Further memoranda from the Ministry of
Defence
Further information requested following the
evidence session on 2 February 2005.[2]
Q 337. The role of British forces in protecting
the transportation of ballot boxes and any other electoral security
measures taken following the 30 January elections?
The role of MNF-I forces in MND(SE) in election
security was to support the Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq (IECI) and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) deliver a safe
and secure election. Much of this role involved providing quick
response forces on stand-by to respond to security incidents.
In terms of usual framework patrolling, UK forces kept a lower
profile than usual on election day itself. In the event, election
day passed off without major security problems. There were a small
number of attacks on polling stations, to which MND(SE) forces
responded appropriately, but these did not have a significant
impact on polling. Protection of ballot papers was carried out
by ISF and personnel from a Private Security Company, contracted
by the US. MND(SE) forces remained on call to assist this activity.
Prior to the election, MND(SE) worked closely
with the IECI and the ISF in drawing up the plans for the election
and conducting rehearsals of the operation. In the event, those
plans worked well, and violence was minimal. Although MND(SE)
forces were available to assist with the guarding of polling stations
and protection of ballot material, this was not required.
Q 346. A break-down of the contribution of
other countries to the NATO Command in Iraq and the coalition
generally as well as the nature of NATO's evolving involvement
in Iraq. Included in this, the Committee would like to know about
the EU's involvement in Iraq.
COALITION CONTRIBUTION
US forces contribute 154,225 and there are forces
from some 27 nations on the ground. These are Italy (3116), Netherlands
(1368), Denmark (485), Lithuania (131), Czech Republic (102),
Romania (747), Japan (536), Bulgaria (495), Mongolia (130), Poland
(2500), Slovakia (105), Ukraine (1589), Albania (74), Kazakhstan
(29), Macedonia (34), Azerbaijan (154),Estonia (47), Latvia (117),
El Salvador (380), South Korea (3700), Australia (282), Armenia
(46), Norway retain 9 staff officers in Multinational Division
South East. (Figures as of 18 February 2005)
NATO
All 26 NATO countries are contributing to either
in or out-of-country ISF training, or contributing to the funding
of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.
The NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) was established
on 30 Jul 04 with the aim of training (both in and out of country)
and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). NATO efforts will
focus on training, and helping with equipment, and technical assistance.
Approximately 90 NATO personnel are currently in Iraq assisting
with the training of the ISF. The NTM-I will proceed in a phased
implementation building on NATO's current effort in Iraq.
Phase 1 deals with assessment and planning
required for the mission (now complete). Phase 2 (which
commenced on 20 February 2005) is broken down into three distinct
stages. Stage 1 will reinforce and expand NATO's current effort
in training and mentoring the Iraqi MOD, Ministry of Interior,
Joint Headquarters, National Joint Operations Centre, National
Command Centre Joint Operations Centre and Iraqi Training Command.
It will also undertake preparatory activities, including `train
the trainer' courses in the International Zone in Baghdad, to
establish the Training, Education and Doctrine Centre (TEDC).
Stage 2 (commencing in September 2005) will establish the TEDC
at Al Rustamiyah in Baghdad to provide leadership and middle/senior
management training for the ISF. Stage 3 will see the expansion
of NTM-I training activities and has yet to be defined. Phase
3 involves the transfer of responsibility for training to
the ISF.
A NATO Training and Equipment Coordination Group
(NTECG) is co-ordinating training offers as well of weapons, vehicles
and other equipment.
EU
The EU has made a clear commitment to help Iraq,
consistent with UNSCR 1546, with the political process, security
and reconstruction.
The UK has worked hard to ensure more EU help
for Iraq and to foster closer EU/Iraq co-operation. In June 2004,
the European Council agreed a medium term strategy for Iraq. This
is now bearing fruit. On 5 November the Council presented an EU
package of assistance to Prime Minster Allawi including commitment
to start negotiations on a new EU/Iraq political and trading relationship
including restoration of GSP, help with the January elections
(funding and technical support) and support for police training,
the rule of law and governance (EU humanitarian assistance to
Iraq continues). Three Commission elections experts played a valuable
role helping the UN with technical support for Iraq's successful
elections on 30 January.
On 21 February 2005, the General Affairs and
External Relations Council (GAERCEU Foreign Ministers plus
the Troika of Commission, Secretariat and Presidency) reaffirmed
EU intent to implement the 5 November assistance package and to
continue to work with the Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq and the UN on Iraq's constitutional process and the December
2005 elections by providing financial and technical support. The
Council also agreed to launch an integrated Rule of Law and Police
Training Mission for Iraq with offices in Baghdad and Brussels
and to open a (Commission) Delegation in Baghdad as soon as possible.
The Commission also committed to help Iraq with capacity building
in the trade and energy sectors, to implement GSP and begin negotiations
on a third country and trade and political framework. The EU also
agreed a new aid package of 200m euros for 2005. On 21 February
at GAERC, the Troika also agreed to visit Baghdad and meet the
Transitional Government when it is in place to discuss these areas
of co-operation and to sign a Joint Political Declaration (as
envisaged in the EU's strategy).
Q 363. The nature of suicide bombers in Iraq:
who they are, where they are being recruited from etc?
It is assessed that the majority of suicide
bombers in Iraq operate under the Zarqawi network. The majority
of these are `foreigners' ie non-Iraqi. Intelligence suggests
that the network recruits its suicide operators through those
volunteering for the Jihad and passing through the training camps.
The suicide bombers have come from a number of, mainly, middle-eastern
countries.
Q 381. Mr Howard mentioned that there are
individuals detained by the coalition because they represent a
threat to security (ie not because of an identifiable criminal
offence). What is the policy for transferring the responsibility
for physically detaining these individuals to the Iraqi authorities?
The MNF has powers to intern individuals where
they represent an imperative threat to security, in accordance
with UNSCR 1546 of 5 June 2004 and the letters from PM Allawi
and Colin Powell.
Individuals held by the UK have their cases
reviewed regularly by the UK Divisional Internment Review Committee.
The first review is within 48 hours of an individual's internment,
subsequent reviews are held every month. The Committee's advice
is passed to the GOC MND(SE) for decision on the individual's
continued internment.
When it is assessed that the individual no longer
represents an imperative threat to security they are either released
back into the area in which they were arrested or transferred
to the Iraqi Authorities for prosecution. Such transfers to Iraq
are considered in the light of our obligations to detainees under
the European Convention on Human Rights.
Q 384. The policy, legal basis and concrete
plans for transferring cases of detainees in British custody to
Iraqi authorities for criminal prosecution or to the United Kingdom
for criminal prosecution?
UK forces assist the Iraqi Police in maintaining
law and order. Under CPA Memorandum No 3 the UK, as part of the
MNF-I, has the authority to arrest individuals for suspected crimes
under Iraqi law. This only occurs when Iraqi Police are not present,
if they are, the Iraqi Police make the arrest. Criminal suspects
arrested by the UK are taken to an Iraqi Police Station as soon
as practically possible. Current practice is that it this must
occur within eight hours. Criminal suspects are never held at
the UK Divisional Temporary Detention Facility at Shaibah. The
UK has also signed an MOU with Iraq which sets out the authorities
and responsibilities in relation to criminal suspects of both
parties.
Q 386. A detailed break-down on the Iraqi
Security Forces in terms of numbers, percentages etc?
As of 14 February 2005, the Multinational Security
Transition Command (MNSTC-I) estimates the total number of trained
and equipped Iraqi Security Forces to be over 136,000. A detailed
breakdown is given below.
MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR FORCES
|
Component | Trained and Equipped
|
|
Iraqi Police Service | 56,900
|
Civil Intervention Force | 2,500
|
Special Police Commandos | 3,600
|
Department of Border Enforcement | 14,800
|
Other MOI forces | 1,100
|
|
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE FORCES
|
Component | Operational
|
|
Army | 11,600
|
National Guard | 37,500
|
Intervention Force | 6,700
|
Special Operations Force | 700
|
Air Force | 200
|
Iraqi Navy | 500
|
|
There are also around 74,000 in the Facilities Protection
Service, who have a very basic level of training, are the responsibility
of the Ministry of Interior, and are allocated across government
departments.
Further memorandum from the Ministry of Defence
Further information requested following the evidence session
on 9 February 2005.[3]
Q 553. The planned protective arrangements for the Iraqi
oil terminals?
Currently the Iraqi Ministry of Oil is responsible for oil
infrastructure security. This is mainly undertaken by private
security companies. The plan for the future is to centralise oil
infrastructure security under the Ministry of Interior, with the
Facilities Protection Service (FPS) taking the lead for security
provision.
The US are the lead for the protection of the oil terminals
in the northern Arabian Gulf. The Iraqi Naval Battalion is being
trained by the US, with the aspiration that they will take the
lead in the future. The plan is also that the Iraqi Navy will
patrol the area of the oil platforms. Protection of land-based
oil terminals would remain the lead of the FPS.
Obviously, any future plans for the protection of Iraqi oil
terminals will be a matter for the Iraqis.
Q 568. The ethnic breakdown of the members of the Iraqi
Security Forces?
This is a matter for the Iraqi Government and Security Forces.
The Coalition does not measure, or have oversight of the breakdown
of members of the ISF by ethnicity.
Q 628. The number of investigations of alleged abuse, which
have taken place or are under way?
At 7 February 2005 only five cases (involving 22 individuals)
which have been referred to the prosecuting authorities could
be categorised as cases involving allegations of deliberate abuse.
Three of these are with the Army Prosecuting Authority, the
fourth was directed for trial in Osnabruck, Germany, sentencing
was delivered on Friday 25 February 2005 . The fifth has also
been directed for trial as set out by the Attorney General on
5 February 2005 .
Q 631. Any changes the MoD may have made in any procedureseg
in training systems, supervisory regimesfor the handling
of prisoners as a result of alleged abuses of Iraqi civilians
at the hands of British soldiers in Iraq?
Our Armed Forces have done and continue to do an outstanding
job in Southern Iraq.
There have been a very small number of cases (five), referred
to the prosecuting authorities that involve allegations of deliberate
abuse and it would be quite wrong to conclude that the UK Armed
Forces have been involved in systematic human rights abuse.
The MoD considers a continuous process of determined professional
review in all areas to be essential. Following the completion
of the courts-martial in Osnabruck, Germany and in view of the
nature of that incident, the Chief of the General Staff has appointed
an experienced senior officer to assess what lessons the MoD may
need to learn. He will also track any subsequent prosecutions.
The findings will be published when no longer constrained by the
legal process.
The MoD sets high standards and demands that they are met.
Those who fail to meet these standards are and will be called
to account. This review reinforces our commitment to openness
and our desire to maintain the highest standards of conduct in
the Army.
What policies is the MoD pursuing in Iraq to ensure that
criminal prosecutions play a central role in the counter-insurgency
campaign?
HMG are following a number of strategies to develop Iraqi ability
to pursue criminal prosecutions.
The MoD and FCO have been training Iraqi Police Officers
in Investigative techniques, including offering technical training
courses in the Adnon Palace and at the Az Zubbayr Police Academy.
The UK Police Advisers team in the Ministry of the interior
in Baghdad have been championing criminal intelligence and forensics.
They have encouraged the Minister of the interior to make these
two priorities for 2005.
In Criminal Intelligence the following has been achieved:
The first 50 criminal intelligence operatives
have just started training in Jordan, under the supervision of
UK and Czech Republic Intelligence advisers
Equipment has arrived to set up criminal intelligence
offices throughout Iraq
The police team in MOI is helping to facilitate
the introduction of AFIS (Automatic Fingerprint Identification
System) which should be in country May 2005. Discussions are taking
place with Baghdad University on the establishment of DNA analysis
capacity for Iraq
The police team in MoI is advancing plans for
Justice Sector Integration meetings and working groups, together
with MoJ and Counsel of Judges
Developments in forensics include:
In MND(SE) a forensics laboratory is being established
and scenes of crime training and equipment provided
$250,000 (US funds) has just been obtained from
to meet the immediate equipment needs of the Forensics Department
HQ of the IPS in Baghdad
Criminal Investigation training at both Az Zubayr
in MND(SE) and Baghdad in the centre will help to advance the
investigative capabilities of the IPS
Plans are advancing to re-furbish and expand the
Baghdad HQ of the Forensics Department.
HMG also have a lawyer based in Basra advising members of
the Iraqi Criminal Justice System, and funded through GCPP.
February 2005
2
Ev 63-85 Back
3
Ev 102-121 Back
|