Memorandum from Mr Des and Mrs Doreen
James
Thank you for your letter dated 18 March 2004
together with a copy of the News Release regarding the proposed
Defence Select Committee Inquiry looking into the duty of care
regimes in initial training establishments in all three services
of the Armed Forces.
We are pleased to note the Committee has recognised
the calls for a public inquiry into the four deaths at Princess
Royal Barracks, Deepcut, Surrey, between 1995 and 2002 and we
are also re-assured by their admission that they do not have the
specialist capabilities to undertake such an inquiry themselves.
The publication of the Surrey Police so-called 5th Report on 5
March 2004 has re-enforced our view that the deaths at Deepcut
must be scrutinised thoroughly and independently in order to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that we are all aware of issues that exist
or did exist at the time of the deaths.
Furthermore we believe that without such process
we cannot identify the appropriate corrective actions that need
to be put in place to prevent reoccurrence.
We consider that any assumption made regarding
the corrective actions required would be dangerous and may well
leave doubts as to whether we have done as much as we could have
to prevent deaths of recruits in future.
Only an independent public inquiry could property
achieve this and we are pleased that the Surrey Police report
made this recommendation.
It is with this proviso that we wish to cooperate
with the inquiry undertaken by your Committee, albeit we feel
that the work you are about to embark upon on a broader scale
across all three forces may well be undermined in the fullness
of time by the lack of any credible examination of the Deepcut
deaths beforehand.
We would suggest therefore that it might well
be in the best interest of all parties for the Committee to actually
propose a public inquiry into Deepcut before they actually begins
their work.
OUR STATEMENT
The following are some of the facts surrounding
our daughter Cheryl's death at Deepcut on 27 November 1995, which
we feel must be thoroughly examined:
1. An officer from a local Army barracks
in Wrexham informed us of our daughter's death. He had no detail
he could discuss with us; he had merely received a telephone call.
He knew only that Cheryl had "taken her own life" but
he was unable to answer any further questions we had.
2. Cheryl should not have been armed and
alone. The army has referred to this previously as their "misunderstanding
of the regulations in place at the time".
3. There has been no explanation made to
us regarding this either immediately after the death, or in the
eight and a half years since then.
4. Cheryl died at approximately 08:20 on
the morning of 27 November 1995. We were not informed until late
afternoon that day.
5. There has been no explanation made to
us regarding the delay in our receiving this information either
in 1995, or in the eight years since then.
6. The Commanding Officer of the Deepcut
camp made no contact with us either at the time of the death or
in the eight and a half years since then.
7. No one from the Deepcut camp made contact
with us at the time of the death, the first time we met an officer
from Deepcut was at Cheryl's funeral one week later, and then
clearly, the Officer did not make himself available for any detailed
discussion.
8. The Army did not insist that Surrey Police
adopted primacy for the investigation into Cheryl's death, despite
there being (we believe) a clear understanding that this was the
procedure in place.
9. The Commanding Officer knew that Cheryl's
death was the second such death by gunshot wound in a period of
19 weeks, yet he did not insist on a thorough investigation, nor
did he insist the civilian police took over the investigation.
10. The Commanding Officer knew that he
had documented (by his staff) 10 separate self-harm incidents
during the same period but still did not insist on a thorough
investigation by the appropriate authority, the civilian police
(Surrey).
11. The Army and the SlB made the assumption
that Cheryl's death was a suicide, and that assumption denied
any possibility of the death (ever) being properly investigated.
12. The Army and the MoD initially denied
this assumption had ever been made.
13. There are Army documents available,
which conclusively prove the death was assumed to be a suicide.
14. The area of the death was not cordoned
off to prevent evidence being destroyed or lost.
15. The barracks were not "stood down"
and closed to those arriving or leaving, which we have since been
led to understand should have been procedure following an event
of this kind.
16. Fingerprints were not taken from the
rifle found with my daughter's body, and therefore it remains
impossible to be sure she had even fired the weapon.
17. No ballistics evidence was taken in
order to prove conclusively the connection between the weapon
and the death.
18. There is evidence that the SIB collected
the bullet fragmentation at the post mortem; Surrey Police have
identified a witness who has confirmed this.
19. The bullet fragmentation was subsequently
lost.
20. It remains therefore impossible to be
sure the bullet found in my daughter's body was fired from the
rifle found near to her body.
21. The ineptitude of the SIB investigating
officers who attended the scene of my daughter's death has effectively
prevented us from ever knowing for sure how our daughter died.
22. The SIB Officers have never been brought
to account for the way in which my daughter's death was investigated.
23. We have every reason to believe that
the SIB Officers who so dearly assumed a suicide and then failed
to carry out the most basic investigation have been allowed to
continue working in this way since 1995.
24. We have never suggested Cheryl was murdered.
25. The Army however did suggest Cheryl
had taken her own life and the MoD supported that assumption.
26. We have documents issued by the Army
that clearly indicate Cheryl's death was referred to as a suicide
seven days before the Coroners Inquest was even convened.
27. The Coroner returned an open verdict
on 21 December 1995.
28. The Army Board of Inquiry concluded
Cheryl had taken her own life on 11 January 1996.
29. The Army Board of Inquiry did not make
conclusions in line with their own Terms of Reference.
30. The investigation into Cheryl's death
was completed within two weeks of her death, although no one outside
of the Deepcut camp was interviewed.
31. Her parents, relatives nor friends were
asked if they believed it possible she might have taken her own
life. We were not invited to partake in any way whatsoever with
the investigation process in 1995.
32. We were not informed when the investigation
such as it was, was completed.
33. We were not informed a Board of Inquiry
was to be convened.
34. The Board of Inquiry was held in secret.
(From the family)
35. We were not informed of the terms of
reference of the Board of Inquiry.
36. We were not invited to partake in any
way whatsoever with the Board of Inquiry process.
37. We were not informed the Board of Inquiry
was complete.
38. We were not informed of the conclusions
of the Board of Inquiry.
39. We were not offered a copy of the Board
of Inquiry findings as various Ministers and MoD Officials have
stated publicly (these past two years) to be the correct protocol.
40. Cheryl's Commanding Officer did not
give evidence to the investigation camed out by the SIB.
41. Cheryl's Commanding Officer did not
give evidence to the Inquest into her death held on 21 December
1995.
42. Cheryl's Commanding Officer did not
give evidence to Board of Inquiry held on 11 January 1996.
43. Cheryl's Commanding Officer left Deepcut
barracks within days of the Board of Inquiry completion in January
1996.
44. At no time during the process of funeral,
Inquest, Board of Inquiry did Cheryl's Commanding Officer make
any contact with us.
45. We consider it grossly insensitive that
the Commanding Officer should return to Deepout barracks, without
the knowledge of Surrey police while their reinvestigation was
ongoing. (November 2002).
46. We consider it grossly insensitive and
indeed inappropriate that the same (Commanding Officer) was awarded
an OBE in the January 2003 Honours List while the Surrey Police
re-investigation was still ongoing.
47. Indeed we consider such an award grossly
insensitive until such time as the Commanding Officer has accounted
for the way in which the investigation into my daughters death
was managed.
48. Cheryl's personal belongings were returned
to us without any rational explanation of items (we believed to
be) missing. (Mobile telephone for example).
49. The co-ordination of the return of Cheryl's
belongings was poor, unprofessional and insensitive to the feelings
of grieving parents.
50. The courier had no idea what he was
delivering and actually broke down on the way to us. He then telephoned
to say he was "parking up in a lay by overnight". The
following day we were asked to sign for our only daughter's personal
belongings as though we were signing for a new cooker.
51. We had no point of contact to ask even
the most basic questions, such as who did Cheryl speak to that
morning, what was she saying etc.
52. Any information was extremely difficult
to obtain. We had a very clear perception that neither the Army
nor the MoD had any inclination to help us, and wished to sever
communication with us as soon as possible.
53. At one stage in early 1996 we waited
10 weeks for a reply to a letter to the MoD.
54. We believe that in such desperate grief
no person should be treated as we were by the Army and the MoD.
55. We have met a number of young people
who were based at Deepcut barracks and have confirmed the culture
of bullying and intimidation which was allowed to exist there:
56. We believe the Army simply use the words
"zero tolerance toward bullying" whereas there was no
realistic management (at Deepcut) to minimise this.
57. We believe the Army had a Duty of Care
for our daughter, and that they failed in exercising that duty.
April 2004
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