Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 420 - 427)

WEDNESDAY 2 FEBRUARY 2005

MR MARTIN HOWARD, LT GENERAL JOHN MCCOLL CBE DSO, MAJOR GENERAL NICK HOUGHTON CBE AND MAJOR GENERAL BILL ROLLO CBE

  Q420  Mr Cran: You said there is a lot to build on, and that could mean a great deal, but I want to be clear that you think that cooperation is possible—and I would ask you to have a glimpse at the background. When in Iraq, we were told this—and I am not going to tell you who told us, because I think I had better not—"cooperation across systems"—that is, in Iraq—"fly in the face of cultural norms in the Arab world and are frequently seen as a threat to individual authority." You do not see that as the impediment, do you?

  Major General Rollo: It is part of the impediment. I think that is what I said at the beginning, there is a mountain to climb in a country where the culture is that the Army is the lead service and we are saying you want to have police supremacy and a police lead. But it is not as straightforward as that, because it depends on individual characters, and there is considerable crossover, so that there are a number of senior policemen, for instance, at the moment who have previous military experience, and that helps to bring the two together because people know each other. Basra is not a big town and that particular class of people all know each other. At a more junior level, we were running three-week courses for a company of the police special unit and a company of the National Guard to work together. It is that habit of working together—and we saw a number of examples where it was successfully done, which I think commonsense says will work in the future.

  Q421  Mr Viggers: Is there consistency and harmonization in training over the whole of Iraq? Is there consistency between training carried out by Americans in the North and the training carried out by the UK in the South?

  Lt General McColl: Within the headquarters in Iraq is the headquarters of the Multinational Support Training Command Iraq ("Menstici" as it is known) which is General Petraeus's command, which is subordinate to General Casey. Within that command there is a number of different departments, looking after the Iraqi National Guard, looking after the Iraqi Army, looking after the Iraqi police force, and there are British officers integrated in that organisation. Up until recently the one-star running the police organisation was a British officer; we have now downscaled that to a colonel. The reason I explain that is because it is a multinational approach, and the object of that organisation is to produce coherence. There is coherence of policy, in terms of, for example, the way in which the police are trained: there is a common syllabus, and there is a common progression in the way in which they move forward. However, when you go on to talk about the ways in which, for example, the National Guard are trained, and the way in which you heard General Rollo describe the integration of one of our infantry battalions in the way it is done in the South East, there is a different approach in the American sector. They have what are called second-tier special forces elements who are given that responsibility and they do it in their own particular way. Within the general guidance from the policy direction from the centre, which is coherent, and which is designed to give a common approach, there are of course individuals of national interpretation. But I think you would expect that.

  Q422  Mr Viggers: If NATO moves into the provision of training, could you explain how this will be coordinated with the Multinational Security Transition Command? If the answer to that is quite long, we would be happy to receive a letter on this.

  Major General Houghton: It is very quick. General Petraeus is also the dual-hatted NATO commander of that training and organisation, so compatibility and coherence is established at the outset.

  Q423  Mr Viggers: Are you worried that countries currently making a contribution in Iraq might switch their contribution, so that it is through NATO training rather than as part of the multinational force? This has happened in the case of two countries, has it not?

  Mr Howard: I do not think it is a major worry. If we are talking about switching training being done under a coalition hat to being done under a NATO hat, I think we will be content with that.

  Major General Houghton: Over time, one might positively encourage it. The whole nature of the shift will be that away from counter-insurgency and towards a security assistance mission, and therefore the nature of people's contributions, nations' contributions, should increasingly, over time, be more focused on the training and security assistance rather than training in counter-insurgency type tasks. So I think it would be, properly controlled, the right thing to be happening over time.

  Q424  Mike Gapes: Could I ask you about the militias. In June, just before it transferred power, the Coalition Provision Authority issued an order outlawing non-governmental militias. We have clearly seen the militias have played a very important role in the stability in the Kurdish area and we know al-Sadr's militia is still around and might potentially be a problem in the future, so what is being done to abolish the militias and to integrate the militias together into an effective defence and security force for Iraq as a whole?

  Mr Howard: The first thing I would say is that militias have traditionally been a part of the Iraqi politics of this. Most political parties have had a militia associated with them. From a British point of view, and, I am sure, from an American point of view, we would like to see the militias either disbanded or integrated as appropriate into the Iraqi security forces as they go on, but this now has to be an Iraqi decision on how they operate. In practical terms, I suspect it is not something you can just do overnight. I think it is a question of persuasion and developing mature political institutions and mature security institutions which make the need for militias redundant. But I do not think that is something that can happen quickly; nor can it happen at our behest or American behest alone. It has to be an Iraqi decision.

  Q425  Mike Gapes: So the coalition is not going to play a role in dismantling the militias.

  Mr Howard: I think we would be prepared to facilitate any action to disband militias and integrate them into Iraqi security forces on the back of an Iraqi Government decision to do so.

  Q426  Mike Gapes: If the Iraqis ask us to play a role in getting rid of al-Sadr's militia, we would do so.

  Mr Howard: I do not think it is quite as simple as that, because there would be a dialogue between the Iraqi authorities and Muqtada himself about, particularly, if Muqtada is taking part in the political process. He will be part of that process. They will then reach decisions about what will be the future of militias, and there are various things that could happen. They could be disbanded. They could be incorporated into the Iraqi security forces and, as part of that, they may come to the coalition and say, "Can you help with a particular aspect of that?" This is all relatively speculative, and I could not say, "Yes, we will definitely help," but obviously we will help where we can and where we think we can add value.

  Q427  Mike Gapes: We will watch this space.

  Major General Rollo: It depends what you think al-Sadr's militia is. If you have a vision of Ireland in 1914, with people drilling on street corners, it is not normally like that. It is a very shifting bunch of people, both in terms of the leadership and the membership, of a very varied size depending on how strongly people feel about a particular issue at a particular moment. I would go back to the huge spike of activity in August and then a very low level since then. I think I would start by saying the issue of militias was there before I arrived; it was not afterwards. I was aiming for a general acceptance across the political class, if you like, and for that matter in wider society that armed people on the street, outside the National Guard and the police force, were unacceptable, that, if they appeared, then they should be removed. That was not acceptable behaviour in Basra or any other part of our area. Once you get that, then the real answer to the militias is to take away the requirement for them to exist, as has been said. You give people jobs and you have a political climate in which militias are not necessary to either give you security or to gain you votes. But easier said than done.

  Chairman: Thank you. We shall not be calling you back. We have had two bites of the cherry. Unfortunately, we will be writing to you because there are some questions that we were not able to ask because of the time constraints. We apologise in advance, but we shall be writing to you.






 
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