Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence


Development of policy implication since 1988

  A full overview of how policy and implementation have developed since 1988 would have to take account of the wider MoD initiatives of the time and would be a significant task. The covering memorandum (Ev 232-5) and Ev 270-1, provide some contextual information, which we hope is helpful to the Committee.

  Since 1988 the Army has been subject to significant and various reorganisations and review (Options for Change etc) and much pre-dates the formation of HQ ATRA. Included within this period is the Army's fundamental review of its training organisation (Review of the Training Base (RTB)). RTB resulted in the formation of the Army Training Regiments and the re-design of Phase I and Phase 2 training, better procedures for the care for young soldiers and improvements to some accommodation.

  The frequent reviews need to be considered against this background of change and within the context of the day—some 12,000 recruits passed through Deepcut between 1995 and 2002, the period over which the four deaths occurred. The death in 1995 was the first such incident for 30 years. Furthermore during this period the Army were heavily committed and were undertaking major operations in a number of theatres including Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone or providing support to the civil authorities at home, for example in the foot and mouth crisis or fire fighting. At the height of the Kosovo operation in 1999, for example, 44% of the Army were committed to operations, an increase from 36% during the previous year. With hindsight it is always possible to see where more could have been done. But the Army was active in making improvements to the training and care regimes during the 1995-2002 period. Surrey Police however rightly identified a greater focus to the Army's efforts to learn and implement lessons from 2002 onwards.

  These efforts have been focussed principally through the Joint Learning Account and the triService work of the Director of Operational Capability. All but one of the 26 recommendations of the Joint Learning Account are complete. The one remaining relates to the issue of recruit screening, where some research is required—this is in hand.

Instructor Numbers

ARMY

  The detail sought for this question is not available, the reasons being:

    In 1990 Phase 1, 2 and 3 training was the direct responsibility of individual Arms and Service Directors and there was no central collation of information on numbers of staff.

    Secondly Options for Change (1992) saw sizable reductions in numbers and in some cases saw Combat Service Support Arms amalgamating into one Corps and the formation of a single training unit, eg the RLC and the RLC Training Group was formed on 1 April 1993 and its predecessors special to arm schools were disestablished.

    Thirdly the Army Individual Training Organisation was created in 1995, and this brought together Army Phase 1, 2 and 3 training under one unified 2* HQ.[5] It also saw the transfer of training responsibility from Arms and Service Directors to the new HQ and the unification of Phase 1 training under a single Initial Training Group.

    Fourthly the SDR[6] review of 1998-99 bought about further changes and this was swiftly followed by the Non-Deployable Establishment Review of 2000, which sought to make more soldiers available for front line duties.

    Therefore, whilst the historical audit train of all these changes is not available to the ATRA, what can be said is that the ATRA's military manpower base has reduced by c4,000 posts since 1990.

    The important issue here is not instructor numbers but supervisory ratios, which relates more directly to the duty of care. This is expanded upon in Ev 262-3.

RAF

RAF INSTRUCTOR NUMBER BY ESTABLISHMENT WITH BREAKDOWN BY INSTRUCTOR TYPE (OFFICER, SNCO, JNCO, CIVILIAN)




  The figures given are a snapshot as at 1 April each year. We are unable to provide figures going back further than the last three years. In some cases it is not possible to give the instructor establishment for any previous years, as they are not generally kept on record.

NAVY

  Data from 1990-2003 unavailable.


Establishment
Officer
SNCO
JNCO
Civilian

RN: as at April 2004
Raleigh
8
47
84
0
Sultan
4
16
50
52
MWS
34
93
183
78
BRNC
39
12
13
38
RM:
CTC-ORs
25
29
91
6
Officers
6
8











5   2* = Major General. Back

6   Strategic Defence Review. Back


 
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