Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100
- 119)
WEDNESDAY 23 JUNE 2004
MR MARTIN
HOWARD AND
MAJOR GENERAL
NICK HOUGHTON
Q100 Mr Blunt: One of the things
we were shown when the Committee visited Iraq was police training
and the development of the Iraqi police in MND(SE). What do you
expect to see in terms of the relationships between the Iraqi
police and the British, in particular in our area of responsibility,
and how will that develop from 1 July and will the police have
a role in setting their own priorities for security operations
in the area, for example deciding whether or not they should be
taking on organised crime as opposed to focusing on public order?
How would you see this developing?
Major General Houghton: Again
the police will be a significant part in the local and the provincial
level security committees. If I understand the Iraqi culture right
on this, they do not have quite the same view of police primacy
as we might understand in Northern Ireland or the streets of England.
The concept that primarily it is a police responsibility to deliver
internal security does not really flow with the culture of the
Iraqi way of doing things.
Q101 Mr Blunt: We seem to be trying
to develop that though?
Major General Houghton: I think
that that is why Prime Minister Allawi's pretty firm statement
of his vision is illuminating. It is quite clear that they see
their police force as more of a community-based force, clearly
to be the front end of what one might call routine crime and protecting
against that. They recognise the requirement to have some level
of capability in a public order dimension and a very small and
focused counter-terrorist capability, what we might call a SWAT
(Special Weapons and Tactics) type of thing, but in terms of the
core responsible for the delivery of security domestically they
still see a leading and primary role for their army. The force
that you will have recognised as being the ICDC—the Iraqi
Civil Defence Corps—to the Iraqi psyche could only ever
be seen as a transitory organisation. They saw it as something
of a fire-fighting organisation and hence the Allawi idea that
that will now be swept up into an overall structure of the Iraqi
army that will operate at three different levels. You will have
the first and premier division of the Iraqi army which will be
a national intervention force capable of delivering high end internal
security. You have another couple of divisions which are conventional
army against long term external deterrent-type threats and then
you have six divisions regionally based throughout the country
called the Iraqi National Guard which had to be recruited from
an amalgam of the current ICDC, militias which have been subject
to a DDR process, and elements of the former Iraqi army that are
brought together. They would be the most likely vehicle for delivering
internal security at the local level. So going back to the genesis
of the question, the police will clearly have a role. Ideally,
one would want to have circumstances in which the sole visible
security presence in an area was the police but their immediate
support in the future I would see being the Iraqi National Guard
in support of police and only then multinational forces as a backstop
to that. Clearly there will still be some areas where multinational
forces will need to take the lead.
Q102 Mr Blunt: You think they are
up to that on 1 July?
Major General Houghton: Not everywhere
but in certain places
Q103 Mr Blunt: In MND(SE)?
Major General Houghton: Yes.
Mr Howard: We said earlier that
in three out of the four provinces on general security we are
reasonably confident that the Iraqis will be able to take responsibility.
Q104 Mr Havard: The emotive issue
of arrest and detention and treatment of prisoners; I would like
to deal with some of that. As I understand it, there have been
70 investigations and half of these have not been carried on with
because there did not seem to be any proper or prima facie
case for further action. However, the Attorney-General's statement
of 14 June announced that four British soldiers were now to be
prosecuted—we are not talking about the American stuff—and
there was one case which had been referred to the Metropolitan
Police. I would like to explore these a bit further if I could.
In this case the reasoning was that the commanding officer had
decided there should not be any further progress and therefore
the RMP could not deal with it. That is as far I understand. Can
I first of all deal with the general; can you tell us how many
British personnel in total have been subject to all of these different
investigations for alleged misconduct?
Major General Houghton: Are you
talking about the general or the General?
Q105 Mr Havard: I meant the general
in terms of general circumstances.
Major General Houghton: I will
let you speak first.
Mr Howard: I can give you the
current number of cases which SIB have been investigating, which
is as of a day or so ago 79. I am not sure I can give you off
the top of my head numbers of soldiers who are involved in each
case, it depends what you mean by "subject to investigation",
but the number of cases is 79.[5]
Q106 Mr Havard: We want to try and
get a feel for just how many individuals are involved in all of
these things. Clearly some of the cases might be one person and
some might be five and so on. If you can give us that information
at some time it might be helpful to give a context to the overall
process. Could I now turn to this particular case with the Metropolitan
Police involvement. I understand that is because the commanding
officer decided that in this particular instance it did not warrant
any further investigation, which in some way debarred the Royal
Military Police from continuing, and that is why it is with the
Metropolitan Police. What training is given to commanding officers
to make that sort of judgment?
Mr Howard: The rule in this is
that the CO does have the right to have the first view. He is
obliged to seek legal advice in doing so. It is less that he has
got legal training, because obviously not all commanding officers
have legal training, but that he is obliged to seek legal advice.
Q107 Mr Havard: We do not want an
army of lawyers, we have got an army of lawyers in here.
Major General Houghton: Could
I just say that at every stage of an officer's career starting
at Sandhurst, through to staff college, qualification for promotion
and all those stages, there is a degree of military law training
given specific to the Army Act. But Martin is absolutely right
that, thank goodness, an Army officer would not pretend to be
a lawyer in that respect and therefore relies heavily on the legal
advice that he is given in how to deal with cases.
Q108 Mr Havard: So you feel it is
right that the commanding officer has this power supported by
these various processes to enable him to properly carry out that
task?
Mr Howard: We are confident that
the process works in overall terms but the fact that the Attorney-
General has decided in this one particular case to pursue a prosecution
where the commanding officer did not, has always been a safeguard
and that safeguard continues to exist. Overall we are satisfied.
Q109 Mr Havard: In this case we have
got that power being exercised and then that stops the RMP but
we now have it with the civil police. If this first process is
so rigorous and effective how come we have ended up with it being
investigated by the Metropolitan Police?
Mr Howard: That is why we have
the Attorney-General there as a safeguard. The commanding officer's
right to do this varies according to the situation. Originally
it was applied at the start of the conflict because we were in
a war situation and it would not be practical. That right has
now moved up, I think, to Brigadier or brigade commander level
rather than the CO of individual units depending on circumstance
because if you are in a war situation it is not feasible to apply
exactly the same approach to all these things that would be otherwise
the case and we are not now in quite the same situation as we
were last year.
Q110 Mr Havard: I appreciate that
it is now with the Metropolitan Police. The Metropolitan Police
may conclude that there is no case and they will not put it to
the Crown Prosecution Service and it may stop again. So this is
part of a layered process which checks and balances these things;
is that right?
Major General Houghton: One could
argue that the fact that only one of these has been referred to
the Metropolitan Police by the Attorney-General really sustains
the efficacy of the process as is.
Q111 Mr Havard: I am more concerned
at this stage that it is the process because an individual case
is an individual case and the rigour of the process in a sense
is not more important than but is particularly important because
cases will come and go judged on their merits. The process is
important to us so that we understand that it is an effective
process and the decision-making is put at the right level and
supported in the right sort of ways, because quite clearly, as
you will appreciate, and we all know, these cases are under examination,
and thereby the process, and it does have a material effect on
the ground which you have alluded to yourselves and which we saw
when we were in Basra. Given that is the case what do you think
the impact has been, not necessarily in terms of the public discussion
there has been about the morality of different activities in one
sense but more in terms of giving the British forces the ability
to achieve their objectives on the ground? What we discovered
when we went to Basra was that a lot of the British troops were
angry because it was soon after the things that were happening
in the Mirror and so on. They were angry for two reasons
really. They felt it was not helping them in their job and they
were angry for their families and their partners and people back
home who were more worried about them because the circumstance
on the ground had become more uncertain as a consequence. They
were very phlegmatic about their own personal position but they
were angry for these other reasons and part of those reasons was
because it was having a material effect on how they could do their
job and what they could practically do. What assessment have you
made of the impact of all that?
Mr Howard: I will ask Nick to
say something about the assessment on operational effectiveness
but could I mention the dilemma we face here because on the one
hand it is very important that if soldiers, sailors or airmen
are accused of wrong doing that that should be investigated properly
and we have due process. We must have a process which we think
works and which is fair to all those involved and we must ensure
that those processes are applied rigorously, and I think that
is right. The difficulty that arises is that once that process
is underway we are not in a position publicly to comment on individual
cases, which means that stories can appear in newspapers or on
television or on the radio about these things which it is very
difficult for the Ministry of Defence to come out and say no,
that is not true. All we can say is the allegation that has been
made is being investigated and that can be a source of frustration
at all levels. I can understand why that is a source of frustration
on the ground in operational theatres. As to the extent to which
it has an effect on operational effectiveness, I think we should
leave aside the very extreme and hopefully not to be repeated
case of the Daily Mirror, for example, and hopefully that
is behind us. I will ask Nick whether it has had a more general
effect.
Q112 Mr Havard: Before you start
General, it is delayed, is it not? It is effectiveness in terms
of the military effectiveness but, as you were alluding to, in
the move from local to regional control and the move to have a
strategic overview, it is about confidence in terms of quick improvement
projects. It is building up confidence to have a process. These
are the reconstruction aspects which the military may not be directly
doing but providing the security for. So there is a very sophisticated
effect you can have on the ground that feeds back into the effectiveness
that troops can have. What sort of assessment of it are you making?
Major General Houghton: Sorry,
you have rather complicated what I thought was a relatively straightforward
question. The answer I was just thinking of was in specific relation
to start with the business of subjecting soldiers to legal inquiry
because of circumstances in which they might have committed some
sort of breach. My view there would be that of course there is
going to be an element of emotion about individual cases and that
will play out locally within units, and there will be concerns
and worries because of local understanding of the circumstances
and knowledge of the impact that might have an on individual and
his family back at home. I think that nevertheless there is collective
robustness within the army and an appreciation that we only enjoy
a moral superiority over an enemy or over a terrorist because
all our actions are subject to the law. If we ever wanted to avoid
that circumstance then our moral superiority would disappear and
our self-respect for ourselves as a force would also disappear.
So although there are some local emotional circumstances I do
not think collectively the army in the round has any difficulty
with that. Your second point was wider—that perhaps regardless
of how good the army is at prosecuting its element of the campaign
that sometimes seems to be undermined because things over which
it does not have a direct control, such as reconstruction, inward
investment and all those sorts of things are not proceeding with
the same sort of energy alacrity and success. It can be a frustration,
of that there is no doubt. From my exposure across to Whitehall
I sense from what the FCO are attempting do in terms of governance
or DfID are attempting to do in terms of inward investment and
reconstruction, that we have got a reasonably good story to tell,
but in circumstances which are undoubtedly difficult.
Q113 Mr Havard: Stray words can mean
stray bullets somewhere else, can they not? One of the examples
that was given to us was the story about the bayonets being fixed,
never mind the photographs, and the effects of that can be interpreted
then locally on the ground in Iraq as being some sort of mutilation
process. Things are read differently in different fora and different
places. It was quite clear that winning confidence to engage in
the process is disturbed by some of these stories so it does set
back, we were being told, the effectiveness with which people
can work because they are being seen differently than they were
the day before. It takes time then to win that confidence back
and move that forward. I just think that in terms of how the processes
are working we need to restate all the time that there is this
rigour in how these things are dealt with and if there are difficulties
they are dealt with in that way. If we are trying to help other
people and encourage them to develop their rule of law and confidence
in the rule of law we had better display the fact that we do it
properly. That is a bit of speech rather than a question but,
there we go, thank very much.
Major General Houghton: We agree.
Q114 Mr Roy: My colleague just spoke
there, Chairman, about winning the confidence of the people. One
way we can do that is to ensure that justice should be done and
seen to be done, especially by the victims and their families.
If you agree with that, the question I would like to ask you is
what plans are there to ensure that courts martial are held in
Iraq so if they are held in Iraq that the victim and the families
will hopefully be able to attend and, if they are in Iraq, will
they be in public?
Mr Howard: I think in general
courts martial have the same sort of status as a crown court and,
as I understand it, members of the public can attend. There may
be constrictions of security of course in actually doing that
in Iraq but in principle members of the public can attend.
Q115 Mr Roy: And in camera?
Mr Howard: The reason for going
in camera in a court martial would be same as it would
be in a civil court. There will be reasons why civil courts go
in camera dealing with a particularly sensitive security
issue for example, but the same would apply to a court martial.
Q116 Mr Roy: Will it be in Iraq or
somewhere in England?
Mr Howard: That would depend on
the case.
Q117 Mr Roy: That is my point because
if it depends on the case presumably the alleged crime would have
been carried out in Iraq. No matter what the case is, if it is
a court martial in relation to the occupation then it has got
to have been carried out in Iraq. What I am trying to get at is
whether an alleged crime is going to be carried out in Iraq and
the court martial then be carried out somewhere in the United
Kingdom or do we have plans after 30 June to make sure that those
courts martial are carried out in the same country as the alleged
crime was perpetrated?
Mr Howard: I do not think there
will be any change in policy after 30 June on this. Again General
Houghton might want to add but the usual practice, as I understand
it, is because of the need to want to hold it promptly to have
the process of justice be held in a speedy way ideally it will
be done close to the scene of the crime because that is obviously
much easier but it would depend on whether you had got the right
legal representation and legally qualified people on the spot.
In the case of Iraq we probably have.
Major General Houghton: I was
looking down here to see if I had any particular advice on it.
I think that the practicalities of arranging for a court martial
would militate towards doing it back at the UK base if that was
possible and if in doing it that way it did not in any way undermine
the ability to have access to evidence, to local witnesses, and
that sort of thing. It would be quite possible to hold a court
martial back in the UK but during proceedings there might be a
requirement for the presiding judge of the court martial to actually
go and visit the scene on the ground.
Q118 Mr Roy: That takes me back to
the point you raised there about winning the confidence of the
people. Surely you are not going to win the confidence of the
people if you decide you are going to have a court martial somewhere
in the south of England as opposed to Basra or somewhere else
in Iraq where the local population who have been victimised are
expecting justice not only to be done but justice to be seen to
be done? I suggest to you that if that is the case then justice
will not be seen to be done by those people in the locality and
the villages an Iraq.
Mr Howard: I think it is question
of having the right expertise and the right ability to carry out
the process of justice and that has to be balanced against the
process of being seen to be done. I do not think there is any
fixed policy.
Major General Houghton: No, if
the result of such a court martial led to a custodial sentence
that could be served in the UK.
Q119 Mr Roy: I understand that. That
is different. I do not mind someone being found guilty and the
custodial sentence being served in the United Kingdom in a jail
somewhere. From the point of view of justice being seen to be
done and to winning the confidence of the Iraqi people, I think
it would be absolutely wrong to say all our courts martial are
going to be held somewhere in the South of England that I do not
even know where, being a Scotsman, never mind someone from outside
Basra, and I think that is the danger—that we would lose
the confidence of the people.
Mr Howard: It would be wrong to
say they will all be tried back in the UK or all be tried in Iraq
in the theatre concerned. We need to look at the circumstance
and it will vary in seriousness.
Mr Havard: Some of the American cases
have already been dealt with and they were dealt with in America.
Is there going to be something, for example, I do not know whether
it is in the status of forces agreement or some sort of understanding
to be established with the new Interim Government or whatever
about how these things are done? Maybe the decision of where to
do them and how to do them and so on comes into part of that thinking.
I do not know what to say. Do you see what I mean? The new administration
there may have a view of how they would like to co-operate with
any given coalition country on how that coalition country deals
with these cases where it deals with some sort of agreement or
understanding of how it is to be done because, quite clearly,
in the coalition situation we have a number of different countries
all of whom may well take a slightly different view of how they
might want to do it and have different requirements in terms of
their own domestic law to do it. Anyway, I will leave that as
a thought rather than a question.
Mr Viggers: Very good. Mr Howard, Major
General Houghton, thank you very much for the way you have answered
our questions. You have been very helpful. Thank you.
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