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1. Disciplined Organisation.
| To operate efficiently the Army has to maintain a structure that demands a disciplined approach and adherence to a strict chain of command.
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2. Malingering
Source: Evans Report 1995
Surrey Police Final Report 2004.
| When referring to the 10 self-harm incidents that took place between the deaths of Benton and James, Brigadier Evans commented, "All but the two deaths appear to be attention or sympathy seeking, copycat behaviour or, conceivably, calculated malingering".
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3. Discourage Reporting
Source: RLC Website, Charter for RLC Phase 2 Trainees 2003
DSC Submission 2004.
| The following excerpt was taken from the website on 23 January 2003. Within a section entitled "Instructors" appears the following text:
"Those NCOs and civilian instructors that teach on the trade courses have been specially chosen to do so. They are very competent, they know what they are talking about and they are accomplished instructors. They know their job better than you do, trust their judgement and above all—DO AS THEY TELL YOU. If at any time you think you have a problem with an instructor, you have the right to speak with your troop commander about the subject, but be aware that if you find yourself in this position, the problem is more likely to be a fault with your attitude than it is with the instructor's."
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4. Diminish Importance of Training
Source: DOC Appraisal of Initial
Training December 2002.
| Para 46:
"Further problems centred on the greater incidence of pressurised, demotivated and often non-volunteer instructors, with posts held by NCOs with welfare, domestic and medical concerns. Most service instructors in Phase 2 were not formally trained . . ."
Skinner could be used as an example.
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5. Over-Emphasis on Front End Delivery
Source: DOC Appraisal of Initial
Training December 2002.
| Para 23:
" . . . A number of compromises, with regard to the assessment of recruits' temperament, fitness and professional achievement, were being made in training to drive down the wastage rate and to maintain output, both often considered key measures of unit success at each stage. Instructors reported that they were under pressure to pass on as many candidates as possible, that quality was often sacrificed to quantity and that some recruits with personal and social problems were moved too quickly into successive regimes."
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6. Unwillingness to Report Matters
Source: DOC Appraisal of Initial
Training December 2002.
| Para 67:
"We noticed another cultural feature of note. This was described as `what's on the line stays on the line' and amounted to an agreed code of silence. The overwhelming view among recruits was that reporting of incidents would always result in extra work and life being made more difficult . . . There was also evidence of collusive activity between some junior officers and NCOs to damp down issues and problems, before their superiors got to hear about it, as well as looking the other way and `managing situations' when irregularities or incidents occurred . . . We found that loyalty between NCOs was particularly strong and that, with a few exceptions, it was difficult for recruits and trainees to bypass the chain of command even in cases of alleged injustice or dispute."
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7. Unforgiving Culture
Source: DOC Re-Appraisal July 2003.
| Para 17:
"In some establishments, instructors were openly hostile to WRVS staff and other `busy-bodies' and berated trainees for resorting to them or to the officers who were responsible for their welfare."
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DOC Appraisal of Initial Training
December 2002.
| Para 71:
". . . There is no doubt that a perceptible amount of low-level bullying occurs . . . Left to their own devices, it is evident that recruits and trainees tend to establish their own hierarchies which can expose the weak, introspective, vulnerable or less capable individual to bullying, harassment, insensitivity and unfair treatment . . . This aspect is heightened by the imposition of blanket or group punishments, whereby recruits and trainees are encouraged, nominally in the interests of teamwork, to feel the effects of the failings of one or more of their number."
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8. Command Structure
Source: DOC Re-Appraisal July 2003.
| Para 30:
" . . . in the Army units . . . a discernible reluctance among recruits and trainees to approach an officer with a problem, on the grounds that the immediate chain of command would be sure to find out and that, anyway, direct contact with officers was considered abnormal."
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9. Attrition Focus
Source: Haes Report 2001.
| "Unless an incident occurs that exposes a problem, it is unlikely to be discovered before the individual reaches the field February 2003 Army or becomes a wastage statistic."
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Source: ASMWG / ASPWG minutes
February 2003.
| The Army Suicide Management Working Group was established in 1998. In February 2003 the title of the group was changed to the Army Suicide Prevention Working Group "to better reflect its overall aim."
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10. Independent Oversight
Source: DOC Re-Appraisal July 2003.
| Para 47:
". . . Initial Training has been under-funded over any years and the risk inherent in the fragility of its structures and in the tautness of some of its programmes is evident. The original Appraisal raised expectations that something would be done about the deficiencies, but, overall, during the Re- Appraisal an air of resigned, weary cynicism prevailed. Most officers and NCOs were sceptical about whether the `system' could do anything to alleviate their difficulties and believed that there was a corporate blindness about what was happening at grass-roots level. One spoke of a `culture of contrived visits which masks the truth' and even within one of the Agencies there was a fatalistic air—`We must accept risk where the solutions are beyond us.'"
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11. Lack of Implementation of Care Issues.
| The Surrey Police Final Report catalogues failures to implement over a number of years.
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