Memorandum from the Department for International
Development (DFID)
Further information requested following the
evidence session on 9 February 2005.[5]
Q 491. The process and procedures used by
DFID to contract (or use) Private Security Companies in PSOs.
Even if this is an FCO responsibility, the Committee is interested
to know the role played by DFID in the selection, funding etc
process
Since 1 July 2004 the FCO has been responsible
for the security of HMG civilian staff in Iraq, including the
management of associated contracts. DFID pays a proportional share
of the costs of these contracts. DFID maintains close and regular
contact with the FCO on Iraq security policy matters through our
offices in Baghdad, Basra and the UK. This includes regular liaison
over the administration of the security contracts, attendance
at the FCO's regular meetings with security providers, and general
briefings.
Prior to 1 July 2004 DFID was responsible for
ensuring the security of staff and consultants working in Iraq.
Following an open competition, Control Risks Group (CRG) was awarded
a contract to provide armed protection, individual bodyguards
and security advice to DFID employees in Iraq for six months from
July 2003. CRG's performance proved satisfactory and so we extended
this contract once in January 2004 and again in April 2004. The
final contract extension was until 30 June 2004.
DFID applies standard checks for all its contractors,
including Private Security Companies. These checks include ensuring
that companies have a sound track record and the necessary legal
and financial status to enable DFID to contract them. Our contracts
hold the organisations responsible for the outcomes that they
deliver and the manner in which they do so.
Q 532. What role did the Conflict Prevention
Pools play in funding Iraqi reconstruction? What were the benefits
from this system and what were its drawbacks?
The Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) is
a joint FCO, MoD and DFID mechanism for funding and managing the
UK's contribution towards violent conflict prevention and reduction.
Iraq became a beneficiary of the GCPP in May 2003. Projects are
considered by a UK-based joint FCO-MoD-DFID Steering Committee.
The FCO has overall management responsibility.
The GCPP has a £19 million allocation for
2004-05, and £13.5 million per year for 2005-06 and 2006-07.
The GCPP's Interim strategy was approved by
Ministers in September 2004. The overarching focus of the GCPP
is support to human rights, through three strategic objectives:
— Conflict prevention and resolution
through community engagement and institution building.
— Supporting a better working
relationship between different sectors of Iraqi society, as well
as between Iraq and its neighbours and development partners.
— Building the capacity of the
security sector, with special emphasis on the police and prisons.
Key projects funded by the GCPP include:
— Civic Education Elections Project
(£3 million).
— Human Rights training (£1
million).
— Support to the Ministry of Interior
(£3.3 million)—DFID managed.
— Support to Iraqi Media Network
(£1.37 million).
— Forensic Training (£0.5
million).
— Iraqi Special Tribunal training
(£1.3 million).
— Police Monitoring/Mentoring
in southern Iraq (£8 million).
— Prisons Mentoring southern Iraq
(£1.4 million).
— Weapons for Iraqi Security Forces
(£2.5 million).
A Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA), completed
in Dec 2004, was managed and co-funded by DFID and is now being
used to inform DFID and GCPP work in Iraq.
Benefits
— Strengthens working relationships
and understanding on Iraq between the three departments responsible
for the fund.
— Clear strategy focused on three
key conflict prevention objectives.
— Priority given to the key issue
of building the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces (Iraqi-isation),
particularly the Iraqi Police.
— Flexible administrative structure
which allows projects to be developed and approved quickly.
Drawbacks
— Lack of traditional implementing
partners in country has meant that HMG staff have had to be more
involved in running projects on the ground, absorbing time and
resources. This has also slowed down implementation and restricted
the range of activities being carried out.
— Volatile security situation
has inevitably led to delays with implementation. Content and
structure of agreed projects therefore have to be revised frequently
to take account of the local situation.
— Difficult to maintain strategic
focus in the face of massive need and competing priorities. Pressure
to support activities which do not fit easily with the three strategic
objectives.
Q 517. DFID's contribution to the Ministry
of defence's joint exercise in December 2004. Did any DFID staff
attend? What was the level of attendance?
Two staff from DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian
Affairs Department (CHAD) attended "Exercise Joint Venture"
in December 2004; one attended for the entire exercise and the
other for five days due to other civil military commitments.
The Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) currently
being developed is an inter-departmental Unit (DFID, FCO, MoD),
hosted by DFID, mandated to improve the UK's capacity for immediate
post conflict stabilisation. Ten PCRU personnel attended the exercise
at some point (typically six were in attendance on any given day),
including two PCRU staff from DFID.
What lessons were learned from that exercise?
Is DFID planning to attend future exercises?
1. CONFLICT AND
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT (CHAD)
Members of CHAD regularly attend such military
exercises, bringing a humanitarian and development perspective
to military planning. These exercises provide an opportunity to
create a better understanding of the mandates, limitations and
strengths of a range of other organisations involved in crisis
response. This enables these organisations to form close working
relationships which are of great benefit in real life operations.
Members of CHAD will continue to attend these exercises.
2. POST CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION UNIT
(PCRU)
The exercise was an important introduction for
the PCRU into the military planning cycle at the operational level.
It demonstrated that the PCRU could influence operations prior
to their execution, thus shaping the post conflict environment
for the better.
Lessons learnt from the exercise are influencing
the development of the Unit and PCRU members will attend the next
exercise to ensure that this process continues.
Additionally the PCRU intends to use the exercise
to identify methods and procedures within the military's planning
for the post conflict environment that encourage local participation
and the use of indigenous capacity.
What lessons have you identified for DFID's cooperation
with British forces in future Peace Support Operations?
— DFID and MoD need to maintain
good and close coordination from the outset.
— Co-location of DFID staff with
the military should be encouraged, particularly in the immediate
post-conflict phase.
— DFID and MoD need to do more
joint lobbying where there is a common interest eg encouraging
increased international engagement in reconstruction in southern
Iraq.
— DFID and MoD need to better
understand each other's goals, objectives and reconstruction approaches.
More systematic briefings required prior to staff being deployed
(DFID and MoD).
— Good joined-up working can help
speed up reconstruction. Working relations between MoD and DFID
officials in Iraq and London are currently good and close. Examples
include, regular meetings between DFID Basra and MND(SE) staff.
Two DFID consultants have been based at the airport since October
2004, assisting with the delivery of QIPs and CERPS. MND(SE) helps
out with DFID Basra transport needs, including helicopter transport
when feasible.
February 2005
5 Ev 86-101 Back
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