House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Sixth Report

7 BROADENING THE COALITION

232. The elections in January 2005 should have marked a new international phase in the effort to stabilise and rebuild Iraq. Yet little by way of a genuine multinational effort has been assembled. As we have discussed, fewer countries are likely to contribute to MNF-I in the future. When asked about this, the Prime Minister admitted to the Liaison Committee: "We would have liked a bigger Coalition".[240] We have been assured by MoD that the military tasks can be managed by the MNF-I as currently constituted. Reconstruction, institution-building and managing the political process, however, would undoubtedly benefit from increased support, in particular from the United Nations, the European Union and NATO.

THE UNITED NATIONS

233. The United Nations supported the Independent Iraqi Election Commission and provided significant support to the electoral process. The organisation and its specialised agencies are not, however, present in significant numbers in Iraq. The role of the UN—and especially that of the Secretary General's Representative—in Iraq remains largely undefined. The UN agencies dealing with reconstruction operate primarily from Kuwait and Jordan: it is only through this out-of-country presence that the UN participates in coordination meetings with the MNF-I. We heard during out visits how inefficient this arrangement was.

234. After turning to UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to negotiate a workable plan for the 28 June 2004 Transfer of Authority, the United States has signalled an interest in drawing the UN further into Iraq's stabilisation process. Similarly, the Armed Force Minister indicated the British Government's eagerness to see the UN become increasingly involved: "Are you asking am I satisfied that there is a sufficiency of UN buy-in on this? Probably the answer to that is no. A lot of our effort, and it is the FCO who lead on this, it is not an MoD lead, is to encourage all of that".[241] But little has happened. Much of the resistance may come from the UN itself. The UN Secretary-General has faced considerable criticism from UN staff for failing to secure the UN compound in Baghdad, which was attacked on 19 August 2003. Lingering resistance from those Permanent Members of the UN Security Council who did not support the war may also be a contributing factor.

235. There can be no doubt that the absence of the United Nations has been a significant impediment to the country's post-conflict stabilistaion. The legitimacy and expertise that the UN is able to bring to bear is significant. Moreover, the UN's presence would also send a helpful signal to NGOs and foreign investors who are unwilling to establish offices in Iraq unless the UN does so. When we visited Iraq in December 2004, several interlocutors emphasised that there was no reason why the UN should not expand its presence in Iraq now. We were told that every demand the UN has put forward by way of security arrangements for their officials has been met by MNF-I. In MND (SE) space has been made available for the UN's offices, and security arrangements have been instituted to protect UN staff. In a recent interview with Al-Arabia TV, Iraq's interim President Ghazi al-Yawar said pointedly: "The lack of security is not a sufficient justification for the United Nations to stay away from Iraq".[242] Perhaps in response to this pressure, in the run-up to the 30 January elections, the UN boosted its numbers beyond the 59 international employees that had been posted to Iraq. The Secretary-General's spokesman said recently that the UN sent 'small liaison detachments' of four persons (military, security and support) to two locations outside Baghdad to assess and prepare appropriate and secure living and working conditions. Thereafter, "and depending on the circumstances," perhaps four or five personnel will be deployed to assist and work with local authorities and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs). We discussed the lack of UN involvement on the ground in Iraq with senior officials at the United Nations during our visit to New York in March 2005. We were told that the situation was under review. We strongly urge the United Nations to expand its presence in Iraq especially in the southern governorates, and engage actively in the reconstruction effort.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

236. At NATO's Summit in Istanbul on 28 June 2004, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to assist Iraq with the training of its security forces. A Training Implementation Mission was established on 30 July 2004. On 9 December 2004, the North Atlantic Council, NATO's decision-making body, decided to transform the embryonic NATO Training Implementation Mission into a full-fledged NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) to support the build-up of the Iraqi Security Forces in Iraq.

237. The NATO mission will proceed in a phased implementation building on NATO's current effort in Iraq.[243] Phase 1 deals with the assessment and planning required for the mission (now complete). Phase 2 (which commenced on 20 February 2005) is broken down into three distinct stages. Stage 1 will reinforce and expand NATO's current effort in training and mentoring the Iraqi MoD, Ministry of Interior, Joint Headquarters, National Joint Operations Centre, National Command Centre Joint Operations Centre and Iraqi Training Command. It will also undertake preparatory activities, including 'train the trainer' courses in the International Zone in Baghdad, to establish the Training, Education and Doctrine Centre (TEDC). Stage 2 (commencing in September 2005) will establish the TEDC at Al Rustamiyah in Baghdad to provide leadership and middle/senior management training for the ISF. Stage 3 will see the expansion of NTM-I training activities and has yet to be defined. Phase 3 involves the transfer of responsibility for training to the ISF.[244]

238. The welcome arrival of NATO broadens the Coalition's efforts and promises to bring countries, such as Germany and France, together in a project which is in the entire Euro-Atlantic community's interest. We are nevertheless concerned that militarily NATO's contribution will not be as effective as it could be. Its numbers are still limited. Approximately 90 NATO personnel are currently deployed.

239. There are also wider questions about NATO's effectiveness. NATO's record as an agent for defence reform is well-known not least through its contribution to the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe's military establishments following the end of the Cold War. It is clear that the ultimate prospect of NATO membership for the Central and East European Countries contributed to NATO's success in this area. In other words, it was arguably not the technical defence reform process alone, which expedited the transformation of these countries' military establishments. It was also the 'pull' of Euro-Atlantic integration. In Iraq, there is no such similar prospect. There is only the internal 'push' for reform.

240. There may also be a risk that countries currently contributing to the Coalition might 'switch' their contribtion to the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). Mr Howard was not concerned. He told us: "I do not think it is a major worry. If we are talking about switching training being done under a Coalition hat to being done under a NATO hat, I think we will be content with that".[245] General Houghton went even further saying that such a switch should possibly be encouraged:

246

241. We welcome the Government's support for NATO's technical assistance programmes in Iraq. We remain concerned by the slow manning of NATO's mission and the fact that the majority of assistance provided by NATO takes place outside Iraq. We urge the Government to lobby for an expansion of NATO's programmes in-theatre. We are also concerned that the countries contributing to MNF-I may be tempted to 'switch' their support to the NATO mission and thereby deprive the MNF-I of front-line capabilities before the Iraqi Security Forces are ready for their increased responsibilities. We also urge the Government to examine the scope for offering the prospect of Partnership-for-Peace-like arrangements to Iraq.

242. We also urge the Government and our NATO allies to give early consideration as to how NATO might be able to assist a democratic Iraq to play some role in a regional security arrangement.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

243. The EU has focused on providing humanitarian relief and financial support to the reconstruction process. In early 2003, the EU set aside €100 million for the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) to provide humanitarian aid to Iraq.

244. To date, the EU has provided assistance amounting to over €300 million from the Community budget to Iraq. This total includes the €100 million committed for humanitarian activities in 2003 and a further €3 million indicatively earmarked by ECHO for humanitarian efforts in 2004, as well as the €200 million pledged in Madrid for reconstruction in 2003-04 and an additional €2 million provided in 2003 from the Community mine action budget. The EU has also developed a three-phased approach to its assistance in 2005. It primarily concentrates on generating a 'political dialogue with the Provisional Government including an EU/Iraq Joint Declaration' and continued support to democratisation, and human rights. It also contributes to reconstruction efforts. Finally, Iraq is a beneficiary of the EU's Generalised System of Preferences, a system which waives barriers to trade.

245. General Hougthon told us that the EU was also tentatively exploring how to increase its non-financial contribution in Iraq[247] and on 21 February 2005, EU Foreign Ministers decided to deploy a so-called "Integrated Rule of Law Mission". This will provide training in the fields of management and criminal investigation to Iraqis, mainly from the judicial, police and prison sectors.

246. We welcome the increased involvement by the EU in the non-financial aspects of Iraq's reconstruction, including the deployment of a mission to train Iraqi judicial, police and prison personnel. We note, however, that this training is to take place primarily outside Iraq and we urge the Government to lobby for an expansion of the EU's programmes in-theatre as soon as possible.

240 Liaison Committee, 8 February 2005, HC 318-i, Q 3 (uncorrected evidence) Back

241 Q 602 Back

242 More staff bound for Iraq, Thalif Deen, IPS, 15 December 2004 Back

243 Q 589 Back

244 Ev 127 Back

245 Q 423 Back

246 Ibid Back

247 Qq 605-606 Back



© Parliamentary copyright 2005	Prepared 24 March 2005