Examination of Witnesses (Questions 380
- 399)
WEDNESDAY 2 FEBRUARY 2005
MR MARTIN
HOWARD, LT
GENERAL JOHN
MCCOLL
CBE DSO, MAJOR GENERAL
NICK HOUGHTON
CBE AND MAJOR
GENERAL BILL
ROLLO CBE
Q380 Chairman: As far as the British
are concerned, they worked very hard—generally very successfully—at
creating a very good image. Do you think this temporarily dented
or permanently dented it, to a limited extent or severely?
Lt General McColl: I think the
effect of the Abu Ghraib issues did not significantly adversely
affect the reputation of the British forces. That would me by
view in theatre. Would you agree with that?
Major General Rollo: I would.
Q381 Chairman: What plans are afoot
to transfer cases of detainees in British custody to the Iraqi
authorities for criminal prosecution?
Mr Howard: We have a policy in
terms of detainees. When we hold them, there are three things
we can do. First, if they, in our judgment, represent an imperative
threat to security, as defined in the Security Council resolution,
then we can detain them, subject to the safeguards, Chairman,
which you have already mentioned. The second class is where we
have picked someone up who on the face of it is guilty of criminality,
in which case we would hand those over to the Iraqi authorities.
Anyone else we pick up, for whatever reason, who does not fall
into either of those categories, we release. We do one of those
three things. So, yes, we do pass those who are prima facie
guilty of criminality across to the Iraqi authorities and that
has been going on for sometime.[4]
Q382 Chairman: When we were there,
it was pretty deserted. One British newspaper reported that a
British citizen was transferred from that detention centre to
a court in the UK. Is that correct?
Mr Howard: We do have one British
citizen who is detained at the moment. I did not think he had
been transferred to the UK, but perhaps I could check on that
particular case and come back to you.
Q383 Chairman: The reference we had—and
we do seek all sorts of information to see if it is worthy of
our attention—was The Sun, 24 January last year.
I am sure you are an avid reader of that illustrious newspaper.
Mr Howard: All the time, Chairman!
Q384 Chairman: We do now! Perhaps
you could drop us a note.[5]
Mr Howard: Certainly.
Q385 Chairman: For those who will
not be transferred to the Iraqis for prosecution, what plans are
there to transfer the responsibility for physically keeping those
detainees to the Iraqi authorities or other facilities?
Mr Howard: I think, if an individual
is not being handed over to the Iraqis because he is going to
be prosecuted because we think he has committed a crime, he is
simply released. We would not hand him over. He would just be
released into the community, unless he is being held under UNSCR
as an imperative threat to security.
Chairman: Thank you very much. Now back
into the sequence of questions, turning to the cost of security
sector reform.
Q386 Mr Viggers: Could I ask, first,
about the numbers of those who are Iraqi trained security personnel?
The estimates have varied dramatically. The Secretary of State
for Defence told the House of Commons on 10 January that 115,000
Iraqi security personnel are trained, equipped and operating across
Iraq. We have had General Schwitters of the United States saying
that in August 2004 only 3,000 of the men in the Army can be regarded
as trained. We have had General Petraeus, also of the United States
Armed Forces, saying that in September 2004 there were 164,000
Iraqi police and soldiers (of whom 100,000 were trained and equipped),
along with 74,0000 facility protection forces participating. Wildly
differing estimates—which is not surprising, because it
depends what you mean by trained. Can you please give us a realistic
estimate of how many Iraqi forces are now trained in the security
field?[6]
Mr Howard: The picture is complicated
by the fact that the Iraqi security forces have a number of components:
National Guard, Army, facilities protection, order enforcement,
etc. Nick will probably go through that in a bit more detail.
Also, there is a question, when we talk about training, as to
which level. Trained to carry out, for example, basic policing
functions is very different from being fully trained and equipped
to carry out hard-edged counter-insurgency operations. So there
is no one definition of trained. With that observation, perhaps
I could hand over to Nick.
Major General Houghton: Essentially,
you will get from me a fourth version of what the numbers might
be. But, first, just a bit on what Martin has said. It is complex,
because within the overall Iraqi security architecture there are
many things which may or may not feature and within that there
are different levels of training accomplished. In very broad,
outside terms, you have the Army, the navy, the air force, the
police, the department of order enforcement and the facilities
protection service. Within, for example, just the Army, you have
the Iraqi Intervention Force, the regular Army, the Iraqi National
Guard, and some special operations battalions. If I could take
them in bite-sized chunks: in the facilities protection service
the level of training is relatively minimal, and 74,000—the
figure you had, I think, from General Petraeus—is probably
about right. In the department of border enforcement (which itself
is an amalgam of border police immigration police and customs
services), it is certainly in excess of 16,000, with a target
figure of 28,000—so, as of today, 20,000 is probably a broad
order of those who are the trained and fielded. Within the police,
the aim is to be at 135,000 by the end of this year. In terms
of those who have formally undergone any element of training,
we are looking at about 90,000—again, as of today. In the
navy and air force, a relatively small number. In the navy you
are talking about the manning of five patrol boats and five inflatables,
and you are talking about a small number of hundreds. Within the
Army, the Iraqi Intervention Force, of those who are trained and
equipped and fielded we are now at 12 battalions, so perhaps about
6,000. In the regular Army, the six operational battalions at
the moment aspire to be nine by February, so you are probably
talking about another 3,000 or 4,000 there. The big numbers rest
within the Iraqi National Guard, where there are 42 operational
battalions—battalions again varying in strength, but you
could take an average of about 500 strong—so upwards of
20,000 in the Iraqi National Guard, and a couple of special operational
battalions. These, if you like, is their SF type equivalent—probably
about 1,000 strong there. I caveat all those because they are,
sort of, moving and dynamic figures; the quality of the training
differs within each; and you have heard previously of the fact
that there are—as I think the British Army would call them—"retention
difficulties" with some of them. But I would be very content,
as it were, given that broad order sort of feel to it, to commit
to paper a more detailed assessment of quite where all the various
elements of the Iraqi security architecture were deemed to be
at the moment. But that is a reasonable, broad order statement.
Q387 Mr Viggers: Thank you very much.
How confident are you in the skills and willingness of the security
forces to fight the insurgents?
Major General Houghton: It is
almost an impossible question because it will differ from region
to region, from battalion to battalion, from individual to individual.
I think I indicated when I tried to steer people away from the
numerical assessment that it is things other than numbers that
are important in determining the competence and capability of
Armed Forces. It is the old: the moral is to physical as three
is to one. It is to do with the motivation of individuals; it
is to do with the competence of leadership; it is to do with—General
John mentioned this—a sense of legality which they enjoy
within their own local community; and it is a sense of overall
motivation and purpose in what they stand for in a new and democratic
Iraq. One can only but think that the success of elections over
the weekend buoys up elements of all those ingredients, and that
it will vary over time. It will probably not be a linear progression,
there will be setbacks, but I think that, given the nature of
those elections, given the undoubted willingness of vast numbers
of Iraqis to volunteer for service in the various components of
their security architecture, I think one can take a strong degree
of comfort and confidence.
Q388 Mr Viggers: The head of one
of the parties in the election, the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution, has said that if his party were to gain power he would
purge Iraq's Iraqi security forces and intelligence service. Would
that be a seriously counter-productive step?
Mr Howard: I have not seen that
statement, Mr Viggers, but I am not quite sure. Purge them of
what exactly? Of particular types? I think I am more inclined
to give weight to statements from Prime Minister Allawi and those
who are keen to build the capacity for security forces and also
want security forces to represent the ethnic make-up of Iraq as
a whole. Without knowing more behind what was meant by that statement,
it would be rather hard to pass judgment on it.
Q389 Mr Viggers: Are you able to
recruit from the United Kingdom people who can assist in the build-up
of security forces in Iraq? Are you successful in recruiting from
the police and other areas?
Mr Howard: It is rather hard for
me to give a comprehensive answer to that because, of course,
I can talk about what the Ministry of Defence is doing and the
Armed Forces. It is rather difficult for me to comment on others.
A lot of the assistance, of course, is being provided by serving
officers, soldiers, sailors and airmen, and, indeed, civilians
from the Ministry of Defence and other organisations. Yes, we
have been able to find the right quality of people and will continue
to do that. We have contracted others to carry out some training,
and that I think has been successful. Armour Group, for example,
have helped with police training, but that is more of a Foreign
Office issue. In general, we have not had any major problems in
being able to find the right level of expertise to assist. I think
there have been some issues about whether we have been able to
get sufficient policemen out to train—I think that was the
issue that came up in you evidence session from a few weeks ago—but
I am not really in a position to comment on that.
Q390 Mr Viggers: What is the cost
of security sector reform in Iraq? What contribution is the United
Kingdom making to this?
Mr Howard: I do not have a figure
for that, Mr Viggers, but I shall try to come up with a cost.[7]
Q391 Mr Viggers: Who is the budget
holder for this sector?
Mr Howard: Within the United Kingdom?
Q392 Mr Viggers: Which department
is subsidising the reform of the security sector in Iraq? Is it
defence? If so, who is the budget holder?
Mr Howard: It goes across a range
of departments. Different departments have responsibility for
different elements of the security sector reform. The Foreign
Office are helping on policing, as is DFID. We, as I say, are
providing assistance to the Ministry of Defence and to the Iraqi
security forces. In terms of who the budget holder is, again that
would be spread across the different topical budgets within the
Ministry of Defence. A point I would make is that, where the Ministry
of Defence has incurred additional costs as a result of doing
this, we will get this, reimbursed by the Treasury under normal
routes from the contingency fund.
Q393 Mr Viggers: If the numbers are
not readily available, would you please write to us?
Mr Howard: We will try to do that.
Q394 Mr Havard: On security sector
reform, there are obviously numbers in America around being on
a continuum of $30 billion to $100 billion, and now the President
has gone back for more money. Between May, our previous visit,
and December, we saw a lot of development in infrastructure, particularly
of the water and sewerage system in Basra, and when we get there
in December we are told, "The money is not coming, and it
is not coming because it has been diverted specifically to deal
with the increasing costs to the security sector reform."
That is disappointing because these things are not mutually exclusive,
as everybody has been demonstrating today. What is happening with
the costs of security reform, if the money for the water infrastructure
in Basra has been stolen in order to deal with it?
Mr Howard: I have not come across
that particular phenomenon. As I have said, I will try to provide
a note on British costs for security sector reform. There have
been issues about money designated for reconstruction having been
focused more on Baghdad and the centre of the country, possibly
at the expense of the South East, which is something that we will
be concerned about given our responsibilities down there. But
that is more for reconstruction elsewhere rather than money being
diverted for security sector reform.
Major General Houghton: I have
very general views—but, again, I will revert to Martin's
note for more accuracy. When, 18 months ago now, Mr Bush went
to Congress for a congressional supplement to finance certain
activity within Iraq as a whole, a congressional supplement of
about $18 billion was voted. The way in which they voted was against
certain pre-determined headings as to where that money should
go: so some was allocated to security sector reform, some to the
major industrial reconstruction projects and that sort of thing.
When, in the immediate aftermath of the passage of sovereignty
and Ambassador Negroponte went over—this might well have
been in John's time, and he might have more granularity than me—the
whole of that congressional vote was subject to a re-scrutiny
to make certain that it was being apportioned in the most appropriate
way to the current circumstances, and I am pretty confident that
as a part of that re-scrutiny there was a movement of some elements
of the UN Congressional supplemental over into the security sector
reform area and away from some of the major reconstruction projects.
Q395 Mr Hancock: I listened very
intently last night to a File on 4 programme about finances
in Iraq. It was talking about the huge sums of money that were
available, cash—$1.7 billion in one instance, all in cash,
being made available—and it being dispersed very willy-nilly
with no proper audit chain, a lot of it financing the training
of police and what-have-you, and senior American officers being
very critical of the way in which the cash that was available
in the country was handled, and the way in which the programme
for the training was actually being financed and who was controlling
it. I am interested to know in the sectors where we had sole responsibility,
were we taking orders about the way that money was spent from
the coalition commander (ie, an American) or where they decisions
that were left to our commandeers to make, to exercise the way
in which that money was properly spent? Because there are some
very serious questions that are being asked now in the American
administration about the way the money was used and where this
money ended up.
Mr Howard: I will ask Bill to
comment from the MND (SE)'s point of view, in a moment. I think
I would distinguish between the cost of security sector reform,
which, as I say, if we are talking about what we, the Brits, have
been doing in MND (SE) would be the cost where we are providing
training teams or contractors—and equipment as well. You
will be aware that we have actually authorised something like
£27 million worth of relatively small-scale equipment for
Iraqi forces. That process is controlled through our normal budgetary
processes. The commander, someone like Bill, has a command secretary
who deals with the finances. That is one issue, and Bill may want
to say a bit more about that. There is another issue, which is
about reconstruction—where the money, as well as from British
sources, comes more from American sources. I think it would be
helpful, Bill, if you would say a bit about how that works, because
you are much more familiar with it than I am.
Major General Rollo: If I may
go back half a stage, to the first question about money having
been diverted: I think, in broad terms, that was correct and that
was a frustration to me, but I did understand the logic behind
it. The logic, basically, was that more effort was needed to go
into building up the Iraqi security forces—and in the circumstances
of last summer that seems a reasonable decision—and that
took money. Indeed, unless you had a better security situation,
you would not be able to spend the money on reconstruction anyway.
So that is the first part of the argument. The second was that
nobody else is going to provide extra money for building up the
ISF, but somebody else might well provide additional money for
reconstruction—and it is not just the US supplemental out
there; there is also all the money that is in US trust funds and
is, technically, at least, available. So at a macro level I could
be very grown up and understand that issue; clearly at a micro
level I was bouncing up and down, as you would expect, on Basra's
behalf, saying, "This is terrible" and then clearly
getting on with it and seeing what were the most urgent things
and what could I do with the money that I had available.
Q396 Mr Havard: It would be difficult
to find somebody from the UN to talk to about Basra, would it
not? That is the other part of the problem. They seemed to be
missing from the barricade when I was there.
Major General Rollo: I used to
send my chief engineer off to find them, wherever they were, and
he successfully did that. In terms of US money and how it was
controlled and for what purpose it was spent, like all the divisional
commanders I had an allocation of what was called CERFs—which
I think were Commanders' Emergency Reconstruction Project Funds,
or some combination of the same, but I knew what they were for
anyway. I had a delegated authority to authorise the release of
those funds up to $500,000 for particular projects. That was a
maximum value of a single project. And there was a similar UK
system. We had a system of boards where people would recommend
projects up through the brigade commander and to me, depending
on the value. If, indeed, there was something which was more than
$500,000, then I could apply to General Metz—up to $5 million,
I think—and he would either authorise it or would not. He
had set out the intent very clearly as being for emergency reconstruction
rather than for long-term stuff which should have been done by
the supplemental. So this is not the $18 billion; these were funds
that were allocated to me. We had a process which looked at what
we were trying to achieve and then allowed us to score individual
project proposals against a variety of parameters which basically
would say, "Right, that quite clearly fits all the parameters,
that will be our top priority"—because there were always
more projects than there was cash available. In terms of accounting,
first, we had to satisfy US accounting rules—and there was
normally a US officer or a US authorised officer who had to do
the detailed control of the release of the cash—and, secondly,
we also applied our own accounting rules to it as well. Have I
half way answered your question?
Q397 Mr Hancock: Did you have large
sums of Iraqi money as well?
Major General Rollo: Not in my
time.
Q398 Mr Hancock: What happened to
the money that was available in Basra? A suggestion was that there
were large sums of Iraqi money around—amounting to well
over $1 billion in cash—which was around for the military
in the first six months and which is now no longer accounted for.
Nobody seems to know what happened to it. Were there large sums
found in Basra?
Major General Rollo: I am not
sure what we are on? Within my time in command, the sources of
my money were either down through the American system—
Q399 Mr Hancock: Through the coalition.
Major General Rollo:—through
the coalition or directly from UK funds under a separate scheme
called QuIPS (Quick Impact Projects).
Mr Howard: Is this money, Mr Hancock,
which was from the oil-for-food scheme, for example?
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