Examination of Witnesses (Questions 420
- 427)
WEDNESDAY 2 FEBRUARY 2005
MR MARTIN
HOWARD, LT
GENERAL JOHN
MCCOLL
CBE DSO, MAJOR GENERAL
NICK HOUGHTON
CBE AND MAJOR
GENERAL BILL
ROLLO CBE
Q420 Mr Cran: You said there is a
lot to build on, and that could mean a great deal, but I want
to be clear that you think that cooperation is possible—and
I would ask you to have a glimpse at the background. When in Iraq,
we were told this—and I am not going to tell you who told
us, because I think I had better not—"cooperation across
systems"—that is, in Iraq—"fly in the face
of cultural norms in the Arab world and are frequently seen as
a threat to individual authority." You do not see that as
the impediment, do you?
Major General Rollo: It is part
of the impediment. I think that is what I said at the beginning,
there is a mountain to climb in a country where the culture is
that the Army is the lead service and we are saying you want to
have police supremacy and a police lead. But it is not as straightforward
as that, because it depends on individual characters, and there
is considerable crossover, so that there are a number of senior
policemen, for instance, at the moment who have previous military
experience, and that helps to bring the two together because people
know each other. Basra is not a big town and that particular class
of people all know each other. At a more junior level, we were
running three-week courses for a company of the police special
unit and a company of the National Guard to work together. It
is that habit of working together—and we saw a number of
examples where it was successfully done, which I think commonsense
says will work in the future.
Q421 Mr Viggers: Is there consistency
and harmonization in training over the whole of Iraq? Is there
consistency between training carried out by Americans in the North
and the training carried out by the UK in the South?
Lt General McColl: Within the
headquarters in Iraq is the headquarters of the Multinational
Support Training Command Iraq ("Menstici" as it is known)
which is General Petraeus's command, which is subordinate to General
Casey. Within that command there is a number of different departments,
looking after the Iraqi National Guard, looking after the Iraqi
Army, looking after the Iraqi police force, and there are British
officers integrated in that organisation. Up until recently the
one-star running the police organisation was a British officer;
we have now downscaled that to a colonel. The reason I explain
that is because it is a multinational approach, and the object
of that organisation is to produce coherence. There is coherence
of policy, in terms of, for example, the way in which the police
are trained: there is a common syllabus, and there is a common
progression in the way in which they move forward. However, when
you go on to talk about the ways in which, for example, the National
Guard are trained, and the way in which you heard General Rollo
describe the integration of one of our infantry battalions in
the way it is done in the South East, there is a different approach
in the American sector. They have what are called second-tier
special forces elements who are given that responsibility and
they do it in their own particular way. Within the general guidance
from the policy direction from the centre, which is coherent,
and which is designed to give a common approach, there are of
course individuals of national interpretation. But I think you
would expect that.
Q422 Mr Viggers: If NATO moves into
the provision of training, could you explain how this will be
coordinated with the Multinational Security Transition Command?
If the answer to that is quite long, we would be happy to receive
a letter on this.
Major General Houghton: It is
very quick. General Petraeus is also the dual-hatted NATO commander
of that training and organisation, so compatibility and coherence
is established at the outset.
Q423 Mr Viggers: Are you worried
that countries currently making a contribution in Iraq might switch
their contribution, so that it is through NATO training rather
than as part of the multinational force? This has happened in
the case of two countries, has it not?
Mr Howard: I do not think it is
a major worry. If we are talking about switching training being
done under a coalition hat to being done under a NATO hat, I think
we will be content with that.
Major General Houghton: Over time,
one might positively encourage it. The whole nature of the shift
will be that away from counter-insurgency and towards a security
assistance mission, and therefore the nature of people's contributions,
nations' contributions, should increasingly, over time, be more
focused on the training and security assistance rather than training
in counter-insurgency type tasks. So I think it would be, properly
controlled, the right thing to be happening over time.
Q424 Mike Gapes: Could I ask you
about the militias. In June, just before it transferred power,
the Coalition Provision Authority issued an order outlawing non-governmental
militias. We have clearly seen the militias have played a very
important role in the stability in the Kurdish area and we know
al-Sadr's militia is still around and might potentially be a problem
in the future, so what is being done to abolish the militias and
to integrate the militias together into an effective defence and
security force for Iraq as a whole?
Mr Howard: The first thing I would
say is that militias have traditionally been a part of the Iraqi
politics of this. Most political parties have had a militia associated
with them. From a British point of view, and, I am sure, from
an American point of view, we would like to see the militias either
disbanded or integrated as appropriate into the Iraqi security
forces as they go on, but this now has to be an Iraqi decision
on how they operate. In practical terms, I suspect it is not something
you can just do overnight. I think it is a question of persuasion
and developing mature political institutions and mature security
institutions which make the need for militias redundant. But I
do not think that is something that can happen quickly; nor can
it happen at our behest or American behest alone. It has to be
an Iraqi decision.
Q425 Mike Gapes: So the coalition
is not going to play a role in dismantling the militias.
Mr Howard: I think we would be
prepared to facilitate any action to disband militias and integrate
them into Iraqi security forces on the back of an Iraqi Government
decision to do so.
Q426 Mike Gapes: If the Iraqis ask
us to play a role in getting rid of al-Sadr's militia, we would
do so.
Mr Howard: I do not think it is
quite as simple as that, because there would be a dialogue between
the Iraqi authorities and Muqtada himself about, particularly,
if Muqtada is taking part in the political process. He will be
part of that process. They will then reach decisions about what
will be the future of militias, and there are various things that
could happen. They could be disbanded. They could be incorporated
into the Iraqi security forces and, as part of that, they may
come to the coalition and say, "Can you help with a particular
aspect of that?" This is all relatively speculative, and
I could not say, "Yes, we will definitely help," but
obviously we will help where we can and where we think we can
add value.
Q427 Mike Gapes: We will watch this
space.
Major General Rollo: It depends
what you think al-Sadr's militia is. If you have a vision of Ireland
in 1914, with people drilling on street corners, it is not normally
like that. It is a very shifting bunch of people, both in terms
of the leadership and the membership, of a very varied size depending
on how strongly people feel about a particular issue at a particular
moment. I would go back to the huge spike of activity in August
and then a very low level since then. I think I would start by
saying the issue of militias was there before I arrived; it was
not afterwards. I was aiming for a general acceptance across the
political class, if you like, and for that matter in wider society
that armed people on the street, outside the National Guard and
the police force, were unacceptable, that, if they appeared, then
they should be removed. That was not acceptable behaviour in Basra
or any other part of our area. Once you get that, then the real
answer to the militias is to take away the requirement for them
to exist, as has been said. You give people jobs and you have
a political climate in which militias are not necessary to either
give you security or to gain you votes. But easier said than done.
Chairman: Thank you. We shall not be
calling you back. We have had two bites of the cherry. Unfortunately,
we will be writing to you because there are some questions that
we were not able to ask because of the time constraints. We apologise
in advance, but we shall be writing to you.
|
