Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel (Retd)
Richard Haes OBE
1. Mod PS4 has notified me at that you are
looking into the Duty of Care and Supervision (DoC&S) of the
military training organisation. As a result of my experience of
working in HQ ATRA as Deputy Head (SO1 G1) Personnel Branch from
January 1998 to April 2001, I have an insight into the Army's
care delivery. Although I have been retired for three years and
I am conscious that things have moved on, these thoughts will
give the Committee a ground level view of the difficulties faced.
2. I wish to note that I have the highest
regard for DGATR for whom I worked, also that I was not party
to the higher workings of ATRA business management. I am gratified
for the sake of the young officer and NCO instructors and the
trainees in ATRA that something is being done to rectify system,
but I fear that in all this we might lose sight of the need to
maintain our fundamental cutting edge of operational effectiveness
by adopting a risk aversion policy as a solution.
MY EXPERIENCE
AND AIM
3. I am the author of the Haes Report that
was referred to in the Surrey Police Report (Reference B). In
1998 it was obvious to me that there were serious shortcomings
in ATRA delivery of DoC&S to its junior instructors and trainees
and I instigated what became the ATRA DoC&S Study. (The MoD
term "Duty of Care" has a limited and legal definition,
I use the term DoC&S to express the wider meaning of caring
for our soldiers). I took on the role of DGATR's "telescope",
reporting directly my meetings with focus groups in the Operating
Divisions (Op Divs). In Jun 2000 I briefed the ATRA Main Board
on my initial findings and throughout my time raised the issues
with ATRA senior military and civilian staff officers as part
of the staffing process.
4. The Aim. The aim of this report is to
address the unanswered questions (see para 5) voiced by Surrey
Police in Reference B; it is written assuming the reader has knowledge
of Reference C.
5. Surrey Police Report (Reference B) left
unanswered three critical questions:
a. "why alternative cost-neutral remedies,
such as moderating the throughput of trainees appears not to have
been considered". (4.7)
b. "Why funding has not been previously
forthcoming". (3.46)
c. "Why structural changes were not
made to reduce repeatedly identified risks". (3.46)
HOW DID
THE SITUATION
ARISE?
6. It is in a unique position acting as
the Army's placenta with society. In the 1990s we saw a major
change of social attitudes and behaviour in the young population
from which we recruited. This made the task of training these
people into disciplined, battle-winning soldiers much more difficult
and the ATRA was a shock absorber between society and military
life. At the same time the Army/ATRA was forced to reduce its
ability to deal with these hugely increased problems. It must
also be noted that ATRA is an Agency and should not be compared
with a formation in the Field Army.
THE CAUSES
7. In my view the problem was caused by:
a. Insufficient funding year on year.
b. Insufficient military personnel to meet
basic care needs in the Op Divs.
c. A failure to adapt traditional Army practice
to the business environment of an Agency.
8. ATRA was run as a business organisation
at the top end, imposing financial and political changes, which
were unachievable in the timeframe with available manpower resources,
but still expecting traditional values including care to be upheld
on the production line. Contractorisation removed substantial
numbers of military posts and replaced them in part with civilians
who had no responsibility for welfare and care of trainees. It
effectively removed a significant part of the chain of command
which traditionally delivered leadership and care to our soldiers
at the front end. Too few were left to deal with ever-increasing
welfare and discipline problems presented by the young of our
society.
9. There are a number of underlying complex
and inter-related reasons that might help to answer the Police
questions, which can be summarised as:
a. Political and budgetary pressure emanating
from MoD level.
b. Military inability to adapt the traditional
care system in the business environment.
c. The over-riding drive to meet business
output targets, regardless of budget cuts.
ATRA ESTABLISHMENT
INCLUDING HQ ATRA G1 AND
AGENCY STATUS
10. In the environment of Options for Change/SDR
and the reduction in military manpower, ATRA was purposely set
up with a lean establishment designed for one aim. The training
organisation was given the minimum number of military staff and
maximum use was made of civilian instructors to achieve that aim.
11. G4 State. ATRA also inherited an estate
that was already in a poor state of maintenance. This resulted
from the G4/Propman/estate budget traditionally being cut first
in successive savings measures imposed by MoD/AG, because it was
seen as least directly damaging to output. This continued to be
the case in ATRA leading to accommodation situations such as SEME
(RMO's report at Annex H to Reference C).
12. Lack of G1 Staff Focus. HQ ATRA was
established with 30 military staff and some 80 civil servants
to run an organisation of 19 Op Divs of about 12,000 people. Personnel
Branch in HQ ATRA with responsibility for overseeing G1 matters,
was staffed by 15 civil servants who managed selected grades of
the civilian workforce in ATRA, and one RO2 G1 MS. There was no
military staff to represent G1 issues in the HQ until my post
was established in 1998, principally to address the impact of
emerging European legislation eg Working Time Regulations.
13. Two Chains of Command. Whilst ATRA as
an Agency, answers directly to Parliament, the military chain
of command responsibilities are divided between AG and Land TLBs.
This had an inherent flaw in that responsibility and budget control
for G1 matters did not go together. ATRA was under AG's command,
including budget, but ATRA's Op Divs "belonged" geographically
in Land TLB thus dividing their chain of command along the lines:
a. ATRA HQ responsible for training policy
and the budget to achieve it,
b. Land responsible for G1 discipline, Health
& Safety, second line welfare provision and garrison duties.
There was a conflict of interest when it came to funding ATRA
needs.
c. ATRA Unit Commanding Officers were responsible
for first line G1 "care".
14. Thus DGATR had responsibility for his
troops' behaviour and performance, but in some G1 aspects of DoC&S,
not the authority or budget to go with it. In 1998, the Op Divs
expressed frustration over which chain of command to use for a
number of G1 issues leading to duplicated effort, and sometimes
contradictory requirements, in trying to serve two masters. This
may, however, help to explain why ATRA HQ did not initially have
a military G1 focus other than MS (Officers manning and reporting)
and why welfare was not considered in the ATRA budget.
15. Operational Tasking. MoD (MO) continued
its manpower demands on AG, which effectively meant ATRA's military
staff and instructors, to nominate increasing numbers to reinforce
the Field Army for operations around the world. Although traditional,
this was incompatible with ATRA's lean, "one-aim" establishment.
In 1999 DGATR wrote to AG, and in turn to MoD ACGS, that ATRA
could not meet this demand and maintain output. The reply was
brief—get on with it. No further attempts were made to change
this system but neither was there an attempt to reduce through-put
of trainees. I give this as an example of Army failure to adapt
its practice in a business environment and is symptomatic of overstretch.
Where as an ATRA posting used to offer some respite from the over-pressed
Field Army, and the chance for some stability in family life,
this expectation is now dashed.
16. Civilianisation. Impose on this, significant
contractorisation in order to save costs on military manpower
and the ability of military staff to supervise trainees, was further
impaired particularly in Armoured, RLC and REME Op Divs. There
were many other reasons for military manpower shortages and overstretch
in ATRA that contributed to the gap in delivering care (see Reference
C).
MILITARY "WILCO"
ATTITUDE IN
THE BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENT
17. No News is Not Necessarily Good News.
A key factor in answering the Police's questions is the "wilco"
attitude of military officers. Op Div Commanders appeared to be
reluctant to tell DGATR the depth of their problems. Op Div staff
officers did brief their commanders, but the bad news was "filtered
out" from reports to HQ ATRA, so that DGATR was not formally
told. Likewise, HQ ATRA was reluctant to tell AG that cuts in
budget and military manpower should mean cuts in output. Whilst
this war-winning attitude is ingrained in the psyche of every
army leader, it does not work well in a lean business environment.
There was a widely held belief of middle and lower military management
that MoD, did not "win" enough resources to meet the
commitments placed on the Army and this resulted in robbing ATRA
Peter to pay Paul.
18. In effect business rules were applied
at the top in ATRA but traditional rules of ethos, leadership
and duty were maintained at the bottom end. The maxim "no
new commitments without matching resources" did not make
an impact and "cut output to match budget cuts" was
anathema. This suggested an element of cognitive dissonance, disbelief
that the problem was so serious because of the magnitude of the
remedy.
19. The Grail of Output Targets. The driving
imperative was to meet the manpower output targets set for trained
soldiers, and deadlines to fill the Army came above all other
considerations. In 1999, the entry "gateway" was widened
to increase the inflow of recruits; this was achieved only by
accepting lower graded applicants who would previously have been
turned away as higher risk. The result was to overwhelm the already
over-stretched DoC&S resources and this policy was reversed
after one year. Although it was now acknowledged that care/supervision/welfare
needed to be improved, without a costed business plan the case
for funds could not be made.
20. Human Cost. The concept of measuring
and costing "first line care" had never been contemplated
in the Army because it is delivered as part of a regimental officer's
normal duty. It did not feature in the training schedule as a
resource for budgeting, but it represents a great deal of time,
mostly after programmed training hours have finished (cf para
8).
21. The increasing plethora of regulation
(listed in Reference C, Annex E) which affects DoC&S, cannot
readily be defined for all eventualities and therefore does not
lend itself to budgeting but ATRA had no budget management mechanism
to measure the human cost and the attempt at Reference C to measure
it was found to be inadequate to satisfy the business mentality.
Therefore it did not enter the budget process, however, no attempt
was made to reduce the amount of regulation and traditional extra-mural
activity for which the military officer was responsible. It was
not realistic to carry out all of it with the staff available.
It drew no comment until something went wrong.
22. The resources and budget (RAB) accounting
process effectively imposed MoD spending cuts on ATRA, and DGATR
was committed to accumulative savings measures and a shrinking
budget that had an increasing impact on delivery of care. Thus,
even when the issue was raised at Main Board level, in an Agency
already financially strapped, where even training was now delivered
"just enough, just in time", it appeared too much to
contemplate. There were two alternatives, both of which were considered
unacceptable:
a. Tell MoD/AG that unless the budget was
increased, output of trained soldiers would have to be cut or,
b. Increase the number of military posts
and restore an adequate military chain of command for delivering
DoC&S.
CIVILIAN ATTITUDES
IN THE
MILITARY ENVIRONMENT
23. Reductions in military manpower were
accompanied by an increase in civilian staff working directly
to produce a practical military product. From a military view,
this affected delivery of ATRA DofC&S at two levels.
24. First, at senior level there appeared
to be a separate aim—to ensure that financial savings were
made as fast as possible, including the sale of ATRA estate, and
to overcome a perceived military reluctance to give up its estate.
But, however competent Civil Servants in ATRA were, most had no
background experience or knowledge of basic soldiering ie ATRA's
core business. Although the military staff were there to inform
this need, the question of military ethos and leadership style
seen by the military as a fundamental necessity, were too often
seen in the civilian mind as an expensive option. They failed
to appreciate how the Regimental Officer delivered "care"
and that it was the same whether in training or in battle. This
cultural difference needs to be addressed.
25. Civilian empathy with the problems of
delivering front line care was not strong and the speed of taking
savings measures from the budget, often went ahead of Op Div ability
to adapt to the changes; this included completion of buildings
eg Army Foundation College, Harrogate and PPP contracts eg REME
Training Group. Units were too often left to "sort it out"
after the savings measures were implemented. It increased the
burden of DoC&S and gave the impression in the trenches that
higher headquarters from MoD down were not in touch with front
line conditions.
26. There used to be a system where senior
civil servants accompanied a four-day military exercise on Salisbury
Plain as observers, to give them an insight into the difficulties
of soldiering. It is recommended that this should apply to all
senior civil servants, HEO and above, taking up appointments at
HQ ATRA and senior staff in HQ AG and selected MoD staff, to help
better understand the needs of ATRA business. I doubt whether
this will be a popular suggestion!
27. Secondly, civilian instructors and contractors
were employed in Op Divs to replace military personnel as a cost
savings measure. It had two main impacts on DoC&S:
(a) It left a significant gap in supervision
outside training programme hours. It worked so long as nothing
went wrong, but it raises the need to define the degree to which
the military is responsible for its staff and trainees after working
hours.
(b) In some Phase two units, trainees
were left with very limited contact with military staff particularly
on long technical courses. What basic military discipline might
have been instilled in Phase 1, "faded" in the absence
of military supervision and in turn weaker discipline brought
increased problems of supervision.
PRINCIPLES OF
WAR V
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
28. In 1998-99, significant new legislation
was introduced with little appreciation of its impact on training
and the delivery of DoC&S in a non-operational training agency.
This included Working Time Regulations (WTR), Young Workers Directive
and Equal Opportunities Legislation. At any one time, the ATRA
had between 40-50% under 18s in training, including females, many
on the same training programme as adults.
29. The principles of war on which military
training is based, are distilled from hard lessons of war learnt
over many generations—they are immutable. The battlefield
does not recognise the political niceties of Equal Opportunities
and Working Time Regulations. There appeared to be little or
no consideration at MoD or HQ AG of the military implications
before new law was passed to ATRA to implement, and little understanding
of the problems raised when clarification was sought. As an example,
whilst trainees were exempt WTR on exercise, the instructors running
the exercise were not and compensatory rest had to be programmed
later thus taking them out of the training cycle and adding to
overstretch of military staff. It brought significant work loads
and changes to the already hard pressed Op Divs. In future the
system must allow for detailed analysis to be carried out before
such changes are imposed on ATRA and changes must be adequately
resourced and programmed. There is no capacity to absorb them.
MONITORING SYSTEM
IN FUTURE
30. If the future system of DoC&S is
to be safeguarded, there are some underlying principles to be
considered:
(a) Fighting skills and good military
leadership do not lend themselves to business practice and political
correctness.
(b) The training needs of the three Services
are significantly different and a single template would not work.
The Army must have a regime of "train hard, fight easy".
(c) Mod and HQ AG must recognise the
impact of new legislation, financial savings and continuing demands
for military manpower for operations from ATRA. Traditional practices
should be reviewed and reasonable time allowed for adjustment
before change is imposed. Changes and new commitments must be
matched by resources.
(d) Business rules must apply both ways
in the Chain of Command. HQ ATRA and Op Div HQs must reflect DoC&S
situation realistically up the Chain of Command. MoD and HQ AG
must demonstrate that they are caring employers.
31. An Independent Inspector. Although
it might be tempting to appoint an independent inspector from
outside the system, the military situation does not equate to
prisons. An inspector may still not identify problems if military
staff and commanders continue not to speak out and furthermore,
it would undermine DGATR's authority to run the ATRA. It is attitudes
and procedures that need to be adjusted and if this happens, there
should be no need for an inspector. It would be preferable for
DGATR to continue this responsibility, but safeguards need to
be in place in MoD and HQ AG to ensure that ATRA resources remain
compatible with commitments/business targets and DoC&S.
32. CHANGE ATTITUDES
AND PROCEDURES (a) DGATR
should have a red card facility to bypass the chain of command
(and not be penalised in any way for using it) to a very senior
MoD officer with direct responsibility for representing the training
organisation needs.
(b) The chain of command must be better
prepared to support ATRA's case, to the highest level if necessary,
rather than simply passing the buck downwards and setting a deadline.
The apparent power of Civil Servants in MoD and TLB to press through
political and financial measures in ATRA, without acknowledging
the military impact and resource requirement, has to be rationalised.
Senior Civil Servants, at least those appointed to ATRA HQ, should
attend a three or four day military exercise on Salisbury Plain
to get an insight into ATRA core business.
(c) DGATR should have a system in place
that gives him a true measure of the health state of G1/4 "care"
in ATRA. Personnel Branch should control a team led by the SO1
G1(Military Deputy Head), including the senior training chaplain,
the SO1 Occupational Medicine, an SO2 and an experienced SNCO
(one of whom should be female) to meet focus groups including
junior ranks in Op Div units and report the findings to DGATR
and Op Div Commanders.
(d) A clearly defined DoC&S policy
that details exactly what standard of care both trainee and staff
should expect in ATRA to satisfy the Military Covenant promise.
A care policy directive with quantified delivery targets and a
ring-fenced budget would go a long way to preventing a deterioration
in future.
April 2004
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