Development of policy implication since
1988
A full overview of how policy and implementation
have developed since 1988 would have to take account of the wider
MoD initiatives of the time and would be a significant task. The
covering memorandum (Ev 232-5) and Ev 270-1, provide some contextual
information, which we hope is helpful to the Committee.
Since 1988 the Army has been subject to significant
and various reorganisations and review (Options for Change etc)
and much pre-dates the formation of HQ ATRA. Included within this
period is the Army's fundamental review of its training organisation
(Review of the Training Base (RTB)). RTB resulted in the formation
of the Army Training Regiments and the re-design of Phase I and
Phase 2 training, better procedures for the care for young soldiers
and improvements to some accommodation.
The frequent reviews need to be considered against
this background of change and within the context of the day—some
12,000 recruits passed through Deepcut between 1995 and 2002,
the period over which the four deaths occurred. The death in 1995
was the first such incident for 30 years. Furthermore during this
period the Army were heavily committed and were undertaking major
operations in a number of theatres including Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra
Leone or providing support to the civil authorities at home, for
example in the foot and mouth crisis or fire fighting. At the
height of the Kosovo operation in 1999, for example, 44% of the
Army were committed to operations, an increase from 36% during
the previous year. With hindsight it is always possible to see
where more could have been done. But the Army was active in making
improvements to the training and care regimes during the 1995-2002
period. Surrey Police however rightly identified a greater focus
to the Army's efforts to learn and implement lessons from 2002
onwards.
These efforts have been focussed principally
through the Joint Learning Account and the triService work of
the Director of Operational Capability. All but one of the 26
recommendations of the Joint Learning Account are complete. The
one remaining relates to the issue of recruit screening, where
some research is required—this is in hand.
Instructor Numbers
ARMY
The detail sought for this question is not available,
the reasons being:
In 1990 Phase 1, 2 and 3 training was the direct
responsibility of individual Arms and Service Directors and there
was no central collation of information on numbers of staff.
Secondly Options for Change (1992) saw sizable
reductions in numbers and in some cases saw Combat Service Support
Arms amalgamating into one Corps and the formation of a single
training unit, eg the RLC and the RLC Training Group was formed
on 1 April 1993 and its predecessors special to arm schools were
disestablished.
Thirdly the Army Individual Training Organisation
was created in 1995, and this brought together Army Phase 1, 2
and 3 training under one unified 2* HQ.[5]
It also saw the transfer of training responsibility from Arms
and Service Directors to the new HQ and the unification of Phase
1 training under a single Initial Training Group.
Fourthly the SDR[6]
review of 1998-99 bought about further changes and this was swiftly
followed by the Non-Deployable Establishment Review of 2000, which
sought to make more soldiers available for front line duties.
Therefore, whilst the historical audit train
of all these changes is not available to the ATRA, what can be
said is that the ATRA's military manpower base has reduced by
c4,000 posts since 1990.
The important issue here is not instructor numbers
but supervisory ratios, which relates more directly to the duty
of care. This is expanded upon in Ev 262-3.
RAF
RAF INSTRUCTOR NUMBER BY ESTABLISHMENT WITH
BREAKDOWN BY INSTRUCTOR TYPE (OFFICER, SNCO, JNCO, CIVILIAN)
The figures given are a snapshot as at 1 April
each year. We are unable to provide figures going back further
than the last three years. In some cases it is not possible to
give the instructor establishment for any previous years, as they
are not generally kept on record.
NAVY
Data from 1990-2003 unavailable.
|
| Establishment | Officer
| SNCO | JNCO
| Civilian |
|
| RN: as at April 2004 | |
| | |
| Raleigh | 8
| 47 | 84
| 0 |
| Sultan | 4
| 16 | 50
| 52 |
| MWS | 34 |
93 | 183
| 78 |
| BRNC | 39 |
12 | 13
| 38 |
| RM: | | |
| |
| CTC-ORs | 25
| 29 | 91
| 6 |
| Officers | 6
| 8 | |
|
|
5
2* = Major General. Back
6
Strategic Defence Review. Back
|
