconceptions held by military
commanders that OSH legislation imposes impractical limitations.
It is important for NCOs and Officers to bear in mind that risk
assessments are actually enabling tools, helping to provide a
framework for safely and sustainably conducting realistic and
valuable training. There must be a firm link between risk assessment
and implementation of the "care regime", with risk assessment
informing the SOPs. Those responsible for employing military trainers
to train recruits must ensure that such trainers have adequate
OSH and risk assessment training (including for dynamic risk assessment)
and access to competent OSH advice as required.
D. To examine the effectiveness with
which these recommendations are implemented: there needs to
be evidence of a management system in which regular management
reviews take place and in which necessary changes and improvements
are implemented in a timely manner and their efficacy checked.
The aim must be for continual improvement in terms of effectiveness
and efficiency.
E. To consider the need for independent
oversight of Armed Forces recruit training: we support the
introduction of oversight of Armed Forces recruit training by
independent auditors with a wide remit, including OSH, as we believe
it could be beneficial in identifying areas for improvement and
in helping to share best practice. An independent commission could
be established for this purpose or possibly each of the three
services could review one another eg RN to audit Army, Army to
audit RAF and RAF to audit RN. We also note from the HSE's recent
report. The provision of health and safety information in the
annual reports, websites and other publicly available documents
produced by the UK's top companies and a sample of government
departments, agencies, local authorities and NHS trusts, 2003
(RR134, p.56), that the Ministry of Defence scored only four
out of a maximum of 11 for reporting OSH performance. As we believe
public reporting can act as a motivator to improved performance
and support the government's aim that all government departments
should act as exemplars, we would suggest this situation be reviewed.
5. Conclusion: IOSH recognises the
commitment and dedication of the men and women of the Armed Forces
in protecting national security and implementing government policy.
We believe that they represent a valuable national asset and should
be adequately protected from avoidable work-related risks, with
the government striving to act proactively and as an exemplar
that other employers can follow.
April 2004
44 In its new document A strategy for workplace health
and safety in Great Britain to 2010 and beyond the HSC states
that ". . . it will continue to press for higher fines, a
new law on corporate killing and removal of Crown immunity . .
.", which may result in duty of care regimes coming under
closer external scrutiny. Back
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