Reconstruction and the Military
216. MoD outlined the British forces roles in reconstruction
activities as follows:
Identification of reconstruction projects in
essential services (water, power, oil), the economy and social
services, governance, and security sector reform, which can then
be financially resourced through UK and/or US funds;
Project management and execution of projects
by the Royal Engineers;
Provision of planning input and coordination
(where appropriate) for reconstruction projects executed by external
agencies including the Project Coordination Office (PCO), DFID,
USAID, Gulf Region South (GRS) US Army Corps of Engineers, the
UN and NGOs.[232]
217. MoD has used a number of different funding mechanisms
to meet these objectives the principal of which have been: Quick
Impact Projects, for which the military was allocated approximately
£30 million; CERPS funds, a US funding mechanism; and funds
from the Project Contracting Office. We praised the significant
contribution of Quick Impact Funds in Lessons of Iraq and
found on our trips in May and December 2004 that the quick-impact
funding provided to the military was still seen as a priority.
218. The Minister for the Armed Forces praised the
Quick Impact Projects, but underlined the need for Iraqi involvement
in allocation decisions:
The wish must be to get Iraqi buy-in to all of
this and then sourcing it through their mechanisms for them to
start delivering with a lot of key and essential support from
other agencies, NGOs or DFID sponsored agencies or UN sponsored
agencies, and to make sure that the money that is being spent
is being spent to good effect.[233]
219. Out of these funding mechanisms, reconstruction
funds allocated by the US Congress to the Coalition are the most
substantial, totalling $18.4 billion. When the Coalition Provisional
Authority was disbanded, its responsibilities were divided among
two organisations, the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), and
the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO). The IRMO was
created by a US National Security Presidential Directive signed
11 May 2004. IRMO is a temporary organisation established under
the US Department of State with offices in the US Mission reporting
to the US Ambassador. It has assumed the policy oversight and
advisory functions for which the CPA was responsible. It also
houses US advisors to Iraqi government ministries. Three key US
Government agencies manage implementation of US aid programmes.
The Project and Contracting Office (PCO), reporting to the Secretary
of the Army, manages most of the construction and some of the
non-construction projects for the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure.
USAID administers some of the programmes, including major infrastructure
projects run by Bechtel, and numerous democracy promotion and
civil society programmes. The Multinational Transition Command
(MNSTC-I), part of MNF-I, headed by General Petraeus has the mission
of manning, training and equipping the Iraqi army and police.
220. In MND (SE), British forces have carried
out their reconstruction-related tasks admirably. But we remain
concerned about the support offered by other departments.
In Lessons of Iraq we wrote that we believed DFID to have
been constrained in the pre-war planning process. We were concerned
that any political reluctance within DFID to assist in the planning
phase played to preconceived notions inside DFID of 'how to do
humanitarian assistance' and the proper role of the department.
These issues go back to the establishment of DFID as an independent
institution and the passing of the International Development Act
in 2002, which, in a sense, isolated the development agenda from
the wider foreign policy agenda by making poverty-reduction the
over-arching aim of development assistance.
221. Since then, the need for an integrated approach
to development, and the move to include post-conflict reconstruction
in any conflict planning, has led to calls for the re-integration
of development, and reconstruction into the foreign and security
policy agenda. DFID—and the wider development community—have
been concerned that this re-integration might compromise humanitarian
principles of impartiality and neutrality.
222. For this inquiry, we took evidence from DFID
and MoD on the former's role in post-conflict reconstruction.
It is for the International Development Committee to oversee the
work of DFID. We were mainly concerned with the relationship between
DFID and the MoD.
223. We asked Mr Drummond, former Iraq Director at
DFID, to provide an outline of DFID's activities in Iraq and the
cost of these. He told us that DFID produced a Country Assistance
Plan, which identified the priorities for the DFID programme over
the next year. "It identified three main objectives for us:
one was to help the international community to re-engage, to help
get the World Bank and the UN back involved. Second was to have
an impact on the functioning of national government. Thirdly,
was to promote reconstruction in the south".[234]
224. On cooperation with DFID, the Minister for the
Armed Forces told us:
The answer is yes, both in theatre and in the
UK. That is one of the increasing areas of cross-governmental
effort, and there are good examples of that in terms of how the
global conflict prevention pool operates and the Africa conflict
prevention pool operates, and the three ministries—FCO,
Ministry of Defence and DFID—will sit and consider all that
at official level and ministerial level, and Treasury will be
part of that process as well. Specifically in Iraq, the answer
is yes. We have DFID personnel in Iraq, we want to see more of
them, we want to create the conditions so more of them and more
of those they would sponsor can come in to take forward those
projects. So there is very good, close working in all of this
…[235]
225. Dr Hutton's comments were similar:
As an official, working at official level with
DFID colleagues is unprecedentedly close these days. In all three
theatres I have had something to do with—Iraq, Afghanistan,
the Balkans—we have had very close working relationships
on a day-to-day basis with DFID colleagues. Certainly when the
humanitarian response to the Boxing Day tsunami occurred, from
day one it was an intimate relationship, involving liaison officers
embedded in each other's teams. So I think the relationship these
days is better than it has ever been before".[236]
226. The tsunami was, of course, not a post-conflict
situation but a humanitarian crisis. As such, it may not be the
best example by which to judge cooperation between DFID and MoD.
227. We are pleased to hear of the improved cooperation
between DFID and MoD since the publication of our Lessons of
Iraq Report in March 2004. In this light, we welcome DFID's
participation in planning and command exercises. Once the Government
has made a commitment to post-conflict stabilisation, as it has
in Iraq, that commitment will only be effectively delivered through
the planned and coordinated effort of all the relevant government
departments.
Non-Governmental Organisations
228. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and aid
workers are frequently the most visible, non-military element
in a theatre of operations. As a result of the experience of recent
years, the relationship between the Armed Forces and NGOs has
moved from antagonism to mutual acceptance. Indeed, in order to
promote mutual understanding between the two sides, the UN has
published 'Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence
Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex
Emergencies'. For its part, the Armed Forces Peace Support Operations
Doctrine published in June 2004 contains a significant section
on NGOs and the "acceptable degree of complementary activity",
which exists between NGOs and the Armed Forces. The need for the
military to work more closely with NGOs in Peace Support Operations
is implicitly acknowledged in the military concept, which most
modern armies now use to understand Peace Support Operations,
namely the "three-block war". "Three-block war"
was a term first coined by General Charles Krulak, the 31st Commandant
of the United States Marine Corps. The concept described an urban
battle space as having three-blocks. On the first block, the military
engage in high-intensity fighting. On the second, the military
is conducting stabilisation operations. And on the third, the
military is expected to deliver humanitarian aid or assist others
in doing that. The military must be ready to conduct these operations
simultaneously and very close to one another and this necessarily
involves cooperation with a range of non-military actors.
229. This has been an issue in Operation Telic almost
from the outset, as the lack of security made the military's involvement
in humanitarian work inevitable. The area that causes NGOs the
most concern is the perceived move by the Armed Forces towards
direct involvement in the provision of humanitarian relief. Where
humanitarian resources are clearly overwhelmed, it is accepted
that the use of the military may be appropriate. NGOs accept that
in these 'exceptional circumstances' the military should act in
support of humanitarian efforts. But many humanitarian actors
see the involvement of military forces in humanitarian activity
as inappropriate. They focus on the need to create a 'humanitarian
space', i.e. a distinction between politically motivated actions
and apolitical humanitarian assistance. Giving evidence to the
International Development Committee, Mr Ken Caldwell, Director,
Save the Children, said:
… we are seeing continuing situations of
military activities, including by the British military, straying
into humanitarian space, and from our perspective that is not
only an issue of inappropriate intervention under international
law it also places our staff very directly at risk.[237]
Similarly, some NGOs recognise the rationale behind
military 'hearts and minds' programmes, but object vehemently
to these being described as 'humanitarian'.[238]
230. The Armed Forces Minister seemed to acknowledge
the concerns expressed by the NGO community. He told us:
I used the phrase earlier about humanitarian
space, about the need for those who deliver into those environments
to want humanitarian space because that is a measure of success
and those who are delivering the humanitarian aid and building
that normal society do not like to do it at the point of a bayonet,
they cannot do that. You are not able to win people if it is "We
are here to give you a bowl of rice and you had better eat it
otherwise we will have trouble". You do not deliver humanitarian
aid in that way, it has got to be done in a much more subtle way
and it has got to be distant and remote from any military presence.
If there is any need for military action to resolve the issue,
that should be sitting round the corner to be able to deal with
that.[239]
231. New ways of describing military activity
in the transition from war-fighting to Peace Support Operations,
i.e. the "three-block war", illustrate how the Armed
Forces are presented with a more complex range of tasks than previously;
they require the military to work more closely with NGOs and other
non-military actors to fulfil their objectives. This, in turn,
requires a level of mutual understanding, which has not always
been present. We hope Operation Telic has provided a degree of
mutual insight as well as an opportunity to improve cooperation
between British forces and key NGOs. We were pleased to hear
that the Joint Services Doctrine staff at the Defence Academy
at Shrivenham have begun to examine the problems of MoD/NGO interface
with NGO representatives.
230 Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance,"
Parameters, Autumn 2003 Back
231
'Build States, not Nations', Carl Bildt, Financial Times, 16 January
2004 Back
232
MoD memorandum Back
233
Q 620 Back
234
Q 436 Back
235
Q 624 Back
236
Q 625 Back
237
HC (2004-05) 224-i, Q 91 Back
238
Ibid, Q 95 Back
239
Q 611 Back
