Memorandum from Surrey Police
INTRODUCTION
1.0 On Thursday 4 March 2004, Surrey Police
published the final report in relation to their investigation
into the deaths of four trainee soldiers at Deepcut Barracks in
Surrey. The report examined issues that, although not necessarily
directly connected to the deaths, were of concern, particularly
in the way that the Army cared for young people undergoing training.
1.1 On the same day the Defence Select Committee
(DSC) Chairman, Rt Hon Bruce George MP announced that the DSC
would be conducting an inquiry the remit of which was at the time
being deliberated.
1.2 On Friday 19 March 2004, the DSC published
the terms of reference of the inquiry. As part of the process
interested parties have been invited to make a written submission
to the Inquiry. Withing the scope of their Inquiry the DSC has
undertaken to include consideration of the three issues raised
by Surrey Police when recommending a broader enquiry. They were:
— To establish whether the risks identified
at Deepcut are replicated across the wider ATRA and how they may
relate to the issues of self-harm, suicide and undetermined deaths.
— How the Army's care regime may be
further improved.
— How independent oversight may help
the Army define and maintain appropriate standards of care for
young soldiers.
1.3 The Surrey Police Deepcut Investigation
Final Report illustrated how risks to soldiers in training have
been identified over a number of years by the Army but have not
been acted upon.
1.4 Surrey Police believes that the report
illustrates the cumulative effect of the risks facing recruits
coupled with a lack of rigour in systemising, reviewing and challenging
risk reduction measures between 1988-2002. Important lessons have
been learned from this period and will no doubt be incorporated
into the DSC Inquiry. However, we believe that it is in the best
interests of all parties that the Inquiry should, generally speaking,
be "forward looking" as it must be acknowledged that
the Army and the Armed Forces in general appear to have made a
great deal of progress in the past two years.
1.5 Although it is accepted that progress
has been made, we remain convinced that there is a need for the
provision of independent oversight and that the increased activity
over the last two years has been as a direct result of a non-military
organisation (Surrey Police) examining internal Army issues.
1.6 The issue of independent oversight will
be discussed more fully later in this document.
METHODOLOGY OF
THE FINAL
REPORT
2.0 The primary purpose of the Surrey Police
investigation has always been to investigate the deaths of Sean
BENTON, Cheryl JAMES, Geoff GRAY and James COLLINSON.
2.1 An integral part of the investigation
was an examination of the training regime at Deepcut to determine
whether there was a direct link with any of the deaths. This investigation
has never had the remit to extend beyond these geographical bounds.
2.2 Each individual death has been subject
of a separate report to HM Coroner, Surrey and in the case of
James COLLINSON an inquest will be held on a date yet to be announced.
2.3 The Police have a duty that extends
beyond investigating crime and therefore as some fundamental duty
of care issues came to light we felt compelled to take two significant
steps:
I. Establish the joint Police/Army Learning
Account to bring to the attention of the Army in fast time any
issues that were considered to represent risk to their staff.
II. Produce the final report to promote our
view that a broader enquiry beyond the scope and remit of Surrey
Police is needed to reduce future risks and prevent harm to young
soldiers.
2.4 The Learning Account represented to
Surrey Police the first tangible evidence of the Army having a
clear auditable assessment and implementation process to deal
with issues that may have posed risks to their staff. It is also
the first evidence of the benefit of external oversight, as we
would question whether such a process would have existed without
the presence of an independent organisation.
2.5 The bulk of the material drawn from
in the construction of the final report was produced by the Army.
Wherever possible, the final report contained a factual representation
of each of the main documents referred to. This reduced the risk
of any misinterpretation of any of the information as clearly
Surrey Police has to acknowledge that we are by no means experts
in the workings of the military.
2.6 At key stages in the process of writing
the report the Army were given the opportunity, both orally and
in writing, to consider the material and make any representations
they felt necessary in terms of accuracy, balance and fact. This
is standard methodology for producing review documents.
2.7 The final report was constructed to
give a clear chronological picture of how risks had been identified
and opportunities missed to reduce those risks.
2.8 Each document relating to Army training
was subject of painstaking analysis. Any commentary recognising
or highlighting a problem was added to a schedule which plotted
chronologically the nature of the issue. Attempts were then made
to overlay any evidence that could be found to show that steps
had been taken to resolve the problem. The Final Report demonstrates
that little evidence was found.
2.9 This work was quite detailed as the
issues identified had many variations. As the analysis progressed,
it became easier to refine the information into broad headings
as the dominant and repeating issues became more prominent. This
reinforced the sense that these were the key areas in which risks
or vulnerabilities were evident in terms of duty of care to young
soldiers.
2.10 There were six broad headings and they
covered the following areas of risk:
| Supervision: | The ratio of instructors to recruits.
The quality of the individuals selected to deliver the training.
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| Screening: | The measures in place to identify vulnerable individuals at the recruiting stage.
The measures in place to track recruits through their training to identify any developing vulnerability.
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| Welfare: | How recruit personal/emotional problems are addressed.
The quality of healthcare provided to trainees.
The provision of welfare support structures.
The quality of the environment provided for recruits such as accommodation and recreational facilities.
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| Accountability: | The ownership of issues and responsibility for finding resolutions.
How the effectiveness of policy and procedure is monitored and measured.
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| Training Structure: | The fragmented nature of Army training particularly the change from Phase 1 to Phase 2.
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| Firearms/Guarding: | The quality of supervision of young soldiers in possession of firearms.
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AN EFFECTIVE
CARE REGIME
3.0 During the construction of the Final Report, Surrey
Police were able to begin to form a model of an effective care
regime. The main components can be described as either preventive
or supportive.
3.1 Drawing on criminological research, (Cohen and Felson
(1979) "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activities
Approach") and research into suicide (Rosenman (1998) Preventing
Suicide—What will work and what will not), a preventive
framework was identified that could be applied to the care regime
at Deepcut. The main risk components are:
— The absence of a capable guardian—this refers
to the physical presence of a guardian but also includes the policies,
systems and procedures of a guardian organisation.
— A motivated individual—this includes those
who have particular vulnerabilities or propensities toward particular
behaviours.
— Suitable opportunity for an act to occur—this
may include access to lethal means.
3.2 In terms of a supportive framework the following
were some of the areas identified.
3.3 Family Care—As part of the investigation
into the individual deaths each of the four families were interviewed.
A common complaint from all of them was the standard of what could
be termed family care that the Army gave them particularly immediately
following the deaths of their children. Examples of this include:
— No single point of contact resulting in mixed
messages being given.
— Insensitive way that some of the contact was made.
— Long periods of time between contact.
— The way that some personal effects of the deceased
were destroyed.
— The manner in which the remaining personal effects
were returned to the families.
3.4 Even wider than post-incident contact, the Army acts
as locus parentis for young soldiers, some of who are away from
home for the first time and as such have some inherent vulnerabilities.
Although not part of the Surrey Police investigation, we believe
that it might be a valuable exercise, in the context of the DSC
Inquiry, to examine how the Army engages with the parents/guardians
of recruits. If families are able to enter into some form of partnership
with the Army there is clear potential for increased support for
young soldiers in the training environment.
3.5 An effective investigative structure—Another
component part is the provision of an effective, competent and
accessible investigative structure. The presence of this would
give the trainees reassurance that should something happen to
them the structures exist to allow them to report the matter and
be confident that it would be dealt with. Surrey Police would
question whether the SIB has sufficient independence to fulfil
these criteria. It will be illustrated later in the report how
inaccessible the reporting system, particularly for young soldiers,
appears to be.
3.6 Effective care performance data collection and
analysis—To determine the effectiveness of any system
or organisation there has to be measurement of performance to
identify what works and where gaps exist. This entails the collection
of data in a systematic way. The Surrey Police investigation uncovered
little evidence of this in the documentation provided by the Army.
3.7 Surrey Police believes that an effective care regime
can only flourish if it includes the above preventive and supportive
components. This will only be effectively applied by the introduction
of properly regulated independent oversight.
SOURCE DOCUMENTS
4. In an effort to support the Inquiry, Surrey Police
believe that the DSC would benefit from examining in detail the
following documents:
I. Joint Police/Army Learning Account established August
2002.
II. Deepcut Investigation—DAG's Final Report dated
3 December 2002.
III. Directorate of Operational Capability—Appraisal
of Initial Training dated 18 December 2002.
IV. DOC Appraisal of Initial Training: Departmental Follow
Up Action Plan undated.
V. Directorate of Operational Capability—Re-Appraisal
of Initial Training.
4.1 All of these documents are subject of comment within
our Final Report. They represent a watershed for the Army in terms
of their recognition and response to risks. It is no coincidence
that this work started post March 2002 when the Surrey Police
investigation commenced and even then there still appeared to
be an element of reluctance on the part of the Army to commit
to meet the challenge of change.
4.2 The Joint Police/Army Learning Account 2002-03
The Learning Account was the result of an agreement between
the Chief Constable of Surrey Police and the Adjutant General
(AG). The process was owned and administered by the Deputy Adjutant
General (DAG). An examination of the document will provide the
Inquiry with an appreciation of how issues were recorded and the
tracking process to resolution.
4.3 Deputy Adjutant General (DAG)—Deepcut Investigation
2002
The DAG was tasked with two important pieces of work during
2002. He had responsibility for co-ordinating the Army response
to issues raised in the Learning Account. In addition he conducted
"a supporting military investigation" to identify lessons
learned from the four deaths at Deepcut and to make recommendations.
4.4 The DAG report highlighted issues that had been of
concern over a number of years. He made six specific recommendations
requiring action. The difference from previous years however is
that steps seem to have been taken immediately to deal with some
of the issues.
4.5 A prime example was supervision ratios. DAG recommended
that, "the establishment at Deepcut should be revised in
order to provide a supervisory ratio of approximately 1:38, and
the resultant requirement for an increment of up to 12 officers
and 50 NCO's be funded in STP03."
4.6 The Learning Account was used as the vehicle to track
progress and on the latest version the following comments were
recorded:
— Fast track action taken to provide an additional
106 training staff across REME and Defence Logistic Support Training
Groups.
— Additional 73 supervisory posts established across
ATRA, 60 to be in post by January 2004 and posting completed by
April 2004.
4.7 DOC Training Appraisal (December 2002)
Between 3 October and 18 December 2002 the Director of Operational
Capability (DOC) conducted an Appraisal of Initial Training across
all three Armed Services which will clearly be of interest to
the current Inquiry. The terms of reference for the Appraisal
were set by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, to whom
the findings were to be reported and the Appraisal team were to
be held accountable.
4.8 The aim of the original Appraisal was "to carry
out a cross-cutting examination of the Initial Training of non-officer
recruits of all three Services (to include initial and basic specialisation
training), taking in ethos, transitional mechanisms (from civilian
to Service life) and duty of care."
4.9 The terms of reference for the Appraisal were that
it should be considered "a health check of training regimes
and should examine possible issues of morale, motivation, training
practices and culture."
4.10 Data was collected from 2,450 questionnaires, over
1,500 interviews and from discussions with recruits and trainees
during visits to 17 Defence Training Establishments.
4.11 The Appraisal produced 60 major recommendations.
4.12 DOC Appraisal of Initial Training: Departmental
Follow Up Action Plan
Following the Appraisal an Action Plan was produced that
was similar in structure to the Learning Account. It listed each
of the 60 recommendations and detailed the actions required and
the progress made by each of the services. Where possible the
recommendation was signed off as implemented or had a set target
date.
4.13 DOC Re-appraisal of Initial Training Report (July
2003)
On 8 April 2003, the Director Operational Capability was
tasked by the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff to conduct an independent
follow-up Re-Appraisal of the Initial Training. It was designed
to provide a further "health-check" of training regimes
and gauge the extent to which progress had been achieved after
the Initial Appraisal.
4.14 The Re-Appraisal took place in June and July and
the team visited 14 Defence training establishments, some of which
had been covered in the previous Appraisal. Questionnaires were
issued to 1,407 recruits/trainees and 910 persons were interviewed
in person and attempts were made to draw participants from as
broad a base of background and experience as possible. Command
and administrative staff, as well as a total of 480 instructional
staff were spoken to, together with representatives from welfare,
social and emotional support groups. Within the Re-Appraisal,
recruiting mechanisms were examined in more detail, "prompted
by issues raised in the Initial Appraisal."
4.15 The Re-Appraisal did not make any specific recommendations
but it was clear that many of the proposed responses to the recommendations
relied on funding being allocated from the Short Term Programme
2004 (STP04) which is a budget bid.
"In some cases, Initial Training has been under-funded
over many years and the risk inherent in the fragility of its
structures and in the tautness of some of its programmes is evident.
The original Appraisal raised expectations that something would
be done about the deficiencies, but, overall, during the Re-appraisal
an air of resigned, weary cynicism prevailed. Most officers and
NCO's were sceptical about whether the `system' could do anything
to alleviate their difficulties and believed that there was corporate
blindness about what was happening at grass roots level. One spoke
of a `culture of contrived visits which masks the truth' and even
within one of the Agencies there was a fatalistic air—`We
must accept risk where the solutions are beyond us.' By any estimation,
a positive outcome in STP04 for the Initial Training System is
likely to provide a considerable boost to morale, as well as reducing
risk of failure during training."
4.16 Within the overall assessment section of the report
the following observations were made:
— The Initial Training System is proving remarkably
successful in delivering large numbers of high quality service
personnel.
— Nevertheless it is running at risk and continues
to be fragile.
— All three Services' Initial Training streams are
still exhibiting strains and stresses of a persistently high throughput
of trainees and under-resourcing, notably in the area of supervisory
and instructional manpower.
4.17 COMMENT
The work conducted by the DAG and the DOC illustrates that
the Army has recognised that there is a need to identify and deal
with the issues that have been for so long ignored. However, their
seemingly bureaucratic structures continually slowed progress
and the Surrey Police Final report illustrates a complete lack
of any sense of urgency until the cumulative effects of four deaths
had been felt.
4.18 The introduction of the DOC to look at the issue
on a Tri-service basis is the nearest process we have seen to
independent oversight. Despite all of the documents produced detailing
recommendations and action plans, Surrey Police does not have
the remit, to check and validate that changes have been made to
reduce risks and prevent harm.
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT
5. The Terms of Reference of the Inquiry includes consideration
of the need for independent oversight of Armed Forces recruit
training.
5.1 Surrey Police believe that credible independent oversight
provides a quality of challenge allowing for transparency that
conventional monitoring systems cannot give. Such oversight must
be unencumbered by the values, constraints and assumptions of
a well established culture such as exists in the Army.
5.2 During their deliberations the Inquiry will no doubt
include the evidence contained in the Surrey Police final report.
This evidence clearly shows how, in the past, the Army has been
unable to effectively reduce identified risks. There has to be
some concerns that without the support of external scrutiny history
could be repeated.
5.3 Clearly Surrey Police are not equipped to oversee
the changes necessary and whatever process is adopted primary
consideration must be given to transparency and accountability
to ensure that public confidence can be restored and maintained.
DUTY OF
CARE/BULLYING
ISSUES IDENTIFIED
6. During the course of the Surrey police investigation,
in the region of 500 either serving or ex-soldiers have been interviewed.
In addition to any information each individual has had about any
of the deaths, witnesses have been asked to give their account
about how they viewed life in an Army training environment.
6.1 Using the information provided by the witnesses,
a very basic evaluation exercise was undertaken. Although not
subject to a scientifically robust process some care issues were
identified which broadly mirror those featured in the six main
risk areas present in the Final Report.
6.2 It must also be pointed out that a significant number
of the witnesses interviewed either made no specific comment about
the regime or expressed positive views.
6.3 A comparison was made between soldiers of the rank
of private who were still serving at the time of interview and
those who had left the Army. It was found that 37% of ex-privates
spoke of bullying whereas only 8% of serving privates claimed
to have been either the victim or witnessed incidents of bullying.
6.4 Bullying as a specific duty of care issue attracts
a large amount of interest as it can have a devastating effect
on both victims and people who witness it. As Surrey Police gathered
evidence from witnesses about the deaths and witnesses spoke of
their other experiences of Army training, the issue of bullying
recurred with sufficient frequency to prompt Surrey Police to
make specific comment about it in our Final Report.
6.5 In addition to what is in effect anecdotal evidence,
two separate studies commissioned by the Army give some credence
to the view that bullying remains a problem for them. Their findings
broadly echo those of the Surrey Police validation exercise mentioned
above.
6.6 The QuinetiQ Post Training Survey was commissioned
in November 2002 by the DAG in following his report of his review
of training establishments in October 2002. The review was designed
to establish the prevalence of inappropriate behaviour during
1998-2001.
6.7 The review found 8.4% of respondents at Deepcut claimed
to have experienced bullying and 42.6% claimed to have witnessed
such incidents.
6.8 In respect of being a victim of bullying at Deepcut
these findings were slightly above rates for Larkhill Barracks
but below those for Catterick. The Deepcut results were in the
higher range for those claiming to have witnessed bullying incidents
when compared to the other two establishments.
6.9 These results compare with the most recent Army Continuous
Attitude Survey, which reveals 5% of personnel believe bullying
to exist in their immediate work environment and 43% believed
bullying to be a problem in the Army.
6.10 Annexe's A & B contain a schedules of allegations/incidents
ranging from criminal acts to breaches of Army discipline which,
in the main, were accounts from witnesses who were primarily interviewed
about one or more of the deaths.
6.11 It is important to point out that, to a great extent,
the witness recollection is uncorroborated and untested and thus
any examples cited should be treated with necessary and appropriate
caution. Many of the examples have not been formally investigated
at this time as the details were given more as background information
as opposed to specific allegations.
6.12 Annex A deals with recollections of witnesses interviewed
about the 1995 deaths. Annex B covers those interviewed in relation
to the deaths in 2001-02.
6.13 In addition to these matters there is a trial due
to start in early September 2004 involving an ex-RLC NCO. He has
been charged with male rape and a series of indecent assaults.
Some of the offences are alleged to have been committed on trainees
at Deepcut in 1996-97. There are potential duty of care issues
which may be revealed during the trial but these are currently
sub-judice and therefore cannot be subject of further comment
at this time.
REPORTING OF
INCIDENTS/PROBLEMS
7. A common theme detected throughout the Surrey Police
investigation has been the lack of faith that young soldiers have
in the way that they can report any problems.
7.1 It has to be remembered that one of the main reasons
that Lord Ashley called for a military ombudsman in 1988 was to
provide vulnerable young soldiers with someone independent that
they could go to.
7.2 The following excerpt comes from the Charter for
RLC Phase Two Trainees and was taken from the RLC website on 23
January 2003. Within a section entitled Instructors appears the
following text:
"Those NCOs and civilian instructors that teach on the
trade courses have been specially chosen to do so. They are very
competent, they know what they are talking about and they are
accomplished instructors. They know their job better than you
do, trust their judgement and above all—DO AS THEY TELL
YOU.
If at any time you think you have a problem with an instructor,
you have the right to speak with your troop commander about the
subject, but be aware that if you find yourself in this position,
the problem is more likely to be a fault with your attitude than
it is with the instructors."
7.3 This seems to give a clear message to Phase Two recruits
in terms of where they stand in the organisation.
7.4 On 15 April 2004, the same document was accessed
on the website. The charter remains the same with the exception
that the three lines underlined above have been deleted.
7.5 This could perhaps be viewed as positive evidence
that the external oversight of Surrey Police has prompted a review
of Army values.
7.6 An example of the apparently prevailing culture was
found in 2000. A female private approached a senior NCO to report
that a male Private had sexually assaulted her. What follows is
an extract from the NCOs statement:
"As a result of being informed that she would be charged
with being in the male accommodation, she withdrew the allegation
and stated that she did not want it to be entered in the Occurrence
Book. No entry was made and no further action was taken."
7.7 To the Army's credit, another NCO found out about
what had happened and immediately made another more senior rank
aware. As a result, the male private was arrested and, after an
investigation conducted by the Royal Military Police, he was convicted
of indecent assault and sentenced to a period of imprisonment.
Although, on this occasion, the situation was retrieved very quickly,
it is an illustration that even as recent as 2000, the issue of
reported criminal allegations may not be taken seriously by some
NCOs. Such attitudes and responses by NCOs may well inhibit the
reporting by trainees of assault, bullying or other abuse.
7.8 A review of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee
(HCDSC) Second report: Policy for People (session 2001-01) reveals
that the Equal Opportunities Commission gave evidence regarding
the lack of receptiveness of the regime to complaints from female
soldiers.
"Regrettably the majority of women who come to us are
women who are about to leave the armed services. This suggests
to us that the culture prevailing in the armed services is one
that is not conductive to them making a complaint while they are
in here and expecting it to be dealt with. What is required is
a culture that supports the complainant and deals with their complaint
swiftly and speedily."
OTHER POTENTIAL
SOURCES OF
INFORMATION
8. Rule 43 Inquest Findings
Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 1984 states:
"A Coroner who believes that action should be taken
to prevent the recurrence of fatalities similar to that in respect
of which the inquest is being held may announce at the inquest
that he is reporting the matter in writing to the person or authority
who may have the power to take such action and he may report the
matter accordingly."
8.1 Research undertaken by Surrey Police reveals that
Coroner's Courts have on occasions identified issues of concern
relating to underlying weaknesses within the Army care regime
which have been seen to be relevant to the cause of death.
8.2 An example of this relates to concerns expressed
by a Coroner in the past regarding access to firearms, live ammunition
and alcohol related incidents. It demonstrates how systemic risks
are sometimes identified by Coroners but not acted upon.
8.3 An inquest into the 1995 death of a 24-year-old fusilier
who died of gunshot wounds found the parties involved had consumed
alcohol in excess of that permitted by the regulations. They also
had access to lethal weapons and were subject to little supervision
at the time. In the events that followed, two soldiers were shot,
one was killed and the other seriously injured. The coroner in
this case made the observation that there was no evidence to substantiate
suicide by the fusilier and that he was an experienced soldier
so it was difficult to understand his irresponsible behaviour.
An open verdict was recorded.
8.4 In concluding the inquest the coroner commented that,
"there are a number of matters . . . which have arisen
from this case that will no doubt be exercising the minds of the
Ministry of Defence . . . Just the things that come to mind are
. . . the drinking aspect. It seems that these lads were drinking
more than was their allotment. That is relatively minimal but
what of course is most concerning is the fact that this was not
apparently an isolated incident." In addition to this,
the coroner also raised the issue of the "apparent easy
accessibility of the loading magazines."
8.5 He acknowledged that easy access to loaded weapons
may be necessary and practical in an operational environment,
and established that weapons were only supposed to be loaded and
unloaded upon the order of an officer or NCO. However, the Coroner
emphasised that the practise of having loaded magazines accessible
at all times in an operational environment should be reviewed.
8.6 In 2003 an inquest into the deaths of two soldiers
found evidence to suggest that alcohol had been consumed in excess
of that permitted by the regulations and at a time when the soldiers
had immediate access to lethal weapons. In this case the coroner
instituted a "Rule 43 Notification" to bring to the
notice of the authorities his concerns in relation to these deaths.
8.7 The issues concerned in both inquests included a
failure to enforce regulations relating to the consumption of
alcohol at times when there is ready and immediate access to lethal
weapons.
8.8 While these inquests did not relate to the deaths
of trainees, the relevance of the care issues to trainees may
be self-evident if trainees or other soldiers are able to access
alcohol and firearms at the same time. It might also be seen as
evidence of the lack of responsiveness by the Army to some identified
risks, despite being notified of such recommendations through
the service of "Rule 43" notification by a Coroner.
8.9 It is not known at this stage how many "Rule
43" notifications have been served on the Army by Coroners
and the Army has conceded that there is no central collation point
where such findings are analysed and responded to at both the
single event level and cumulatively. The Army has confirmed it
cannot provide an account of the "Rule 43" notifications
it has received or of the responses to them.
8.10 It is, however, understood that inquest transcripts
and police reports, where available, are considered by Army Boards
of Inquiry and the findings of such inquiries are considered by
Army HQ Land Command to determine whether changes are required
to policy, procedure or practice.
8.11 Once again, Surrey Police has only conducted a limited
examination of a few Coroners' inquest findings. It may be beneficial
for the current Inquiry to explore this issue more thoroughly
through the offices of the Lord Chancellors Department.
8.12 In June 2003 a report entitled, "Death Certification
and Investigation in England, Wales and Northern Ireland—The
Report of a Fundamental Review" was presented to Parliament
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. This report
clearly sets out the limitations of the current Coroners system
and the Inquiry may find it helpful to review a copy.
8.13 Other military deaths that Surrey Police are aware
of
During the course of the Surrey Police enquiry we have become
aware of a number of other deaths of military personnel, predominantly
within training establishments, which appear to feature duty of
care issues including:
— Supervision of trainees in possession of firearms
and live ammunition.
— The placing of vulnerable recruits on armed guard
duty.
— A possible lack of effective medical care.
— Ineffective risk assessment process for placement
of soldiers who are a potential risk to others.
— Allegations of bullying.
8.14 These issues span a period of nine years and involve
at least three other police forces. The investigations are in
effect owned by these forces and therefore Surrey Police believes
that, should the Inquiry seek further details, that these forces
be asked to submit evidence themselves. This will ensure accuracy
and reduce the risk of any current police investigation being
compromised. Surrey Police will of course supply details of the
forces and act as a link if so required.
CONCLUSION
9. Surrey Police has conducted an in-depth reinvestigation
into four unexplained deaths at the Deepcut Barracks. This has
led to the collection of large amounts of new evidence that we
are confident will assist the Coroner and the families in seeking
an explanation.
9.1 This evidence is detailed in the four reports already
supplied to the Coroner, one for each death, and the Final Report
which was published in March 2004 and deals with the wider issue
of the Army training regime and the quality of the supervision
and care provided.
9.2 The question of whether the regime weaknesses identified
in the Final Report have any relevance to any of the deaths is
not a matter for Surrey Police to consider. It is, however, the
duty of the police to prevent crime and protect life, hence why
as apparent weaknesses were identified the Learning Account process
was adopted to ensure that any identified vulnerabilities could
receive urgent attention.
9.3 It is intended that this submission will supplement
the Surrey Police Final Deepcut Report and thus inform the DSC
Inquiry.
9.4 Surrey Police firmly believe that to establish an
Army training regime that is effective, transparent and capable
of gaining public confidence an element of independent oversight
must be introduced.
9.5 Surrey Police are committed to supporting the DSC
Inquiry and will consider and further requests for information
or assistance that may be deemed necessary for the Inquiry to
progress.
June 2004
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