Examination of Witnesses (Questions 333
- 339)
WEDNESDAY 2 FEBRUARY 2005
MR MARTIN
HOWARD, LT
GENERAL JOHN
MCCOLL
CBE DSO, MAJOR GENERAL
NICK HOUGHTON
CBE AND MAJOR
GENERAL BILL
ROLLO CBE
Q333 Chairman: Gentlemen, welcome
back. We will be continuing with our session on British operations
in Iraq. Thank you for making yourselves available. Last time
we ended our discussion with a series of questions about troops
in multi-national divisions south and the strains that the Dutch
withdrawal from Al Muthanna province may place upon British forces.
Since then the Secretary of State has announced further deployments
to cover any gaps which have arisen. We will return to that later
on this morning. Last week I told you we would start the session
with questions about the elections. I, for one, am absolutely
delighted, despite the loss of life, that the elections passed
off far more successfully than many in the media and some here
had feared or, dare I say it, in some cases hoped. We will come
to this shortly. Obviously what marred the election further was
the loss of the aircraft and British personnel. Without prejudging
any inquiry that is obviously taking place, is there anything
that you would like to add to what might have appeared in the
media which may or may not have reflected reality?
Mr Howard: First of all, obviously
we share your pleasure at the outcome of the election. We were
very pleased; I think it was highly successful. If it will help
the Committee, General Houghton will be prepared to say something
about the security operation and how that went a little later,
when it is convenient. We were very pleased. I think there was
a very good turnout, particularly in the North and South. As expected,
the Sunni turnout was low but in some areas it was encouragingly
high, where there was less intimidation perhaps. It is, of course,
just the first step and there is a process which you are familiar
with of going through to draft a constitution, a referendum, and
then elections at the end of this year. So a very good start.
Without pre-empting what Nick may say later on, I think the general
view was the security operation went well both in terms of performance
of Iraqi security forces and the coalition. On the crash of the
C130, I think the first thing to say is that everyone in the Armed
Forces and the MoD is thinking of those who have lost their loved
ones in the crash. It is too early to say very much about what
happened on the day, there is a very thorough investigation which
is underway now. I think I would prefer not to come up with any
detailed points when that investigation goes on. In answer to
your direct question, Chairman, I do not think there is much I
can add at this stage.
Q334 Chairman: When you have small
Armed Forces the loss of any soldier in any circumstances is distressing.
Obviously we, on the Committee, send our condolences to the families
and friends of those who were killed wherever they stand. General,
you mentioned security support for the election turned out very
well. Were there any incidents involving British troops? What
did they disrupt or disturb or find? Was there any departure from
your description last week that they would operate on the third
outer tier of a security ring? Were there occasions when they
had to go closer in towards the polling stations in order to support
the Iraq police?
Major General Houghton: No, there
were not. There were—and there was some press coverage of
it—some pre-emptive operations on the eve of election day
during which there was some interdiction of explosives and bomb
making materials which was very good, intelligence led. There
was no requirement for British soldiers to close in on key point
defence of election sites, they maintained a reaction force capability
in depth. There was some element of framework patrolling which
went on. Across the piece, as a whole I would echo Martin's comments
that security on election day passed off well in the round. I
think it reflected great credit on the security arrangements provided
principally by Iraqi security forces but also, of course, the
supporting troops of the multi-national force. To give you just
a statistical feel for what went on on the day, there were in
overall terms a total of 260 incidents reported, 108 of those
targeted directly against election sites, polling booths, that
sort of thing, but the lethality of these attacks was low, reflecting
the fact that many of them were either poorly planned or else
pretty speculative in nature, firing small arms from great distances,
more to have some sort of an atmospheric effect rather than targeting
specific people. No single attack penetrated any polling station.
There were a total of eight suicide bombers and collectively those
eight suicide bombers caused ten deaths and 33 injuries.
Q335 Chairman: Overall?
Major General Houghton: This is
overall in Iraq. The total casualty figures for the day were 44
killed and 161 injured and whereas one certainly cannot make light
of that, it being very sad, I think that against what some of
the worst case prognoses might have been, this can be seen as
a relatively good success for the nature of the overall security
operations.
Q336 Chairman: Were Armed Forces
involved in escorting ballot boxes to wherever the collecting
points were?
Major General Houghton: To be
perfectly honest, I will have to come back to you on that, that
certainly was not the plan that they needed to. I would not want
to give you a definitive no without checking that out.
Q337 Chairman: Maybe in support of
those who were carrying them. If it is possible, when you have
more information, perhaps you could give us a fuller account because
that would be very helpful.[1]
I think we are all delighted—except some journalists who
are now having to revise what they wrote—that the elections
were very successful and have led to a democratically elected
sovereign authority and we have been able to play an important
part in achieving that objective. It is much too early, I suppose,
to start thinking about security for further elections but I think
we are reasonably satisfied. While we will get to a more detailed
discussion of security sector reform later in our discussions,
can you provide us with an assessment either in full or in part
now, or if you cannot provide it in full now perhaps by letter,
as to how the Iraqi security forces performed? Was there evidence
of them all turning up for work? I know we were informed in some
very dangerous parts of the country there were a few sickies sent
in to their employers and a lot of people did not turn up for
duties.
Mr Howard: Is that during the
election, Chairman?
Q338 Chairman: In the run-up to the
election, were they fully manned?
Mr Howard: I think the picture
with Iraqi security forces varies from unit to unit and province
to province and we can give you a more detailed note, certainly,
rather than go into all the ins and outs now. In general, I think
in certain areas, even against quite demanding opposition, the
Iraqi security forces have done well. For example, units performed
well in Fallujah in support of coalition action, also in Sada
City and Samara and Najaf. There have been other occasions where
they have performed less well, I think Mosul would be an example
of that, and certainly in some areas there have been problems
of desertion and absence without leave. It is varied across the
piece. I think generally in MND (South East) we have had perhaps
a better performance overall. No-one would suggest that they are
fully effective at this stage to take on full security duties,
that is obviously a priority for our policies during 2005. Nick,
do you want to add anything?
Major General Houghton: I could
not instantaneously give you—and they are not yet available,
as it were—percentages of turnout figures on the day for
the various elements of the security force architecture within
the Iraqi security forces. Martin is right to reflect that in
general terms, not just for the elections but in operations leading
up to the elections, the turnout within the Iraqi security forces
has been a general reflection of the nature of the security situation
in the area in which they are operating, the level of intimidation
that they and their families are subjected to in the local environment
and the degree of training and battle inoculation which has gone
into the preparation of those particular units. Clearly this varies
quite significantly across the piece. In the normal run of things
we would expect to get some sort of percentage feedback on the
figures for turnout on the day because this feeds back into the
training mechanism.
Chairman: It is rather humbling for politicians
who ponder over the elections in Iraq and the bravery of people
involved, when you think that at the last election 40% of the
electorate in this country decided for one reason or another not
to vote without any threats of being beheaded en route and so
it is very encouraging for the future of what I hope will be a
democratic Iraq to see people who were courageous enough, especially
those people who were Sunni where the threats must have been infinitely
greater for them to vote. I think we ought to express our admiration
for everybody concerned in the process. The last question on this:
I know areas other than our own are not your responsibility but
if in the course of your work you come across any studies which
are more or less open sourced in other parts of the country I
think it would be very helpful if you would not mind alerting
us to the authors or maybe, with the permission of the authors,
pass them on to us because this is such an important part in the
evolution of contemporary Iraq. Thank you very much. We have a
few questions on the coalition troop levels.
Q339 Mr Viggers: The Prime Minister
has commented on the handover of control and his spokesman said
that the Prime Minister was setting out "a timeline, rather
than a timescale". I do not know if you can distinguish between
the two?
Mr Howard: I think the way we
would see it, and the way Prime Minister Allawi has seen it also,
in his statement last week on the subject of 25 January, is that
in looking ahead to the potential withdrawal of British troops
and coalition troops more generally, it is more a question of
defining the right conditions under which that withdrawal could
take place. I should make the point, also, that no-one would expect
the sudden withdrawal of everything, it will be a staged process
and it will be linked to the security situation in the province
but most of all linked to the ability of the Iraqi security forces
to take on responsibility, both at provincial and national level
for containing and ultimately defeating insurgency. The Prime
Minister's spokesman obviously speaks for himself but the thinking
that we have in the Department is that we try to find conditions
against which reduction can take place, and ultimately withdrawal
can take place, rather than saying "It will happen by date
X". As our thinking refines itself, and as we are clear about
progress on development of Iraqi security forces, it may be possible
to give more precision about timings but at this stage I think
we would be quite cautious about putting a date on it.
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