Examination of Witnesses (Questions 140
- 159)
TUESDAY 2 NOVEMBER 2004
MR GEOFFREY
HOON MP
Q140 Mr Hancock: So it is 30
days from today, is it, not 30 days from when they left their
base last week?
Mr Hoon: I am confident that they
will be back in their base within 30 days.
Q141 Mr Hancock: If this was
simply a request that you would normally get in the exchange between
allies in this sort of set-up, and I think it is reasonable to
accept that that possibly is the case, and that there were no
permanent or significant alterations to the battle plan for the
British deployed forces, why then could the commanders in theatre
not have agreed this? Why did it necessitate ministers getting
involved? You cannot really have it both ways, can you?
Mr Hoon: But then neither than
the Committee because I anticipate, if it had been left to commanders
on the ground to resolve this, this Committee and Parliament would
have made some perfectly legitimate constitutional complaints
about the importance of Parliament being informed over significant
deployments of British troops.
Q142 Mr Hancock: So this was
part of a regular pattern of exchanges that the Americans said,
"What reserves have you available? Can you spare us a battle
group?" So did you at the same time assess what reserves
they had available and what their capabilities were? Considering
the size of the troop deployment they had, are you seriously saying
that of 130,000 deployed troops, they did not have 100 troops
available?
Mr Hoon: I think the Americans
have probably got rather more than 130,000 but I accepted entirely
that the nature of the operations that they are contemplating
requires a particular kind of force; that force we are replacing
with The Black Watch; and I accept entirely that it is necessary
to replace like-with-like, and that not all of those 138,000 soldiers
that the Americans have deployed are of that kind of capability,
so it is not entirely accurate to talk about 138,000. This is
a particular armoured capability and there are nothing like that
number of American troops with that capability on the ground.
Q143 Mr Hancock: Less than 1
per cent of the deployed forces were capable of doing this job,
as far as the Americans are concerned?
Mr Hoon: Again, I do not recognise
that statistic.
Q144 Mr Hancock: Well, 138,000.
They needed 800. It is less than 1 per cent of the deployed force.
Mr Hoon: I do not think that is
a terribly accurate way of describing it either.
Q145 Mr Hancock: They are your
figures.
Mr Hoon: If you will allow me
to answer the question, the Americans require particular capabilities
to conduct some quite difficult offensive operations in places
like Fallujah. Not surprisingly they require armoured capability
to achieve those operations successfully. Now, they have more
than a single battle group of armoured capability but that will
be deployed either to existing operation or for the operations
that are in prospect, therefore I accept that they do not have
spare capacity both to conduct those operations and to cover the
area that The Black Watch are now in a position to cover.
Q146 Mr Hancock: In that case
then, Secretary of State, what sort of decision can senior commanders
take on the ground in Iraq about the deployment, with negotiation
with their allies, for troops to be deployed around the country?
Where do you step in and where can they make a decision? What
is the size of our roulement?
Mr Hoon: Obviously there is a
constant process of discussion. I am accountable to Parliament
for the decisions that are taken at every level in the Ministry
of Defence, and therefore certainly I would expect to be informed
of any significant deployment. I think there is a difference between
the United Kingdom and many other countries as far as troop deployment
is concerned. There is a very strong constitutional tradition
in this country that these matters are important to Parliament,
and that inevitably means that ministers do take a close interest
in these questions. I would say as a matter of routine British
forces report more to the Ministry of Defence about what perhaps
in other countries would be considered to be relatively minor
changes and adjustments simply because ministers are regularly
accountable to Parliament in a way that does not happen in most
other countries.
Q147 Mr Hancock: I agree with
that, and on 18 October you told the House in a statement that
other British land forces had previously been deployed and operated
outside that area, but we had not been told of it until you mentioned
it in your statement, and then you did not clarify it. Would you
care to do that today?
Mr Hoon: British forces were engaged
outside MND(SE) on border operations for a short period of time
conducting basically operations to try and assist the Iraqis in
securing that border.
Q148 Mr Hancock: And that is
the only other occasion, is it?
Mr Hoon: Well, there are other
occasions I do not wish to go into.
Q149 Mr Hancock: Yes, but they
were always taken on the ground by commanders there and not by
ministers there, who felt they had to tell Parliament about that?
Mr Hoon: I think I was told of
those operations.
Q150 Mr Hancock: You "think"
you were told, or you were told?
Mr Hoon: I was told, yes.
Mr Hancock: Thank you, Chairman.
Q151 Mr Havard: We have a situation,
then, where the British troops are undertaking the mission you
described, which is presumably in order to allow something else
to happen elsewhere. One of the "something elses" that
is going to happen is presumably a "successful" assault
in Fallujah, gain stability there, the end-state presumably is
to see that happen, secure the land environment and help that
whole process towards the elections process in January. That seems
to be the declared aim certainly of the Americans in terms of
the overall mission, if you like, of all the particular missions
which, when they all come together, will be established. Is that
right?
Mr Hoon: Certainly Fallujah is
one of the places where it will be necessary to conduct operations
to deal with the very significant terrorist threat that is based
there.
Q152 Mr Havard: I really want
to come on to this question about the role of the Iraqis in all
this as well, which is why we were asking about what the British
role is in terms of shaping the whole exercise and what is the
role of the Iraqis in this. Now, there is an arrangement, as I
understand it, of the Ministerial Committee for National Security
under which there is then the Security Action Committee, and then
below that there are some Joint Co-ordination Committees that
can operate at both provincial town and municipal level. All of
these are methods by which people are involved, as I understand
it, in mission selection and in deciding the policy. Is that roughly
the correct description of where we are?
Mr Hoon: The decision as to whether
any operation will be conducted in and around Fallujah or elsewhere
will be a decision for the interim Iraqi government.
Q153 Mr Havard: What is behind
my question, as you will know, is the concern less about what
the Brits will do and what might happen as a consequence of broader
activities. The collateral damage that maybe comes about because
of an attack in Fallujah; 60,000 people or whatever it is are
still in the town and so on; so what is the Iraqis' view of it?
Was this put to this Ministerial Committee of National Security?
Were they involved in that, and if so when?
Mr Hoon: I have emphasised to
you that these decisions will be taken by the Iraqis. They will
be taken after a political process inside Iraq whereby the information
will be provided to that particular Committee and they will reach
a view as to whether it is appropriate. I am confident that, for
example, one of the steps that they will need to take is to warn
the population of Fallujah, or wherever operations are conducted.
There is no doubt, as I think I have mentioned to Parliament before,
that there is growing evidence that the ordinary people of Fallujah
are sick and tired of having foreign fighters who are intimidating
them, threatening them and on occasions killing them, who are
using their city as a base for launching terrorist operations
largely against Iraqis. The combination of military action and
a political process, I hope, as we have seen in places like Samarra,
and as we saw in Najaf, will produce a situation where there are
elections in Iraq crucially where cities like Fallujah are once
again answerable to the government of Iraq, and that is a perfectly
legitimate ambition for the government of Iraq to pursue, but
it will be they who will be pursuing it.
Mr Havard: I have a couple more questions but
my colleague on my right is itching to ask you something.
Q154 Mr Jones: Secretary of
State, you said that the decision, for example, on operations
in Fallujah is down to the Iraqi government. What is their role
once those operations have started? What is their involvement,
for example, in calling a halt to action, or in the day-to-day
running?
Mr Hoon: It is their country.
They will have complete authority and, indeed, responsibility
for those operations. They will be briefed in the way that I have
been briefed: they will expect to receive thorough detail as to
what is happening and, of course, if they decide that the operation
should stop at any stage, that is a matter for them. If they decide
it should stop, it will stop.
Q155 Mr Jones: But the bulk
of the people involved in, for example, the assault at Fallujah
are not Iraqi National Army but other forces, they are foreign
forces in terms of the US and other elements of external
Mr Hoon: I think you must just
be careful about your premise. I do not think either of us are
in a position to say what that force composition will be. There
will be a very significant representation of Iraqi Security Forces.
The precise proportion has not been decided.
Q156 Mr Jones: How does it work
then? For example, if they have control over, for example, the
Iraqi forces there, which I assume from what you are saying is
correct, are you saying that they have a veto or they will stop,
for example, or overrule what a US commander on the ground would
want to do?
Mr Hoon: The final decision as
to whether this operation will be conducted, how it will be conducted,
and the nature of the operations involved is a matter for the
Iraqis and it is a matter for the Committee, as I referred to
earlier.
Q157 Mr Jones: So they can call
a halt at any stage?
Mr Hoon: Of course.
Q158 Mr Havard: My understanding
of it is that the local American commander who is organising the
attack on Fallujah has said that the attack will have an Iraqi
face, that there will be Iraqi troops within it in order to give
it that but obviously the predominant people involved in it are
going to be American forces.
Mr Hoon: Sorry, I just dealt with
the premise. I do not think you can say at this stage who will
be the predominant force. There will be a very significant Iraqi
participation in these operations.
Q159 Mr Havard: As far as I
understand it, as far as the Security Action Committee is concerned,
we have been told that there is British involvement some way and
another through multinational force, presumably through the Americans?
Mr Hoon: A British general is
second in command of the multinational force.
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