CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pre-war Planning for the Post-Combat Phase
1. The
post-conflict situation with which the Coalition was faced did
not match the pre-conflict expectations. The strategic centre
of the Coalition in Iraq was inevitably the Coalition Provisional
Authority in Baghdad. To some extent this complicated the task
of British forces in the south. Taken together these factors contributed
to delays in post-war stabilisation. It is not difficult to understand
how mistakes could have been made in planning and executing Iraq's
post-conflict reconstruction. No post-conflict mission in the
last 60 years has been as challenging as that which faced the
Coalition in June 2003. (Paragraph 26)
2. The considerable
success that has been achieved in Iraq—especially in the
areas controlled by the UK—can, in large part, be traced
to the British forces' ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
Suppleness and pragmatism are at the heart of the British forces'
professionalism. (Paragraph 26)
The Insurgency
3. It
is difficult to avoid concluding that the Coalition, including
British forces, were insufficiently prepared for the challenge
represented by the insurgency. A wide range of predictions for
the post-conflict situation in Iraq were made in advance of the
conflict. We are concerned that there is some evidence that the
extensive planning, which we know took place in both the US and
the UK, did not fully reflect the extent of that range. We also
believe that the Coalition should have foreseen that its presence
would be resented by some Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs and
some Shia nationalist elements, and portrayed as cultural and
economic imperialism. (Paragraph 36)
4. We note that there
is not one anti-Coalition insurgency in Iraq, as frequently portrayed
in the media, but several, anti-Coalition, anti-Iraqi Government
movements. These different movements are conducting operations
with very different objectives. (Paragraph 43)
5. We note that the
scale of the anti-Coalition, anti-Iraqi Government insurgency
movements was underestimated by the Coalition. At the same time,
we acknowledge that a fixation simply on the number of insurgents
does not necessarily, by itself, provide insight into their effectiveness
and resilience. (Paragraph 47)
6. We are concerned
at the continued influx of foreign fighters into Iraq through
neighbouring countries, particularly Syria and Iran, and note
that this was probably facilitated by the inadequate attention
paid to border security by the Coalition immediately following
the invasion. More broadly, it appears to us that the Coalition
failed to appreciate the potential for an insurgency in Iraq to
attract foreign fighters, both from the Middle East and further
afield (e.g. Chechnya). (Paragraph 51)
7. We note that the
various insurgency movements have been structured, motivated and
resourced to inflict significant military and civilian causalities.
They have employed a range of tactics from assassinations to suicide
bombings depending on their motivations and goals, but foreign
fighters, such as Musab al-Zarqawi and other Islamic extremists,
have been particularly skilled at using psychological operations
such as kidnappings and beheadings. In the foreseeable future,
MNF-I and the Iraqi Government will continue to be attacked, but
the various insurgency movements have not developed into a genuine
national war of liberation and are unlikely to do so in the future.
(Paragraph 56)
8. We commend British
forces for their approach to counter-insurgency in their areas
of operations. We are convinced that their approach has been a
contributing factor in the development of the more permissive
environment in southern Iraq, which has resulted in relatively
little insurgent activity. We do, however, remain concerned about
a number of tactics employed by the MNF-I generally. We urge MoD
to use its influence to affect MNF-I's posture and approach. We
also encourage MoD to ensure that the Iraqi civilian powers are
given a prominent role in the counter-insurgency campaign. Finally,
we emphasise and endorse the need to combine politico-economic
and military strands of the counter-insurgency campaign. We have
been told that this approach was adopted following the appointments
of General Casey and Ambassador Negroponte, but we are concerned
about the state of civil-military cooperation in the counter-insurgency
campaign preceding their appointments, i.e. from May 2003 until
June 2004 when Ambassador Bremer was head of the Coalition Provisional
Authority. (Paragraph 73)
Challenges in Southern Iraq
9. We
note that the relatively stable security environment in southern
Iraq has been caused by a number of factors, including population
density, topography and the attitude of the Shia population to
Coalition forces. But we are also in no doubt that the approach
and tactics of the British Armed Forces have played a major part.
(Paragraph 84)
10. We condemn any
abuse of Iraqi civilians by British forces. We believe, however,
that coverage given to these cases has been magnified because
British forces are known—both in Iraq and beyond—for
the professionalism and sensitivity which they bring to their
tasks. As such, we trust that the actions of a few soldiers will
not be allowed to overshadow the contribution made by the many
soldiers who have served in Iraq. (Paragraph 90)
11. We welcome a review
of the circumstances that led to the incidents in March 2003.
We have noted previously that the Coalition did not expect—and
did not have adequate facilities to deal with—large-scale
looting and looters. The consequent pressure on individuals may
have been a contributing factor in some of the cases. But we are
also concerned that the incidents may have been connected to the
way in which soldiers and officers are instructed in their legal
obligations during post-conflict operations. We therefore urge
the senior officer leading the lessons-learned process established
by the Chief of the General Staff to approach the review of the
issue of abuse by British service personnel in Iraq as broadly
as possible, examining not only the circumstances in Iraq, but
also more generic questions related to the policies, preparations
and pre-deployment training provided for Peace Support Operations.
(Paragraph 91)
12. We accept that
circumstances in Iraq currently call for the limited use of internment
of civilians by MNF-I. We believe, however, that this extraordinary
power needs to be reviewed regularly and should only be maintained
for as long as there is a compelling operational need for it.
MNF-I should, as matter of priority, assist the Iraqi Government
in developing the capabilities to detain, prosecute and imprison
those who are judged to present a serious threat to the country.
(Paragraph 101)
13. The cost of UK
military operations in Iraq for the three years 2002-03 to 2004-05
is expected to be in excess of £3.1 billion—equivalent
to the target acquisition cost for the two future aircraft carriers
for the Royal Navy. The 2004-05 Spring Supplementary Estimates
provide only limited information on the costs of operations in
Iraq. We consider that a more detailed breakdown of costs, for
operations involving such substantial sums of money, should be
provided in future to facilitate effective parliamentary scrutiny.
(Paragraph 109)
Security Sector Reform
14. We
conclude that the successful conduct of the elections to the Iraqi
Transitional National Assembly on 30 January 2005 will go down
as a turning point in Iraq's post-conflict development. Their
success demonstrated not only that Iraqis have an appetite for
democracy and an enthusiasm to be involved in shaping their country's
future, but also that the Iraqi Security Forces have begun to
develop the capabilities to provide effective security for their
own people. (Paragraph 120)
15. We believe that
Security Sector Reform should have been given greater priority
by Coalition and British forces before and immediately after the
invasion in March 2003. Only belatedly, did the Coalition begin
building the Iraqi Security Forces. Even then, a bottom-up, numerically-focused
approach meant that the Iraqi military, security, and police did
not develop in a well-coordinated manner. We are pleased to see
that a more realistic approach to the build-up of the Iraqi Security
Forces is now being taken with much greater emphasis on capability,
effectiveness and long term sustainability. (Paragraph 129)
16. The need for political
oversight by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence over the Iraqi Security
Forces is a crucial part of Iraq's post-Saddam Security Sector
Reform and we remain concerned about the slow institutional development
of the Ministry. (Paragraph 135)
17. We welcome the
creation of the Ministerial Committee of National Security as
a mechanism for the Iraqi Government to begin taking control of
the Iraqi Security Forces and to coordinate military and security
policy with political and economic policies. These mechanisms
now need to be developed further by the Transitional Iraqi Government
as well as at working-level. (Paragraph 139)
18. Parliamentary
oversight must be a central feature of the 'new' Iraq's security
arrangements, and we call on Coalition partners and the UK Government
to provide assistance to the Transitional National Assembly in
establishing mechanisms for parliamentary oversight of the Iraqi
Security Forces. (Paragraph 142)
19. Ensuring appropriate
oversight over, and coordination mechanisms for, the Iraqi Security
Forces that mirror Iraq's decentralised political system is important,
but we believe care needs to be taken not to undermine the Iraqi
Government's control of its national security apparatus. (Paragraph
145)
20. The command chain
of the Iraqi Security Forces cannot yet sustain responsibility
for operations carried out in its name. At this stage of the Iraqi
Security Forces development this is unsurprising It is important,
however, that we recognise the limitations which this places on
the current and future capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces.
(Paragraph 150)
Naval Forces
21. It
seems clear to us that MNF-I—and, by extension the UK—will
need to assist Iraq in protecting its sea-based assets and territorial
waters from terrorist attack or incursion for the foreseeable
future. (Paragraph 153)
Iraqi Police Service
22. The
Coalition's early efforts at Security Sector Reform—particularly
in the civil policing area—were characterised by short-termism
and indecision. Weaknesses in that reform programme came close
to undermining the success of the initial military operations.
We are disappointed that two years after the start of those operations
the Government's response to the systemic shortcomings, which
contributed to those weaknesses, has amounted only to the establishment
of a 'Strategic Task Force' to examine the deployment of UK police
to post-conflict situations. (Paragraph 169)
23. We welcome recent
initiatives by the Government and the EU to train the Iraqi Police
Service in complex policing techniques. We note, however, that
assistance to develop Iraq's policing arrangements was not incorporated
in the post-conflict planning. As a result, there was an absence
of strategic policing advice at senior levels in the Coalition
while the policing policy was unduly 'militarised'. Consequently,
the kind of police forces that were established in Iraq were unprepared
for the complex policing tasks subsequently expected of them.
(Paragraph 170)
Iraqi National Intelligence Service
24. We
accept that there was good reason for the Coalition not to retain
the intelligence apparatus, which Saddam Hussein used to terrorise
Iraq's citizens. At the same time, we acknowledge that developing
indigenous Iraqi intelligence capabilities is necessary for the
Iraqi Security Forces to engage the insurgency. We call on MoD
to provide assistance to the Iraqi Transitional Government and
National Assembly so that the need for intelligence is balanced
with the need to maintain judicial and political oversight of
all intelligence activities. (Paragraph 177)
Iraqi Army
25. The
Iraqi Army is a central element of the Iraqi Security Forces both
at the present time and in the future. We note that time has been
lost in establishing the Iraqi Army and that changes in policy
have slowed down its full establishment. It will be important
to ensure that the future development of the Iraqi Army, including
its prospective merger with the Iraqi National Guard, does not
compromise its operational effectiveness or organisational coherence.
(Paragraph 183)
Judicial Reform
26. Reforming
the Iraqi judicial system is key to the country's post-Saddam
transition. We welcome MoD's assurance that progress is being
made. It is moreover essential that Iraqi Security Forces act
within the parameters of the judicial process and it is incumbent
upon MNF-I to do what they can to ensure that they do. (Paragraph
190)
Militias
27. Paramilitary
militias continue to exercise considerable power in Iraq. We understand
the need to prioritise MNF-I's limited forces in the counter-insurgency
campaign and we realise that some militias made a contribution
to the stabilisation of the country. But militias exist to protect
particular sectional interests and we believe that until all Iraq's
militias are disbanded, questions will continue to hang over the
Iraqi Security Forces' authority. We welcome MoD's assurance that
MNF-I will be willing to assist the Iraqi Government in dismantling
the militias if circumstances should so require. (Paragraph 195)
Disarmament and Small Arms
28. Understandably,
small arms were low on the list of Coalition priorities, which,
in the initial stages, were focused on finding weapons of mass
destruction and securing heavier conventional weapons. But the
well-armed insurgency, which subsequently emerged, suggests that
focusing on small arms could have been beneficial in the longer-term
and that in the medium-term ways must be found to reduce the very
large amounts of small arms in circulation. It also appears that
more planning and resources should have been devoted by the Coalition
to securing Iraq's many arms depots immediately following the
invasion. These arms depots have now become a key source of the
insurgency's material for Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
and heavy weapons. (Paragraph 200)
Private security companies
29. It
is now three years since the Government published its Green Paper
on private military companies. We recommend the Government urgently
brings forward proposals for the regulation of the overseas activities
of private security and military companies. We do not believe
that the current reliance on contracts is sufficient. We are well
aware of the complexities involved in a licensing regime for individual
contracts not least from our experience of the export control
regime. We suggest that the FCO should enter into discussions
with the Security Industry Authority to find ways in which its
offices could be used. Once a mechanism has been established to
regulate these companies, Parliament should consider how best
it could undertake the necessary oversight. (Paragraph 211)
Civil-Military issues
30. Non-governmental
organisations, the private sector, international organisations,
all have a crucial role to play in addressing matters of governance,
justice and reconciliation, and economic and social needs in Peace
Support Operations. (Paragraph 215)
31. In MND (SE), British
forces have carried out their reconstruction-related tasks admirably.
But we remain concerned about the support offered by other departments.
(Paragraph 220)
32. We are pleased
to hear of the improved cooperation between DFID and MoD since
the publication of our Lessons of Iraq Report in March
2004. In this light, we welcome DFID's participation in planning
and command exercises. Once the Government has made a commitment
to post-conflict stabilisation, as it has in Iraq, that commitment
will only be effectively delivered through the planned and coordinated
effort of all the relevant government departments. (Paragraph
227)
33. New ways of describing
military activity in the transition from war-fighting to Peace
Support Operations, i.e. the "three-block war", illustrate
how the Armed Forces are presented with a more complex range of
tasks than previously; they require the military to work more
closely with NGOs and other non-military actors to fulfil their
objectives. This, in turn, requires a level of mutual understanding,
which has not always been present. We hope Operation Telic has
provided a degree of mutual insight as well as an opportunity
to improve cooperation between British forces and key NGOs. (Paragraph
231)
Broadening the Coalition
34. We
strongly urge the United Nations to expand its presence in Iraq
especially in the southern governorates, and engage actively in
the reconstruction effort. (Paragraph 235)
35. We welcome the
Government's support for NATO's technical assistance programmes
in Iraq. We remain concerned by the slow manning of NATO's mission
and the fact that the majority of assistance provided by NATO
takes place outside Iraq. We urge the Government to lobby for
an expansion of NATO's programmes in-theatre. We are also concerned
that the countries contributing to MNF-I may be tempted to 'switch'
their support to the NATO mission and thereby deprive the MNF-I
of front-line capabilities before the Iraqi Security Forces are
ready for their increased responsibilities. We also urge the Government
to examine the scope for offering the prospect of Partnership-for-Peace-like
arrangements to Iraq. (Paragraph 241)
36. We urge the Government
and our NATO allies to give early consideration as to how NATO
might be able to assist a democratic Iraq to play some role in
a regional security arrangement. (Paragraph 242)
37. We welcome the
increased involvement by the EU in the non-financial aspects of
Iraq's reconstruction, including the deployment of a mission to
train Iraqi judicial, police and prison personnel. We note, however,
that this training is to take place primarily outside Iraq and
we urge the Government to lobby for an expansion of the EU's programmes
in-theatre as soon as possible. (Paragraph 246)
Future Commitment to Iraq
38. Until
such time as the private sector is confident that the necessary
security can be provided by the Iraqi Security Forces, British
troops are likely to be invited by the Iraqi Government to stay
in Iraq. This may be a substantial period of time. (Paragraph
254)
39. In light of the
state of the insurgency and the condition of the Iraqi Security
Forces, and subject to the continuing agreement of the Iraqi Government,
it seems likely that British forces will be present in Iraq in
broadly similar numbers to the current deployment into 2006. We
support this commitment and believe that calls for a withdrawal
of British forces are premature. Experience has taught us that,
if nation-building exercises, such as that in Iraq, are to succeed,
they must have a serious commitment of time, energy, financial
resources and political resolve. (Paragraph 255)
40. We welcome the
Government's announcement that the lump sum benefits under the
existing Armed Forces pension scheme are to be at least doubled.
We also welcome the announcement in the Budget that compensation
payments for injured serving personnel will not be taxed in future.
We regret, however, that these changes are effective only from
6 April 2005. We urge MoD to consider making them retrospective
to the start of combat operations in Iraq. (Paragraph 257)
Whitehall Issues
41. The
first step to achieve a systematic and multifaceted post-conflict
planning process will be for MoD to conduct and publish a comprehensive
study on all the lessons of the post-conflict period in Operation
Telic. Such a report should cover the post-conflict challenges
faced not only by British forces, but also by British civilian
organisations that have operated in Iraq alongside the military.
In particular it should examine relationships with other Coalition
partners, including the United States, and what lessons can be
learned for future Coalition operations. Without a clear baseline
of the problems encountered, it is near-impossible to correct
failures. (Paragraph 260)
42. MoD's own analysis
of the international security environment 'Delivering Security
in a Changing World' envisages that the UK will be regularly
engaged in stabilisation and post-conflict efforts for the foreseeable
future. Successfully meeting this challenge will require effective
planning and preparations well in advance of the outbreak of hostilities.
The establishment of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU)
should contribute significantly to the creation of capabilities
to do this. But the PCRU faces a number of challenges in establishing
itself. We are concerned that it may not achieve its initial operating
capability by the target date of Spring 2005. (Paragraph
270)
43. If the Government
manages to establish a cross-departmental capacity to coordinate
the UK's post-conflict activities, then the House of Commons will
need to consider how best to provide oversight of this work. This
is likely to include the Defence, Foreign Affairs and International
Development Committees. (Paragraph 271)
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